Tracey C German. European Security, Volume 16, Issue 3-4. 2007.
This essay examines growing European Union (EU) involvement in the South Caucasus, focusing on efforts to resolve the protracted conflicts in the regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. To date, the EU has occupied a back seat in conflict resolution efforts, supporting organisations such as the UN and OSCE, which have taken the lead role. However, over a decade of negotiations has produced few tangible results and the EU now has the opportunity to play a much greater role. This essay argues that the EU needs to become more involved: it has a much wider range of tools at its disposal with which to influence the various situations and it is in its own interest to ensure the stability of its neighbours.
Introduction
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union (EU) in January 2007 has pushed the borders of the organisation eastwards to the Black Sea and ever closer to the volatile South Caucasus, which is divided by a series of unresolved conflicts. There has been growing unrest in the region in recent months: two sets of presidential elections and referenda on independence in Georgia’s secessionist region of South Ossetia held in November 2006 were followed by a rally calling for independence in Abkhazia, as well as a similar referendum in the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. These events have brought renewed international attention to an oft-overlooked, but increasingly tense, region, where the threat of violent conflict is high, as the aforementioned territories seek to sever ties with the central authorities and achieve de jure independence.
Problems within the Caucasus can no longer be regarded as extraneous to the security of European states. Separatist disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have implications not only for stability in the Caucasus region, but also for Europe and the wider international community. These conflicts undermine regional stability, not just because of the threat of a renewal of fighting, but because they have created security vacuums that are outside of government control, providing ideal conditions for transnational security challenges such as terrorism, organised crime and illegal trafficking to flourish. They also undermine efforts to boost regional cooperation, hampering economic development and further destabilising the area.
One of the principal aims of the EU in the wake of the 2004 enlargement process has been to expand the zone of ‘prosperity, stability and security’ that its citizens enjoy out to its neighbours. This approach has developed from an understanding that the organisation cannot keep enlarging ad infinitum, that there is a need to find new ways of spreading security beyond its borders to ensure the long-term stability of the EU, together with the security of its citizens. Unstable peripheries, such as the South Caucasus, pose a threat because their instability could spill over into the security core and thus threaten the gains already accomplished there in terms of stable security. The EU’s failure in the Balkans during the 1990s was its largest and most public failure as an international actor and prompted the realisation that peace and stability on the periphery are crucial to the security of the Union. Consequently, the EU has taken steps towards boosting its involvement in conflict resolution efforts in the South Caucasus.
Recognition of the growing significance of the South Caucasus for European security is reflected in the EU’s gradual engagement with the region, particularly with regard to conflict resolution. In February 2001 the General Affairs and External Relations Council declared that the EU was willing to play a more active political role in the South Caucasus, stating that it would seek ways of lending its support ‘to prevent and resolve conflicts’ and assist in post-conflict rehabilitation. In addition to boosting its cooperation with the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), UN (United Nations) and Council of Europe, the Council conclusions affirmed the organisation’s intention of reinforcing bilateral and multilateral dialogue with the South Caucasus states, a position affirmed in the organisation’s 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which identified the region as an area in which it would be taking a ‘stronger and more active interest’. Deepening EU engagement with the three countries of the South Caucasus was demonstrated by the appointment of the Union’s Special Representative (EUSR) for the region in 2003 and the inclusion of the three states in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and in December 2005 Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, affirmed that the organisation was ready to play a greater role in efforts to resolve the long-running conflicts of the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, in spite of the numerous, well-intentioned declarations of interest, little of any substance with regards to conflict resolution has actually been achieved.
This essay examines growing EU involvement in the South Caucasus, focusing on efforts to resolve the protracted conflicts in the regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. To date, the EU has occupied a back seat in conflict resolution efforts, supporting organisations such as the UN and OSCE, which have taken the lead role. However, over a decade of negotiations has produced few tangible results and the EU now has the opportunity to play a much greater role. This essay argues that the EU needs to become more involved. It has a much wider range of tools at its disposal with which to influence the various situations and it is greatly in its own interest to ensure the stability of its neighbours.
Mechanisms for Deepening Engagement
The key strategic location of the South Caucasus, squeezed between the Black and Caspian Seas, Iran, Russia and Turkey, make it an area of increasing significance in the contemporary security environment, particularly given regional instability and the potential threat to western economic interests associated with its energy resources and transport infrastructure. The European Parliament’s 2004 Gahrton report recognised its growing importance, stating that ‘due to its geographical location, the South Caucasus can play an increased role in strengthening international security; whereas if it is instead left out of the evolving networks of interdependence and co-operation, the susceptibility of the South Caucasus states to the danger of export of instability from neighbouring regions would increase’.
Energy represents one of the most important aspects of the growing significance of the region and the EU has a keen self-interest in the development of stability and security in the Caucasus. The region is a vital transit route for oil and gas from the land-locked Caspian Sea to international markets, a role boosted with the commissioning of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and South Caucasus (SCP) export pipelines, essential elements in developing the hydrocarbon base in the Caspian basin. The Caspian is set to become an important source of oil and gas for EU member-states as they seek to diversify sources to secure supply and avoid over-reliance on any one country. By 2020 it is estimated that two-thirds of the EU’s energy requirements will be imported, with European gas consumption in particular set to grow dramatically over the coming decades as indigenous reserves decline. Consequently, EU member-states are going to become increasingly reliant on suppliers located on the organisation’s periphery, particularly to the East and South. Thus, there is a need to ensure reliable and stable export routes, and energy security has become a significant factor driving deepening engagement with the Caucasus region.
The need to stabilise the periphery was recognised in the 2003 ESS, which spoke of ‘preventative engagement’ and the ability to act ‘before countries around us deteriorate’, and has given rise to the development of the ENP, which is seen as one way of stabilising the periphery without enlarging further. The EU has included the South Caucasus in the ENP with the aim of advocating political and economic reform, supporting conflict prevention and resolution, and enhancing intra-regional cooperation. The inclusion of the three South Caucasus states is of considerable significance, recognising the importance of the region to an expanding EU. A resolution on the ENP issued by the European Parliament in January 2006 stressed the importance of peaceful development on the European continent and in neighbouring areas, stating that the EU must help settle conflicts in the Caucasus region. It described the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as an impediment to ‘the development of Armenia and Azerbaijan and regional cooperation as well as the effective implementation of the European neighbourhood policy’.
The ENP is viewed as a way to address the EU’s relations with its new neighbours and promote its shared values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, in the hope of promoting stability. The EU’s external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner has described it as the EU’s ‘newest foreign policy instrument’, aimed at using the organisation’s soft power to leverage reforms that will facilitate the expansion of the ‘zone of prosperity, stability and security’. Crucially, Ferrero-Waldner believes it is about encouraging reform from within—not imposing it from without. It is hoped that by encouraging stable democratic development within a country, the ENP can play a key role in conflict resolution. As Ferrero-Waldner affirms, ‘through promoting democracy and regional cooperation, boosting national reform programmes and improving the socio-economic prospects of the region, it can contribute to a more positive climate for conflict settlement’. The concept of encouraging reform within a country is rooted in the belief that the EU will have an adequate level of influence. However, one of the major drawbacks of the ENP is that, while it is based on the same positive conditionality that underpins enlargement and rewards progress in reforms with inducements such as an even deeper relationship with the EU, the greatest potential incentive—membership—is not on offer. This means that the organisation has much less influence, not just in terms of its relationships with ENP countries, but also in terms of conflict resolution.
Although the ENP does not offer potential membership of the EU, it does offer a ‘privileged relationship’ with the aim of sharing the Union’s stability and prosperity. The relationship is supposed to be mutually beneficial with the EU serving as a major source of investment and trade for the region, which has considerable potential for economic growth. The organisation has bilateral trade relations with each country in the South Caucasus, as opposed to the region as a whole and the level of trade with the three countries varies considerably, thereby impacting on the level of influence that the EU is able to exert. Azerbaijan is the EU’s largest trading partner in the region, whilst trade with Armenia is limited. Thus, trade leverage also varies considerably. In 2005, Azerbaijan had a positive trade balance with the EU with exports amounting to nearly €2.4bn, predominantly oil, gas and cotton, whilst imports from the EU totalled €1.5bn. Nevertheless, despite being the EU’s largest trading partner in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan’s share of total EU imports was only 0.2 per cent and 0.14 per cent of total exports. By contrast, Armenia accounted for only 0.04 per cent of total EU imports in 2005, with exports to the region amounting to €528m, predominantly transport materials and machinery, and imports of €416m. Georgia’s trade with the EU was similarly limited, with exports amounting to €264m, predominantly energy resources, and imports totalling €495m.
These figures raise the question of influence within the various relationships and where the balance lies. Azerbaijan’s strategic importance, in terms of energy security and geographical location, means that the EU is willing to turn a blind eye to the country’s painfully slow pace of liberal democratic reform. Without the lure of potential membership, the EU lacks any form of significant leverage by which it can seek to influence Azerbaijan’s behaviour, whilst conversely Azerbaijan appears to have considerable leverage in the form of its hydrocarbons. This contrasts strongly with the positions of Armenia and Georgia, which are keen to expand their limited trade links with the EU, but have little to offer in return, other than potential political support, giving the EU substantial potential for leverage within the ENP relationship.
In return for a ‘privileged’ relationship with the EU, which includes access to its internal market, ENP partners accept precise commitments to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, promote economic reforms, and cooperate on key foreign policy objectives, such as counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These commitments are set out in detailed Action Plans, which are agreed with individual countries and specify how that partner can achieve a closer relationship with the EU. These Action Plans establish the joint priorities that the EU and the states involved wish to tackle together over a five-year period. They cover a wide range of topics and issues, which vary according to the country, highlighting the EU’s recognition of the need for a differentiated approach to its relations with non-member states. This differentiated approach can be seen most clearly in the organisation’s trade relations with individual states.
Action plans were successfully negotiated with all three South Caucasus states during 2006. In a speech delivered at the Bled conference in Slovenia in August 2006, Ferrero-Waldner highlighted the importance of these Plans, stating that they were ‘designed to promote political reform and sustainable economic and social development’. The individual Action Plans, signed by the three South Caucasus states in November 2006, highlight the interests of each specific country involved and the emphasis it gives to certain issues. They also highlight the objectives of the EU with regard to democratic development and economic reforms, stating in the introduction to all three that the level of ambition in the relationship depends on ‘the degree of (…) commitment to common values as well as [the] capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities’. Conflict resolution receives reasonable attention in the Action Plans, although their focus is more towards economic and political transformation as opposed to the settlement of outstanding disputes.
Given that the ENP approach is firmly rooted in differentiation, it is interesting to note the varia tions in the Action Plans even in the introductions. The Azerbaijan Action Plan identifies specific ‘common values’ to which the two parties are committed, including ‘the respect of and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability and internationally recognised borders of each other’, clearly a reference to the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Precedence is given to this conflict throughout the Action Plan, particularly when compared with the Armenia Action Plan. Contributing to a ‘peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’ represents the first priority area in Azerbaijan’s Action Plan, but only the seventh in Armenia’s, reflecting Baku’s determination to seek a resolution and Yerevan’s tolerance of the status quo. The Georgian Action Plan notes the EU’s continuing ‘strong (…) commitment to support the settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts, drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, and in close consultation with the UN and OSCE’. It also stresses that the EU is ‘ready to consider ways to strengthen further its engagement’. Priority area six is identified as the promotion of a ‘peaceful resolution of internal conflicts’ and stresses the need for ‘constructive cooperation between interested actors in the region’.
The ENP and associated Action Plans are the rhetoric, providing a theoretical framework for the development of relations and EU engagement in the conflict resolution process. But what about the reality? What is actually happening on the ground and what concrete steps is the EU taking to resolve the three long-running conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh? To date, the EU has preferred to play an important, but background, role as a key financial donor, lending its support to negotiating mechanisms, but not directly participating in them.
Georgia
Georgia is the most pro-Western of the three South Caucasus states and the relationship between Tbilisi and the EU acquired considerable momentum after the 2003 Rose Revolution and President Mikhel Saakashvili’s accession to power. The South Caucasian state has sought to maintain an autonomous and pragmatic foreign policy that removes it from the Russian sphere of influence and the new leadership in Georgia has been inclined to seek the engagement of external actors such as the EU, the OSCE and the US, demonstrating its desire to integrate with the West. The country has ambitious aspirations of its relationship with the EU and what the organisation could and should be doing to support it. In particular, it was hopeful that the EU would provide it with greater political support in its strained relations with Russia and the resolution of its separatist disputes. There has been some progress. The Georgian Action Plan recognises Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders, and the EU has also pledged assistance in confidence building, together with economic assistance in the light of progress in the settlement process. Nevertheless, the EU is very aware of the need to maintain friendly links with Russia and is keen not to jeopardise its relationship with Moscow, thus it has tended to take a very pragmatic approach in its relations with Georgia.
Georgia’s secessionist regions represent one of the most serious threats to the security and stability of the multi-ethnic country, a threat exacerbated by Russian backing for the separatist territories. Following wars of independence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early 1990s, both have existed as de facto independent states for over a decade. Tension is very high in the conflict zones and the threat of renewed hostilities remains very real, as military skirmishes have threatened to escalate, jeopardising stability in the volatile Caucasus region. From the beginning of his presidency, Saakashvili has made the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity a priority, expressing his wish to consolidate the country by resolving the enduring conflicts with the two secessionist regions. Despite several years passing since he came to power in which to resolve the disputes, they remain locked in stalemate. The unresolved conflicts mean that nearly 20 per cent of Georgian territory is outside the control of the central authorities. They have led to the displacement of around 260,000 people and provide fertile ground for the smuggling of weapons, narcotics and people.
Saakashvili’s desire to consolidate Georgia’s territorial integrity has pushed the country towards renewed conflict with Russia, which not only has peacekeeping contingents in the two regions, but maintains two military bases elsewhere on Georgian territory and is accused of providing tacit support for the separatists. The hand of its powerful northern neighbour has been visible in all of Georgia’s separatist conflicts, as Moscow seeks to maintain political leverage over the South Caucasian state, and Tbilisi has frequently accused Russia of seeking to undermine Georgian sovereignty by supporting separatist provinces. The Georgian leader has cautioned that in the event of large-scale armed conflict erupting in South Ossetia it would be an issue of bilateral Georgian-Russian relations, not merely an internal conflict. Speaking in September 2005, Saakashvili declared that there is ‘no Ossetian problem in Georgia’, but ‘a problem in Georgian-Russian relations with respect to certain territories’. Georgia’s separatist conflicts are far more than domestic territorial disputes: they have both regional and international implications, and represent one of the principal obstacles to the development of Georgian-Russian relations.
Of all the conflicts in the South Caucasus, the EU is most involved in the search for a settlement of that between South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) and Tbilisi. South Ossetia is not seeking to become an independent state. Rather, it is calling for reunification with fellow Ossetians in the Russian republic of North Ossetia-Alania, across the international border between Georgia and Russia in the North Caucasus. Hence it is seeking to become a constituent part of the Russian Federation. Russian is the region’s official language, the Russian ruble is the official currency, and in February 2004 the South Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, proclaimed that 95 per cent of the republic’s population of approximately 100,000 had adopted Russian citizenship.
A fragile peace is kept in the region by a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) that comprises ‘national’ battalions from Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia-Alania and Russia (500 troops from each). A quadripartite negotiating body, the Joint Control Commission (JCC), also exists to foster political reconciliation between the various sides and includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, North Ossetia-Alania and the OSCE. The European Commission participates in economic-related issues that are discussed at the JCC. The EU has provided grants to the OSCE Mission in Georgia to finance the JCC, but Georgia is keen for the organisation to have greater involvement in the body, which it feels is very biased against its wishes because of its composition. The Georgian Action Plan went some way to reflecting this, with its recognition of the need for the JCC to intensify its work, but there is still much work to be done. A further step towards greater EU participation would be the inclusion of the EUSR at JCC meetings in an observatory capacity. His presence would perhaps satisfy Georgia’s wishes and, as he would only have observer status, may also be acceptable to South Ossetia and Russia.
The situation in Abkhazia is somewhat different to South Ossetia and the EU is far less involved in the search for a negotiated solution, lending its support to ongoing negotiations and providing financial assistance for rehabilitation. Abkhazia is seeking full independence, an ambition its leaders insist is non-negotiable and based on close political and economic integration with Russia. Following his election to power at the beginning of 2005, the Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh stated that integration with Russia was a priority for his government. He described Abkhazia as being tied to Russia ‘by an umbilical cord’ and said his administration would do ‘everything we can to make the laws and the acts of legislation of the republic of Abkhazia dovetail with those of the Russian Federation’. Similar to South Ossetia, a majority of the republic’s population has adopted Russian citizenship. In August 2005 the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed that over 80 per cent of Abkhazians hold Russian passports, a figure that Bagapsh confidently expects to rise, particularly following a declaration from Moscow that, as of 1 December 2005, it will no longer pay pensions to those Abkhazians who do not hold Russian passports.
The UN leads on mediation in the conflict with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), established to oversee the ceasefire, whilst the Secretary-General’s ‘Group of Friends’ (France, Germany, Russia, UK and US) is leading efforts to find a resolution within the framework of the so-called Geneva process. Little has been achieved in the years since the 1994 ceasefire agreement and, speaking during a UN General Assembly summit meeting in September 2005, Saakashvili called on the international organisation to do more than merely talk about solutions, declaring that it ‘must act to end the lawless and immoral annexation’ of Abkhazia.
Georgia is very keen for the EU to increase its presence in the country and is encouraging its participation in conflict resolution. It was hopeful that the EU would establish its own border monitoring mission to replace the now defunct OSCE mission on the border with Russia. However, internal wrangling between member-states over the issue of Russia meant that no agreement was reached. Instead of an EU border monitoring mission, the mandate of the EUSR was enlarged to include reporting on the border situation, together with the establishment of a support team to work with Georgian border guards in non-conflict areas, with the aim of strengthening Georgia’s border security.
At present, the largest contribution that the EU makes to conflict resolution efforts in Georgia is financial and it is the largest donor to the South Caucasus region. It has been financing the rehabilitation of the conflict zones in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 1997, providing assistance worth a total of €33m to the two areas over the period 1997-2005. At an OSCE donor conference, held in June 2006, the European Commission pledged a further €2m to assist in the economic rehabilitation of South Ossetia and indicated that it was ready to make a similar contribution in 2007, if projects were implemented satisfactorily and the situation on the ground was ‘favourable’. The organisation has also announced an aid package of €2 million for victims of the conflict in Abkhazia to assist in reconstruction, the provision of food, healthcare and job creation programmes. The EU’s latest project in Abkhazia is a programme worth €4m to support rehabilitation and reconstruction in the conflict zone, with the aim of creating conditions for the return of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and refugees.
However, these unresolved conflicts require more than financial aid from the EU. They also necessitate political action. So far, the organisation has preferred to provide assistance through economic rehabilitation, humanitarian aid and confidence building projects, tackling problems at the grass-roots level, as opposed to engaging in ongoing negotiations. Whilst its financial efforts to date are commendable, it also needs to engage politically in order for its conflict resolution efforts to become more effective. With no presence or voice in the key negotiating mechanisms for either the Abkhaz or South Ossetian dispute, the EU’s political influence remains extremely limited.
Nagorno-Karabakh
The unresolved dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the majority Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most worrying unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus region, both because it is between two sovereign states and because the three principal regional powers—Russia, Turkey and Iran—all have a differing stance towards the issue, raising fears that, if there was a renewal of fighting, it could rapidly become internationalised. The conflict dominates the foreign policies of Armenia and Azerbaijan, with each seeking allies to strengthen their position, reinforcing the fears that a renewed conflict could quickly acquire an international dimension. The Armenian and Azeri leaders have held discussions intermittently, but negotiations over the disputed territory have failed to produce any tangible result in recent years.
Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave within Azeri territory, mainly populated by ethnic Armenians. Violence erupted at the end of the Soviet era over demands for autonomy, violence which soon developed into full-blown civil war between Azerbaijan and the enclave, supported by Armenia. The war lasted from 1988 to 1994, resulting in a definitive defeat for Azeri government forces. At least 20,000 people were killed during the fighting and Azerbaijan lost as much as 20 per cent of its territory (Nagorno-Karabakh and the broad Lachin security corridor that connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia). The conflict area includes not only Nagorno-Karabakh, but also the total or partial territory of eight surrounding districts of Azerbaijan, occupied by the Armenians during the 1992-94 war. Although it is over a decade since a cease-fire agreement was signed, the two countries are still officially at war over the mountainous region. The ensuing stalemate has brought no real peace or stability and there are fears that the conflict could be easily reignited.
The ‘wall of money’ that Azerbaijan expects to receive over the coming years from its hydrocarbon reserves could significantly alter the current status quo, shifting the balance of power towards Baku and making it less inclined to seek a peaceful resolution. At the same time, Armenia is totally isolated from the oil windfall and perceives it to be a threat. There is a fear in Yerevan that, in the short term, oil-rich Azerbaijan will be in an economic and financial position to settle the conflict by force, whether Armenia likes it or not. This may fuel hawkishness on the Armenian side, in order to pre-empt the perceived risk of future Azeri aggression. As long as mediation efforts remain fruitless, the possibility of renewed hostilities cannot be discounted.
With all parties refusing to compromise, there has been an intensification of international efforts to resolve the long-running stand-off. The peace process was kick-started in 2004 and efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the frozen conflict were stepped up by several international and regional actors, including the OSCE Minsk Group, the UN and the Council of Europe, while Russia and the US have both issued statements on the conflict. Azerbaijan is keen for greater international involvement in the resolution of the conflict and has called for the EU, Council of Europe and UN to play a more active role, although Armenia prefers OSCE Minsk Group mediation.
There is a deep mistrust of external actors involved in mediation efforts, a suspicion that undermines attempts to resolve the dispute peacefully. The OSCE has been the main external actor engaged with the issue since the early 1990s, but its limitations have been recognised by Bernard Fassier, the French co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, who has made it clear that, while the group can help to facilitate negotiations, it cannot resolve the Karabakh conflict: ‘The Minsk Group is a political forum. It can put forward political ideas. However, it does not have financial resources to implement those ideas’. He has suggested that the EU should perhaps play a greater role, as ‘it has enough economic capacity’.
In spite of the danger posed by a renewal of this conflict, current EU involvement in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is very limited. It is not directly involved in conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms, choosing instead to support actively the ongoing political dialogue between the three parties, as well as the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group. This support is provided largely by the EUSR, whose mandate covers precisely this area. Financial assistance from the European Commission is perhaps the most direct form of support for conflict resolution. The EC has provided considerable financial aid for the rehabilitation of territories damaged during the conflict, including the rehabilitation of a railway line, electricity supplies, drinking water and irrigation and the reconstruction of schools. In the future, it is planned that such financial assistance will be used increasingly to reduce tensions from the conflict by supporting regional cooperation, post-conflict rehabilitation and linking assistance levels to progress in conflict resolution.
This financial support from the EU is a start, but more needs to be done to break the negotiating deadlock. The EU’s official position is that it would consider contributing to peacekeeping forces in the region, if there was agreement between the parties on the deployment of such forces, a highly unlikely prospect. The organisation’s determination to maintain a neutral position means that its policy towards the conflict is often incoherent and contradictory. This can be seen most clearly in the recently signed Action Plans prepared for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Plan supports the country’s territorial integrity, whilst the Armenia Plan supports the contradictory ‘principle of self-determination of peoples’. One key reason for the EU’s often incoherent stance towards this conflict is the position of its member-states, in particular France. The country’s appointment as a co-chair to the Minsk Group in 1997 angered Azerbaijan, who perceived it to be pro-Armenian, as France is home to a significant Armenian minority of approximately 400,000, the largest in Europe, which has an impact on both the country’s internal and external politics.
The international community, including the EU, needs to take preventative action and put more pressure on the parties involved to resolve the dispute peacefully in order to avert the threat of a complex emergency that would destabilise the entire region. Although the EU is represented within the Minsk Group by individual member-states, the EUSR needs a presence within the Group in order to represent the organisation’s position and give it a voice. A renewed conflict could spell disaster for the volatile South Caucasus: the resumption of large-scale conflict would herald a war of attrition, with the civilian population bearing the brunt of the fighting. Azerbaijan needs to be persuaded that it stands to lose far more than it would gain from any attempt to impose a military solution on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. There is no military solution to this latent conflict—it can only be solved by political means.
Conclusions and Outlook
The growing strategic significance of the Caucasus region within the contemporary security environment means that efforts to resolve the long-running conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh need to be stepped up by international and regional actors. Peaceful settlement of the three conflicts would boost stability in the region and strengthen regional security and cooperation. After years of stalemate, there is a need for greater international involvement, but there is a lack of resolve in the international community to sort out the problem partly because of a fear of setting a precedent and the need to balance the seemingly contradictory principles of territorial integrity and self-determination.
These separatist conflicts have implications not only for stability in the Caucasus region, but also for Europe and the wider international community. As the EU and NATO seek to expand their borders, it is becoming more important to focus on conflict resolution on the periphery, where the presence of weak or unstable states poses a threat to the stability of member states. Thus, resolution of these disputes has become more critical and the EU needs to use its not inconsiderable influence to play a more active role in the search for a negotiated settlement, rather than waiting for other actors to negotiate a solution.
As discussed above, current EU involvement in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus is limited to political support for existing negotiating mechanisms and financial assistance for rehabilitation within the conflict zones. If the organisation is truly committed to boosting stability in the South Caucasus, and avoiding a repeat of the 1990s Balkans experience, then it must take more substantive action. There have been numerous well-meaning statements and reports, but very little has actually been achieved and the organisation urgently needs to make the move from rhetoric to reality. This sentiment was echoed in a communication on the ENP from the European Commission in December 2006, which called on the EU to be more active in addressing frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus as they threaten to produce ‘major spillovers for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism’. It noted that the ENP has so far achieved little in terms of conflict resolution and that the EU needs to be more active and more present in regional and multilateral conflict resolution mechanisms, as well as in peace monitoring or peacekeeping efforts. In a highly critical statement, the communication declared that, if the ENP ‘cannot contribute to addressing conflicts in the region, it will have failed in one of its key purposes’.
The ENP and associated Action Plans are an attempt to promote a stable framework for political and economic reform within which violent conflict is seen as an unacceptable way to resolve political disputes and a hindrance to further development. The policy is based on laudable ideals, but it remains to be seen whether it will be any more effective than previous efforts to develop relationships with peripheral countries. Action Plans were only signed at the end of 2006 and more time needs to be allowed for a full assessment of their value. Pessimists will point to the lack of progress made by the three South Caucasus states in meeting their obligations under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), which preceded the ENP and represented the first attempt to cement the relationship with the EU. Although the principal focus of the PCAs was on trade and economic cooperation, the three countries did little to implement policies to promote conflict settlement, one of the key commitments. The EU’s lack of teeth is already becoming evident in terms of its relationship with Azerbaijan. The latter may have signed up to an Action Plan pledging democratic reform, but it is showing little sign of acting upon this, well aware that EU member-states are becoming increasingly reliant upon its ability to supply them with oil and gas, both as a producer and key transit country.
There are two key issues that need to be addressed if the EU is going to genuinely deepen its engagement in the South Caucasus. Firstly, can the organisation get more involved if it wants to? And, secondly, how much can it actually achieve in reality? With regards to the first issue, there are several obstacles to further EU involvement in the South Caucasus. The region comprises three independent states, which may or may not welcome the involvement of an external actor in their sovereign affairs. They are very different actors pursuing different objectives in the development of their strategic partnership. As an organisation comprised of various member-states that espouses ‘the shared ideals of democratic institutions, human rights, the protection of minorities and the rule of law’, the EU will obviously seek to promote these ideals, both in its internal and external relations. However, it is likely to face considerable difficulties in attempting to link these ‘values’ to reforms in countries that perhaps have a completely different value set and are more focused on developing their economies and raising the standard of living, rather than adhering to ‘European’ norms and values. The three South Caucasus states are sovereign entities that will seek to protect and further their own national interests, hence the divergence in the approaches of the two actors.
Whilst Georgia is keen to encourage the EU’s participation in the region, Armenia and Azerbaijan are slightly more wary, concerned about balancing their relations with the regional powers, particularly Russia. One of the worrying implications of the ENP and the EU’s deepening involvement in the South Caucasus, particularly within conflict resolution issues, is the potential for a wide gulf to open up between Russia and the EU, as Russia is involved in all conflicts in the region, to varying degrees. Russia’s role as a mediator must be fostered within the OSCE Minsk Group framework and as one of the principal regional actors. Moscow holds the key to the resolution of territorial disputes in the South Caucasus, both in terms of its relationship with the various parties and the mediating role it purports to play. Fundamental issues remain unresolved and the threat of renewed hostilities persists, as the separatist leaderships remain entrenched in intransigent positions, with little incentive to participate in negotiations while they have the security of Russian backing. Moscow has a very positive role to play as the major economic and military power, but it needs to move away from its traditional geopolitical view of the region towards a more cooperative and consensual approach.
The EU has its limitations as an organisation and perhaps greater involvement in the South Caucasus is a step too far. It has numerous other commitments both within its own borders and abroad. This raises the question as to whether it actually wants to become more involved in conflict resolution on its periphery and what it is capable of achieving. Perhaps it is more comfortable making rhetorical statements and awaiting settlement, rather than participating in negotiations and providing peacekeeping contingents. The costs of deepening engagement with the region may well far outweigh any benefits.
What could the EU do to boost its involvement in conflict resolution efforts in the South Caucasus? It needs to redouble its commitment to stability and democracy in countries in the region, as well as its involvement in the search for acceptable solutions to the long-running disputes. In addition to providing financial assistance for rehabilitation and confidence building, it should promote the negotiation process and advocate the necessity of compromise and consensus. Confidence must be restored and all sides need to express a willingness to compromise on key issues such as political autonomy and the rights of refugees. Thus, the organisation needs to further expand the mandate of the EUSR and take concrete steps towards enhancing the conflict prevention aspect of its presence in the region. There was some optimism for positive action in 2006, as the Austrian and Finnish presidencies made it clear that they intended to consider expanding the role of the EUSR, as well as supporting EU conflict resolution efforts, but little was actually achieved. In May 2006 the new EUSR for the region, Peter Semneby, underlined the EU’s ‘more active’ interest in resolving conflicts in the South Caucasus, stating that the organisation now has ‘unlike a few years ago, the military means to support settlements’. However, whilst it may have the means to support settlements, it does not appear to be in any hurry to employ them. The role of the EUSR, and consequently that of the EU, is undermined by the fact that it has no active presence at any of the negotiating mechanisms for the three conflicts (with the exception of the JCC in South Ossetia). The EU has more leverage than actors such as the OSCE. It is developing into a major international player and is a key trading partner for the South Caucasus countries, giving it considerable influence. It failed to act promptly and resolutely in the Balkans, but now has the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to act as an autonomous player that can strengthen security and stability in its own backyard. However, without a voice or visibility in key conflict settlement fora, the EU risks remaining a mere financial donor, as opposed to the important political actor that it aspires to be on the international stage.