Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif. Arab Studies Quarterly. Volume 40, Issue 3, Summer 2018.
There is an established literature which argues that the Druze of Palestine were either neutral during the Colonial period or supportive of the Zionist Agency and its plans. The aim of this research is to counter the Zionist narratives that promote the concept of Druze-Zionist cooperation. I argue that the Druze were supportive of the Palestinian-Arab cause, and they heavily participated in the anti-colonial activities of the Palestinians, politically and militarily. Their military participation was manifested in their participation in the events of 1929, 1936, and 1948. Politically, Sheikh Amin Tarif led the community in their stance against Zionism. This research will provide a new account and narrative for the Druze role in the events in mandatory Palestine, revealing their supportive stance to the Palestinian national struggle.
Introduction
The success of Sherif Hussein’s Arab revolt against the Ottomans, with British support, gave the opportunity for the British forces to station themselves in Palestine. However, the British were unable to establish direct political control over Palestine until the San Remo conference in 1920, when the League of Nations entrusted Britain and France mandatory powers over previously held Ottoman regions in the Middle East. In this context, the Druze community in Palestine, a conservative, traditional, rural, and marginalized minority in Palestine, came in contact with three powerful forces simultaneously: the British authorities as a mandatory power, the Arab nationalists from urban centers, and the Zionist group. Thus, the new situation was a breakaway from the last 402 years of Ottoman rule. The aim of this research is to provide a new understanding and interpretation of the political behavior of the Druze community in Palestine.
Academics consider the Druze to be neutral in the period under study, and some talked about a Druze-Jewish alliance. I propose looking at the Druze political stance from a new angle: one that considers the Druze political behavior during the British mandate, as countering the colonial and Zionist plans for Palestine. I do not aim at documenting historical events, but rather to analyze these events and interpret accordingly the Druze stance. Hence, I extensively use the historical data and primary material provided by the academic work of Kais Firro, Laila Parsons, Zeidan Atashe, Yoav Gelber, and Said Naffa’. I will use the same data as those authors, but my arguments and conclusions will differ as I consider that the Druze took a staunch stance against Zionism. Consequently, this study refines the narrative of the Palestinian Druze political behavior and points out to the historical misconceptions with respect to the role of the Druze community.
The article consists of four parts. The first part discusses the Druze socio-political context in the Palestine. It is hard to explain the Druze political behavior in Palestine without considering the general attitude of the Druze in the region as a whole because their behavior in the region was consistent in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. The second part deals with the Druze stance in 1926 during the short-lived civil unrest. I then move on to the third part which studies the Druze participation in the 1936-39 Palestinian rebellion, and finally, the fourth part engages with the Druze commitment to the Palestinian cause throughout the war in 1948.
The Socio-Political Context of the Druze Community
The Druze community in Palestine inhabits different areas in Northern Palestine. In the coastland, the Druze community live in the Yirka, Jathth, Kuwaykat, Mimas, Iklil al-Hanbaliyya, and Abu Snaan. They inhabit four towns in the Shagour region: al-Ramah, Sajour, Shafa’mr, and al-Maghar. In the Galilee, they inhabit seven towns: al-Buqai’ah, Bet Jan, Harfish, Jat al-Jalil, Ain al-Assad, Kfar Sami’, and Yanuh. In the Carmel, the Druze are settled only in two towns which are ‘Isfiya and Daliyat al-Karmel. In other parts of historical Palestine, the Druze live in other mixed towns and cities, where they are a small minority, examples of which are Ilat, Bir as-Sabe’, Jan Yafti, Haifa, Jerusalem, Kfar Yasif, Acre, Hobuut, Sheikh Yazbek, Tel Aviv, and Yafa.
The general character of the Druze population in Palestine was predominantly that of an independent peasantry deriving their livelihood from their own pastoral and agricultural labor. By 1948, most of the Druze lived in rural villages in the mountains away from the metropolitan Arab-Palestinian cities, and the community suffered from ignorance and illiteracy. Therefore, political ideologies did not find their way to the Druze in Palestine. The Druze villages were remote, and their preoccupation with their day-to-day affairs limited their interaction with other sections of the Palestinian population, mainly the urbanized Muslim elites. The social class of the Druze was that of farmers, and farmers have little influence in political affairs.
Hajj Amin al-Husseini established the Supreme Muslim Council in 1922, without inviting the Druze to take part in the council. One reason for the Druze exclusion was the 402 years of Ottoman rule in Palestine which institutionalized the Druze subordination to the Muslim community in political, social, and religious affairs. Another reason was that most Palestinian Druze lived in small towns and rural areas where they had no voice among the politicized urban elite. Despite that, when some Druze were calling for the establishment of a Druze Council separate from the Muslim community in Palestine, the Druze religious establishment did not support the proposal and the plan failed.
The Palestinian Druze never had a feudal family to rally around for temporal political purposes. They always looked to the feudal Druze families in Lebanon and Syria for leadership and political guidance. In addition, the lack of leading families paved the way for a greater role to be played in political affairs by religious leaders. This explains the strong leadership of Sheikh Amin Tarif as community leader from 1928 until his death in 1993. His religious credentials were unmatched by any other person, and this legitimized his leadership over the Druze in Palestine.
The Civil Unrest of 1929
With the beginning of the mandate in Palestine, the British authority committed itself to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, by which Britain promised to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine to establish a state for the Jews. The Balfour declaration and the political activity of the Jewish Agency created a tense situation since Palestinians perceived it as a threat to their vital interests. Ethnic tension manifested itself in the violence that erupted in August 1929 around the Wailing Wall, which is adjacent to the Muslim al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.
The clashes that erupted around the Wailing Wall lasted for two weeks. Despite its short duration, the civil unrest had an important consequence: it mobilized and politicized the inhabitants of Palestine according to ethnic belonging. While the two main groups were the Muslim Palestinians and the Jewish immigrants, the Druze stance was mistakenly accounted as a neutral one. Firro considered that the Druze perceived the clashes as one bearing a religious character, and because their towns were not affected by the clashes, the community opted for neutrality. Laila Parsons shared Firro’s conclusion that “the Druze in Palestine were not involved in the rioting that took place in 1929.” She failed to mention, however, that the Druze in Palestine participated in the first form of anti-Zionist and anti-British military resistance, when Ahmad Tafesh, a Druze from Safad, Palestine, formed the Green Palm Gang (‘Isdbat al-Kaf al-Akhdar). Despite mentioning that the Green Palm Gang was formed and operated by Druzes, Firro maintains that the Druze were neutral from 1929. However, it is unclear how the Druze were neutral when the gang executed several military operations against Zionist settlements in Safad and other places in northern Palestine, as well as in some areas in Jerusalem and Acre. The organization was the first of its kind in Palestine, but other communities failed to support it; eventually, the harsh measures taken by the British authorities against it led to its disintegration.
This organization is important for three main reasons. First, it proved that the Druze community in Palestine was not afraid of taking sides and supporting the Palestinian cause. Even though the community was rural and politically disenfranchised (until the 1930s, more than 95 percent of Druze manpower was occupied in agriculture and pasturage), the Druze were aware of their national and religious orientation. Second, despite the small number of Palestinian Druze that did not surpass 10,000 people at that time, the military stance reflected their confidence in their political expression and identification. Hence, we cannot consider that the Druze were neutral, nor can we ignore and disregard the presence of a military organization run and operated by the Druze. It is true that the gang failed to operate for more than few months, but it coincided with the first Muslim-Zionist clash in Palestine. Third, the creation of the gang in the aftermath of the clashes around the Wailing Wall reaffirmed the Druze claim that they are an indispensable part of the Arab and Islamic world. It is important to contextualize the establishment and the activities of the gang as a Muslim reaction to the Zionist activities around the al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock, as well as a reaction to the increasing Jewish immigration into Palestine and the political presence of the Zionist movement. Hence, by forming such a military organization at that time, the Druze negated any skepticism regarding their Arab and Islamic belonging.
Another important Druze initiative was in late 1929 when Shakib Wahhab proposed to the Mufti of Palestine, Sheikh Amin al-Husseini, for the latter to help create a gang that would fight the British and the Zionists. Nevertheless, the Mufti rejected the proposal and considered that it was not the right time for military activities. Hence, it is fair to consider that the general Druze stance in 1929 was a staunch support for the Palestinian military activities against the British forces and the Zionists.
Within a year, the British controlled the situation but at a high cost: 133 Jews dead and 339 injured, while 116 Arabs were killed and 232 injured, around 1,000 people were put to trial: 900 Arabs and 100 Jews. The events convinced Zionist and Arab leaders that military activity is a necessary option, and hence they began preparing for another military showdown which took place in 1936 and lasted until 1939.
The Palestinian Rebellion: 1936-39
As the Jewish Agency increasingly began to purchase lands and settle Jewish immigrants in the Galilee, the Druze began to object to the Jewish settlement in areas near them, which led to bloody clashes in the town of Buqai’ah in 1930, followed by another clash in 1934. In order to overcome challenges in Palestine, the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Council established the Joint Bureau for Arab Affairs in 1930 to create contact with Arabs inside and outside Palestine. The Zionists in Palestine were interested, above all, in establishing contact with the Druze community in the region. According to Yoav Gelber, the fierce resistance of the Druze against the French army in Syria (1925) convinced the Zionist leadership that it is critical to neutralize or align the Druze with their cause. Hence, Zionist figures such as Abba Hushi and Yitzhak Ben Zvi began cultivating relations with the Druze. Their main policy was to follow the colonial policy of divide and conquer, by exploiting Druze factionalism and political rivalry between the three leading families: the Tarifs of Julis, Mu’addis of Yarka, and Kheirs of Abu Snaan.
Druze internal relations became intense in 1932, when a young educated Palestinian Druze by the name of Abdallah Kheir introduced a new concept to the Druze community: he proposed the making of a Druze Union Society, which would be responsible for conducting the affairs of the Druze community, and its members would come from all Druze villages. He also wanted to put the Druze endowment (waqf) under the supervision of the Druze Union Society and, in particular, the Nabi Shu’aib shrine in Hittin, which was under the supervision of the Tarif family, in an attempt to undermine the influence of the Tarifs. The Tarifs perceived themselves as the legitimate guardians of the shrine since the nineteenth century, so they rejected Kheir’s proposal. The Zionists exploited the incident to manipulate the factionalism and gain themselves a Druze ally. At the beginning, they tried to establish contact with Sheikh Amin Tarif, considering his position as a paramount Druze spiritual leader. However, he refrained from widening contacts with the Zionists, so they turned to Abdallah Kheir, who cooperated with them. Tension between the two camps reached its climax in April 1933 during the Druze annual gathering in the Druze Nabi Shu’aib shrine, causing a bloodshed among the Druze, and the crisis ended with the intervention of the Lebanese Druze religious men. For this purpose, the Yazbaki and the Joumblatti Sheikh al-Aqel, Rashid Tali’, and Hussein Hamadah were dispatched to Palestine and succeeded in creating a compromise between the two groups. The settlement agreed upon stated that Abdallah Kheir would retire from public affairs, so Sheikh Amin Tarif became the paramount spiritual and political leader of the Druze community in Palestine.
The Zionist establishment lost a strong ally with Kheir’s withdrawal from the political scene in the Druze community. Since Sheikh Amin Tarif was not interested in expanding any Druze-Zionist relationship, Abba Hushi and Ben Zvi began cultivating relationships with second-rank Druze families. Between 1930 and 1936, Abba Hushi had managed to create close ties with the Abu Rukn family from Isfaya, in particular, with Hasan Abu Rukn. In addition, the Jewish Agency recruited another Palestinian Druze from a second-rank family named Salih Khnaifes.
The continuous Jewish immigration into Palestine with British support led to the first full-scale Palestinian revolt against the British authority and Zionist agencies in April 1936. Firro considered that a small number of Druze joined the rebellion: a few Druzes from ‘Isfiya joined the rebels from the Muslim villages in the Haifa area, while others joined the group of Fakhri Abd Hadi, and a third group under the command of Qasim Ghadban in Buqai’a ambushed a column of British army cars. Parsons shared Firro’s narrative and added that the Druze were put under pressure from the rebel leaders to join in the military activities. It is true that the Druze were under pressure from the Muslim rebels, especially, due to the intimidating activities of Labib Abu Rukn, Salih Khnaifes, and Yusuf al-‘Aisami, who played a role in selling lands to the Jewish Agency. Nevertheless, both authors disregarded the important battles that the Druze participated in during the revolt. For instance, Naffa’ wrote that the Druze participated in five main battles between the rebels and the British authorities. In addition, Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the military leader of the rebellion, created a Druze squad under the leadership of the Lebanese Druze Najib Saab which consisted of many Palestinian Druzes, some of whom became squad leaders, and four Druze personnel in this rebel group were killed in action against the British. Despite these efforts, the military activities under Qawuqji were briefly stopped at the end of 1936, but it resumed its work in 1937 with a new leadership.
The first military confrontation between Palestinian Druze and Zionist bands was between August and September 1936. A Druze band under the command of Hamad Saab participated in the battle of Bal’ah, by which the Druze succeeded in bringing down two warplanes, killing one pilot, and three lieutenants, while nine members of the band were killed and buried in the town of Aintaba. The second battle took place in Tarshiha-Naharaya, where the local leader Sheikh Salman Ghadban from Buqai’ah gathered a group of 60 armed men from the local Druze in the region. The group managed to kill three British soldiers, and the intensity of the battle obliged the British to use airpower against the rebels, which led to the death of 29 Druze, and eight injured. In 1937, Ghadban attacked the British again but was overwhelmed by their forces, which led to his death along with three other Druzes: Mohammad Ghadban, Yusuf Kheir, and Saleh Shaumari. The fourth battle took place in Faradiyah, where the Druze from Bet Jan participated in the fight, and the British used heavy weaponry as well as their warplanes, killing and injuring tens of Druzes in the process. The final battle took place in the Abu Firah Mountain, where the British defeated the Druze, and 13 fighters were killed in action.
The participation of the Druze of Palestine in these five battles, which were fierce and led to heavy casualties among the Druze, meant that the community had a clear stance with respect to the events in Palestine. However, it is no secret that the Druze rebels were having difficulties in arranging themselves after 1937. Therefore, after the heavy defeat of the Druze in different battles and due to the weak political communication that they had with the Muslim elites, the Druze became less enthusiastic about joining the rebels. Nevertheless, at that time, there was no military cooperation between the Druze and the Zionists. All the Zionists could do was to mobilize their friends from the Abu Rukn and Khnaifes families to persuade the Druze of Lebanon and Syria not to join the rebels. Zeid Abu Rukun talked to religious men in Lebanon, while Hasan Abu Rukun talked to religious men in Syria, and Ben Zvi recruited Yusuf al-‘Aisami, a Syrian Druze who participated in the 1925 Great Syrian Revolt with Sultan al-Atrash, to persuade his community not to fight in Palestine.
The Zionist recruitment of Druze members from the Abu Rukun and Khnaifes families sparked fear of betrayal among the Sunni military leadership. The Muslim leadership in Palestine disregarded the Druze participation in Qawuqji’s army, and by 1937, mutual distrust between Druze and Sunni Palestinians led to instances of humiliation of Druze townsmen in mixed villages. In 1938, the collaboration of the Abu Rukun family with the Zionists angered a rebel leader by the name of Youssef Said Abu Durra who attacked Isfaya (the town that Abu Rukn originated from), caused damage to the city, assaulted Druze women, and desecrated Druze religious texts. As a result, the British forces attacked Abu Durra’s group, killing him and his men. This incident raises two important issues: First, why did the British disregard Abu Durra’s activities in the north of Palestine until his group attacked, humiliated, and desecrated Druze holy books? Second, why was this armed group in particular so aggressive toward the Druze, with no major attacks against the Zionists and the British being reported? Probably the logical answer is that the British intentionally allowed Abu Durra’s group to move freely in the north of Palestine and, particularly, in the regions with a Druze presence, because of Abu Durra’s anti-Druze sentiments. It is hard to imagine that a national military leader, responsible for an anti-colonial revolution, decided to divert his efforts and energies to attack a minority that already participated in the same rebellion before his group came into existence. Hence, assaulting the Druze community due to the collaboration of few members of two low-ranking families is more of an act of sabotage and a conspiracy to allow the Jewish Agency to actively use the incident that serves the colonial policy of divide and conquer.
The ‘Isfiya incident empowered the Jewish Agency which promoted a more ambitious plan; rather than asking for Druze neutrality, the agency introduced the idea of a transfer plan. For this purpose, Abba Hushi ordered al-‘Aisami to establish communication with Sultan al-Atrash, who was the prominent Druze figure at that time. Abba Hushi paid two visits to Sultan. The first one was in August 1938 where Sultan rejected any sort of cooperation with the Zionists. The second, in April 1939, where al-‘Aisami, on behalf of Abba Hushi, officially proposed the transfer plan. Sultan’s response was that “if our brothers [The Druze of Palestine] have the desire to come here [To Syria] voluntarily and see that it would be to their benefit, we have no objection.”
With respect to Sultan’s decision not to develop political relations with the Zionists, it was a normal decision considering that the man was the first anti-colonial leader in the Middle East. In addition, Sultan’s statement might have sounded vague, but if we want to analyze it and look at it from the lens of the Druze mentality, his statement was clear. Sultan used the term “voluntarily” to state his acceptance of Druze migration from Palestine to Syria. Nevertheless, throughout Druze history, forced migration only happened once in 1711 when there was an intra-power struggle between Lebanese Druze families over supremacy in Lebanon. The Qaisi coalition defeated the Yemeni coalition, and the latter was forced to migrate to Hawran in Syria. Also, voluntary migration took place due to economic hardships, which explains why Druzes from Lebanon migrated to Syria during the eighteenth century. However, it has never happened that the Druze migrated due to the use of force against them or as a result of expulsion from their land by non-Druze. This explains why there are still Druze in Idlib and Aleppo, despite the fact that these two regions had witnessed long periods of instability before the Ottoman conquest in 1516, and today, as a result of the Syrian civil war. Hence, researchers have overlooked the term “voluntary” in Sultan’s statement, which happened to be a critical and defining term that explains his position. Due to the crisis in the 1930s, Sultan knew that the Druze migration was not going to happen voluntarily, and hence the use of this term in his response to Yusuf al-‘Aisami and Abba Hushi.
Another explanation of Sultan’s stance was his association with Arab nationalists who had unequivocal opposition to Zionism, chief among them were the Arslan brothers, Adel and Shakib. Adel Arslan participated in the Great Syrian Revolution and was then exiled with Sultan al-Atrash to Transjordan. He tried (with his brother) to influence the Druze of Palestine to take a more aggressive stance against Zionism. Shakib, however, was more into politics and ideology (despite his brief Jihad in Libya against the Italians). After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, he spent his time in exile in Europe, so he had the advantage of keeping up with Zionist activities. In a series of articles, Shakib rejected cooperation with Zionism and continuously attacked its activities in Palestine. He did not object to the Zionist plan of uniting Jews but rejected the establishment of a Jewish state on an Arab land. Because of his eminence all over the Arab and Islamic world, the Zionist Agency tried to approach Shakib, and in November 1934, a meeting was set up with Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion tried to win Shakib to his side by stating that the Jewish presence in Palestine can benefit Arabs by supporting their anti-colonial movements and providing financial support to Arab states, a proposition that Shakib rejected.
There is, however, a misconception about Sultan’s association with Zionism. Laila Parsons and Yoav Gelber considered that Sultan had personal reasons to cooperate with the Jewish Agency, explaining that Sultan wanted a deal with the agency so that it can help persuade the French government to allow his return to Syria. The question is then why would Sultan cooperate with the Jewish Agency when he could have easily cooperated with the British and made use of a British influence over the French to allow him to return to Syria? In other words, if Sultan wanted to strike a deal with the French, why would he use the Zionists and not the British as intermediaries? Parsons stated that Sultan returned home in 1937 due in large to the efforts of the Jewish Agency, while Gelber considered that Sultan needed the Jews to strike a deal with the French government. However, it is hard to put together an argument that Sultan returned home due to the efforts of the Jewish Agency, and then rejected Druze-Zionist cooperation when Abba Hushi visited him in the same year. On the contrary, in 1936, Sultan dispatched Shakib Wahhab in to assist the Arab rebels in Palestine, which contradicts Gelber and Parsons’s claim about Druze cooperation with the Zionists.
Reconciliation and Commitment
Abu Durra’s retribution in ‘Isfiya led to the deterioration of Druze-Muslim relations in northern Palestine, and in the summer of 1939, there were bloody events in Shafa’amr which led to the killing of eleven Druze. To prevent further bloodshed, the Druze of Palestine cooperated with representatives of the Muslim and Christian communities of northern Palestine, and they reached an agreement that blood money would be paid for the Druze, while the British authorities would free the six Palestinians convicted of murder of Druzes and awaiting execution.
The Jewish Agency, from its side, could not accept a reconciliation between the Druze and the Muslims because that would hinder the interest of the Zionists in attracting the Druze to their side. For this purpose, Abba Hushi intervened on a couple of instances: first, he asked Saleh Khnaifes to reject the reconciliation proposal, and second, he spread rumors through his agents that the Muslims are planning an all-out attack on the Druze in Palestine. Consequently, the reconciliation efforts failed.
The failure of the Palestinian Druze to reach a reconciliation with their Muslim counterparts pushed the Druze of Syria to intervene. For this purpose, a Syrian Druze delegation led by Abd al-Ghaffar al-Atrash met with Sheikh As’ad Qaddura, and on January 14, 1940, the two communities in Shafa’mr agreed on a draft reconciliation. It might be the case that the Syrian Druze suspected a Zionist role in the failure of the Palestinian Druze initiative, and this prompted the Syrian Druze to intervene on behalf of their Palestinian brethren. Eventually, the success of reconciliation abolished any doubts with respect to the transfer plan, and it paved the way for Druze participation in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948.
The Druze during the First Arab-Israeli War
It is critical to revisit the Druze role in 1948, as some researchers have misinterpreted the Palestinian Druze military and political stance during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. For instance, Kais Firro considers that the Palestinian Druze preferred a waiting attitude when the war started, Benny Morris writes that the Druze and Circassian villages nowhere resisted the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) advance, Robert Brenton Betts states that the Palestinian Druze had not contributed to the Arab forces fighting in 1948, while Zeidan Atashe and Laila Parsons believe that the Druze sided with the Zionist forces.
As 1948 approached, the Jewish Agency became worried about the possibility of a Druze participation in the war against them. To avoid Druze enlisting on the Arab side, Elias Sasson and Ya’acov Shin’oni ordered Labib Abu Rukn and Salih Khnaifes to disseminate the idea of neutrality and friendship between the Druze and Jews. For this purpose, a Druze association was established and headed by Tawfiq Abi-Hamdan to counter the influential anti-Zionist “Association of Aiding Poor Druzes” (established by Dr. Yusuf Yahya, Dr. Naif Hamza, and Judge Hussein Abd al-Salam) which was popular in many Druze areas. The association mobilized many Druze to support the Palestinian cause, politically and militarily. There were other similar associations established by Palestinian Druze, examples of which are the Druze Fraternity Club in ‘Isfiya, along with two other associations in Rama and Buqai’a. In return, the Jewish Agency stepped up its activities among the Syrian and Lebanese Druze to stop Palestinian recruitment, and the Jewish Agency exploited Jaber Mu’addi’s support to the Zionists and encouraged the creation of a Druze militia. Firro mentions that the Druze were suspicious of Mu’addi’s militia because of collaboration with the Zionists, so it failed. The failure of this militia is a further proof that the Druze began to mobilize in support of the Palestinian cause.
The real turning point that explicitly establishes Druze support for the Palestinians and active enrollment against Zionism was in the 1948 war. When Fawzi al-Qawuqji was recruiting for the Arab Salvation Army (ASA) to defend Palestine, he enlisted a 500 Druze strong force led by the Lebanese Druze Shakib Wahhab, whose brigade was stationed in Shafa’mr. Another brigade in the ASA was called the Qadisiyah brigade, which came under the command of a Druze lieutenant named Fayez Hdaifah, accompanied by two Druze sergeants: Naufal al-Hajlah and Yousef Karkut. Kamal al-Kanj, a Syrian nationalist, organized a group of 250 Druzes from Syria to join the Palestinians in their struggle. Two other Druze chiefs, Husayn Hassun and Qasim Halabi, also succeeded in recruiting Druzes, and in January 1948, a group of Druzes from Syria were recruited by Naif Huzayfa and joined the force of al-Jihad al-Muqaddas, commanded by the famous Abd al-Qadir al-Husayini; both men were killed in action in the battle of Qastal in April 1948. In addition, the brother of Prince Majid Arslan (Defense Minister of Lebanon at that time), Nihad Arslan, recruited some 400 Druze men and led them to Palestine. Moreover, individual Druzes from Isfiya, Yarka, and other Palestinian Druzes joined Wahhab’s battalion or the Yarmouk battalion led by Adib al-Shishakli in central Galilee. Naffa’ correctly mentioned that the Druze composed around 22 percent of the ASA, without counting the army of irregulars who joined other units not under the command of the ASA. Hence, the Druze, who counted less than 1 percent of the populations of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, and Jordan, participated in a proportion 22 times more than their proportion of the Arab population in the region. Consequently, it is a mistake to consider that the Druze were neutral or with the Zionists.
The role of the Druze in the first Arab-Israeli war was not only in their active participation in the ASA and the army of irregulars that fought the Zionists; another reflection of the Druze commitment to the Palestinian cause was in the casualties and the intensity of the battles they fought against the Haganah. The first direct confrontation between the Druze battalion and the Haganah was in April 1948 in Ramat Yohanan, which ended with a Zionist victory. The Haganah then pushed the Druze into Husha and Kasayer, beside Shafa’mr. The battle in Husha and Kasayer lasted for a few days, and the Haganah managed to repel nine Druze attacks: the battle ended with a Druze casualty of around 130 dead, and 25 Jews were killed. Despite these efforts, historian ‘Arif al-‘Arif suspected that there was a pre-arranged deal between Wahhab and the Haganah, neglecting the casualties of the Druze battalion (around one-fifth of its men were killed in action). The main reason for the Druze defeat was the inability of the ASA command to meet Wahhab’s demand for more weapons, and the Druze were left on their own against the better equipped Haganah. Wahhab kept on calling for weapons, soldiers, logistical means, and money to pay for the troops from his defeat in April since May 7, the date of his withdrawal, and the inability of the ASA command to respond to Wahhab’s demand forced many Druze to desert, another fact which was not taken into consideration by scholars such as ‘Arif al-‘Arif when evaluating the Druze role in the war.
Despite the Druze defeat, there were Druzes who continued to fight with other battalions and groups. For instance, in Mishmar Herdin, the armored battalion under the command of the Druze lieutenant Fayez Hdaifah from the Qadisiyah brigade (and his two Druze sergeants Naufal al-Hajlah and Yousef Karkut) succeeded in occupying the Jewish settlement after a heavy battle. The brigade also fought in the battle of Latrun with the Jordanian army. Finally, when the Haganah tried to take the Druze village of Yanuuh, they were met with fierce Druze resistance, leaving twelve Druze dead and 3 killed from the Haganah.
The defeat of the ASA and, in particular, the Druze battalion allowed the Haganah to recruit Druze defectors to its side. In the process, the Zionists established a Minority Battalion mainly from Druzes who defected from the ASA. Nevertheless, some of those soldiers who joined the newly established battalion had a history of collaboration with the British intelligence in Palestine. Others simply wanted a source of income since the ASA was not paying them regularly and properly.
Countering the Zionist Narrative
The Zionist narrative with respect to the Druze participation in the 1948 war is best expressed in Laila Parsons’ words. Parsons writes that during the war (1948), relations between Jews and Druze reached a point of critical mass whereby individual instances of Druze support for Jews and vice versa were sufficiently numerous that they came to be interpreted as representing the two communities as a whole. It is unclear how Parsons reached such a conclusion, considering the intensity of Druze participation in military activities against the Haganah, and the fact that only few Druze supported the Zionist camp: Labib Abu Rukn and Salih Khnaifes. Then comes Parsons’ adoption of the Israeli narrative about the battle of Shafa’mr and how the Druze asked the Israelis to engage in a fake battle to preserve their face. Similarly, the deputy director of the Middle East Affairs Department in the Foreign Ministry, Ya’cov Shim’oni, wrote, “We had no military surprises in the Galilee thanks to a network of information gathering and to the conquest of Shafa’mr which came as a result of good relations with the Druze and the organization of the operation within.” Parsons and Shim’oni fail to recall that the Druze fought fiercely in Ramat Yohanan, Hushi, and Kasayer before withdrawing from Shafa’mr. They also fail to mention the casualties in Shafa’mr and the lack of proper equipment to fight the Haganah. Hence, it is hard to accept these narratives because the battle in Hushi and Kasayer proved for all how tough Druze soldiers could be. If the Druze battalion of Wahhab were losing its men due to attrition, lack of proper equipment, food, money, and reinforcements from the headquarters in Damascus, then this is a logistical shortage that should be blamed on the ASA and the states behind it. Also, the Zionist conquest in Shafa’mr came as a result of the Druze defeat in Hushi and Kasayer, where the Druze managed to take and hold areas previously controlled by the Haganah for a short period despite the Druze logistical shortages in manpower and ammunition.
Parsons is not the only scholar who adopted a Zionist narrative. Benny Morris writes that the Druze (and Circassian) villagers nowhere resisted the Israelis. It is not clear how a historian can negate such a tremendous Druze effort to support the Palestinian cause. To put it in Makarem’s words, “the Druze have always been so attached to their land that it is traditional for them to die on their land rather than leave it,” and historical data support Makarem’s argument. In Druze history, the community has never opted for forced migration from their towns and villages, and this is why the Druze of Antioch were annihilated rather than expelled and the Druze of Aleppo suffered from Fatimid persecution from 1021 AD to 1028 AD. Later on, the Druze were used as the first line of defense by the Islamic empires against the Crusaders, and consequently, their towns and villages in the Garb region in today’s Aley district in Lebanon, were completely destroyed a couple of times and suffered heavily from the Crusaders. Nevertheless, the Druze did not migrate even though at one point the Crusaders managed to exterminate all Druze leaders, and only one was left alive. Another example of Druze persistence and attachment to their land in times of crisis is recent events in Syria, where the community has managed to adapt to a radical change in reality after al-Qaeda affiliated an-Nusra-controlled Druze villages in Aleppo and Idlib. Despite the hardship, the community has not migrated or left their hometowns. Only once did the Druze migrate and leave their places of origins, and that was during the internal struggle in Mount Lebanon between the Qaisi and Yamani factions.
It is important at this stage to revisit an important speech by Shakib Wahhab during the course of war in 1948. During the course of war, Wahhab told his men: “It is known to all that we have no Druze aims in this war but that we are merely professionals who receive salaries and who must fulfill any obligation bestowed upon them.” This speech illustrates the level of commitment of the Druze with respect to the Palestinian cause, something that was reflected in the intensity of their fighting and their sacrifice during the war. We have to relate this speech to an important fact that the leading Druze political families in the region rejected cooperation with Zionists and called for open struggle to defend Palestine: Majid Arslan whose brother Nuhad fought in Palestine, Kamal Joumblatt who asked the Lebanese President to send irregulars to fight in Palestine, Sultan al-Atrash who was the leading figure behind the Druze battalion and its 500 soldiers, Kamal Kanj Abou Saleh from the Golan, and last but not least, Sheikh Abou Youssef Amin Tarif who refused cooperation with Zionism (at least until the defeat of the five Arab armies in 1948).
The Peculiar Case of Sheikh Abou Youssef Amin Tarif
The genuine Palestinian Druze stance was manifested in Sheikh Abou Youssef Amin Tarif’s leadership in 1948. The Druze, who were a traditional and conservative population, looked upon the religious establishment for guidance, especially, in the absence of Druze feudal lords in the Galilee. Hence, Tarif became the Druze public figure who united in his leadership the temporal and religious authorities. Tarif had a strong reputation of piety and religious knowledge which helped him gain the confidence and the unlimited support of the Druze religious establishment in the region. Sheikh Amin Tarif excelled in the Druze religious studies during his stay in Bayadah, Lebanon, and this enabled him to be selected as the spiritual head of the Palestinian Druze (referred to among the Druze as Sheikh ‘Aqel) in 1928.
The Kheir and Mu’addi families also had their temporal and spiritual leaders, but no one matched the prestige and status of Sheikh Amin Tarif. For instance, when the Druze community in Palestine was divided between Sheikh Tarif and Abdallah Kheir, the religious establishment in Bayadah (the most respected establishment among the Druze located in southern Lebanon) sent a letter of support to Sheikh Tarif and declared that they oppose the religious council that Abdallah Kheir was establishing. In the letter, the religious men noted that “every Druze who joined or supported the council [of Abdallah Kheir] should be excommunicated.” The Druze of Syria and other distinguished Druze religious men from Lebanon also expressed their support to the contents of the letter, and hence Sheikh Tarif became the undisputed leader of the Palestinian Druze.
Tarif used his role as Sheikh ‘Aqel to influence decision making among the Palestinian Druze. He decided not to establish communication with the Jewish Agency in the 1930s and 1940s; second, he did not oppose the Druze support to the Palestinians. There is a very important event that expresses Tarif’s unequivocal support to the Palestinian cause in 1948: according to Sheikh Salah Ali Abu Rukn, who told the Ministry of Religions official Ya’acov Yehoshua, that
Sheikh Amin Tarif placed a secret ban on men who enlisted in the Israel army [during the 1948 war], and for this reason, the war dead of the Minorities Battalion in the Yanuh battle were not buried, and their bodies became carrion for the birds.
In an Islamic context, Muslims who do not receive proper burial are considered Kuffar (infidels), and abstaining from burying the dead means that the community has disavowed them. In this case, Tarif’s ban meant that the Druze used their religious doctrine to send a political message that the community viewed supporters of the IDF as infidels. This happened at a critical time in history when the Palestinian nationalists and Arab regimes were being defeated by the Israelis at all fronts. Consequently, this episode represents one instance of Druze full commitment to the Palestinian cause and opposition to the Zionists. The other significance of this event is that it negates all other claims about the Druze and Jews alliance during the war. There cannot be an alliance between two communities and, at the same time, a rejection to honor the fallen dead in battles.
Conclusion: The Alternative Narrative
The main characteristic of the Palestinian Druze during the British mandate is their conservative and traditional nature. Political ideologies did not find their way among community members, contrary to their brethren in Syria and Lebanon. Nevertheless, when the community was faced with existential threats and challenges regarding the Zionist campaign, the community stood its ground in support of their Arab-Palestinian heritage. I have provided empirical evidence throughout the period under study to support my argument: the first anti-colonial rebel group was established by a Palestinian Druze named Ahmad Tafesh (the Green Palm Gang), the Druze then participated in the 1929 and 1936-39 rebellions, and last but not least, their support for the Palestinian cause during the 1948 war was expressed in two ways: either in active participation in the fighting force, as soldiers in the ASA, or in accommodating and supporting the ASA personnel into their homes and the irregulars who fought in groups alongside the ASA.
At the level of elites, it is obvious that the Lebanese and Syrian Druze feudal lords opposed the Zionist plans. Sheikh Amin Tarif rejected cooperation with the Jewish Agency, which forced the latter to align with Abdallah Kheir, and later with Labib Abu Rukn and Salih Khanifes when Kheir retired from politics. The Druze support to the Jewish Agency included only Abu Rukn and Khanifes who were later joined by Jaber Mu’addi, the only representative who came from the leading Palestinian Druze families. I argued that to figure out the Druze stance, we have to look at Sheikh Amin Tarif, who had a paramount leadership, thanks to his religious piety and regional Druze support. His rejection to collaborate with the Jewish Agency and his staunch position against those Druze who fought with the Hanagah reflect the general commitment of the Druze to support the Palestinian cause. One cannot consider the attitude or stance of the Druze community except by looking at the stance of their leading political families.
To properly evaluate the Druze political behavior, we have to keep in mind that the Druze were a minority and a rural community. In such cases, it is hard to blame a rural minority if it chooses sides according to what serves its interest because the instinct of survival shapes political behavior. However, despite the fact that the Druze are considered to be a rural minority in Palestine at that time, their political considerations had little to do with their status as minority. Hence, we can understand Shakib Wahhab’s speech to his soldiers, when he said that the Druze have no private considerations in this war. Indeed, the active enrollment of the Druze in the ASA reflects their commitment to the Palestinian cause in 1948, and in the previous years, only marginal elements in the community collaborated with the Jewish Agency.