Ivan Goncharenko & Elad Ben-Dror. The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies. Volume 8, Issue 2, Fall 2022.
Approximately four million Iranians live outside their home country today. As a proportion of the local population, Sweden is home to the largest Iranian expatriate community in the world—some 121,000 strong. Its members are diverse in all respects and have achieved remarkable success in their new country. This article examines attitudes held by Swedes of Iranian origin about Israel, as well as the factors that influence these attitudes. Data were gathered by means of a Swedish-language questionnaire distributed to members of the local Iranian community via social networks. Their answers suggest that most of the Iranian diaspora holds a conciliatory attitude towards the Iranian-Israeli conflict and may have the potential to effect a rapprochement between the two countries. However, many members of the community are passive or silent, clearly exposed to the threat of their home country’s regime. Hence, it may not be possible for them to realize their peace-making potential.
Introduction
There has not yet been a study of Iranian expatriates’ feelings about Israel. This topic holds profound significance, as diasporic communities have the potential to influence the host country’s policies in the Middle East. Some four million Iranians live outside their home country today—1.9 million in the Americas, 1.18 million in Europe, and 950,000 in Asia and Africa.
The present study addresses Iranians in Sweden as they relate to Israel. This group presents an ideal subject for this inquiry for several reasons. First, as a proportion of the country’s population, the Iranian exiles in Sweden comprise the largest Iranian expatriate community in the world. Second, Sweden is unique among European countries with regard to the character of its relations with Israel and Iran. Its tense relations with Israel, on the one hand, and its ongoing efforts for rapprochement with Iran, on the other, make the local Iranian community significant for Swedish foreign policy with regard to both countries. Positive feelings about Israel among Iranian Swedes might be a moderating factor in the relations between Israel and Sweden and could have a negative impact on the relations between Sweden and Iran, and vice versa. Third, the regime in Tehran sees the Scandinavian countries as an economic force with the potential to help rebuild the Iranian economy by means of trade agreements and collaborative ventures. As home to the largest Iranian community in Scandinavia—121,000 persons—Sweden has the ability to influence the other Scandinavian countries’ approach to Iran in the future. Fourth, the Iranian community, having achieved social prominence through the rise of an energetic and creative second generation that actively participates in political life, is in a position to exercise some leverage on Swedish policy.
It is not hard to conjecture the sentiments about Israel held by other minorities that originate in the Middle East and are currently living in Europe. However, this is not so for the Iranians. On the one hand, they have roots in and a bond with Iran, which has long pursued an existential conflict with Israel. On the other hand, life in Europe, with all this implies, may have modified their perceptions of the world, and even led them to feel sympathy for Israel. In addition, many of these expatriates left their homeland because of their opposition to its theocratic regime; consequently, they might be supportive of Israel, which is perceived as the regime’s foe.
The first section of this article reviews the theoretical background, laying the foundations to understand the character of diaspora and its ability to influence international relations. It goes on to present the history and profile of the Iranian community in Sweden, followed by a survey of the relations between Sweden and Israel and between Sweden and Iran—important factors that affect how the group under study relates to Israel.
In order to answer the research question, a Swedish-language questionnaire was circulated among the Iranian community in Sweden via social networks. The second part of the article analyzes the replies to the questionnaire. The responses indicate that the members of the Iranian expatriate community in Sweden are highly educated, liberal, supporters of human rights, and alienated from religion. The community appears to want to remain distant from various conflicts in the Middle East, including that between Israel and the Palestinians. About a quarter of the respondents said that they had positive feelings about Israel. The majority replied that their opinion of Israel was neutral; however, we may assume that many were deterred from providing candid answers to this question by fears of Iranian surveillance activity in Sweden or of Israeli actions (such as attempts to recruit the respondent to work on behalf of Israel). Thus, that it is likely that a larger percentage in fact supports Israel. All of the respondents were under the age of 55, probably because few older people are active on social networks, so that the research necessarily reflects the positions of the younger generation.
Theoretical Background: Diasporas as a “Soft Power” Tool
Although there is no universally accepted definition of the term “diaspora,” most scholars now agree that it should not be seen as a bounded entity, but rather as “an idiom, a stance, a claim…” Some scholars have argued that, in examining diaspora, the emphasis should be placed on intergenerational continuity, lateral links among its members, and elite interests and their political projects, together with opportunity structures shaped by other agents such as home and host country governments. Adamson defined diaspora as “a social construction of transnational networks and identities, shaped and formed with the help of new developments in technology and communication.”
A diaspora may consist of multiple subgroups with diverse interests, backgrounds, and expectations. Its members cannot be subsumed under a single motive or origin, as can refugees, exiles, or labor migrants. The Iranian diaspora is a useful example, as it is fragmented along ethnic, religious, political, and class lines, and belies any expectation of a tightly bound community with a solidarity based on common cultural references and ethnic identities.
Nonetheless, many scholars agree on the need for a mechanism to help understand the internal structures of diasporas. Members may be assigned to three groups—core, marginal, and dormant members; or, alternatively, core, passive, and silent members. Core members are the organizing elites, who are deeply involved in the diaspora’s affairs and are in a position to appeal for the general mobilization of its members. Passive members may be available for mobilization of this kind when called on by the active leadership. Silent members constitute the largest pool of people, who are generally uninvolved in the discursive and political life of the diaspora’s institutions, but who may be rallied in times of crisis. This categorization clarifies boundaries and places mobilization at the center of diaspora politics and classifications.
In the study of international relations, a diaspora is often seen as a “soft power” tool and an important non-state actor, with the capacity to influence the domestic politics and foreign policy of both the homeland and the host country. Less theoretical attention has been paid to the scenario in which a diaspora serves as a resource for a third country that forges relations with the diaspora community, using it to influence its relations with the community’s host country or homeland. With regard to the relations between a third country and the host country, a diaspora can influence policymakers if its members constitute an significant electoral bloc or belong to the political and economic elite. With regard to the relations between a third country and the homeland, the diaspora can influence the homeland’s policies through its support or opposition to the government and by providing financial and other support to political parties, social movements, and civil society organizations.
It should be mentioned that the relations between a diaspora and its homeland or host country are critical to the diaspora group’s potential for influence. For example, in some cases, a diaspora is vulnerable to threats by its homeland, especially when that country’s regime exerts a strong influence on the diaspora’s life or does not want diaspora groups to intervene in domestic politics. In our case, despite the traumatic history of its dispersal and its broad antagonism and hostility towards the theocracy in Tehran, the Iranian diaspora is relatively silent. This silence should be viewed through the lens of the homeland’s attitude towards the community.
A diaspora can also exert influence on conflicts in its homeland. “Long-distance nationalism”—”a set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in various geographical locations to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home”—is a popular model to describe a diaspora’s connection to the homeland and its politics. The term is often applied to diasporas composed of marginal nationalist groups living abroad that will not compromise on matters related to homeland conflicts and are usually reluctant to make concessions for peace. However, a quantitative study of the Yugoslav diaspora in Sweden found that its members tend to be more conciliatory than the population of the home country, and that their social integration in the host country plays a major role in the cultivation of a distinct attitude.
Baser argues that any proclivity towards more militant forms of political activism derives from the formative interactions between host-state institutions and the diaspora. Diasporas are more likely to succeed in influencing affairs in their homeland when the host country offers an environment that allows them to mobilize locally and transnationally. For instance, the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden has been able to create greater visibility for the human-rights plight of Kurds in the Middle East via active advocacy and lobbying of local policymakers. There are four different positions that long-distance nationalists may take vis-a-vis their homeland: anti-colonialism, separatism, regime change, and participation. The last two seem more relevant to the Iranian diaspora; they may overlap or even be used interchangeably.
Scholars do not agree whether the transnational ties of the second generation are as strong as those of the first generation. Some argue that the second generation has fewer ties with the homeland; others note that the ties may weaken or otherwise vary in different stages of one’s life. Baser suggests that the political outlook of second-generation migrants is often shaped by visits to the homeland and negative experiences they might have had there. She notes that many of the first-generation Turkish migrants who arrived in Sweden in the 1970s have now lived much longer in Sweden than in Turkey; hence, it is likely that they have internalized elements of Swedish political culture. The second generation’s view of conflicts in the homeland also means that its motivation to engage in peace-building or conflict perpetuation may be quite different from that of their parents and not necessarily based in diaspora networks.
The Creation of the Iranian Diaspora in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries
Many Iranians have left their country since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, but no systematic and reliable documentation of the number of expatriates exists today. Data published by the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 2021 counted 4,037,258 Iranians and their offspring currently residing outside the country. Given that there were only between one and two million Iranian expatriates in 2010, there has clearly been a sharp increase in emigration in the last decade. The reasons for this increase seem to be the heightened tension between Iran and the West, especially the United States; the difficult economic situation in Iran; and a search for employment opportunities.
Of the four million Iranians abroad, approximately 1.9 million live in North and South America, 1.18 million in Europe, and 950,000 in Asia and Africa. The largest community, in the United States, numbers 1.5 million. The Arab Gulf states have also become attractive for Iranians, due mainly to the geographical proximity and cultural similarities to Iran. There is a large Iranian community of over half a million in the United Arab Emirates—although today they find themselves caught in the continuing strife between the UAE and Iran. Another 50,000 Iranians live in Kuwait.
Until the 1970s, few Iranians emigrated; only a small number went abroad in pursuit of jobs and higher education. In the late 1970s and 1980s, two major political developments in Iran drove many to leave the country. The first was the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which triggered an exodus of non-Muslims, political activists, and supporters of the previous regime. The second was the long war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988), which induced between 1.5 and 2 million Iranians to pack their bags and seek their fortunes elsewhere.
The deteriorating political and economic situation in the early 1990s pushed thousands more Iranians to seek employment outside Iran. This trend continued in the new millennium, as the economy entered a tailspin as a result of the sanctions imposed by the West and the turmoil that followed the stolen presidential election of 2009, when a million demonstrators poured into the street to protest the fraud that brought the extremist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power. In the last decade, many Iranians have emigrated to Western countries as students, entrepreneurs, and professionals.
The Iranian diaspora in Western Europe, Australia, and the United States consists of highly educated middle- and upper-middle-class individuals. Unlike many other immigrant communities in the West, who tend to hold low-paying jobs and live in neighborhoods of other impoverished migrant families, Iranian immigrants are mostly professionals with well-paying jobs who live in middle-class neighborhoods.
Although diaspora Iranians share many commonalities, the community is not homogeneous. Its members are of different religions, ethnicities, and geographical origins, as well as diverse political beliefs and socioeconomic backgrounds. The Iranian expatriate community in every country is marked by a strict hierarchy among its members, based on subjective perceptions of members’ status back in Iran and their current situation in the host country.
Alongside the community’s character and internal variety, the diaspora has a problematic and complex relationship with the homeland. On the one hand, many continue to visit Iran from time to time, and most are in contact with relatives and friends there. On the other hand, some researchers have reported that the emigrants are antagonistic towards the current regime. This attitude, along with factors such as social status in the host countries and the extent of integration into the new society, means that there is no uniformity in how they relate to Iran. For example, despite their antipathy to the current regime, Iranian expatriates are rarely involved in efforts to enact political change in Iran; this suggests that the country’s role as their national political center is waning. Still, the homeland retains its cultural primacy. The emigrants speak Farsi, celebrate Iranian holidays, and eat traditional foods. This duality is reflected in the emergence of a distinct transnational diaspora identity that emphasizes pre-Islamic Persian culture, alongside multicultural values and an alienation from Islam that is not compatible with the situation in Iran today.
The Iranian Migration to Sweden
The modern era of Iranian migration to Sweden began after the Second World War and can be divided into two distinct periods. The first, extending from 1945 through the mid-1970s, was driven chiefly by Sweden’s need for working hands. The second group, from the mid-1970s on, consisted largely of refugees, family reunification, and students.
Since the Islamic Revolution, many Iranians have felt a strong push to leave the country. Sweden’s reputation on humanitarian issues, its small population, and its developed economy, which was open to absorbing migrants, made it an attractive destination. Therefore, over the last four decades, there has been an active flow of Iranians to Sweden. Some have come as refugees seeking political asylum, others have been admitted in the framework of family reunification, and still others have arrived as students.
As late as 1980, there were only about 3,000 Iranians in Sweden, most of them university students. The revolution in 1979, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, and the regime’s violent repression of opponents stimulated a massive surge of emigration to the West, including Sweden. Iranian immigration to Sweden peaked in the second half of the 1980s and declined after the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in 1989. In the present century, changes in Swedish immigration policy that granted skilled workers and professionals priority over asylum seekers sparked a new wave of Iranian immigrants. Between 2000 and 2014, the number of skilled newcomers from Iran grew sevenfold. There was also an increase in the number of Iranians who came to Sweden for higher education. Thousands were attracted by the promise, in effect until 2010, of its free universities. Whereas the total number of Iranians enrolled in Swedish academic institutions for the entire period between 1986 and 2003 was only 422 Iranians (about 25 at any given time), the corresponding figure for 2004-2014 was 6,364 (a fifteenfold increase). This increase in the arrival of students and professionals augmented the diversity and prosperity of the Iranian community in Sweden. In 2019, 80,136 residents of Sweden had been born in Iran, and another 40,883 with at least one Iranian-born parent had been born in Sweden—in total, a community of 121,019. It is hard to determine the ethnic breakdown of the contemporary Iranian community, but a survey conducted in 1993 found that it included Persians, Armenians, Azeris, Kurds, Turkmens, and Assyrians. The overwhelming majority, 79%, were ethnic Persians.
A Profile of the Immigrants
Most of the Iranians who have moved to Sweden are from the educated urban middle class. In their new country, they prefer to live in cities: more than 36% of all Iranian-born residents of Sweden live in Stockholm, and another 17% in Gothenburg. Unlike many other immigrant groups, the Iranians do not huddle in a closed community, but rather endeavor to integrate spatially with the native population. Over the course of the last decade, the community has gained social prominence, thanks to the rise of an energetic and creative second generation whose members are active in various fields, including business, the arts, journalism, literature, academia, and politics. More than 50 first- or second-generation Iranians were candidates in the 2014 general elections; seven were elected to the 349-seat Riksdag. The coalition government established that year included Ardalan Shekarabi, of Iranian parentage, born in Iran, as Minister for Public Administration, and after 2019 as Minister of Civil Affairs.
With regard to employment, the most prominent datum about the Iranians in Sweden is the large number who are self-employed. Unlike other immigrants from other countries, such as Turks and Arabs, the Iranians’ businesses are built on an individual rather than collective approach. Similarly, because of their advanced education, a significant proportion work in the public sector (42%), an opportunity that is less available to other immigrant groups.
The Iranian community in Sweden, like the population back in Iran, is heterogeneous. It consists of several ethnic groups (Persians, Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris), religions (Muslims, Christians, Jews, Baha’is), political affiliations and ideologies, and social classes. There is also a growing gay community, with its own communication networks, organizations, and political positions. There are also internal divisions that correspond to the extent of individuals’ integration into and cultural identification with Swedish society.
The Iranian community in Sweden is also segmented by waves of immigration. Judging by interviews with young Iranian Swedes who arrived in the country between 2007 and 2009, a broad cultural gap separates them from those who landed earlier. The newer arrivals classified their predecessors as “refugees” and themselves as “migrants.” That is, the younger generation does not see itself as having run away from Iran, but as pursuing economic opportunities and education. Another interesting aspect of the generation gap concerns the ongoing debate about the definition of Iranian identity. This may not be unexpected, given that the two groups left Iran in different social and political climates—the first group in the 1980s, and the second after the turn of the century. Those who arrived in the recent decades—students and professionals with strong socioeconomic resources and solid cultural capital, such as command of the language and higher education—do not engage with the “refugees,” whom they dismiss as unable to advance in or influence their new country. The “youngsters” also grew up with new communication technologies and are intimately familiar with the dominant cultural codes of the wider world. They see themselves as “open to other cultures” and “cosmopolitan,” while keeping their distance from the narratives typical of the “refugees.”
Iranians in Sweden are acutely aware of the need to acquire the local language, and of the social and economic benefits that accrue from command of Swedish. In fact, unlike their parents, the second generation is more fluent in Swedish than in Farsi. This may be seen as evidence of the Iranian immigrants’ desire to integrate into Sweden.
The Iranians are a classic example of “good immigrants,” meaning those who are spatially integrated, educated, and entrepreneurial. Another factor in their perception as successful immigrants is the secular lifestyle led by the majority. The experience of life under the Islamic theocracy in Iran has played an important role in the immigrants’ staunch secularism and even Islamophobia—many Iranians in Sweden are active in anti-Muslim organizations and networks. In demonstrations against the construction of mosques, members of the Worker-Communist Party of Iran stood side-by-side with xenophobic Swedish groups.
The most recent waves of immigration have included an increasing number of LGBTQ individuals, who influence the exile community’s narratives and behaviors. Even though this group has been active since the late 1990s, more recent gay immigrants have greater social visibility as a result of their public social and cultural activity, including participation in annual Gay Pride marches in Swedish cities. The group also influences the contours of the Iranian community from the inside.
Adaptation
Scholars have found that Iranian immigrants are generally more open to their host culture than other groups from the Middle East. More than 73% of Iranian Swedes said that they live in harmony with their new neighbors. Furthermore, research conducted in the early 2000s found that 70% of Iranian Swedes are content with their lives in Sweden. Iranian immigrants’ sociocultural adaptation scores were above average, especially with regard to their understanding of the appropriate way to organize their lives in the host country. Some maintain that this attitude is embedded in their group behavior and their tendency to comply with the adage “when in Rome, do as the Romans do.”
Nevertheless, interviews and conversations with Iranian Swedes exposed their sense that they are strangers in the new country. Even though they live well, many do not feel a bond to Sweden. Among those interviewed, some 40% feel themselves to be foreigners. A quarter of the Iranian immigrants do not want to go back to Iran, while a third said that doing so depended on the specific circumstances; however, 38% want to repatriate. The desire to go home increases as immigrants grow older; members of the younger generation are less eager to return.
Relations Between Iran and Sweden
Bilateral relations between Sweden and Iran have a long history. As early as 1920, with the official opening of the Iranian Embassy in Stockholm, diplomatic relations were at the highest level. In 1968, the mutual abolition of the visa requirement for visitors from the other country enhanced their political and economic cooperation. Sweden was also one of the first countries to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 revolution. In the 1980s, Iran became Sweden’s second-largest export market in the Middle East. Swedish firms were active in Iran, and Swedish experts helped build infrastructure there.
Bilateral economic relations were severely curtailed by the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the European Union (EU) in 2006. Swedish exports to Iran in 2005 amounted to $913 million, but dropped to $416 million the year after the sanctions were imposed. When the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions against Iran on January 16, 2016, Swedish interest in the country increased, and high-level diplomatic visits took place aimed at improving trade relations. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani issued personal invitations to the leaders of the Scandinavian countries to visit Iran and improve bilateral relations; Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven took up the invitation in 2017. While throughout his visit the Swedish delegation emphasized its displeasure with the human rights situation in Iran, this did not prevent the two sides from signing numerous bilateral agreements on higher education, scientific research, transportation, technology, innovation, and trade.
With regard to Iran’s nuclear program, Sweden favors dealing with it through diplomatic means rather than sanctions. For instance, at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt said that Iran had the right to make use of nuclear technologies for civilian purposes. With reference to Iran, he noted that “No one denies Iran the same rights as every other member of the Treaty, including to nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle.”
Nonetheless, a number of factors threaten to disrupt the good relations between Sweden and Iran. For example, the vast majority of Iranians in Sweden exert a negative influence on relations between the two countries. They are highly critical of the Iranian regime and do not serve as brokers to promote relations between Sweden and their homeland. Their attitude harms Iran in Swedish public opinion. A similar dynamic holds true in the other direction, namely, how the Iranian leadership views the expatriates in Sweden. According to the 2020 annual report of the Swedish Security Service (SAPO), “[Iranian] opposition groups in exile are considered to be an internal threat located outside the borders of the country [Iran].”
The second factor that could impair relations between the two countries is Iranian espionage and other activities that endanger Swedish security. The SAPO report cited China, Russia, and Iran as posing the most significant threats to Sweden. It stated that Iran gathers information about Swedish universities and research institutes, conducts industrial espionage, and spies on the members of the Iranian diaspora community, whom it sees as a threat to the regime.
The legal proceedings in Iran against a Swedish citizen, Ahmad Reza Djalali, and the trial in Sweden of an Iranian citizen, Hamid Nouri, have also contributed to the recent tension between the two countries. Djalali, born in Iran, is a Swedish university lecturer who specializes in emergency medicine. He was not known as a public opponent of the regime, but was arrested and accused of espionage and collaboration with Israel while on a visit to Iran in 2016. He was sentenced to death in 2017 and is still awaiting execution. This protracted affair reveals that Sweden has no means of exerting pressure on Iran, even to protect one of its citizens. The trial also demonstrated that members of the Iranian community are under surveillance and risk facing legal proceedings in Iran, even if they hold Swedish citizenship. The case of Hamid Nouri is the mirror image, rooted in the sensitive debate between the two countries over matters of ethical importance for the Swedes and its government, and especially human rights. Nouri, an Iranian official, was arrested in November 2019 when he came to Sweden to visit family. He does not hold Swedish citizenship. He was charged with being a key figure in the execution of Iranian political prisoners in 1988, when as many as 30,000 persons were killed. In early 2021, he was indicted for murder and war crimes. Nouri could be arrested and tried in Sweden under its principle of universal jurisdiction over such offenses; Sweden is the only Scandinavian country that asserts this principle. According to the local media, members of the Iranian Swedish community expressed pride that the Swedish authorities were bringing Nouri to justice. Nouri’s case is important for the relations between the two countries for several reasons. First, it may cause Iranian officials to fear that they too could face charges if they visit Sweden. Second, it emphasizes that the Iranian community in Sweden supports criminal proceedings against these officials. The precedent of Nouri may stimulate Iranian exiles in Sweden to ramp up the search for evidence of crimes by other regime officials and submit them to the authorities, which would certainly put a damper on the relations between the two countries.
Relations Between Sweden and Israel
The state of the relations between Sweden and Israel impacts the social and political situation in which Iranian Swedes live, and is one of the factors that determines their attitude towards Israel. From Israel’s birth until the late 1960s, relations between the two countries were quite warm; Sweden supported Israel during the Six-Day War. However, Sweden’s attitude towards Israel changed for the worse when Social Democrat Olof Palme became prime minister in 1969. Motivated by ideology, Palme moved Sweden from the Western camp, which supported the United States, to the neutral bloc, then known as the “peace camp.” This transition chilled the relations between Sweden and the United States. At the same time, Palme turned a cold shoulder towards Israel and adopted a pro-Arab policy. Since then, Sweden has supported anti-Israel decisions at the United Nations and in EU institutions, repeatedly signing on to condemnations of Israel while showing tolerance for Arab aggression against Israel.
This deterioration in bilateral relations may be attributed to several causes. First of all, trade between Sweden and the Arab countries burgeoned in the 1970s; Saudi Arabia became Sweden’s leading supplier of oil, and 80% of Swedish exports went to Arab countries in the Middle East. Second, the massive migration of Muslims from the Middle East to Sweden had a strong impact on Swedish antipathy towards Israel. Local pro-Palestinian organizations sprang up and exerted pressure on any group that promoted cooperation with Israel. Third, Swedish society attaches great importance to human rights, both domestically and in foreign policy. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict raises many questions about this issue; Israel, as the stronger side in the conflict, is viewed as the primary culprit in the violation of human rights. The fourth and perhaps most important reason is the ideology of the Social Democrats, the dominant party in Sweden in recent decades, which champions solidarity with underdeveloped countries and identification with the Palestinians and Arab states.
It should be stressed, however, that despite their fraught relations in the diplomatic arena, Sweden and Israel have engaged in many collaborative ventures that have stabilized the ties between them. Since Israel and the EU signed the Agreement of Association in 1995, trade between the two countries has flourished, and several Swedish companies do business in Israel. In 2000, the two countries signed an industrial cooperation agreement to encourage and promote collaboration between firms and research institutes in Israel and Sweden. There is nothing on record about military cooperation between the countries, but a report issued by Palestinagrupperna, a Swedish pro-Palestinian organization, offers evidence of extensive cooperation in training, development, and acquisition of electronic and military equipment.
In October 2021, Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde visited Israel in an attempt to calm the waters after years of tension between the two countries over the Palestinian issue. Hers was the first official visit since 2014, when Sweden officially recognized the “State of Palestine.” At a joint press conference with Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, Linde emphasized that Sweden is Israel’s friend. The visit may have marked a change of direction towards closer relations between the two countries in the future.
The thorny relations between Sweden and Israel could have a strong impact on negative perception of Israel by members of the Iranian community, particularly those born in Sweden. On the other hand, the cooperative ventures between the two countries and the warming of relations in 2021 could serve as a moderating factor, facilitating ties between Israel and the Iranian community in Sweden.
How Iranian Swedes Feel About Israel and the Factors That Influence Their Attitudes
The following data are based on a Swedish-language questionnaire that was distributed via social networks to members of the community in Sweden. The questionnaire addressed four main topics: general attitude towards Israel, attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, attitude towards the Jewish community in Sweden, and attitude towards Iran. 60 Iranian Swedes submitted their replies. The findings were analyzed qualitatively and the responses correlated with demographic parameters such as sex, age, and country of birth. The Facebook questionnaire has obvious limitations and several potential bias factors. First, the sample is not necessarily representative, because it was generated in only one specific way. Second, it is not possible to assess the size of the possible bias, because there is no information on those who decided not to participate. Third, community members who are not on Facebook are underrepresented in the questionnaire; they tend to be older and less educated. For these reasons, the research must be seen as more suggestive than definitive.
1. Profile of the Respondents
Most of the respondents were under the age of 40 (19-29, 37%; 30-39, 33%; 40-55, 30%). Because the survey was distributed online, immigrants above age 55, most of whom are not on social networks, were not represented. By sex, 71% of the respondents were men and 29% were women. Those born in Iran accounted for 63% of respondents, while 37% were born in Sweden. Within the former group, 72% were born in Tehran. The latter were born all over the country, and especially in Stockholm (30%), Malmo (11%), Umea (16%), Uppsala (10%), and Gothenburg (10%). A majority of the respondents have a university education and are not religiously observant.
The respondents fall into three categories. About 49% were born in Iran and brought to Sweden by their parents as children (the so-called Generation 1.5); 14% were born in Iran and came to Sweden without families; and 37% are second-generation, born in Sweden to an immigrant parent or parents. Most define themselves as both Swedish and Iranian. An overwhelming majority (96%) of those born in Sweden speak Farsi, which is important for the transmission of Persian culture.
2. Sweden
A majority of respondents (63%) are happy with their life in Sweden; another 37% are satisfied to some extent, while only 4% are unhappy. Some respondents in the “to some extent” category added that while Sweden is better than Iran, Swedish society is not receptive of citizens of foreign origin, and they still face prejudice. Some also dislike the harsh, extremely cold climate in Sweden, the cost of living, and workplace discrimination. Those who are happy in Sweden emphasized its democracy, quality of life, excellent education, and open society.
Despite their general satisfaction with life in Sweden, a majority of respondents (67%) reported that they had frequently encountered racism on both an individual and a systemic level. They also noted discrimination against non-ethnic Swedes in the labor and housing markets. Still, 65% of respondents said that they hoped to be living in Sweden five years hence. When asked, “How do you see relations in Sweden between the Iranian community and immigrants from other Arab countries?” 40% replied that relations are not good, 22% that they are good, and 38% that they did not know how to answer the question. It is possible that one reason for the high level of negativity is the disparity in the two groups’ typical levels of education and liberalism.
When asked, “Do you think that Sweden should grant asylum to migrants from the Middle East?” more than 60% replied that all persecuted minorities from the Middle East should be granted asylum. Only 14% think that all asylum requests by persons from the Middle East should be granted. Some 65% support granting full rights to the LGBTQ community; only 4% said that it should not be granted rights.
In summary, despite their frequent encounters with racism, most Swedes of Iranian origin are happy with life in Sweden and would like to stay in the country. The community is liberal and supportive of LGBTQ rights. Nevertheless, most respondents believe that only persecuted minorities from the Middle East should receive asylum in Sweden. This may be interpreted as displeasure with the wave of Arab immigration to Sweden in recent years. The datum that explicitly supports this conclusion is the statement by roughly a quarter of the respondents that relations between the Iranian and Arab communities in Sweden are not good.
3. Iran
Although all of the respondents have remained in contact with friends or relatives in Iran, 45% said that they never visit the country, and 55% that they do so at least once in five years. The main reasons provided for not going back are the fear of being drafted for military service or being sent to prison for having evaded conscription. Those who do visit reported that they did so to see relatives and to arrange documentation related to military service. In view of these findings, we may conclude that Iranian Swedes are apprehensive about showing support for any kind of anti-regime activity, as such support might cause their relatives back home to suffer. As for repatriation, 84% said that they had no thought of going back to live in Iran over the next five years.
With regard to Iran’s nuclear program, the questionnaire asked, “Do you think that the international pressure on Iran about its nuclear program is justified?” Some 49% replied in the negative, and 35% in the affirmative. Most of those who see no justification for the pressure said that it hurts the civilian population and not the regime. When asked, “Do you support the current regime in Iran?” (a question marked as “optional”), 78% reported that they do not support the regime, 18% chose not to answer, and only 4% indicated that they do support the regime. The supporters added that they do not agree with all of its decisions but believe that it is good for Iranian security. Those opposed to the regime cited its corruption, religious extremism, and violations of human rights as the reasons for their stance. Although almost four-fifths of respondents answered the question, the fact that many chose not to do so bears out the idea that the Iranians in Sweden are afraid that the Iranian authorities might take retaliatory steps against them or family members in Iran.
These results may explain why the Iranian diaspora in Sweden should be seen as largely passive and silent. As noted, the relations between a diaspora and a homeland are crucial to the tools available to the former in order to influence the situation. The Iranian diaspora in Sweden seems to be vulnerable to threats by the regime, which has a powerful influence on diaspora affairs and society.
4. Israel
When asked about their opinion of Israel, 33% replied that their opinion is unfavorable, 45% that it is neutral, and only 22% that it is positive. The main reason for the antagonism is not the conflict between Israel and Iran but the Palestinian issue: the perceived violation of the Palestinians’ rights, construction of settlements, and Israeli actions seen as a form of apartheid. Those who have a positive view of Israel cited its technological prowess and asserted that the Palestinians are responsible for the continuation of the conflict. Out of the 45% who expressed a neutral opinion of Israel, it may be assumed that the community’s fear of Iranian surveillance operations in Sweden or Israeli activity (such as trying to recruit them to work on behalf of Israel) kept many from providing candid responses, and that many more have a favorable attitude towards Israel. One could argue that a respondent’s neutral stance on Israel does not necessarily imply positive feelings about the country; it could just as well indicate an antagonistic attitude. However, this logic ignores the reasons that respondents might not be candid. They have good reason to conceal a favorable opinion about Israel—their fear of Iranian surveillance activities in Sweden. But there is no reason to hide an unfavorable position, which complies with the regime’s official line.
Those born in Sweden tend to be more positive about Israel than those born in Iran. The members of the Swedish-born generation are less likely to consume Farsi news sources and, it would seem, are not as heavily influenced by Iranian propaganda on the Palestinian issue. This situation might be different among Iranian Swedes above 55, who remember Iran before the revolution, in the days when Iran had close ties with Israel. Their presence in the sample might well have yielded stronger sympathy for Israel. On the other hand, it is the younger generation whose answers look to the future, reflecting how younger Iranians feel about Israel. The findings would seem to support the claim that diasporas tend to have conciliatory attitudes about their homeland’s conflicts and that the Iranian community in Sweden could play a moderating role in the conflict between Iran and Israel.
Some 82% of the respondents reported that they had spoken with (non-Muslim) Israelis at least once in their lives. When asked if they would like to visit Israel, 65% said that they would; 21% that they would not. The reasons cited for not wanting to visit were the conflict with the Palestinians and the feeling that Israel is unsafe. This means that the conflict with Iran is not a deterrent for wanting to visit Israel. Some 64% said that they would like Israel and Iran to sign a peace agreement, while 14% reject the idea.
Some 61% stated that they do not support Iran’s attitude towards Israel, and 14%, that they do; the rest “don’t know.” Those born in Sweden are less likely to support Iran’s policy towards Israel than those born in Iran. This may be because the younger generation grew up with the democratic European mindset, in which any call for the destruction of another country is deemed illegitimate. In response to the opposite question, 40% said that they do not support Israel’s policy towards Iran, 29% that they do, and 24% that they don’t know. Most of the explanations offered by those who do not support Israel’s position on Iran focused on cyberattacks and the assassination of Iranian scientists. Those who do support it emphasized their antipathy for the Iranian regime. A large percentage of those who replied “don’t know” may in fact support Israeli policies but fear to say so openly, for the reasons mentioned above. Those born in Sweden are more supportive of Israeli policy towards Iran. This may be because Israel, unlike Iran, is not threatening to destroy its foe; alternatively, it may be because the younger generation is aware of both countries’ infringements of human rights but is more sensitive to what goes on in Iran.
In summary, a majority of the respondents say they are neutral about Israel, while a quarter report a positive attitude towards Israel. However, it is likely that support for Israel is actually much higher. Once again, those who were born in Sweden are more sympathetic towards Israel than those who were born in Iran. As noted previously, the second generation’s views of the homeland’s conflicts means that its motivations to engage in peace-building or conflict perpetuation may be quite different from those of their parents and not necessarily based in diaspora networks.
5. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Some 37% of respondents believe that the Swedish media’s coverage of the conflict is objective, 31% that it is pro-Palestinian, and only 14% that it is pro-Israeli. When asked who is responsible for the failure to resolve the conflict, 45% replied that both sides are responsible, 35% that the Israelis are to blame, and only 8% that the Palestinians are. It is interesting to note that when asked, “Should Sweden be more involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?” 80% replied in the negative and only 16% in the affirmative. The fact that this solid majority does not want Sweden to get involved in the conflict reflects the community’s desire to maintain distance from events and disputes in the Middle East, as well as problems associated with nationality and religion. Once again, this finding supports the assumption that the Iranian community in Sweden should be seen as primarily comprised of passive and silent members, because the Iranian government has a long arm and does not want diaspora groups to intervene in its domestic politics. The Palestinian issue could be seen as a domestic Iranian concern.
6. The Jewish Community in Sweden
When asked, “What is the level of antisemitism in Sweden?” 37% replied that it is high, while 39% said that it is no stronger than the negative sentiments about other minorities. Many observed that this hatred and antisemitism can be attributed to Muslims from the Middle East, not ethnic Swedes. Around 35% replied that they would like to be involved in projects with the Jewish community in Sweden; 33% demur, because they do not want to have anything to do with matters related to religion. This fits with the profile of the Iranian community in Sweden as liberal, well-educated, and intentionally distant from religion or anything to do with the conflicts in the Middle East. Another 15% of the respondents added that their participation would depend on the type of project, while 17% said that they did not have time for such engagements. Those who would like to be involved noted that the themes would have to be apolitical and focus on Judaism and culture.
Summary and Conclusions
The Islamic Revolution in 1979, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, and the violent repression of opponents to the regime have spurred many Iranians to leave their homeland. Today, there are about four million Iranian expatriates worldwide. The current study examines how Israel is viewed by the Iranians in Sweden, which, proportionally speaking, is home to the world’s largest Iranian exile community. There are currently about 121,000 Iranian Swedes. Most of them are middle-class, highly educated, politically liberal, supporters of human rights, and alienated from religion. Although most have experienced racism, both individual and systemic, they are content with their lives in Sweden and would like to stay there. The community prefers to give a wide berth to the conflicts in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
About a quarter of the respondents said that their position towards Israel was positive, while the majority said that they were neutral on the subject. It is likely that fears of Iranian surveillance operations in Sweden or Israeli actions (such as trying to recruit them to help Israel) deterred many from providing an honest answer to this question; therefore, the percentage of those sympathetic to Israel is probably much greater. In fact, Iranians in Sweden do not feel that they can express themselves freely. Iran sees opposition groups in exile as posing a domestic threat to the regime, and spies on their members everywhere, including on Swedish soil. The case of Ahmad Reza Djalali shows that Sweden has no way to exert pressure on Iran if an Iranian Swede is arrested during a visit to Iran and charged with anti-Iranian activities.
The thesis that many are sympathetic towards Israel is further supported by the fact that a majority said that they would like to visit Israel and would like Israel and Iran to conclude a peace agreement. Another interesting datum is that most of the respondents have spoken at least once to a non-Muslim Israeli. Moreover, more than a third would like to be involved in projects with the Jewish community in Sweden.
Another important finding is that respondents born in Sweden have a more positive attitude towards Israel than those born in Iran. They are less likely to agree with Iran’s policy towards Israel and are more supportive of Israel’s policy towards Iran. This may be due to the fact that the Swedish-born generation is less exposed to Farsi news media and consequently is less influenced by Iranian pro-Palestinian propaganda. In addition, the younger generation, educated in a country that attaches great importance to human rights, tends to agree that Israel respects human rights more than Iran.
Many Iranian Swedes were born in Sweden and not in the Middle East. For this reason, the relations between Sweden and Israel also affect their feelings about Israel. Their relations are far from having a positive influence on how the community views Israel. Still, bilateral cooperation and the warming of relations in 2021 could prove a moderating factor that may serve as a bridge between Israel and the Iranian community in Sweden.
Even though a majority of the Iranians in Sweden do not support the Islamic regime in Iran, the community maintains very close ties with their home country. All of the respondents are in contact with family or friends in Iran. About half reported that they visited Iran at least once in five years. Taking this into account, it seems likely that Iranian Swedes are wary of supporting any activity against the Iranian authorities. This corroborates the assumption that the neutral attitude towards Israel reported by many respondents is in fact a cover for support of Israel.
Therefore, it seems that the Iranian diaspora tends to have a conciliatory attitude to the Iranian-Israeli conflict, and could promote rapprochement between the countries, especially in light of the community’s good relations with its host country. However, the community is largely passive and silent, because its members are exposed to the threats of the regime in the home country—Iran. Hence, it is not clear that the community’s potential to make peace can be realized. However, the finding that those born in Sweden hold more positive attitudes towards Israel than those born in Iran may indicate that the second generation of Iranian expatriates are less influenced by the homeland and will evince stronger support for Israel than their parents.
From the perspective of diaspora politics in general, the Iranian diaspora in Sweden may exemplify a case where the home country’s influence on a diaspora is disproportionately large. In this situation, the relations between the diaspora and the host country are irrelevant, even if the latter provides tools for challenging the home country’s policy through the international arena.
There is a need for further discussion about how a third country can mobilize a passive and silent diaspora in its host state in order to encourage its members to try to influence the host country’s or homeland’s policy in its favor.