Frida Lyonga. Journal of Homosexuality. December 2019.
Introduction
Concepts are as indispensable to social sciences as compasses are to navigation. Concepts provide common frames of meaning for researchers working in different parts of the world; they serve as or inform the development of methodological tools for structured analysis of social issues and they act as “building blocks” in theory development (Goertz, 2006, p. 1). For a concept to serve these purposes, clarity in terms of both its content and scope is crucial. It, therefore, goes without saying that where the interpretation or use of a concept is characterized by considerable promiscuity—as is the case with the concept of homophobia in sexuality research—providing such clarification of content and scope, or at least striving to do so, is a responsibility which researchers must not neglect.
Figure 1. Shades of homophobia
The inconsistency in the interpretation of homophobia is to a great extent linked to the very origin of the concept. When homosexuality was clinically considered a mental illness back in the 1960s in the United States, George Weinberg, a psychologist and psychoanalyst at the time, coined the term homophobia to describe the discriminatory attitudes of mental health professionals toward gay people (Herek, 2004). Weinberg perceived the stigma-type attitudes of psychoanalysts toward gay people as arising from some kind of phobia and he defined his new vocabulary, homophobia, as the “dread of being in close quarters with homosexuals” (Weinberg, 1972, p. 4). Homophobia as a qualifier emerged at a time when there was no specific label to capture the diverse forms of hostility and discrimination faced by homosexuals, and the term quickly gained popularity in the scientific community. With popularity, however, came evolution.
Homophobia is today the preferred signifier for a broad spectrum of negative attitudes toward homosexuality (Bender, 2016; Haaga, 1991; Robinson, 2008). For instance, Davison and Frank (2006) characterize the sexist harassment and the exclusion of homosexuals from sports as homophobia-based discrimination. When the former Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe described homosexuality as unnatural and proclaimed that “homosexuals were worse than pigs and dogs,” his statement was widely characterized as homophobic and Reddy (2002, p. 163) with reference to this case, conceptualized homophobia as “hate speech.” In 2013, when thousands of protesters took to the streets of Paris against the proposed gay marriage bill in France, gay activists launched a counter demonstration describing the opposition to the bill as homophobic (BBC News, 2013).
Weinberg’s terminology has evolved and one can liken its application in research to an amoeba that takes whatever shape that convenience dictates. Sartori (1970, p. 57) refers to such amorphousness as “conceptual stretching or conceptual straining.” In certain cases, the concept has been stretched to encompass not only attitudes against homosexuality but also negative attitudes toward other non-straight sexual minorities like transsexuals. Such lack of clarity on the different categories of biases that can be subsumed under homophobia explains why Herek (2000, 2004), and others (Haaga, 1991; Neisen, 1990; Smith, Oades, & McCarthy, 2012) call for a replacement of the concept in research; for instance Herek’s proposal of the concepts sexual prejudice (in 2000) and subsequently sexual stigma (in 2004; 2007) to replace homophobia.
Despite calls for its abandonment, homophobia remains widely used in research and in everyday political debates on homosexual rights. The enduring affinity for the concept both within the research community and among gay-rights advocates indicates that Weinberg’s terminology has not outlived its usefulness. This article chooses not to throw out the baby with the bathwater and strives to address the critique related to the concept’s content and scope by proposing a framework that delineates the different categories of biases against homosexuals that constitute the term homophobia. This framework is particularly relevant in view of Epprecht’s (2013a) observation that progress made in terms of increased homosexual rights in Africa is sometimes overlooked, as media spotlight typically hones on egregious cases of discrimination. The framework’s clear differentiation of the various categories or shades of homophobia will facilitate analysis of the evolution of homosexual rights within societies and will enhance comparison between contexts. By offering a more structured analysis of homophobia, the framework ensures that even subtle forms of discrimination against homosexuals in a context will not go unnoticed.
In the next section, I briefly review the current contestations around the definition of homophobia and, in doing so, emphasize the necessity for conceptual clarification. Next, I discuss some of the existing typologies of homophobia in academic literature, including the limitations that make them inadequate as frameworks for in-depth analyses of homophobia. Within this context of identifying limitations of existing taxonomies, I describe the methodological procedure used to develop the homophobia framework put forward in this paper. The proposed framework is then described in detail. It upholds that negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men manifest in seven distinct, yet interrelated shades, namely: radical, prohibitionist, denialist, avoidance, morbidity, tepid, and veiled.
Homophobia: A Contested Term
Debates around the concept of homophobia take several dimensions. One area of disagreement relates to the usefulness of the concept in exposing and challenging discriminations against gay men and lesbians. On the one hand, the concept is lauded for making a remarkable contribution to the gay-rights struggles by calling attention to societal marginalization and oppression of homosexuals. According to Murray (2009), homophobia has become a yardstick for comparing societies in terms of socio-cultural emancipation. Herek (2004) equally argues that homophobia has fostered a shift from perceiving homosexuality as a problem to perceiving negative reactions toward homosexuality as the problem (see also Bryant & Vidal-Ortiz, 2008). This shift in perception is particularly glaring in contemporary Western media constructs that tend to portray societies with draconian laws against homosexuals as conservative, in other words as backwardness and unenlightenment in a modern world. In media reports, the qualifier “homophobic” carries with it a strong negative connotation that can be compared with the sting of the word racist, and herein lies the advocacy power of the concept. As Hopkins (1996, p. 100) observes, homophobia has evolved from a psychiatric to a “political term” (see also Boellstorff, 2004).
While some see the concept as emancipatory, others critique homophobia for being a double-edged sword that presents negative attitudes toward homosexuality as a clinical illness, and by so doing, casts homophobes as victims rather than victimizers. In this regard, Wickberg (2000) likens homophobia to anti-Semitism, wherein some anti-Semites justified that their oppressive actions toward Jews were a consequence of an uncontrollable medical condition. In line with this perspective, Mison (1992) cites several examples where homophobia was used as a defense strategy in murder cases. In these cases, the defendants argued that a clinical irrational fear of their victim’s homosexual orientation triggered their acts of physical violence.
Related to the conflicting positions on the role of homophobia in gay-rights struggles is the issue of the concept’s applicability to different sexual minority groups. As homophobia was initially framed with specific reference to homosexuality, O’Brien (2008) faults homophobia for failing from a gender and queer perspective to recognize other forms of same-sex sexuality, hence fostering homonormativity and the homo/hetero binary of sexuality. In light of this critique, researchers (for instance Msibi, 2012) tend to apply or stretch the concept of homophobia to all non-straight sexual categories or LGBTQI populations. The stretch on its part leads to the characterization of homophobia as being too broad, vague and hollow. It is however understandable that some researchers borrow and apply the term homophobia to other sexual minority groups, as these groups tend to experience or undergo similar types of discrimination like homosexuals. For the purpose of clarity and to avoid ambiguity in analysis, this paper uses homophobia with specific reference to homosexuality, even though the proposed shades of homophobia could as well apply to other sexual minority groups.
Another subject of contention around homophobia relates to the very definition of the concept as viewed from a linguistic perspective and from a causality standpoint. From the linguistic perspective, the prefix, “homo” which has both Greek and Latin origins raises a question of gender applicability. Herek (2004, p. 9) characterizes homophobia as “ambiguous” on grounds that definitions that follow the Greek interpretation of homo as “sameness” apply the term to both male and female same-sex relationships while others that follow the Latin interpretation of homo as “man” use homophobia with strict reference to the masculine gender. The suffix as Herek (2004) further notes originates from the Greek term, “phobos” which means fear. Although the suffix is not afflicted with the linguistic ambiguity that characterizes the prefix, its meaning raises the even more controversial question of whether negative attitudes toward homosexuality are caused exclusively by fear.
Weinberg’s (1972) original definition of homophobia as the fear of homosexuals continues to raise the causality question. In Herek’s (2004) view, Weinberg’s definition is problematic as it omits other emotional factors such as anger and disgust that also account for negative attitudes toward homosexuality. Kirk and Madsen (1989), for instance, use the term “homo-hatred” to put emphasis on hatred as a major source of negativity toward homosexuality. Mison (1992, p. 147), on his part, retains the term homophobia, but redefines it as “the hatred of gay men and lesbians rather than … a clinical fear of homosexuals.” He sees fear as an excuse used by homophobes in court to justify intentional and hateful acts of violence toward homosexuals. While Mison’s definition totally disregards fear, he nonetheless refers to both fear and anxiety as causes of “latent homosexuality” (Adams, Wright, & Lohr, 1996, p. 441)—a person’s negative attitudes toward homosexuals that is inspired by the individual’s own conscious or unconscious same-sex desires.
While authors like Green (2005) support the attribution of fear as a causal factor for negativity toward homosexuality, others like Haaga (1991), Logan (1996) and Herek (2000, 2004) object to this interpretation. The latter argue that homophobia represents more of a prejudice than a phobia. Haaga (1991) contends that people who experience a phobia would exhibit anxiety and avoidance when faced with the subject of their phobia meanwhile homophobes often express anger and aggression. Despite this viewpoint, Haaga does not totally disregard the possibility of fear or a phobia in homophobia. He proposes the term “antihomosexual prejudice” as a replacement for homophobia and recommends that homophobia be used with strict reference to phobic reactions. Similarly, Herek (2004) underlines the inadequacy of empirical data that show fear as the cause of homophobic attitudes but acknowledges the possibility of fear as an influence.
There is no doubt that literally, fear and hatred refer to different emotional reactions. However, these emotions (although not always) are to some extent interconnected. Fear sometimes breeds hatred which in turn sustains fear; hence it would be inappropriate to consider these two emotional traits as mutually exclusive with reference to homophobia. Researchers who perceive such distinctions as artificial and unnecessary have fused these emotions in their conceptualizations of homophobia (see Flood & Hamilton, 2005; O’Brien, 2008; Pharr, 1997). Murray (2009, p. 3) for example, notes that homophobia:
is not always or only couched in terms of hatred or fear; discrimination against homosexuals can be conveyed through a range of attitudes: from indifference to dismissal, “scientific” logic, “tolerance,” or even a carefully delimited embrace (as in “love the sinner, not the sin”).
Such critique of the separation of the two emotions lends support to those definitions of homophobia that make no specific reference to causality and which are not bogged down by the fear-versus-hatred standoff. As a case in point Robinson (2008, p. 3) defines homophobia as “anti-homosexual policies, practices and behaviours.” This article adopts this definition of homophobia.
To the health sociologist David Plummer (1999), the ambiguities around homophobia are not sufficient reason to discard the concept. He considers homophobia as a relevant term in research because it resonates with everyday discussions on gay rights and has no authentic replacement. Others as mentioned earlier, however, consider homophobia as too controversial and problematic and have suggested alternative vocabularies. There is a variety of terminological choices—heterosexism, homoprejudice, anti-homosexual bias, homonegativism, and sexual prejudice. However, homophobia remains the most popular term both in everyday use and in social science literature, especially as the other suggested vocabularies have weaknesses of their own. The suggested alternative concepts are caught up in the same, and perhaps worse, causality trap as homophobia (Plummer, 1999). Even Herek’s (2000, 2004) most recent and rather appealing suggestion, sexual prejudice, is criticized as equally loaded with “value judgements and attitudes conveyed by ‘homophobia’” (Bowers, Plummer, & Minichiello, 2005, p. 33). Meanwhile, the term heterosexism which is favored by some researchers lacks the “rhetorical and emotional impact” that homophobia commands (Hopkins, 1996, p. 99). Furthermore, Boellstorff (2004) explains that heterosexism cannot replace the term homophobia, as there are contexts where heterosexism prevails but where there is no gay bashing. Even Smith et al. (2012, p. 40) who favor heterosexism over homophobia, concur that heterosexism “fails to sufficiently reflect the fervour of overtly intolerant attitudes and behaviours” toward homosexuality.
Existing Typologies of Homophobia
Before becoming disillusioned with the concept of homophobia, Herek (1986, p. 924) noted that there is not just one homophobia; “there are homophobias.” Attempts have been made to categorize these different types of homophobia. Herek (1986) highlights two types: cultural or institutional homophobia and personal homophobia (also see Mison, 1992). However, Blumenfeld (1992) separates institutional homophobia from cultural homophobia and classifies them as two distinct categories. While institutional homophobia is based on established laws or rules against homosexuality, cultural homophobia constitutes discrimination fostered by societal norms and values that are not written into law. Institutional homophobia is alternatively referred to as state-sponsored homophobia, which for Ottoson (2010, p. 4) would include state laws that “deny the most fundamental human rights to LGBTI people.”
As opposed to institutional and cultural homophobia, personal homophobia is exercised at the individual level. Herek (1986) identifies three types of attitudes that constitute personal homophobia: attitudes that develop from personal experiences, attitudes that arise from self-identity and attitudes that emanate from latent homosexuality. Herek’s discussion of personal homophobia focuses on causality, which as highlighted above is an area of contestation. According to Blumenfeld (1992), personal homophobia is concerned with an individual’s private views that consider heterosexuality as superior to same-sex sexuality. When an individual outwardly manifests such views toward another individual, then it is no longer personal homophobia but constitutes interpersonal homophobia (Blumenfeld, 1992).
Blumenfeld (1992) therefore extends Herek’s (1986) two typologies into a total of four: personal, interpersonal, institutional and cultural homophobia. Herek’s and Blumenfeld’s typologies contribute significantly in giving some structure to the concept of homophobia as they facilitate the grouping of homophobic attitudes. While these typologies specify the different spheres in which homophobia manifests, they do not clearly delineate the different forms which manifestations take. This weakness, coupled with the broadness of the typologies makes them inadequate for analyzing differences in homophobia between societies and across time. For instance, according to Blumenfeld’s typologies, a country like Sudan that criminalizes homosexuality and stipulates a death sentence for third-time offenders (Anderson, 2007) would fall in the same category (institutional homophobia) as countries like Slovakia and Lithuania, which have decriminalized homosexuality but prohibit gay marriage and adoption. While all these countries have laws that portray institutional homophobia, Sudan’s policies are draconian relative to the policies of the other two countries, hence necessitating a different kind of categorization.
Within a society, homophobia whether cultural or institutional is not static and evolves into different forms over time. Developing a typology of homophobia that is more attentive to changes in manifestations of homophobia is therefore crucial. Green (2005) proposes a classification of homophobia putting forward eight different categories; however, like Herek in the case of personal homophobia, her typologies emphasize on causality rather than on manifestations of homophobia. Her categories are not further detailed here as they focus on explaining the factors that instigate the phobia in homophobia, and are therefore too narrow to incorporate those homophobic attitudes that are not based on fear.
Other classifications of homophobia include internalized versus externalized homophobia. Internalized homophobia (Herek, 2004; Sullivan, 2003) refers to a situation where homosexuals manifest self-hatred and are therefore both the source and subject of homophobia. Meanwhile, homophobia portrayed by heterosexuals constitutes externalized homophobia (Sullivan, 2003). The categories, internalized and externalized homophobia are also too broad and are focused on the “who” in terms of sexual orientation. Additional categories include, overt and covert (McCormack & Anderson, 2010); implicit and explicit (Plummer, 1999); or subtle and blatant (Croteau & Morgan, 1989). These classifications are in themselves vague as they are applicable to diverse forms of homophobia, for instance, institutional or interpersonal homophobia can, depending on the specific nature of the discrimination, be overt or covert. In addition to being broad, the dichotomous nature of these classifications is rather problematic as it overlooks intermediaries. In light of the above shortcomings of existing homophobia typologies, this article proposes a more nuanced taxonomy of manifestations of negative attitudes toward homosexuals—the framework of homophobia.
Methods
Integrative literature review which allows robust conclusions to be reached on a subject through a process of synthesizing and critically analyzing several studies (Broome, 2000; Christmals & Gross, 2017) was the methodological approach best suited for this paper’s objective of developing a comprehensive framework of homophobia. The approach is particularly useful for addressing topics for which a rich body of research exists (Torraco, 2005), as is the case with the concept of homophobia, and for research aimed at refining concepts and “stimulating new thinking about a topic” (Torraco, 2016). An internet-based search of academic literature that discussed homophobia was used to collect material for the literature review using various variants of the keywords: “homophobia,” “attitudes against lesbians and gays” and “discrimination against homosexuals.” The scope of the search included published academic literature from 1972 when the concept of homophobia was first put forward up to 2018 (present day). The consulted academic literature included research that addressed the genealogy and evolving conceptualization of homophobia; studies that focused on conceptual critique, and case studies of the manifestations of homophobia in different parts of the world.
The literature search also entailed a snowballing approach whereby the references listed in relevant academic literature served as pointers to other literature on homophobia that were themselves consulted. This snowballing approach helped to ensure that the collection of research works used in the literature review was representative of the body of literature that addressed the key debates on the conceptualization and manifestations of homophobia. In addition to academic literature, news reports that discussed homophobia and contemporary debates on criminalization or decriminalization of homosexuality in different countries were consulted as part of the internet-based search.
The framework of seven shades of homophobia was developed from the literature review through an inductive process of analyzing qualitative data, which “allows research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in … data” (Thomas, 2003, p. 2; Srivastava & Hopwood, 2009). Specifically, cases of gay or lesbian prejudice within the literature that shared a common attribute or defining trait were categorized under one type or shade of homophobia. This process of coding or development of typologies of homophobia focused on the manner in which anti-homosexual attitudes and actions manifest (“the how”), rather than on the causes (“the why”), to enable the framework serve as a tool for discerning such attitudes where they exist. Furthermore, while avoiding the pitfall of having codes that are catch-all in nature, the formulation of typologies followed an “iterative process of analysis” (Yin, 2011, 2014), of moving back and forth to crosscheck if the literature presented any manifestations of homophobia not covered under already constructed codes. This iterative process and consultation of literature continued until a point of saturation was reached (Beyea & Nicoll, 1998) where no additional manifestation of homophobia could be found in the literature that did not fit in the constructed typologies. By this point of saturation, a total of 373 academic papers and 39 news sources had been reviewed. The typologies or seven shades of homophobia arrived at were presented in three research seminars to test the extent to which the framework could be considered comprehensive. Peer researchers in the seminars could not point to any case of homophobia that was not captured within the typologies, thus lending credence to the robustness of the qualitative analysis. As review of literature is the source of data that informed the development of the framework, specific examples within the literature are cited below under each typology to elucidate the key attribute of the specific shade of homophobia.
Shades of Homophobia: A Framework
By its very nature, the term homophobia makes an attack on reputation, as being labeled homophobic is by inference equivalent to being labeled discriminatory, prejudicial, dishonorable, and/or scandalous depending on the context. Given this attribute, the term is both shunned and loathed by those who exhibit negative attitudes toward sexual minorities in that while an individual or institution may openly endorse restriction of rights to homosexuals, they, on the other hand, would vehemently reject the characterization of their actions as homophobic. For instance, in February 2014 in Ireland, the Catholic group, Iona Institute, filed a defamation lawsuit against the outspoken gay-rights activist and drag queen, Panti Bliss (aka Rory O’Neill) and the television channel RTE Ireland, over use of the term homophobia. In an interview with the TV channel, Panti Bliss had characterized as homophobic the Iona Institute’s opposition to a proposed bill on same-sex marriage in Ireland. In its defamation case against Panti Bliss and the television channel, the Iona Institute argued that the label, “homophobic,” was inappropriate as homophobia is a term that should be reserved for societies where homosexuality is banned and punishable under the law, which is not the case in Ireland. Although RTE Ireland agreed to making a settlement of US$114,000 for the controversial lawsuit, Panti Bliss passionately upheld her view of homophobia as a qualifier that encompasses various types of discrimination that deny equal rights to gay people—inclusive of the right to marriage and adoption. In her view, allowing those who advocate against equal rights for gay people to delimit, as they find convenient, the scope of what counts as homophobia and what does not would in itself be the hallmark of prejudice toward persons with same-sex sexual orientation.
The case between the Iona Institute and Panti Bliss highlights how the absence of a clear framework that identifies the various components of homophobia leaves space for subjectivity in interpretation, which contributes in creating a safe haven for some forms of discrimination against gay people to thrive. The framework of homophobia discussed here identifies seven different, yet interrelated, attributes of negativity toward gay men and lesbians that fall under the umbrella term, homophobia, including those forms of prejudice that may be considered relatively mild in some contexts. The framework’s seven shades of homophobia, namely radical, prohibitionist, denialist, avoidance, morbidity, tepid, and veiled homophobia, are discussed below.
Radical Homophobia
Radical homophobia relates to everyday use of the word radical, which includes violence, call for violence or related actions that qualify as extreme. The typology follows Hopkins’ (1996, p. 100) conceptualization of homophobia as “physical violence and strong verbal, economic and juridical abuse against gays.” Radical homophobia can take three different forms. First, it can manifest as direct violence on homosexuals or on gay-rights activists, for instance, rape, beating, stoning, and killing (Herek & Berrill, 1992), also referred to as gay-bashing (Nardi & Bolton, 1991). Instances of this form include the use of corrective rape as a means of “curing” lesbianism in rehabilitation clinics in Ecuador (Caselli, 2012), and cases of rape of lesbians in South Africa (Agbanyim, 2013). Another example is the January 2014 attack on the offices of Alternative Cote d’Ivoire, a prominent gay-rights organization in the Ivory Coast, by a mob of about 200 people (Aljazeera, 2014). Violence of this kind also took place in the Gishiri neighborhood of Abuja in February 2014, just after the enactment of a same-sex marriage prohibition bill in Nigeria. A mob of about forty people broke into the homes of thirteen gay men; beat them with sticks, and forced them to leave the neighborhood (Eichelberger, 2014). In his analysis of a similar attack on a gay man (Paul Broussard) who was beaten and stabbed to death in Texas in 1991, Hopkins (1996, p. 99) frames such acts of violence on gay people as “a radical kind of evil.”
Radical homophobia can also take the form of laws against homosexuality that include some sort of physical violence as the punishment or sanction. Laws in countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia (Nardi & Bolton, 1991), and Sudan (Anderson, 2007) that stipulate a death penalty for acts of homosexuality, and Malaysia that endorse flogging of persons engaged in homosexuality are instances of radical homophobia. Thirdly, radical homophobia can be in the form of fiery rhetoric—hate speech—that dehumanizes homosexuals. Although extreme hate speech is not physical violence per se, its dehumanization of homosexuals makes them fair game for any kind of physical abuse (Reddy, 2002). This is especially so when such fiery rhetoric comes from people in political office or other influential figures or opinion leaders of a society. The characterization of homosexuals as less human or as “worse than dogs and pigs” by the former Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe in 1995, for instance, encouraged or served as a carte blanche for people to assault or victimize homosexuals in their communities without fear of prosecution. In like manner, the 2008 call of the former Gambian president, Yahya Jammeh, for homosexuals to leave Gambia or else he would cut off their heads (Hodes, 2012) was tantamount to denying gays protection against violence under the state. Hate speech against a group can be a strong contributing factor to a climate of intolerance within which violence against that group emerges and takes root, as evidenced by cases in human history like the Ku Klux Klan, Nazism’s atrocities against Jews, and the Rwandan Genocide.
Prohibitionist Homophobia
This type refers to regulatory, normative and value systems that ban or condemn homosexuality, but which unlike radical homophobia do not include physical violence as a measure of enforcing such prohibition. Prohibitionist homophobia, therefore, encompasses Blumenfeld’s (1992) categories of institutional homophobia (rule-based condemnation of same-sex sexuality), and cultural homophobia (norm and value-based prohibition). Under this shade of homophobia, prejudice against homosexuals can include a range of sanctioning measures such as imprisonment, fines, shaming, social exclusion, and so forth.
Specific examples of rule-based prohibitionist homophobia include Section 347 bis of the Cameroon Criminal Code (Fomeni, 2012) and Article 319 of the Senegalese Penal Code (M’baye, 2013) which forbid homosexuality; violation of which is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years and/or fines of up to 200,000 CFA Francs in the case of Cameroon and up to 1,500,000 CFA Francs for Senegal. The homosexuality laws enacted in Russia in June 2013 and in Nigeria in January 2014 that criminalize any form of advocacy for gay rights depict yet another dimension of prohibitionist homophobia. Such bills mirror the prejudice of the failed 1970s “Briggs Initiative” of Californian State Senator, John Briggs, which sought to prohibit homosexuality by proposing a law that called for public school teachers who expressed support for gay rights to face dismissal (Blumenfeld, 1992). Rule-based prohibition may also manifest as a targeted exclusion of homosexuals from some forms of employment or social activities. The United States, for instance, upheld a ban on lesbians and gay men to serve in the military, until this exclusion was ruled as unconstitutional and revoked in 2011 (McVeigh & Harris, 2011). Similarly, the United Kingdom maintained until 2011 a blanket law that excluded gay men from donating blood. Such prohibitive laws pertaining to blood donation remained in force in Northern Ireland until 2016 when it was abolished (Connolly, 2016).
Prohibitionist homophobia that is based on values and norms vary in form depending on social and cultural context. Religious doctrine especially Christianity plays a tremendous role in promoting and upholding values and norms-based homophobia across widely different contexts throughout the world. Lyonga (2016) for instance highlights how Pentecostal Christian churches fuel negative attitudes toward homosexuality in Cameroon by construing homosexuality as an abomination for which the Biblical God will unleash severe punishment on the societies that practice or endorse it. Stereotypical values and norms around homosexuality often translate into the use of derogatory jokes and labels against gays, for instance, fagots, dykes and “pede” (short for pedophile, commonly used in West Africa in reference to gay men). As such pejorative references aim to discourage homosexuality through ridicule (Hopkins, 1996; Kimmel, 1994) they embody the attribute of prohibitionist homophobia.
Denialist Homophobia
Denialist homophobia includes refusal to acknowledge the existence of homosexuality in a given society or denial to recognize homosexuality as possibly innate. An example is the notion of homosexuality as “un-African” (Cock, 2003, p. 41), wherein same-sex sexuality is presented as a problematic phenomenon from the “morally decadent” West whose introduction in Africa is corrupting African values on sexuality. Denialist homophobia can be seen in the nationalist opposition to gay rights by some African politicians and opinion leaders, who claim to be resisting the external imposition of a practice that historically did not and does not exist in Africa (Epprecht, 2013b). The “it does not exist here” claim is however not limited to the African context. Prior to the 2014 Sochi Olympics in Russia, the Mayor of Sochi, Anatoly Pakhomov stated that homosexuality “is not accepted here in the Caucasus where we live. We do not have them [homosexuals] in our city” (BBC News, 2014).
Denialist homophobia also applies to situations where negative attitudes toward homosexuality arise from a person’s rejection of their own same-sex sexual desires, as is the case with latent homosexuality and internalized homophobia. Herek (1986) notes that with latent homosexuality, the individual refuses to acknowledge their own homosexual feelings by outwardly expressing contempt toward gay men and lesbians. In internalized homophobia, the individual refuses to accept their sexual orientation even though they engage in homosexual intercourse, and tend to adopt “covert lifestyles” (Miller & Humphreys, 1980, p. 169) even in contexts where homosexuality is not criminalized or stigmatized. Moreover, they often experience self-hatred that may lead to suicide (see Richmond & McKenna, 1998). Denialist homophobia could lead to manifestations that fall within the other shades of homophobia. For instance, when an individual with latent homosexuality or internalized homophobia reacts violently toward gay men and lesbians or inflicts harm on themselves, respectively, such actions would also be classified as radical homophobia.
Avoidance Homophobia
Richmond and McKenna (1998, p. 365) list as one of the attributes of homophobia: “an overwhelming desire … to avoid physical contact/interaction with homosexual individuals.” Homophobia that takes this form can be referred to as avoidance homophobia. The degree of avoidance can range from gross aversion to even discussing the subject of homosexuality to more tempered avoidance. In the case of the latter, the individual may hold the view that homosexuals should exist and should not be imprisoned, but such existence should be clandestine. Bersani (1995, p. 19) qualifies such individuals or societies as agents that favor a “closety atmosphere,” where homosexuality is tolerable as long as it is not in their face or that of the public. Individuals with avoidance homophobia are quick to condemn any public expression of affection by homosexual couples, such as the holding of hands, as exhibitionism or flaunting (see Doan, Loehr, & Miller, 2014). The prejudice here is that while they would relegate homosexuality to the shadows, they would celebrate similar or more expressive show of affection by heterosexual couples (e.g. hugging and kissing) as poetically romantic or really cute.
Sharpe (2002, p. 268) notes that negative attitudes toward homosexuality are seldom based on “personal contact with lesbian or gay … people but [rather] on hearsay and stereotype.” Avoidance-type homophobia, where an individual averts interpersonal interaction with homosexuals, therefore serves to sustain the stereotype cycle, as it bars any opportunity for such preconceptions to be weighed and debunked through actual experience and understanding. Avoidance homophobia especially has negative repercussions for gay people when it manifests in nurses and other caregivers in hospital settings, as it may result in substandard care and depression for the patient (Irwin, 2007).
Morbidity Homophobia
Morbidity homophobia relates to the perception of homosexuality as a disease or a bringer of disease. It includes instances where homosexuality is framed as a psychological illness, a biological defect, or a spiritual affliction. Homosexuality was for instance classified as a mental disease in the United States until 1973 when the American Psychiatric Association Board of Directors voted to remove it from its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Blumenfeld, 1992; Herek, 2004). The conceptualization of homosexuality as a genetic gender error (Butler, 1993; Hopkins, 1996; Sullivan, 2003) inspires in many parts of the world the establishment of clinics and rehabilitation centers that claim to “cure” people of homosexuality. Legislation banning such therapy for gay teenagers in California only came into effect in January 2013, following which a similar ban was made in New Jersey (Filipovic, 2013). Many other states in the US, however, still allow corrective therapy for gays. The ex-gay movement, which consists of lesbians and gay men who profess of having been “cured” of homosexuality and who encourage others to seek or accept corrective therapy (see Fetner, 2005), fuels this perception of homosexuality as a genetic defect.
The perception of homosexuality as a spiritual affliction, for instance, the attribution of homosexuality in Cameroon to occultism (Geschiere, 2010, 2017), is particularly common in settings where belief in the existence of witchcraft and demonic powers is strong. Many films on homosexuality by the Nigerian film industry, Nollywood, represent homosexuality as a demonic influence that can be corrected through charismatic prayer and spiritual deliverance by a Christian pastor (Lyonga, 2014). Morbidity homophobia can also manifest through the association of homosexuality with licentiousness and the characterization of homosexuals as bringers of AIDS (Mison, 1992; Reid & Dirsuweit, 2002). Such conceptualization was prevalent in the United States in the 1980s when Kaposi’s sarcoma was referred to as gay cancer, and HIV/AIDS stereotypically attributed to the “gay lifestyle” (MacKinnon, 2005) or in other words, a promiscuous lifestyle.
Tepid Homophobia
In tepid homophobia, the society or individual is not against the practice of homosexuality but is against extending to gay people rights that have traditionally been associated with heterosexuality, such as rights to marriage and adoption (Brodzinsky & Pertman, 2012; Mison, 1992). It also applies to cases where even when gay marriage is legal, associated marital rights such as “spousal benefits and child custody” are not applied to sexual minorities (Blumenfeld, 1992, p. 5). The tepid shade of homophobia can therefore be referred to as “rights-with-limits homophobia,” as it permits homosexuals to have rights, but only to a certain limit. The extent of rights permitted may vary from context to context, depending on what, in their largess, the heteronormative individual or society is comfortable to allow at the time.
With the satirical caption, “Will you civil partnership me?”—as opposed to “Will you marry me?”—gay activists criticize as tepid discrimination the fact that same-sex union in countries like Germany and Czech Republic are limited to “registered civil partnership.” Also, it is only in 2013, that the French parliament, amidst massive antigay marriage protests, voted in favor of extending rights to marriage to same-sex couples, bringing an end to the double standard position on marriage. Similarly, over a dozen states in the United States of America had a ban on same-sex marriage until 2015, when the Supreme Court passed a historic ruling for same-sex marriages to be recognized nationwide (BBC News, 2015).
Veiled Homophobia
As its name suggests, veiled homophobia relates to disguised forms of prejudice toward gay men and lesbians. Homophobia under this category is often subtle and could go unnoticed as it shrouds itself under some sort of excuse or justification—the veil—that can range from flimsy to elaborate. This type is exhibited more in contexts where anti-discrimination laws exist and where manifestations of homophobia are frowned upon; consequently, people or institutions are tactful in their prejudice toward homosexuals. In the workplace, veiled homophobia can manifest as non-recommendation of a highly qualified and experienced staff for promotion, even though the staff’s performance clearly meets the criteria for granting a promotion (Savin-Williams, 1993).
Veiled homophobia can also be observed in situations where law enforcement officials treat with disinterest and nonchalance investigations into homicides involving gay or presumed gay victims. Davis (2007, p. 501) discusses the case of the “gay gang murders,” a series of murders of homosexuals in the late 1980 and early 1990s in Bondi, Sydney, which to a great extent were carelessly handled and neglected by police investigators for over a decade. She notes that given the presumed sexuality of the victims, the police did not consider the loss of lives as “worthy of grieving,” nor did they consider the investigation of the crimes as a priority for police resources. In this case, other issues considered as more important were the excuse or “veil” for the indifference toward the hate crimes. Prejudice in veiled homophobia sometimes manifests as longstanding preconceptions that individuals continue to hold on to even when contemporary laws have made such assumptions invalid. Hunter (2015), for example, discusses a situation in Canada where parenthood in some social settings and particularly among health-care providers is often associated automatically with heterosexuality, despite the country’s legal recognition of same-sex marriage. This heteronormative assumption, she notes, puts lesbian parents in a perpetual and frustrating position of needing to clarify they are not heterosexual, leaving them with a feeling of being invisible in a context where their legal right to be parents is not in question. In veiled homophobia, while the institution or individual that exhibits the double standard may be conscious of their bias, they do not see it as problematic but as the way things are or should be. Moreover, they can easily take refuge in the claim that their actions were innocent and those who feel aggrieved have read too much meaning in their attitude. Such is the nature of the veil.
Conclusion
The framework of homophobia discussed in this article lends support to conceptualizations of homophobia that encompass both fear and hatred; such as Cook-Daniels’ (1998, p. 37) definition of homophobia as “fear of and/or hatred towards homosexuals.” The categories or shades of the framework (radical, prohibitionist, denialist, avoidance, morbidity, tepid, and veiled homophobia) clarify the different dimensions of discrimination and prejudice that fall under this broad definition. In doing so, the shades of homophobia provide a more structured lens through which different qualitative researchers can look at a given setting and reach the same conclusion on the manifestations of negative attitudes toward homosexuals therein.
While some of the shades are obviously more grievous than others (for example, radical homophobia versus veiled homophobia), the proposed framework deliberately refrains from imposing a hierarchical structure to the types of homophobia for two reasons. First, the typologies are not mutually exclusive, and rather are interrelated shades of a spectrum of prejudices against gay men and lesbians depending on the social context in which they are. Secondly, making any upfront assumptions about the grievousness of one shade of homophobia relative to others will be presumptuous, as the individual who endures a particular shade of homophobia is the best judge of its severity. Homophobia may be considered as being at its worst by a teenager who is driven to self-hate and depression by family members pressuring for him or her to undergo spiritual cleansing and/or hormonal therapy (morbidity homophobia). Yet to another individual, the most disturbing experience of homophobia could be living in perpetual fear of being “found out” in a society where homosexuality is forbidden (prohibitionist homophobia). Not imposing a hierarchical structure to the framework, therefore, leaves room for the researcher or analyst to articulate, as part of qualitative analysis, what each shade of homophobia means for the individual, group or context that is the focus of discussion. And should the analysis of a particular context reveal a manifestation of homophobia that is not represented by any of the seven shades of the framework, an additional shade may then be advanced as an update to the proposed framework of homophobia.