Andrzej Szeptycki. The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs. Volume 20, Issue 1, 2011.
Colonialism has been traditionally defined as West European powers’ rule over overseas territories inhabited by other racial groups. “What is the distinctive feature of colonial expansion, seen as a quality of the Western civilization? In a nutshell, it is the striving to turn advantage, control and ascendancy over other societies into domination and imposition of supreme authority. A colony is a territory subordinated politically and economically, lying outside the colonizers’ own state and their own civilization.” Coming as an important part of such understanding of colonialism is the belief that its specific traits manifested themselves most fully towards the close of the “imperialist” stage of 19th-century capitalism.
That definition needs to be broadened. Colonialism should be described as a protracted rule over another racial/ethnic group, coupled with a policy of economic exploitation and forced acculturation. So understood, the notion of colonialism can be applied to Antiquity (Rome), white settlers’ colonies (Australia, Canada), or the expansion of some non-European powers (Japan). It also embraces internal colonization, i.e. the policy pursued towards smaller discriminated peoples in a given state. A classic example here is offered by Ireland, Scotland and Wales, which, although finding themselves in a different situation than other possessions of the British Crown (now and, to some extent, also in the past), have in many respects resembled the traditional colonies.
Increasingly more authors have been seeking to put the (post)colonial paradigm to use in interpreting the past and the present of the Soviet/Russian empire and states arising therefrom. Many publications on the colonial nature of the Soviet/Russian empire appeared prior to 1991, but this paradigm is also drawn upon today.
While no doubts are provoked by opinions about the colonial character of Central Asian countries (ethnic/religious differences, economies dominated by commodities and agriculture), some objections do appear when discussing Ukraine. It could be argued that the three East Slavic nations are derived from the same stem (Kyivan Rus), that they united voluntarily and in pursuit of common interest (Union of Pereyaslav, 1654), as propounded by Russian historians, and that the community of religion and linguistic similarity rule out any talk about colonization. The English may have treated Ireland as a colony, but in that case there were differences in terms of religion (Catholicism) and, theoretically, language. During the tsarist era the Russians must have indeed believed, or wanted to believe, that they constituted a unity with other East Slavic peoples. The Valuev Circular of 1863, claiming that “no separate Little Russian (Ukrainian) language ever existed, doesn’t exist, and couldn’t exist,” was not only a manifestation of political cynicism or concerns about raison d’état. In part, it must have also reflected a genuine belief of the tsarist Russia’s political elites of the time.
The situation changed diametrically after the Bolshevik revolution, when the new authorities-initially recognizing, and then backtracking on, the peoples’ right to self-determination-understood that they could not afford ignoring the nationality factor. As a result, a nominally federal Soviet Union was formed, including among its constituent parts the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
Bolshevik philosophy posited that the culture of individual republics (and smaller parts of the USSR) should be national in form and socialist in content, a concept that was not entirely foreign to West European colonizers. The colonial peoples were expected to internalize the superiority of colonists’ and their culture-that was a pillar of colonial dependency-but opinions were also expressed that part of these peoples’ traditions should be retained, after first being subjected to civilizing influences (e.g. by encouraging natives to record their oral traditions in writing, following the example of the enlightened Europeans).
Compared to the pre-1917 period, the position of the Ukrainian language indeed changed: during the 1920s and in the years immediately following Stalin’s death, the government pursued a relatively liberal cultural policy allowing leeway for the vernacular. Compared to the tsarist policy, that was a novel development, even if short-lived. Right in the 1930s, a drive towards Russification and the fight against national differences intensified, leading in the case of Ukraine to the tragedy of Holodomor (genocide by famine). The Soviet authorities greatly contributed to the formation of Ukraine as we know it, by delineating its borders, which they portrayed as historical and ethnicity-based (but which, in fact, were randomly defined, as best exemplified by the incorporation of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR).
In this context, one would be justified in asking the question of whether Ukraine can be described as a postcolonial state or, to be more precise, whether -and, if so, to what extent-the past dependency on Russia influences Ukraine’s present political, economic and social development and its relations with the Russian neighbor.
While no comprehensive model of the colonial state can be found in literature on the subject, we can identify the most important features of such a state by drawing on the theory and practice of (non-European) postcolonial states. In the proposed model, analysis should be extended to six areas and to the manifestations, specific to those areas, of the postcolonial state’s dependency on the former metropole: (i) the political system (complementary nature of the interests of postcolonial elites and metropole elites); (ii) the economy (dependence on metropole markets, investments and development aid); (iii) security and defense (importance of the metropole’s military commitment, vis-à-vis the postcolonial state’s internal and external weakness); (iv) society (people-to-people relations, especially migrations from the metropole to the {former} colony and vice versa); (v) culture (the role played by the metropole’s culture in the postcolonial state); and (vi) foreign policy (protection of the metropole’s sphere of influence and institutionalization of cooperation with former colonies). It is through the prism of these factors that the issues involved in Ukraine’s relationship with Russia should be examined.
Political System: Mimicry and Compradorship
Leaders of postcolonial countries, just as their elites and whole societies, tend to mimic the colonial powers and their traditions, which they perceive as the model and symbol of higher culture and good taste. This attitude reflects objective factors (lack of alternative examples) and subjective ones alike (respect for the metropole’s culture and institutions).
The next feature of postcolonial states’ ruling elites, after mimicry, is their comprador-class nature. The Portuguese term comprador means a local merchant in a colonial state, acting as an intermediary in trade between the local market and the metropole’s market. In Marxist terminology, it describes a representative of the merchant bourgeoisie, which owed its status to the intermediary role it played. Within the postcolonial school framework, the comprador bourgeoisie denotes a broader category: the elites enjoying a relatively high financial status, consuming imported luxury goods and identifying with the former metropole. The weak central authorities are dependent on them and actually act as their agents-often in accordance with the metropole’s interests and against the will of their own societies.
Of the independent Ukraine’s four presidents, policies that could be classed as pro-Russian were pursued by two (in one case, only for a certain period). The other two sought to consolidate the country’s independence of Russia, even though they, too, treated the latter in a special way. The second president of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) won the election calling for closer relations with Russia, much in the manner of Alaxandr Lukashenka. But once in office, he took a multi-pronged approach, seeking to develop and improve relations both with the West (quite successfully in his first term) and with Russia. The picture changed at the beginning of Kuchma’s second term in office, when his dwindling popularity and growing authoritarian proclivities weakened his position domestically and abroad. The president then opted for a rapprochement with Russia, which was ready to buttress the flagging regime. With Putin-Kuchma meetings held frequently and Russia asking low prices for gas suppliers, Ukraine’s cooperation with the West shrank and dependence on Russia grew. In September 2003, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed a treaty establishing a new integration structure, the Common Economic Space, and in July 2004 the provisions about Ukraine’s seeking NATO and European Union memberships were deleted from the country’s military doctrine. Viktor Yanukovych (2010-) also came out the winner of the presidential race promising improved relations with Russia, after an “Orange” period, and he indeed took many steps towards that goal after taking office. Under the Kharkiv agreements of April 2010, emblematic of that policy, the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s deployment in the Crimea was prolonged until at least 2042, in exchange for a limited-term and limited-extent reduction of Russian gas shipment prices. Pro-Russian sentiments could not be imputed to Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994), a signatory to the Belavezha Accords and a major opponent of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) idea. And yet he did hold close relations with President Boris Yeltsin and, in a way, feared Russia. The policies of Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) were on many occasions branded anti-Russian, but during the premiership of Yulia Tymoshenko he, too, vied for Russia’s favors, in the expectation that gas contracts on favorable terms would strengthen his image among the public.
A pro-Russian label can be assigned to the Party of Regions, which now governs Ukraine. It was created in the 1990s, representing the eastern part of the country (especially the Donbas region), which has traditionally looked more to Russia than to the West. Yanukovych is its most prominent representative; other pro-Russian figures include Mykola Azarov, the Ukrainian prime minister and an ethnic Russian, and Education Minister Dmitry Tabachnyk, known as a Russophile and critic of West Ukrainian tradition and culture. But it should be noted that within the Party of Regions there is a rivalry between its various factions, with the pro-Russian rhetoric only partly reflected in actual action. The Party of Regions has been adamant in opposing Ukraine’s membership of NATO, which is in line with Russian interests, but it does not rule out military cooperation with Western partners, including the United States, as evidenced by the country’s involvement in Iraq after 2003 or the Sea Breeze 2010 maneuvers along the Black Sea coast, held with the participation of U.S. troops. A pro-Russian stance is also taken by the Communist Party of Ukraine, once a major political force in the country and currently a minor partner in the ruling coalition. The party has always had a limited influence on Ukraine’s policy, whether in opposition or in government, but its relations with Russia merit attention: most significantly, when the party joined the coalition and thus made possible the formation of the second Yanukovych cabinet, the move was said to have been inspired by the Russian government.
Ukraine’s comprador class is best exemplified by the industrial-financial groups. The local oligarchs made their fortunes in the 1990s, largely in natural gas trading, and only in this century did they turn to production, drawing on the country’s strengths (steel industry). Kuchma’s policies were supported during his reign by the top three clans, based in Donetsk (Rinat Akhmetov), Dnepropetrovsk (Viktor Pinchuk) and Kyiv (Viktor Medvedchuk). After 2004, the picture diversified. Rinat Ahhmetov stayed in politics as a leader of the more pragmatic, business-oriented faction of the Party of Regions; Viktor Pinchuk leftpolitics for charity and lobbying, initiating, for example, the Yalta European Strategy (YES) forum, which seeks to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union; and the Kyiv circle lost some of its former weight. But new players have emerged, among them Dmytro Firtash, a co-owner of RosUkrEnergo, profiting from intermediation in gas trade with Russia, and Valeri Khroshkovski, a media mogul and the current head of the Ukrainian security services. While it would be wrong to describe the Ukrainian oligarchs as being unequivocally anti-Russian, their position in the political and economic system is precisely what sets Ukraine apart from Central Europe and draws the country closer to Russia.
Russia actively takes advantage of Ukraine’s dependency in the political field, by interfering in its internal situation. One example was provided by the developments leading to the Orange Revolution of 2004. The Constitution barred outgoing President Kuchma from running for re-election, and a decision was taken to repeat the Russian scenario of 1999 and 2000, when Boris Yeltsin anointed Vladimir Putin as his successor. Kuchma backed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as presidential candidate, and the latter also received unmistaken support from Russia, which, on the eve of the election, agreed to sign gas supply agreements offering short-term benefits to Ukraine. The election was rigged in favor of the ruling camp’s candidate, but public protests forced a repeat which brought victory to the leader of the opposition, Viktor Yushchenko. That was a major blow to Russia, which, however, got some consolation from Yanukovych’s win in a democratic election held in 2010.
There are four major reasons why the Ukrainian elites are inclined towards cooperation with Russia. They believe this is what voters expect from them, which is partly correct. They also hope that cooperation with Russia will produce tangible results, especially in the economic field (cheap natural gas supplies), both for Ukraine and for the compradors themselves. And finally, the Ukrainian elites view both countries’ close cooperation as something natural. They were born and grew up in Soviet times, when the republics were not separated by borders, when Russian served as the lingua franca, and when Moscow was a natural center of gravity. The best example is Kuchma himself- a “red dictator” of the late-stage USSR who until today prefers speaking Russian over Ukrainian.
Economy: Dependency and “Development Aid”
The economy of a postcolonial state was largely shaped in the period of European domination. Drawing on economic incentives and political and administrative means of coercion, the colonizers imposed on the colony an economic monoculture, usually based on agriculture or raw materials. That subordination was by no means broken with the coming of independence. For reasons which included the weakness of the postcolonial state, mediocrity of its elites and shortage of financing, a more or less conscious decision was made to go on with the dependency, which was producing temporary benefits. As a result, the hold of monoculture on the economy only grew stronger.
Industrial cooperation and investments, prodded by economic growth in both the metropole and the postcolonial state, have indeed been added to the picture, but that kind of cooperation only makes the dependency stronger. The weak postcolonial state has only limited influence on the activities of multinational corporations doing business locally. The economy ceases to be driven solely by agriculture and commodities, but the line of the country’s economic development is largely determined by foreign investors, with locally generated profits often transferred to the metropole. Consequently, the postcolonial state remains a periphery.
Coming as an important element of postcolonial economic dependency is development aid, linking the former colony with the metropole. Quite often it is connected with the requirement of accepting the donor country’s trade offer or technical assistance, making it a not entirely disinterested enterprise. And in many instances, development aid is not properly tapped, having been directed-in one form or another-towards the authorities or compradors linked to them.
The Soviet economy was highly centralized, inefficient and autarchic. As a result, strong economic ties developed between the Russian and Ukrainian republics. In 1988 more than 39% of Ukraine’s GDP was generated by shipments to other Soviet republics. Following the break-up of the USSR, those ties were largely retained, with the non-competitive post-Soviet economies finding it difficult to engage new partners outside the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
For a number of reasons, the Ukrainian economy’s strongest dependence on Russia is in the energy sector. To begin with, Ukraine’s economy is highly energy-intensive. A large proportion of fuels are imported, mostly from Russia or through Russian territory (from Central Asia). Out of the 47 billion sqm. of natural gas which Ukraine needed in 2009 (against 13.7 billion sqm. in Poland), imports accounted for 27.7 billion sqm. This is a legacy of the Soviet era, when, under central planning, there was no motivation for an economical use of the allocated means of production-which, incidentally, had a certain rationale: cheap energy provided an important factor behind the country’s modernization, initiated back in the 1920s. Energy-sector links are petrified by “pipeline geopolitics,” with gas/oil transport requiring a transmission network that is costly to build and operate. Russia has often taken advantage of that dependency in order to destabilize Ukraine’s internal situation, discredit the country internationally and snatch concessions. Such were, broadly, the scenarios of Russia-Ukraine gas crises in 2006 and 2009. As of the end of the preceding year, the two countries did not reach agreement on gas trading and transit after 1 January, which led to the discontinuation of gas shipments to Ukraine and their subsequent resumption, after negotiations.
There are three specific features of Ukraine-Russian relations in the field of energy (natural gas). First, Russian gas exports-priced for a long time at a fraction of rates required from EU countries-offered a hidden form of development aid. For example, in 2005 Germany and Poland paid some US$200 for a ton natural gas, whereas the price asked from Ukraine was US$50. Only under Yushchenko’s presidency was that price substantially raised.10 That has been an important instrument for Russia to influence Ukraine, remembering that high gas prices would painfully hit the inefficient Ukrainian companies. Second, the institutional arrangements in the gas sector have been highly non-transparent, especially as regards the go-betweens (such as the previously-mentioned RosUkrEnergo company) capable of deriving profits-at levels hardly explainable in economic terms-from participation in transactions conducted by Gazprom and its Ukraine counterpart, Naftogaz Ukrainy. Those arrangements, it could be surmised, helped to channel a part of the profits to politicians and oligarchs in
Russia and Ukraine. And third, Ukraine’s dependency on Russia is limited by the fact that most of Russian gas exports to the EU go through Ukrainian territory. Consequently, problems in Ukraine-Russia relations also affect European buyers, which to a certain extent narrows Russia’s room for maneuver. Russia is top of the list of Ukraine’s trading partners, with two-way exchanges reaching US$21.7 billion in 2009-but the combined figure for trade with all EU countries, at US$24.9 billion, is higher. Russia’s importance for Ukrainian trade stems from its deliveries of energy sources and also from the Russian market’s role for Ukrainian business. Ukraine sought in the past to have trade with Russia, or within the Commonwealth of Independent States, liberalized. Russia, for its part, opposed the move and sided with its own producers-but was ready to go along with the idea on condition that it would come as part of a broader integration project, transcending trade links. The bilateral trade relations are conflict-prone, and are further exacerbated by the fact that Russia is outside the World Trade Organization. In some cases, the conflicts are of a political character. At the turn of 2005 the Russian Federation introduced anti-dumping procedures in respect of pipes imported from Ukraine, and it banned imports of meat and dairy products from that country, citing sanitary considerations. That limited trade war was intended to weaken Ukraine’s new authorities and destabilize the situation on the eve of the March 2006 elections.
Russian investments in Ukraine do not play a significant role, although their share in foreign direct investment (FDI) is on the rise: from 4.6% and seventh place on the by-country list in early 2007 to 6.7% and fourth position in early 2010. But this data does not reflect investing via third countries, especially Cyprus (21.5% in early 2010). Russian investors seem to be guided primarily by economic motives: expectation of profits from investments in other post-Soviet countries, plans to increase presence there, the need for vertical integration of post-Soviet economic sectors (to complete the production cycle), etc. The energy sector is an exception: the Russians would like to control it in order to safeguard gas transit via Ukraine. While failing to take over the country’s gas system (although not for want of trying), they nevertheless managed to take over control of some of Ukraine’s refineries. As for the methods of investment expansion, they have been typically imperial.
The deeply asymmetric dependency between the economies of Russia and Ukraine is not, however, of a typical colonial character. This reflects the specific features of the Soviet Union’s economic development, such as central planning and forced industrialization. The USSR imposed on the empire’s individual provinces certain economic arrangements which complied with communist ideology, but not with the requirements of economic rationality or the interest of its peoples. But the typical pattern of the developed core vs. backward periphery did not emerge, because the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic was itself backward. Besides, the Soviet authorities sought the industrialization of the whole country, including through cheap energy. As a result, the former province, Ukraine, is today dependent on raw material imports from the former metropole, Russia-quite in contradiction of the predictions formulated by theoreticians of postcolonialism.
Society: Colonialists and Immigrants
The former colony and metropole are linked by strong social ties created, on the one hand, by immigrants (usually job seekers) coming from the postcolonial country to the former metropole and, on the other, by former colonialists, their descendants and new migrants from the metropole to the postcolonial country. Both these community types had been in place for long, but with the onset of globalization their importance increased, contributing to the development of a complex, hybrid identity of both the postcolonial state and the former metropole, and also to the emergence of related problems, including racism, xenophobia, alienation, etc.
According to the 2001 census, Russians account for 17.3% of Ukraine’s population, inhabiting mostly the Crimean Peninsula and the country’s eastern and southern regions. Their presence is a result of at least three factors: the migration of Soviet citizens to individual republics; the Soviet authorities’ intentional demographic policy seeking changes in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (development of large industrial centers in eastern Ukraine, a weakening of Ukrainian elements, e.g through Holodomor, etc.); and the incorporation of ethnically non-Ukrainian areas into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (particularly, the Crimea). The presence of the Russian minority in the country provides Russia with a convenient instrument of pressure, used to interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs, in defense of the-purportedly or actually-discriminated Russian diaspora. Another reason why Russia backs its compatriots abroad is that in return it expects to win their support.
The Russians living in Ukraine have relatively weak identity with contemporary Russia. The exception are those living in the Crimea, and it is precisely them that Russia attempted to use to weaken the Ukrainian state. In the 1990s a separatist movement was formed in the Crimea, seeking self-determination and incorporation into Russia. These aspirations were backed by part of the Russian political class, even though the authorities showed official restraint. Russia thus wanted to destabilize Ukraine, perhaps hoping for a repetition of the examples set in Abkhazia and Transnistria. But when in 1997 an agreement was reached on the split-up of the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimean Russians ceased to be of use to their country. That made possible the adoption of a new Constitution, recognizing Crimea’s autonomy within Ukraine (1998). The Crimean problem did not go away, though. In 2006, in a move against President Yushchenko, the peninsula’s inhabitants held protests which prevented the staging of military exercises-with the participation of U.S. troops. In 2008, after the war in Georgia, fears heightened that the Russians might use the same tactics in Ukraine (massive issuance of Russian passports to local ethnic Russians, followed by an intervention in defense of Russian citizens). Such an outcome seemed to be confirmed by the 2009 revision of the Russian defense act, which now allowed for the deployment of Russian troops in defense of the Russian Federation’s citizens abroad. Dual citizenship is barred under Ukrainian law, but it is very likely that segments of Ukraine’s citizens, especially in the Crimea, hold both Ukrainian and Russian citizenship.
The Russian-speaking population officially represents 29% of the total, reflecting the presence of a large Russian minority in the country, a long-term policy of Russification by the Soviet authorities and, in part, the contemporary influences exerted by Russian culture in Ukraine. The emergence of an independent Ukrainian state and the policies pursued by its authorities have contributed to a weakening of the position held by the Russian language. In 1991 the proportion of pupils schooled in the Ukrainian language stood at 45%, and it rose to 75.1% in 2003-2004. Some of these successes, however, are more apparent than real. Ukrainian is still seen by some inhabitants as the language of lower social strata. Speeches and official documents in Ukrainian are part of a public ritual, but in private many politicians and officials turn to using Russian. The significance of linguistic divisions rose in the middle of this century’s first decade. Viktor Yanukovych twice announced that he would seek to give to Russian the status of an official language in Ukraine-first, during his election campaign in 2004; then, already as prime minister, after the 2006 election-but those announcement have yet to be put into practice. Moves to strengthen the position of the Ukrainian language have frequently provoked protests from Russia, posing as a defender of not only Russians but also all Russian-speaking people, with the intention of winning their backing. A strong position of the Russian language translates into an important instrument for Russia to exert influence in a neighboring country, and also an impediment to the emergence of a modern nation-state, whose important feature is a linguistic community. And finally, the recognition of a dual-language Ukraine would move the country away from the West-by restricting opportunities for English teaching at schools (teaching three languages well would be a real challenge)—and would thus strengthen Ukraine’s dependence on Russia.
Little wonder, then, that the people of Ukraine regard relations with Russia as an important foreign policy element, while noticing an asymmetric nature of bilateral relations and Ukraine’s weak position vis-à-vis Russia. This approach can be seen in nearly all regions of the country-even though the pro-Russian sympathizers are perceptibly stronger in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine, whose links to Russia have been much closer compared to the western and central regions. These regional divisions benefit Russia, which tries to turn to its advantage the pro-Russian sentiments in the southern and eastern regions and which occasionally backs decentralist tendencies in the country—thus seeking to weaken the central authorities.
It can, therefore, be concluded that, just as expected by the postcolonial school, Ukrainian society is of a hybrid character. And the divisions between individual ethnic and linguistic groups are fluid. According to findings of a 1990s study, 55.9% of respondents considered themselves to be Ukrainians, 10.8% to be Russians, and 26.7% to be both Ukrainians and Russians. Asked about the preferred language (but not necessarily the mother tongue), 41% pointed to Ukrainian and 44% to Russian. Actually, a large proportion of Ukrainian citizens speak sourjik, or a mix of both languages, which resembles pidgin languages used in relations between colonialists and the subjugated peoples. Some authors see a parallel between Ukraine and Ireland. In both countries colonization was uneven, which led to diversified national identities in individual regions, with the processes of Russification (Anglicization) hitting primarily the most industrialized regions, i.e. those connected most closely with the metropole. This makes Donbas the Ukrainian equivalent of Ulster.
In the social sphere Ukraine’s ties with the former metropole are asymmetric, with a greater role played by representatives of the imperial nation on Ukrainian territory than by Ukrainians in Russia. This reflects the fact that the Russian expansion, at least in Ukraine, was in the nature of settler-driven colonialism. Still, Ukrainians are present in Russia-even if not posing such problems as those associated with the presence of inhabitants of the Caucasus or Central Asia. Just as Russians were settling down in Ukraine during the Soviet times, so were Ukrainians moving to the Russian Federal S.S.R. There were 2.9 million Ukrainians in Russia in 1989, with the figure dropping to 2 million in 2002. Russia is among the most popular destinations for Ukrainian economic migrants: an estimated 1-2 million of them work in Russia at present. The presence of some 2-4 million Ukrainians in Russia provides arguments for the claim about both people’s close relations, and is conducive to the pro-Russian current in Ukrainian politics. Besides, the Ukrainians working in Russia (and the families in Ukraine they support) may provide the Russian authorities with a useful instrument of pressure on the Ukrainian partner. Should the relations with Ukraine deteriorate, Russia might take steps towards reducing Ukrainian employment, make it more difficult for them to settle in Moscow and other big cities, or even impose entry visas.
Culture: Creolization and Humiliation
Closely connected with society, culture is perhaps that area where-in the postcolonial studies framework-the ties between the former colony and the metropole are the most pronounced, and where decolonization is the most difficult to effect. The elites, just as the whole society, imitate the former colonizers’ culture, seen as dominant, and absorb their traditions, customs and modes of behavior-in a process known as Creolization, or the emergence of a new hybrid culture with mixed indigenous and colonial elements. It manifests itself, for example, in language; other fields with an imprint of colonialism include history (the domination of Eurocentric historical narrative), law (with frequently unsuccessful adaptations of the colonizers’ law) and mass culture (e.g. pop music blending together indigenous and Western styles). In what emerges as a strong component of postcolonial dependency, respect for the colonial power’s culture is accompanied by contempt, or ignorance, of one’s own indigenous traditions: the colonized perceive themselves through the stereotypes of the colonizers, making constant comparisons with them and seeking to emulate them. The mimicry of colonial culture usually fails to bring the expected results, tending to end up in mockery.
The Ukrainians have no single, widely approved vision of history: with some simplification, there is a rivalry between the national and the post-Soviet/Russian historical narratives. Disputes are about the past (e.g. whether Bohdan Khmelnytsky, by signing the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav, was a traitor or co-founder of both nations’ brotherly union; or how to assess Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who fought against Russia, alongside the Swedes) and also about the present (was the Holodomor of 1932-1933 just a tragedy of Ukrainian peasants, or an intentional action to weaken the Ukrainian nation).
One of the most controversial chapters in Ukrainian history is the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which in the 1940s fought against Poles, the Soviet authorities and-to a more limited extent-against the Germans. Its members are seen in western Ukraine as heroes, and in the east of the country as criminals, German collaborators and Nazis. These disputes are by no means purely academic, and they constitute an important element of Ukrainian politics. Yushchenko conducted a fairly consistent policy of building a national identity based on history; the centerpiece of this policy was the Holodomor, provoking numerous quarrels with Russia. And as a lame-duck president after a lost election, he conferred the Hero of Ukraine title on the leader of Ukrainian nationalists, Stepan Bandera. Yanukovych promised that, after taking office, he would rescind that decision, and subsequently the title was taken away from Bandera by a court verdict.
Russian and Russian-speaking artists are highly popular in Ukraine, and the country is a noticeable market for Russian publishers. The titles brought out in the Ukrainian language are largely Ukrainian and foreign classics, school textbooks and children’s literature. Those available in Russian are popular literature titles, reaching much larger readership. Russian-language books are often imported from Russia, whose publishers, benefiting from the economies of scale, have a competitive advantage over the Ukrainian counterparts. According to findings of a study conducted in the middle of the 2000s, 60% of the books purchased by the Ukrainian population were in Russian, and 38% in Ukrainian. A strong position is also enjoyed by Russian and Russian-language media (especially electronic media), which provide an important channel of communication between the Russian authorities and Ukrainian society. Most official websites are bilingual. Overall, the Russian language takes the upper hand in the cyber space, with seven Ukrainian-language sites for each ten Russian-language sites. The strong position of Russian and Russian-language artists, writers, media and publishers is a major trump for Russia. First, it keeps the Russian language popular in Ukraine and helps to promote it in regions with a traditional dominance of the Ukrainian language. Second, it confirms the claim about “brotherly” relations linking both peoples. And third, it helps to promote in Ukraine the content which complies with Russian interests. The Russian media’s information policy is among the important factors behind Ukrainian society’s opposition to NATO accession.
And finally, a major conduit for influencing Ukraine is provided by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), which is part of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is among Ukraine’s main religious denominations, with followers representing 15-20% of the Ukrainian populace. Pursuing a dexterous policy, the Church retains a strong position in Ukraine. Its adherents are most numerous in the south and east of Ukraine, but advances have also been made in the western part. Instrumental in this process has been the official designation as “Ukrainian Orthodox Church,” concealing the subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. The UOC (MP) has 9,500 priests (against 3,000 at the competitor, the Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchate) and 179 monasteries (against the UOC-KP’s 45). This vigorous activity is probably rendered possible by support from clergymen from Russia. The position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patrarchate) is bolstered by the fact that it is the only Orthodox Church with canonical status, which means it is recognized by the whole Orthodox community globally. The other “Orthodox” communities (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, and the less numerous Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church), which seek separation from the Russian Orthodox Church, are non-canonical. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) opposes creating a national (autocephalous) church in Ukraine-along the lines of churches in, for instance, Greece or Bulgaria-citing the links between the three Eastern Slavic peoples and the supranational character of the Russian Orthodox Church. This position is in line with the interests of the Russian state, seeking to keep religious ties with Ukraine. And actually the role of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) in Ukraine also has a political dimension. Just as the Russian Orthodox Church has close ties to the Russian government, so the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) maintains good contacts with Ukraine’s pro-Russian parties (once with the Communist Party of Ukraine, and now mainly with the Party of Regions) and it acts as an advocate of Russian interests in Ukraine. That found reflection in the criticism of Viktor Yushchenko and support for his opponent during the 2004 election, and in the opposition voiced to Ukraine’s membership of NATO.
These examples clearly demonstrate that Ukrainian culture is of a hybrid nature, being considerably influenced by Russia. As with the other fields, this reflects the longstanding incorporation into the Russian/Soviet empire, the presence of a large Russian and Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine, and finally the intentional policies of the Russian Federation.
Security and Defense: Artificial Borders, Foreign Bases
The postcolonial state is weak internally; this situation is due to an unstable, often undemocratic, regime conflicted with the people (or with the comprador elites); a weak society, deprived of identity; an inefficient economy; etc. It is also weak internationally, compelled to defend the artificially drawn colonial borders, now disputed by neighbors, and wishing to retain control of the natural resources which are eyed by powerful multinational companies. In these circumstances, military aid from the former colonial power is very much in demand, for reasons which are military, political and prestige-related. The metropole’s activities in the military sphere may include direct use of force (armed intervention), troops’ presence (bases), cooperation in strictly military matters and in the industrial-military field. Military measures need not take the form of direct use of force: in peacetime, they may be symbolic (“gunboat diplomacy”) or indirect (guerrilla, terrorism).
Ukraine, having gained independence, took over control of most of the Soviet Army units stationed on its territory. In the 1994-1996 period, the question of post-Soviet nuclear weapons found a definite solution: under an agreement involving the United States, Russia and Ukraine, they were moved to the Russian Federation. At present there are three major security-related problems in relations between the two countries.
Ukraine has failed to assume control of the post-Soviet Black Sea Fleet after 1991, which led to acrimonious disputes with Russia. In 1997 a decision was reached to split up the Fleet, with the Russian forces authorized to station in Ukraine for twenty years, i.e. until 2017. Yushchenko’s efforts to withdraw the Fleet from Ukraine did not solve the problem. His successor agreed in 2010 to the Black Sea Fleet’s deployment in the Crimea until at least 2042, with an option to prolong that period for another five years. Russia hopes to be able to strengthen its military presence in Ukraine-perhaps also outside the Crimean Peninsula. The Fleet has a combined military personnel of some 13,000, and its combat value is assessed as middling. The presence of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea is a major asset for Russia, while for Ukraine it poses a nagging problem (or may pose once the authorities in Ukraine change or relations with Russia deteriorate), due to a number of factors. The Fleet and the Russian secret services (which resumed Crimea operations from 2010, by consent of the Ukrainian authorities) may extend support to the Crimean separatists, back organizations which lobby for closer ties with Russia and against Euro-Atlantic integration (and which are “non-governmental” only in name), or conduct the passport-issuing campaign among the local Russians (to whom the Fleet’s presence has a symbolic value, nourishing the belief in a permanent nature of Crimea-Russia ties). In international relations, on the political level, the Black Sea Fleet is supposed to underscore that Ukraine belongs in the Russian sphere of influence. The Fleet could also play an important role militarily should Ukraine-Russia relations deteriorate, as was the case with Russia-Georgia relations. It should also be noted that the Ukrainian presence of the Black Sea Fleet may pose a considerable impediment in the event Ukraine resumes its NATO aspirations. And finally, at the regional level, the Fleet strengthens Russia’s hand in the Black Sea basin, which is not without importance in the context of rivalry in the region with Western states, or the tough relations with Georgia.
The Ukraine-Russia ties in the armaments sector are of a different kind. Ukrainian producers used to account for 17% of the Soviet Union’s total arms output, giving employment to 2.7 million workers.26 But the industry, designed to supply the needs of the Soviet Army, was dependant on suppliers in other Soviet republics. After the disintegration of the USSR it could not meet on its own the needs of the Ukrainian Army—and this inability has not changed until today. Simultaneously, some kinds of weapons were manufactured in excessive quantities. In these circumstances, export production involving cooperation with Russia proved to be the best solution. In the early years of the 21st century, some 60% of the Ukrainian arms output went to Russia. The Ukraine arms industry depended on Russia for some 70-80% of supplies, and Russia depended on other CIS states (primarily Ukraine) for 50-60% of supplies. As of 2001, both countries were tied by some 40 agreements on armaments cooperation, which was especially vigorous in the aircraft and missile industry. This cooperation has a certain economic rationale-specialization and access to the partner’s market helps to bring down costs and boost profits-but, on the other hand, it hampers the development of Ukrainian arms companies (which otherwise could compete against the Russian partners), positioning them in sub-contractor roles. On the political plane, the dependency on Russia has adverse consequences: the arms-industry cooperation with that country restricts Ukraine’s room for collaboration with Western states and contribution to European projects (unless these are projects involving Russia); it also poses an obstacle to weapons imports from other countries and to adjustment to NATO standards in the armaments field. And there is the important question of certainty of Russian supplies should both countries enter into a conflict.
In the past, a major issue in Ukraine-Russia relations was the shape of boundaries of the independent Ukrainian state. It was only in a 1997 treaty that the border between the two countries was confirmed, even though its detailed delineation will not be completed until 2011. Probably the biggest challenge for Ukraine at present is the neighborhood of Transnistria (Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic), which remains unrecognized by the international community but is backed by Russia. The existence of that unrecognized entity, a center for cross-border crime, arms trading, smuggling, etc., may act towards destabilizing the situation in the region and, consequently, hampering a shift towards Western structures. The unregulated border between Ukraine and Moldova (or, more precisely, between Ukraine and Transnistria) may be used as an argument against visa regime liberalization or Ukraine’s hypothetical accession to NATO. Unlike the breakaway provinces in Georgia, Transnistria does not border on Russia and as such could not function without tacit support from Ukraine, which backs the status quo against its own medium- and long-term interests in the name of good relations with the Russian neighbor. President Yushchenko’s efforts towards resolving the Transnistria problem failed to produce definite arrangements, but one consequence was the establishment of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). Ukraine now seems to back Russia’s policy towards Transnistria, and especially the Russian military presence in the region in the peace-keeping capacity.
The Russia-Ukraine relations in the sphere of security and defense reflect a considerable, largely asymmetric dependency rooted in the Soviet era. Emblematic of this dependency is the deployment in Ukraine of the Black Sea Fleet, whose presence resembles the operation of West European military bases in former colonies. Both countries are engaged in arms industry cooperation, which, however, unlike in many other cases, is not confined to shipments of military supplies to the former colony. The Transnistria problem is peculiar as Ukraine not only feels the consequences of its Russian neighbor’s policy, but also makes its own contribution to that policy.
Foreign Policy: Exclusive Sphere of Influence
The postcolonial state is linked with the former metropole through an array of formal and informal ties. But that is not enough. The metropole seeks to institutionalize-especially on the multilateral level-if not domination, then its special position and specific relations with the former colonies. Having a formalized sphere of influence will confirm its power status and make it harder for other powers to expand into its former colony.
Since the break-up of the USSR, Russia has sought to reintegrate the post-Soviet area, or at least its part, by means of diverse initiatives of both political-military and economic character. This policy has brought only limited results with regard to Ukraine, an open opponent of reintegration of the former Soviet Union. One of the founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991), Ukraine treated that organization only as an instrument to dismantle the USSR. It showed restraint towards most Russian initiatives to tighten up cooperation within the CIS, whether on the political or commercial- economic level, fearing that a more stronger CIS would augment its dependency on Russia (which that country, without a doubt, had been seeking) and also render cooperation with the Europe Union more difficult. Consequently, Ukraine did not ratify the CIS charter, and it joined the CIS Economic Union only as an associated member (1993). And yet, despite distancing itself from the CIS, Ukraine did not leave it-for at least three reasons. First, while staying within the organization it can exert greater influence on it, even if in practice this means a negative influence. Second, the pro-Russian part of Ukrainian political elites want a full-fledged membership in the Commonwealth. And third, prior to the entry into force of the Ukraine-Russia treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership (April 1999), the agreement establishing the CIS was the only joint document recognizing the territorial integrity of Ukraine and inviolability of its borders.
In September 2003, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan announced the creation of a new integration structure, the Common Economic Space. Ukraine’s access reflected a deterioration in its relations with European states and a shift towards Russia taking place early in the 2000s. But Ukraine and Russia had different visions of what the Common Economic Space would be in the future. Russia wanted it to assume features of a customs union with elements of an economic union. That was opposed by Ukraine, whether prior to the Orange Revolution or afterwards, because an integration model going beyond the free trade zone would impede deeper cooperation with the EU, in addition to requiring common supranational bodies, which Russia would dominate. This position did not change after Yanukovych’s victory. Ukraine stays outside the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and neither has it joined the customs union established in 2009-2010 by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as this would prevent the country from even partially integrating with the European Union, e.g. within a deep free trade area, currently negotiated.
The prospect of Ukraine’s closer integration with Western structures is not to the liking of Russian authorities, which seem to consent only on condition of a simultaneous development of Russia’s relations with those organizations. Officially, the thrust is against Ukraine’s potential membership of NATO, but in practice Russia is also angry at the development of Ukraine’s cooperation with the European Union. Russia perceives the Atlantic Alliance as a hostile bloc and opposes accession by post-Soviet states. Its main argument against Ukraine’s entry in NATO, and one that is also taken up by opponents of the move within Ukraine and in the West, is the attitude of Ukrainian society, with 60% of Ukrainians consistently opposed to NATO accession. This attitude is a relic of the Soviet past, and also a result of skilful propaganda exercised in recent years by the media, both Russian and domestic (linked to the authorities). NATO’s image has also been tarnished by the war against Yugoslavia (1999) and the intervention in Iraq (2003), even though that was not an operation of the Alliance. During the Yushchenko presidency, an active campaign was carried out against NATO. Public protests in the Crimea in May 2006 prevented U.S. troops from participation in the Sea Breeze maneuvers, and a month later the Crimean Supreme Council proposed to declare the peninsula a “NATO-free territory.” NATO accession is also opposed by President Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. For this reason, in September 2006, Ukraine suspended its efforts to get the Membership Action Plan (MAP) status with NATO, and in July 2010 it opted for a non-bloc status, which excludes membership of the Alliance (and also of the Collective Security Treaty Organization).
Officially, Russia is not against Ukraine’s cooperation with the European Union, both because of the weight of its own relations with the EU and because the prospect of Ukraine’s accession is distant and uncertain. But there can be no doubt that a tightening up of Ukraine-EU relations would generate deep changes in Ukraine, and in practice rule out the country’s participation in the integration of the post-Soviet area. Towards the close of the Kuchma term, a great deal of publicity was given in Ukraine to the motto “Towards Europe with Russia,” which in practice threw away the chances of Ukraine’s full integration with the EU (accession to the EU is not a goal for Russia). At present, there are a number of elements which merit attention. One is Russia’s distrust (at least initially) towards the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative targeting Ukraine and five other post-Soviet republics. Another is the visa question, where neither Russia nor its allies among EU member states would like Ukraine to outpace the Russian Federation on the path towards visa regime liberalization and, finally, its elimination. Thirdly, in the energy field, Russia has disapproved of the EU’s plans to engage in the modernization of Ukraine’s natural gas sector (central for each party, given that Ukraine is a transit country for Russian gas supplies to Europe), and has opted for trilateral cooperation in the field. And finally, there is the perception of Ukraine and Russia by Western states, with Ukraine seen in Western Europe as part of the Russian empire. Its history has provoked little interest among specialists and its independence aspirations were treated with skepticism. Until 2004, Ukraine was regarded as being dependent on Russia politically, culturally and in the energy field, as a country incapable of developing its own concept of relations with the West. According to that thinking, the West must not ignore Russia when dealing with Ukraine. Similarly as Belarus and Moldova, Ukraine was not listed among potential candidates for EU and NATO membership. That perception of the country and of relations within the triangle of Russia, Ukraine and the West has partly changed since the Orange Revolution. Ukraine is no longer seen exclusively as part of the Russian sphere of influence, even if it has yet to receive concrete declarations on EU membership. The Russian government has sought to discredit the country internationally, claiming that its independence was premature and that it would either reintegrate with Russia or break up. One of Russia’s goals during the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine was to blemish the country’s reputation in the West. This is probably among the reasons why the Russian authorities backed a candidate with a criminal record. And in the course of the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, Russia sought to put the blame on its southern neighbor, especially for the disruption of gas supplies to European partners. In 2011, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be concluded that Russia has at least partially succeeded in attaining its goals. Because of the absence of reforms and the post-2004 chaos (which, incidentally, was instigated by Russia), Ukraine largely dissipated the capital it had accumulated during the Orange Revolution. Yanukovych’s victory in 2010, his controversial internal policies and a pro-Russian foreign policy only put a crowning touch on the process.
Ukraine is certainly not among Russia’s closest partners in the post-Soviet area. And it seems to be unwilling to be part of Russia’s exclusive zone of influence. But at the practical level, the ongoing trends in the evolution of the international order act towards strengthening Ukraine’s dependency on Russia. The Commonwealth of Independent States may be a rather virtual entity, but the area it covers is geopolitical reality. Euro-Atlantic structures are for the time being closed to Ukraine; the blame for that goes both to the Ukrainian authorities and to the Western states, including Poland. At least some politicians in the West continue to treat Ukraine as a country where Russia has special interests, which, they believe, should be respected.
Conclusions
Although not a typical postcolonial state, Ukraine does exhibit many of its features. Dependency on the former metropole can be seen most strongly in the social sphere, culture and the economy, but it is also visible in internal politics and in the country’s external affairs. The above-mentioned departures from the proposed model of the postcolonial state, i.e. the specific features of Ukraine and its relations with Russia, stem from three major factors. First, Ukraine is a European country, which-for subjective reasons-may render more difficult the application of postcolonial concepts (former colonies are usually associated with faraway, overseas territories, rather than the EU’s direct European neighbors). Second, Ukraine and Russia are linked by cultural, linguistic and religious ties that go back to the times preceding the incorporation of what is today Ukraine into the Russian empire. Consequently, even if there are asymmetric relationships between the two countries, these are not exclusively the result of having been part of a “colonial” tsarist Russia/USSR or of postcolonial designs by the contemporary Russian Federation. And third, the economic concepts underlying the postcolonial school (dependency theory, the concept of economic imperialism, the world-system model, etc.) proceed from the assumption that the metropole (center, core) represents the advanced capitalist states-a condition which neither tsarist Russia nor the USSR ever met. The Soviet Union sought rapid industrialization in a drive to catch up with capitalist states, but it did that without differentiating between the metropole and the peripheries of the empire. As a result, Ukraine is an industrialized country today, even if it is considerably dependant on the Russian economy.
These conclusions suggest a look at contemporary Ukraine and prospects for its evolution in a slightly different light. To begin with, the country is unlikely to break its dependency on Russia anytime soon. Nor is it likely to repeat the scenario-known from Central European experience and expected from the Orange Revolution of 2004-of quick political and economic reforms and integration with Western structures. Therefore, Poland and the European Union’s policy towards Ukraine, if it is to be effective, must take account of Ukraine’s specific features, including the weight and consequences of its dependency on Russia. We must not focus exclusively on strengthening democracy, promoting the rule of law and building a free market economy; we have to help the country with forming a modern nation state along the Central European lines, and we must openly discuss the difficulties in Ukraine-Russia relations (Russia’s negation of the national character of the Holodomor, gas-related blackmail or the policy towards the Crimea). Otherwise the Ukraine policy of Poland and the Europe Union will fail to produce any tangible results.