Dmitrii Tolkachev & Tamar Tolordava. Sexuality & Culture. Volume 24, Issue 2. April 2020.
Introduction
Russia and Georgia share a common legacy and colonial relationship. Georgia was a part of the Russian Empire, and then part of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian-Georgian relations were affected by conflicts in the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1990s, and Russian-Georgian war in 2008. Russian authorities used imperialist logic to explain the last conflict as a necessity to protect Russian compatriots in the post-Soviet territories who share common values (Makarychev and Yatsyk). This discourse of ‘common values’ is an attempt of the Russian government to distance itself from Europe ideologically, claiming dominance in the post-Soviet space through a critique of ‘Western’ values, most importantly, LGBT rights counter-positioned to ‘traditional values’ (Makarychev and Medvedev). Attitudes toward homosexuality and the legal regulation of gay and lesbian rights have become a dividing factor in this version of the East/West dichotomy (Mizielinska and Kulpa).
Despite these conflicts, Russian and Georgian people share a relatively common negative view on LGBT rights based on Soviet legislation (Healey). World Value Survey (Inglehart et al.) data (wave 6) shows that 54.1% of Russians and 86.1% of Georgians thought that homosexuality is never justifiable. If we compare the mean values on the question about the justification of homosexuality by country, where one is never justifiable, and ten is always justifiable, we see that, in WVS sixth wave, Georgia scored 1.23, and Russia scored 2.51. In wave five, Georgia scored 1.15, and Russia scored 2.46. In the third wave, Georgia scored 1.56, and Russia scored 1.78. Thus, both countries have similarities in the non-justification of homosexuality by the majority. However, more Georgians than Russians see homosexuality as never justifiable. Moreover, the Russian mean value is higher than the Georgian one and increased from 1.78 in the 1990s to 2.51 in the 2010s. The Georgian mean value has declined from 1.56 in the 1990s to 1.23 in the 2010s. Attitudes toward homosexuality have changed slightly over the past decade, but they remain homophobic in both countries and reflect the prevalence of the overall intolerant environment.
Shared Soviet past and similarities in public opinion notwithstanding, each country has taken a different approach towards changing the legislation on homosexuality. Russia decriminalized homosexuality in 1993 and Georgia in 2000. However, Russia still does not have anti-discrimination laws and regulates “homosexual propaganda” since 2006 according to regional initiatives, and “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships” since 2013 according to federal law. Georgia has had discrimination protection on the basis of sexual orientation according to Article 2 of the Labor Code since 2006. In 2012, an amendment about the aggravating factor of crimes against individuals, based on sexual orientation was included in the Georgian Criminal Code. Finally, in May 2014, the Georgian Parliament accepted an anti-discrimination law, banning discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
Why is public opinion in one country deteriorating alongside the passing of anti-discrimination laws, while in another country, with little improvement in public opinion, it is prohibited to “propagandize homosexuality”? How do the actors discursively shape such institutional changes? Our argument addresses the theoretical framework of institutional change, especially in relation to the use of queer linguistics as a method. We analyze the political space and the transformation of the authorities’ discourses in Russia and Georgia, which frame homosexuality in different ways.
Theoretical Framework and Method
We approach law and policy changes in Russia and Georgia through the institutional transformations methodology outlined by Štulhofer and Sandford. They propose to take into account such institutions as religion, family, and law when analyzing the regulation of sexuality. Firstly, in our analysis, we focus on institutional transformation, mainly laws and norms shared by the authorities and church representatives. Secondly, we want to advance this methodology by including studies of language and explore the discursive arrangement of legal and political debates through queer linguistics.
Transition and transformation of the post-socialist regimes concerning sexualities and gender dimensions have been analyzed through different frameworks. Mizielinska and Kulpa proposed to question the power relations between Western and Non-Western sexualities, and how ‘Western’ ideas of LGBT politics were translated in the post-communist countries. Eastern European countries are “Othered” and homophobia is highlighted as an “Eastern” problem through the leveraging of European institutions and mechanisms (Kulpa). The repulsion of these “patronizing” ideas and politics leads to anti-gender campaigns. Opposing transition vectors of gender politics were considered through political regimes, gendered geographies, and ideologies (Gradskova and Morell). Anti-gender campaigns became a national populist strategy, aimed to deal with gender and sexual policy fatigue (Kuhar and Paternotte) and to broadcast moral sovereignty (Wilkinson). This transition process is a way to defend “traditional values” and challenge Western hegemony (Edenborg).
Politicians proposed to separate the ‘decadent West’ and ‘traditional East’ using nationality/sexuality discourses (Mole). Regional nationalisms, based on a heterosexual matrix and denial of LGBT rights contributed to the growth of the political homophobia and delegitimization of LGBT rights (Weiss and Bosia) or sub-discursive homophobia (Kondakov). The international trend toward increasing LGBT recognition became a global political question. The idea of LGBT rights is equated with “political tolerance” as a value (Mondak and Sanders), and/or advanced through inclusive sexual citizenship (Kondakov).
We take this literature further by the view on the political aspect of the discursive formation of institutions “as codified systems of ideas and the practices they sustain” (Hay, p. 58). Political science scholars have debated the causal role of ideas in policy and institutional change over the past decade (see Eleveld). Scholars engaged in ideational analysis (Hay; Blyth; Schmidt) study how the actors think, speak and act, and by doing so, how they create ideas, which shape institutional changes. Changes, in turn, depend on the contestations of actors’ discourses, while the stability of institutions depends on the acceptance or rejection of these ideas (Blyth). Hence, the analysis of institutions could help discern how the ideas about homosexuality translated by political actors shape the institutional environment and lead to policy changes.
New institutionalists, engaged in ideational analysis, explain transformation dynamics by path-shaping institutional change. That is, we are not interested in the “old regime” (as in path-dependency theory), but the current struggle for new constitutive ideas (Hall). Ideas influence the development trajectory: they perform as interpretative filters for actors after codification (Hay, p. 58). The change of ideas is considered through language, that is, words and contexts that are used in the institutional shaping.
We address institutional changes and the role of actors in these changes by means of queer linguistics, which challenges heteronormativity (Motschenbacher and Stegu; Cameron and Kulick). Queer theory allows us to analyze how institutions and social structures promoted heteronormativity and constructed it as natural, normal, and wishful (Sullivan). In this sense, queer linguistics approaches the discourse based on a poststructuralist focus on the relationship between language and sexuality, and adopts the view of how heteronormativity is (re)constructed discursively. At the heart of queer linguistics is “the role of public discourses in constructing particular versions of reality, and the constructed nature of identity categories such as gender and sexuality” (Motschenbacher, p. 152). The heteronormative order is produced in everyday conversations, speeches, and texts that create hierarchies based on dichotomies with bad/good, natural/unnatural, and traditional/non-traditional sexualities. Our usage of queer linguistics explains how politicians in Georgia and Russia are motivated to contribute or otherwise, to the construction of this order. We take into account the peculiarities of the use of certain words in relation to LGBT in authorities discourse. Further, we provide words to address non-heterosexuality to analyze what importance actors attach to them for the shaping of institutional changes.
Queer language performs a crucial role in the diffusion of Anglo-American discourse, negotiating Western and local values (Baer). The Russian and Georgian languages operate with the same terms to describe same-sex relations: homosexuality (gomosexual’nost’/homoseksualoba) and homosexualism (gomosexualism/homoseksualizmi). The definitions of “homosexualism” and “muzelozestvo” (sodomy) were given in the Big Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE) and Stalinist law, which recriminalized homosexuality in 1934. Homosexuality was understood through terms like “unnatural attraction” and “sexual perversion” reinforcing heteronormativity at the level of language and reproducing the idea of homosexuality being ‘deviation’ from this norm. The GULAG culture has spread the use of argot vocabulary in Russia (see Kozlovskii), which is also in use in Georgia: words like “Pidaras,” “Pederast,” “Pedik,” “Gomik,” “Petukh” are among them.
There are various forms of non-heterosexual identity categories in the Russian language. Laurie Essig, in her analysis of Russian queer language, refers to the terms “light blue” (goluboi), “pink” (rozovaya), “theme” (tema) and “our” (nashi), then in Francesca Stella’s book respondents already use the words “lesbian”, “bisexual”, and “straight”. Georgians use these terms, too, and there are no specific local terms to describe non-heterosexuality. To describe the changes in the terms used by non-heterosexual women, Stella refers to the theory of “dubbing culture.” The idea of dubbing culture enhances the influence of global mass culture and “dubbing” of Western sexual subjectivities (Boellstorff, p. 236).
The vocabulary about LGBT is crucial, but we are not trying to illustrate how the LGBT representatives refer to themselves. We assume that the LGBT policy and institutional design have to do with how authorities determine and name the community. We involve vocabulary to search for these keywords, and further to show their meaning in the authorities’ discourse. We are interested in what terms do the authorities describe (non)heterosexuality. We are going to imply their contextual usage and show how the use of one term, instead of other, shapes institutional changes.
We assume that the formation of institutions is possible in the process of discursive struggle when actors defend their ideas and meanings. Ideas that involve a specific queer vocabulary in the process of “debates” become codified systems that contribute to institutional transformation. Can the local terms constitute institutional changes, or does the improvement of the situation with LGBT rights require only Western, global terminology?
Then, we analyze discursive changes in Georgian and Russian debates from 2013 until 2019. First, the period when the Georgian antidiscrimination legislation and Russian propaganda law were deliberated and passed in 2013-2014. Second, public contestation that has continued ever since. For the Russian part, we analyze official statements of politicians from the president, the prime minister, the parliament, and the patriarch web sites, where topics of (homo)sexuality were mentioned. For the Georgian part, we analyze official statements of politicians (the president, the prime minister, and members of parliament) and Georgian Orthodox Church in the press, as well as articles and research focusing on topics of (homo)sexuality.
The Georgian Church, Political and Civil Society Actors, and Russian Interference
In 1999, Georgia became a member state of the Council of Europe. The speaker of the Parliament of Georgia, Zurab Zhvania, at the Parliamentary Assembly, outlined the country’s EU aspirations and declared, “I am Georgian, and therefore I am European.” This speech can be considered as one of the first steps in the process of acknowledging Georgia’s political aspirations. Moreover, it leads to standards acceptance set forth by the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights. One year later, in 2000, Georgia decriminalized homosexuality, and amended the criminal code (Hildebrandt). After the Rose Revolution in 2003, the idea of “Europeanization” and “Westernization” was highlighted, and the changes were linked with the political and social context—”the revolution, which happened under the slogan of democracy, quickly became the revolution for the modernization of the country—fighting against corruption, building public institutions, transforming societal values” (Zedania, p. 9).
Georgia’s pro-western orientation has presumed to establish the “western-style democratic institutions” (Kakachia). The close perspective of signing the EU Association Agreement and launching a visa liberalization dialogue in the 2010s had opened the discussion about LGBT rights in Georgia. In 2013, the European Commission published “the first progress report on the implementation, by Georgia, of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalization.” The report included a recommendation to adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination law that would be in line with European and international standards. Besides, “given the sensitivity of the matter,” it was suggested to work on raising awareness among the citizens and explaining the law (The European Commission, pp. 24-25).
Simultaneously, the representatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) raised their voices with anti-Western messages, including “propaganda of depravity” accusations (Tolordava, pp. 50-55). For Georgians, the GOC is a historical and national cultural symbol, and the church plays “a major role in domestic political discourse” (Jones and Kakhishvili, pp. 20-21). The GOC has tried to influence Georgia’s foreign policy and often challenges Georgia’s pro-Western aspirations. In particular, the Church presents the nation’s desire to become a member of the European Union and NATO as a threat to Georgian identity. Some extreme groups within the GOC establishment have shared their skeptical ideas toward the European Union, and Georgian clergymen very often link the EU with the destruction of Georgian traditions and values, promotion of homosexuality, and undermining “Georgia’s spiritual mission” (Kakachia, p. 4).
Importantly, the GOC considers Russia as a ‘brother’ and tries to frame this brotherhood as an anti-Western discourse. “The love between the countries will be eternal… In the past, Russia and Georgia were like brothers, but apparently, someone envied this and artificially created hostility between us,” stated the patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church, Ilia II, during a Moscow visit (Kakachia, p. 5). It is implied that the “West” is considered as the one who “created hostility” between the nations. The “warm attitudes towards Russia” from the side of the GOC were highly appreciated by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin (Kakachia). The Kremlin’s attempt to establish stronger ties with GOC, as it has a strong influence on Georgian citizens and their “anti-western rhetoric”, can be used while shaping the country’s foreign policy.
Political, economic, social, or cultural development in Georgia very often gives an arena for discussions where homophobic or anti-homophobic narratives are represented. As we have already mentioned, the majority of Georgian citizens hold homophobic attitudes towards the LGBT community. Because of this, conservative political actors are actively involved in demonstrating their anti-LGBT sentiments. The central debates related to LGBT shaped by Georgian authorities and the Georgian Church. The authorities, on the one hand, were forced to adopt the law banning discrimination, but on the other hand, they continue to gloss over LGBT issues. Georgian authorities do not carry out discursive formation of institutions. LGBT people are silenced citizens who are denied, as we will show later, their political rights. Thus, the authorities, choosing the strategy “it is better not to say anything than to say bad,” loses the fight for meanings.
Tensions become more apparent when the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHOT) approaches. Each year, political actors start to make public comments about homosexuality. On May 17, 2013, demonstrators, led by the clergy of the GOC, physically attacked a dozen LGBT activists and their supporters, who were planning to mark the IDAHOT. The Georgian NGO “Identoba,” whose mission is to promote and protect LGBT rights in Georgia, organized the peaceful rally.
According to research conducted by the Media Development Foundation (MDF), political parties and public organizations use discriminatory speeches regarding sexual minorities in 56% of their statements (Media Development Foundation, p. 59). While discussing May 17, 2013, Mikheil Saakashvili, former President of Georgia, who was often “blamed” for “LGBT propaganda” by conservative groups, shared their narrative saying: “Naturally, everybody has the right to rally. However, whether it is appropriate to hold the rally close to the place where the funeral ceremony of soldiers, killed in Afghanistan, is being held is a different issue and a separate topic, as far as I know… and I am not touching upon it” (Media Development Foundation, p. 71). Georgian Dream MP, Zakaria Kutsnashvili, criticized the chosen location too, mentioning, “They could have held that rally in a closed building… They have chosen a provocative form, which naturally irritated a large part of our society, because their Georgian identity historically developed as an ethnos, one of the characteristics of which is its religiousness, Orthodox Christian religiousness” (Media Development Foundation). The LGBT community is not directly called, but the pronoun “they” is used. The political rights of LGBT citizens are questioned, and the radical right-wing activists are not condemned.
Moreover, LGBT citizens are blamed for creating conflict. Eka Beselia, that time chairperson of the committee of Human Rights and Civil Integration Committee, underlined the importance of the church and rebuked the organizers for provocative actions: “Nobody has absolute freedom… We must also consider that it was the day of mourning [for soldiers who died in Afghanistan]. However, if the aim is to create a provocative environment and to have injured people, bloodied police officers, etc. as a result” (Media Development Foundation, p. 72).
The Georgian Patriarchate a few days later, on May 22, released an official statement on the incident, expressing regret and underlined that LGBT demonstration organized by “Identoba” was “of a provocative nature.” According to the statement, in the country where the absolute majority of the population is Christian, or followers of similar religions such as Islam and Judaism, “such rallies are perceived by the population as propaganda of homosexuality” (Civil Georgia) and thus leads to justified protest. The Patriarchate criticized organizers for not considering such things as historical memories and traditions. The Church uses not only a minority approach, separating LGBT people from the majority, but also points to sinfulness in the Patriarchate’s statement: “the country cannot tolerate the legalization of a sin. The Church loves a human being, and just because of this love, it fights against sin for the salvation of the soul. Despite that, there is no excuse for violence. We unequivocally distance ourselves from the aggressive actions from the part of the demonstrators, which were not within either legal or religious norms” (Civil Georgia). This statement is important, as it demonstrates that LGBT rights do not correspond to the values of the Georgian people for the Patriarchate. Besides, using the “propaganda of homosexuality” term, the GOC is sharing the linguistics of the Russian State and Russian Orthodox Church.
The Church successfully copes with the transformation of the institutional space, attracting more supporters. In 2013, a new actor appeared on the arena, businessperson Levan Vasadze. In 2013, he founded “Georgian Demographic Society XXI,” which, in partnership with World Congress of Families (WCF), conducted the tenth Congress in Tbilisi on May 15-18. Patriarch Ilia II, Georgian clergies, and politicians, in addition to the delegates from the USA, Europe, and Russia, attended this Congress. WCF is actively opposing LGBT rights, abortion rights, and gender studies on an international level. Even though the organization was perceived as an “American political export,” Russians were taking the leadership roles using their money and political influence (Gessen). Larry Jacobs, WCF’s managing director, mentioned that Russia’s anti-gay laws were a great idea and underlined that “the Russians might be the Christian saviors of the world” (The Daily Beast). The existing relationship between WFC and Russia, anti-Western, and pro-Russian rhetoric made by Georgian organizers of the congress makes it clear how Russia is trying to interfere in Georgian political and social life (Radio Tavisupleba).
The discussion of the anti-discrimination bill caused new tensions, in which not only politicians and civil society representatives, but also the Georgian Patriarchate and clergy were involved. As previously mentioned, Georgia passed the anti-discrimination law in 2014, using Western vocabulary as “sexual orientation” and “gender identity.” On the one hand, the EU was demanding Georgia to make the laws in harmonization with international standards, and on the other hand, Russia was trying to influence Georgia’s foreign policy aspirations by using “Eurosceptic” Georgian clergymen. Next, we will show how the authorities, following the EU, did not create opportunities to build up a pro-LGBT discourse, and the Church used the opportunities in the discursive construction of anti-Western rhetoric.
The ruling party and the parliamentary opposition supported adopting the law by 2014. Legislative harmonization was incentivized by a visa-free regime with the EU for Georgian citizens. The process stalled because of a split within the ruling coalition of the Georgian Dream. Pro-western parties, subsequently evicted from the alliance, pushed hard for the law, whereas the core of the more conservative Georgian Dream party was against it, backing the Church.
The process, which accompanied the resistance lead by the GOC, endangered the outcome. Opponents of the law organized protest demonstrations, and clergymen were actively involved in discussions of the law organized by the Parliament of Georgia. Activities as demonstrations against the adoption of the bill, MPs as well as the government pressure, media campaign, accompanied by explicit anti-Western rhetoric and mostly with some implicit endorsement of the Kremlin politics and Russian discourses on LGBT rights (Gelashvili).
The GOC and patriarch personally intervened to block the anti-discrimination legislation. Patriarch Ilia II and radical orthodox groups were insisting on removing the term “sexual orientation” from a non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds of discrimination (Civil Georgia). “Introduction of a notion of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’—non-existent in the constitution—into this bill, essential for the development of our country, triggers colossal anxiety in the people because the personal rights of our citizens are already equally protected by the existing Georgian legislation. Proceeding from God’s commandments, believers consider non-traditional sexual relations to be a deadly sin, and rightly so, and the anti-discrimination bill in its present form is considered to be a propaganda and legalization of this sin,” said the statement of the Patriarchate released on 28 April 2014 (Civil Georgia). The Church denies Western-style vocabulary and uses Russian terminology of “non-traditional sexual relations”, in addition to the religious discourse of “sin.”
After a heated debate with the representatives of the Orthodox Church, on May 2, the law on the prohibition of all forms of discrimination was passed with 115 votes against one. According to some actors, it was the personal involvement of the former Prime Minister Ivanishvili, who was then retired but still in informal control of the government, which lead to the passing of the law. In the beginning, the bill was opposed by some members of the ruling Georgian Dream Coalition, but a chat with the billionaire and founder of the coalition led them to change their minds (Eurasianet). The final version of the adopted law was named as the “Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination.” The demand of the Orthodox Church to remove the words “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” from the law was not granted (Legislative Herald of Georgia). Western terms remain in the text of the law.
Furthermore, the rhetoric of the Georgian Orthodox Church, in 2014, was influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which is actively promoting a traditional values agenda, and fights against women’s and LGBT rights issues, both domestically and internationally (Hug). On the one hand, the GOC was not satisfied with the Georgian Parliament’s decision, and on the other hand, Georgian Human Rights Organizations were criticizing the proposed bill, as it lacked effective mechanisms of enforcement. NGOs requested a bill “that would not only outlaw discrimination on paper, but would also enforce the prohibition of all forms of discrimination in practice” (Human Rights House Foundation).
On the part of the conservative community, attempts to change the law persist. In an interview with CBN News in 2016, conservative activist, Levan Vasadze emphasized the American and European influence in Georgia, on fighting against family values and on the adoption of Anti-Discrimination Law, with the aim of “destroying our families.” He noted that he is for selective westernization and “if you [the West] think that radical sexual activities are what you want to do, this is your choice, but I think that it is a shameful sin, I want to preserve the society that is capable of saying this.” During the speech, Vasadze criticized Georgian Dream for adopting Anti-Discrimination Law in 2014 (CBN News).
Assumptions about the ineffectiveness of the law were confirmed later. The authorities failed to create effective institutions, and for the most part, ignored the problems of Georgian LGBT people. In 2016, during the Parliamentary Election Campaign, the Republican Party was the only one openly criticizing the Georgian Orthodox Church and supporting LGBT rights. The party could not make it to parliament, as the topics, criticized by them, were not popular among the Georgian electorate. In 2019 the first-ever Gay Pride Event was scheduled in Tbilisi. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the Georgian Government, in general, made a statement underlying that the state was not capable of guaranteeing the safety of the participants of the event. The police did not react to the actions of the far-right groups who were threatening not only LGBT people and organizers of the Tbilisi Pride, but were threatening the state institutions as well. It is not the first time when a state fails to protect the rights of its LGBT citizens willing to protest the conditions they are living in.
The European Union’s recommendation to adopt the anti-discrimination law, underlining the words such as ‘gender’ and ‘sexual orientation,’ became a battlefield where the Georgian clergy and far-right groups with Russian influence, were actively demanding the deletion of those terms from the law. These contentions and the ambivalent attitude of the governing party, “Georgian Dream”, proves that adopting the anti-discrimination law is not the only panacea if state homophobia will not be defeated.
Russia: Constructing “Traditional Values” Around the Enemies
In 1993, Russia decriminalized homosexuality according to international norms. It happened because of the influence of the Council of Europe of which Russia aspired to be a member (Hildebrandt). The idea of banning the propaganda of homosexuality emerged in Putin’s Russia in 2000s. In 2013, President Vladimir Putin signed the Federal law ‘135-FZ on amendments to article 5 of the Federal law “On protection of children from information harmful to their health and development” and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation to protect children from information promoting the denial of traditional family values.’ It imposes administrative sanctions (article 6.21, Administrative Offenses Code of RF) on anyone “propagating” “non-traditional sexual relationships” among minors (see about minors Tolkachev and Vasileva). The regulatory context in Russia is heavily influenced, not only by the “propaganda law” itself, but also by explanatory notes to it, previously enacted regional laws on the “prohibition of gay-propaganda”, resolutions of courts, and law-enforcement practice.
Based on our theoretical framework, we analyze how political actors shape this institutional change and how the discourse around it is constructed. We propose to consider how ideas about homosexuality have formed changes in law from a more inclusive decriminalization of male sexual intercourse to the discriminatory ‘gay-propaganda’ legislation. Four general ideas can be traced in the authorities’ discourse from 2013 (as first mentions of homosexuality on the presidential web site) to present: human rights, pedophilia, family, and anti-Westernism.
According to the presidential website, Putin commented on the situation of ‘sexual minorities’ as a human rights issue for the first time at the press conference with the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, in April 2013. It should be noted that the journalists’ question framed Putin’s answer because it contained the words ‘human rights’ in the phrase. The first part of his answer was devoted to the human rights and the president’s role in it: “In the Russian Federation, there is no infringement on the rights of sexual minorities. These people, like everyone else, enjoy full rights and freedoms. As the President of the Russian Federation, I believe that they have no other President, as citizens of Russia, and I consider it my duty to protect their interests and their rights” (Zajavlenija dlja pressy…). The President has affirmed to the Western community that the issue of human rights prevails for “sexual minorities.” Note, however, that the minority discourse deprives the “minority” of its former invisibility (Kondakov) and creates a discursive ghetto (Edenborg), beyond which, heteronormative discourse continues to be reproduced.
The human rights issue, as oriented to the Western community, was discussed during the preparation for the Olympic Games, too. At a meeting with the President of the International Olympic Committee, Thomas Bach, Putin stressed that everything had been done to make guests “feel comfortable at the Olympic Games in Sochi—regardless of nationality, race or sexual orientation” (Vstrecha s rukovoditeljami…). Dmitrii Kozak, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, also confirmed the principle of non-discrimination, but added, referring to the official explanation of law enforcement agencies and the Ministry of Justice about the scope of the propaganda law: “People can engage in anything in their private life, including in the spreading of its [homosexuality] benefits and attractiveness among adults” (Po zavershenii soveshhanija…). Kozak’s perception of homosexuality as “spreading” intersects with a “floodgate theory” (West) that means if homosexuality is showed in a positive way, the number of homosexual people will increase. Therefore, the very intention of such propagation is understood as a threat from the Kozak’s point of view.
The issue of human rights has been raised not only in the conversations with Western countries, but also inside Russia. When Putin held a meeting with representatives of non-parliamentary parties in 2013, he pointed out that the legislators made him the culprit of the law on propaganda and added, “We must not create the foundations of xenophobia in society against anyone, including against people of nontraditional sexual orientation” (Vstrecha s predstaviteljami…). If, initially for the Western community, Putin spoke about sexual minorities, in the Russian context, he talked about people of ‘non-traditional sexual orientation’. He emphasized that there are no differences between Russian citizens based on sexual orientation despite the very fact of the ‘gay-propaganda’ law.
Respect for human rights in practice becomes evidently questionable when we look at the discussion related to the Chechnya case. In February 2017, Chechnya’s authorities launched an anti-gay purge, putting gay men in secret prisons (They Have Long Arms…). Information about these incidents caused an international outrage. Next, as the scandal received global coverage, it was widely discussed in Russia. The Commissioner for Human Rights, so called Ombudswoman, Tatyana Moskalkova, described the problem with ‘non-traditional orientation persons’ in relation to the purges as follows: “although these are not, perhaps, actual large-scale violations, these cases require special attention because of a huge public outcry.” Putin, on the other hand, identified the information as “rumors about people of non-traditional sexual orientation in the North Caucasus” (Vstrecha s Upolnomochennym…). The President clearly stated before that Russia abides by non-discrimination principles. Therefore, any case of alleged discrimination in Russia is most likely a “rumor”, or worse, defamation and slander originating from the West, so should be double-checked.
In 2019, in an interview with the Financial Times, Putin said: “I do not want to offend anybody, see, we are already accused of homophobia and so forth. And we have nothing against people of non-traditional sexual orientation” (Interv’ju gazete… ). Two days later, he commented on Elton John’s accusation on hypocrisy (Sir Elton John… ) after the gay scenes had been censored and deleted in the film, Rocketman, in Russia: “I did not distort anything here, we really have a very equal attitude to the representatives of the LGBT community. Really calm, totally unbiased” (Press-konferencija…). It was the first time when Putin used the word LGBT, although, he tried to explain that the T stands for “transformers.” Putin makes it clear that even when using Western terminology such as LGBT, these words are devoid of meaning to him and his electorate.
Thus, over the past 6 years, the human rights discourse allowed Putin to use minority language and even community vocabulary (the abbreviation LGBT), following the principles of a dubbing culture. These messages were aimed at Western countries, dubbing from their linguistic notions. Other Russian politicians talked about LGBT rights as human rights if it was linked with international attention (sports events, Chechnya case).
The next main idea of the law justification was linked to pedophilia: “I can hardly imagine that a court in Moscow would allow an organization that promotes pedophilia to function” (Zajavlenija dlja pressy…). In these words, Putin uses the idea of creating institutions to satisfy the demand of the majority and eliminate conflicts with minorities: “people would take up arms” (Zajavlenija dlja pressy…) to resist pedophilia. The idea of pedophilia propaganda prohibition was firmly entrenched in the President’s discourse by 2014. Putin had defined the regulation by saying that “you can feel free, at ease, but leave the children alone, please” (Vstrecha s volontjorami…). Commenting on Russian Internet restriction laws to journalists (Interv’ju…), Putin mentioned “suicide, drug propaganda, pedophilia” in one sentence. After journalists asked about homosexuality, Putin, for the first time, used the word ‘gomosexual’nost‘ (homosexuality): “We have no ban on ‘homosexuality.’ We have a ban on the propaganda of ‘homosexualism’ among minors.” The confusion of pedophilia and “homosexual propaganda” arose with the assertion of “traditional” family values as an opposition to same-sex families where children seemed to be at risk if this idea was taken seriously. According to this logic, the authorities are trying to protect children not only from information about homosexuality: it is assumed that homosexuals pose a threat to children’s sexual safety (Moscow police…).
Another side of the issue is the protection of ‘traditional’ family: “same-sex marriages do not produce children,” asserts Putin by giving his nationalistic comment against migration, “but I would like to see the birth rate in Russia grow among titular nations” (Zajavlenija dlja pressy…). The authorities deny same-sex couples to have their own children and try to prevent adoption, basing their sentiment on the idea that only heterosexual families should reproduce. As we have shown earlier, they link the adoption with pedophilia. Chairwoman of the Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko, stresses this idea in her gloomy predictions: “the right of same-sex families to adopt children, in my opinion, will simply lead to the degeneration of mankind” (Privedet prosto…).
Russian Orthodox Church representatives support discourse against same-sex marriage, too. For example, Patriarch, Kirill, said that “we do not demand any toughening in relation to those people who have some peculiarity in sexual orientation,” however, same-sex marriages themselves are “against Christian morality” (Patriarh Kirill..). Later, the Patriarch compared the laws on same-sex marriages with the fascist laws and the laws of apartheid (Patriarh Kirill..).
The anti-western discourse was significant for Putin since 2013: “You [Western journalists] have got me sick of these same-sex marriages. Wherever I go in Europe, and they are there with flags waving, I come here, and you are bothering me again” (Press-konferencija po itogam vstrechi…). Putin claimed he would like to see a group of ‘traditional orientation’ people (heterosexuals) protected by the law: “In fact, we all need to be more tolerant and show less aggression to people of traditional orientation, and people of non-traditional orientation.” Putin raises the idea of people of ‘traditional orientation’ who, as a constructed heterosexual majority, should be protected from same-sex relations and LGBT social movements. Protection includes both the preservation of the “traditional marriage” as the union between man and woman and the opposition to LGBT activism.
During a visit to Finland (Press-konferencija…), Putin commented on the idea of propaganda laws and the law about “foreign agents” (which complicates the work of NGOs with Western funding): “Please do not interfere in our regulations.” The “traditional values” policy served as a populist strategy of “moral sovereignty” (Wilkinson) and aimed against Western influence. Russian Prime Minister, Dmitrii Medvedev, referred a few times to the journalist the idea of the propaganda law as an “emotional question” that only interested the West. He added that the propaganda law had not been implemented and same-sex relationship was not prohibited, as sexual minorities do not write about discrimination, “even on the internet” (Interv’ju Dmitrija Medvedeva…). Moreover, the discussion of the law and the resistance to it came from the West. As an antipode of European homonationalist, anti-Islamic discourse (Kulpa), Russian authorities invented a new form of “homonationalism” with anti-Western discourse, as even homosexuals “support” the propaganda law and traditional values. Even Vitaliy Milonov, author of Saint Petersburg propaganda law, shared the idea of protecting Russian gays from the West: “The West is trying to impose its values on Russian gays” (Svoja Pravda…). In the authorities’ logic, the Russian LGBT community has no problems with discrimination, and only the West imposes alarmist sentiments.
Following the results of the Russian-Austrian talks in Vienna in 2014 (Zajavlenija dlja pressy…), Putin outlined the problem of attitudes toward homosexuality as follows: “in relation to the so-called problems of sexual minorities, this problem is largely virtual.” Further, he repeated the idea that ‘homosexualism’ and ‘other manifestations of non-traditional orientation’ are not a criminal offense, unlike in other countries—Putin mentioned the USA as an example. The Russian President paid attention to the discrimination of LGBT people in the USA and very often pointed to criminal punishment for homosexuals in some American states, which is a falsehood. That is, only the lack of penal prosecution means, for the President, the opportunity to “enjoy the rights” of being an LGBT citizen in Russia.
The discourse of the Russian political actors is based on Vladimir Putin’s articulated views, which is not surprising for authoritarian regimes. The original idea of protecting both heterosexuals (“people of traditional orientation”) and children from “homosexual propaganda” creates an institutional change that leads to greater discrimination. At the same time, the language and forms of statements about sexuality and the propaganda law constantly change as they use both local and Western terminology. The human rights discourse is presented by different terms such as ‘homosexuality,’ ‘LGBT,’ ‘sexual minorities,’ ‘sexual orientation,’ etc. However, the notion of LGBT rights protection is limited to Putin’s repeated idea of the absence of penal prosecution. Western terminology is used in conjunction with local content as synonymous with pedophilia and persecution of same-sex families, dismissal of LGBT movements or same-sex marriages. The use of Western and local terms blur the political agenda. Ideas do not shape institutions since they are flexible and used for different groups in different contexts. It is impossible to decipher only one idea for the discourse. In such circumstances, the establishment of institutions remains unpredictable.
Conclusion
Russia and Georgia went their separate ways in regard to the regulation of homosexuality. Georgia has adopted anti-discrimination legislation, on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, despite the deterioration of public opinion. In Russia, with a slight improvement in public opinion about homosexuality, a ban of ‘gay-propaganda’ was adopted. In the article, we analyzed how the actors discursively shape such institutional changes.
Institutional changes have become possible in Georgia because of law harmonization with the EU; however, western-styled LGBT rights ideas do not prevail in Georgian authorities’ discourse. Instead, conservative discourse of the Georgian Orthodox Church and Russia-supported actors predominates in Georgian society. The legislation uses Western terminology, while the authorities do not participate in the discursive transformation of institutions, and religious representatives, using local terminology, attract more attention to their ideas.
Russian institutional changes are shaped by different ideas about homosexuality. The political actors use the propaganda ban justification in different ways for different audiences, linking homosexuality with human rights, on the one hand, and pedophilia, family, and anti-westernism, on the other. Analysis shows that the Russian politicians use both local and Western terms and different explanations of the causes of the law. Authorities interact with several groups, which does not allow only one idea to prevail. This instability and flexibility opens up a discussion about homosexuality and may eventually have different effects on Russian society.
Russian and Georgian authorities have changed local vocabularies by introducing international (Western) identity terms into political discourse. Using queer linguistic, we have shown, how these changes still promote heteronormativity and create hierarchies. At the same time, we can also see that a more conservative discourse is also taking prominent space in both countries, mostly through the influence of Orthodox churches there, especially the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, the struggle for ideas and meanings will continue.