Thomas Just. Journal of International Communication. Volume 22, Issue 1, 2016.
As the Soviet Union fell, the ideological glue that was the source of national unity and identity was no longer present in post-Cold War Russia. Recently, however, Russia has made attempts to redefine itself in the post-Cold War world, establish a new national identity, and project it to the world. Russia’s exercise of public diplomacy and soft power differ starkly from most Western countries, as the Russian approach is defined by a top-down, centralized nature that emphasizes a nationalist message to its target audiences. The Russian approach has been marked by a tendency to locate and mobilize sympathetic Russian diaspora populations, but an aversion to building networks among those who do not presently share Russia’s foreign policy goals. This approach has led to significant limitations on Russia’s ability to persuade foreign publics and build new partnerships. Such tendencies are especially evident through an examination of Russia’s public diplomacy in Ukraine, where attempts are made to mobilize Russian diaspora communities, while other potential audiences are diminished. This paper argues that the inherent contradictions, limitations, and divisive nature of Russian public diplomacy are especially evident in the case of the Crimean annexation and inhibit Russia’s ability to influence and persuade non-Russian audiences.
Introduction
The practice of public diplomacy has become increasingly important as the flow of information and the ability of states to convey messages directly to foreign publics has become easier and more cost-effective than ever. Russia, however, has undergone significant change since the end of the Cold War, and these changes have made it difficult to craft a consistent and coherent message to project to the rest of the world. As Mankoff contends, ‘Russia’s fundamental identity … remains ill defined’ (2009, p. 21). The ideological glue that was the source of unity in the Soviet Union is no more, and thus Russia has been forced to redefine itself and establish a renewed identity. Since the rise of Vladimir Putin, Russian nationalism has become the source of political legitimacy. Moreover, Putin and the Russian elite have emphasized the importance of increasing Russia’s soft power assets as a means to help achieve greater foreign policy and security goals.
As is the case in many other areas, Russia has not viewed the exercise of soft power in the traditional manner that most Western countries do. Russia has viewed its diaspora population, an estimated 30 million people, to be a distinctly separate audience from other foreign peoples (Batanova 2009). This idea has led Russia’s exercise of public diplomacy to be unique and possessing inherent challenges. Such challenges are especially evident with regard to recent developments in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The top-down centralized approach that largely defines the Kremlin’s public diplomacy initiatives tend to be undermined in many Western countries, due to the lack of receptiveness to such messages and the inability of these messages to penetrate established and existing information channels.
However, with regard to Russian diaspora populations, Russian public diplomacy tends to be focused on locating and mobilizing those already most loyal and willing to support Russian foreign policy objectives. Thus, instead of persuading those sceptical of Russian aims and focusing on partnership over unilateralism, Russian public diplomacy tends to draw on nationalist sentiment. And while the concept of Russian nationalism is indeed quite complex, the inherent weakness of combining nationalist messages and public diplomacy is that nationalism is by definition exclusionary, and therefore limits the appeal of messages abroad. There is some debate among scholars as to what exactly characterizes contemporary Russian nationalism—some argue that geopolitics plays a central role (Tsygankov 2010) (Laruelle 2012), while others point to cultural factors such as the role of the Russian Orthodox Church (Hemment 2015). Nonetheless, nationalism as a public diplomacy message limits a state’s ability to persuade new foreign audiences. This sort of treatment of foreign audiences as separate and distinct can lead to contradictory messages that, while perhaps mobilizing Russian nationalists abroad, leads to a lack of credibility among others. Therefore, this paper argues that the different treatment of Russian diaspora and other foreign populations tends to lead towards conflict and contradiction rather than partnership and credibility, and these trends are indeed evident in the case of Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and related events in Ukraine.
Russian soft power and its challenges
Public diplomacy is defined by Nicholas Cull to be, ‘an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public’ (Cull 2009, p. 12). This is one of the most widely accepted definitions of the concept and one that is highly related to the broader concept of soft power, which Joseph Nye defines as ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment’ (Nye 2008, p. 94). Nye outlines three elements that are necessary to effectively exercise soft power, which are: a country’s culture and its attractiveness, its political values, and the perceived legitimacy of its policies (2008, p. 96). The concept of soft power has been of increasing importance to Russia, as a recognition of ‘great power’ status has re-emerged as one of Russia’s international priorities, and such a goal becomes challenging, if not unattainable, without a general positive international acceptance of Russia.
Throughout the 1990s, Russia struggled with an ‘image problem’. The Russian state struggled to define its identity, guide an economic transition, and achieve its desired international status. The new socio-political context and economic chaos of the 1990s all fed this identity crisis that added to foreign perceptions of Russia as a land full of lawlessness (Lebedenko 2004, p. 72). Bogomolov and Lytvynenko argue that ‘a country cannot project soft power over time unless it has a strong conception of itself and its future’ (2012, p. 2). As Vladimir Putin came to power in the early 2000s, the ‘image problem’ was a point addressed by numerous official documents, and indeed by President Putin himself during this period (Feklyunina 2008). An official Kremlin document entitled ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ was released in 2000, and updated in 2008, that listed the promotion of ‘an objective image of the Russian Federation globally’ and the promotion of the ‘Russian language and the Russian peoples’ culture’ as among the top objectives of Russia’s foreign policy. The document outlines that these activities are to be carried out as ‘information support for foreign policy activities’ (Concept 2008). These activities are outlined in the following statement:
An important part of the foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation is communicating to the broad world public full and accurate information about its stance on major international issues, foreign policy initiatives and actions [ … ], [about] its domestic social and economic development processes and plans, as well as the accomplishments of Russian culture and science. [ … ] In public diplomacy, Russia will seek its objective perception in the world, develop its own effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad [and] strengthen the role of the Russian mass media in the international information environment providing them with essential state support. [ … ] [Russia will also] actively participate in international information cooperation and take all necessary measures to repel information threats to its sovereignty and security. (Concept 2008)
Thus, this ‘informational approach’ has been identified as one of the fundamental elements of Russia’s foreign policy.
Whereas public diplomacy is typically viewed as having mutuality and dialogue as central components, this is not necessarily the case with the Russian approach. In fact, this can be seen in the Foreign Policy Concept document where it reads: ‘it is obvious that a greater emphasis should be put on the export of Russian culture and its popularization abroad, rather than on the import of foreign culture into Russia’ (Concept 2008). Such a statement is indicative of the Russian nationalism perpetuated by Russian authorities under Putin, as well as a reflection of the general top-down approach taken by the Russian elite. These factors have led to the sort of ‘informational approach’ that has come to define Russia’s public diplomacy. The operating assumption among many Russian diplomats and politicians is that negative perceptions about Russia abroad are primarily due to a lack of appropriate or sufficient information, as well as deliberate attempts by Western media to portray Russia in a negative light (Solovyev 2010). These have indeed been the predominant beliefs that have shaped Russia’s public diplomacy campaign, although the appropriateness and effectiveness of the methods used remain debatable.
Russia’s ability to project a desired image of itself to the outside world faces a number of challenges; undoubtedly the Western media plays a role, but also the Russian approach does little to bridge the credibility gap in its messaging. Erast Galumov, a professor at the Russian Diplomatic Academy, has suggested that Russia’s image can be improved without any substantial changes within the country or in its policies by arguing that ‘image is not reality, but only the reflection of reality that can be made positive’ (Feklyunina 2008, p. 606). Such an argument implies that negative perceptions of Russia abroad are correctable merely by disseminating information more effectively. Some, such as Tsygankov, have accused Western media of having an inherent anti-Russian bias and have criticized such media for allowing ‘politically minded elites to shape views of a poorly informed public’ (2009, p. 43). Further, Tsygankov points out that opposition forces, such as Gary Kasparov, Sergey Magnitskiy, and Mikhail Khodorovsky, receive access to Western media attention far beyond that of most Russian officials or representatives (2009, p. 44). Because of this, the anti-Kremlin narrative tends to dominate the Western mass media, as the official Russian perspective tends to suffer from a perceived lack of credibility.
Furthermore, the top-down approach to Russia’s public diplomacy campaign tends to perpetuate this credibility gap, particularly with regard to Western audiences. Public diplomacy and ‘soft power’ are indeed concepts largely developed within the West and are often defined by the engagement of non-governmental organizations and other civil society groups. The Russian approach, however, does not emphasize the engagement and use of such groups to disseminate messages to any extent comparable to many Western countries, such as the USA. The centralized, top-down approach is indicative of Russia’s socio-political culture, the origins of which can be traced back to the early days of its statehood, and is very much reflected in the manner in which messages are communicated. In other words, the Kremlin has essentially monopolized the work of public diplomacy and tends to control the process.
This monopolization of messaging defined by a top-down, centralized approach tends to be at odds with the more open and direct communication style preferred by Western, and especially American, audiences. The top-down, centralized approach is often dismissed as propaganda by Western audiences, particularly when the messages contradict those that are being distributed via established, existing information channels. However, consistency is not often viewed as a goal, as Sherr argues, ‘To the Russian mind, contradiction is part of life itself, not a sign of intellectual failure. It is something to be utilized, not overcome’ (2010, p. 162). Such a mindset is much less accepted by other audiences, and is thus a fundamental obstacle to Russia’s ability to communicate effectively in an international context. Although these points indeed present challenges for Russia’s public diplomacy to influence many Western audiences, it is important to note that Russia’s campaign does not treat or communicate with all audiences in the same manner.
Separate public diplomacy audiences: the case of Ukraine
Russia’s conceptions of its target audiences for its public diplomacy campaign are indeed separate and distinct. Russia’s attempts to engage its diaspora population are notably different from its attempts to engage other audiences. The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept document specifically emphasizes the need to cultivate closer relationships with Russian diaspora communities in the near abroad (Concept 2008). As Laurelle writes, ‘The Kremlin’s perception that it was defeated in its neighborhood had serious repercussions and revived Moscow’s will to invest into soft power and image making’ (Laurelle 2015, p. 10). These efforts are largely directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as affiliated organizations such as the Russian World Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo—an agency established in 2008 to maintain Russian influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States. These organizations attempt to reach audiences in the near abroad by organizing festivals and cultural events, maintaining a network of cultural and educational centres, and attracting Russian diaspora and other foreign students to study in Russia (Feklyunina 2008) (Filimonov 2010). However, the effectiveness of the programs has been limited, due to the tendency of such projects to locate and mobilize sympathetic Russian diaspora and those most loyal to Russia’s nationalist ambitions, as opposed to persuading sceptics and emphasizing partnership over unilateralism (Bogomolov & Lytvynenko 2012, p. 14). So while this approach may in fact encourage those already sympathetic to Russia, it can have an opposite effect on others.
This sort of divide can be observed especially within Ukraine and the manner in which Russia attempts to communicate with the population of the country. In fact, as Bogomolov and Lytvynenko write,
From the perspective of Russian policymakers, Ukraine has never been a monolith … The uneven attention to different regions can easily be accounted for by a widely shared belief that Ukraine is an incoherent entity, if not, in Putin’s words to George W. Bush an ‘artificial’ one. In this view, some parts of Ukraine are more Russian and some less. (2012, p. 14)
Because of this, different populations and perspectives are treated unequally, rather than Russia attempting to engage the Ukrainian population in general. Put simply, Russia tends to view its diaspora as part of a common future, while non-Russian nationals are often viewed as a threat that needs to be diminished. Putin has spoken openly about what he terms the ‘aspiration of the Russian World, of Russian history, to reestablish unity’ (Putin 2014). In this context, the Russian World was understood by Putin to mean Russians outside of Russia and it is indeed such thinking that has led Russian public diplomacy efforts to focus on this particular group, while failing to adequately develop messaging that resonates with others.
Instead of using Russian diaspora to engage and persuade other Ukrainians to adopt a more positive perception of Russia, Russian public diplomacy is focused on mobilizing sympathetic diaspora groups to oppose and conflict with what Russian authorities view as Ukrainian nationalists. As Bogomolov and Lytvynenko explain, ‘Russia sees “Ukrainian nationalism” as an existential threat. Evidence that Russian policymakers perceive (non-Russian) nationalism as an extremist ideology is abundant’ (2012, p. 3). Putin has even argued that ‘the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world divided by borders’ (2014). For these reasons, Russia continues to wage a soft (and more recently hard) power battle within Ukraine by employing resources in particular regions of the country to mobilize one group to oppose the other.
The competition of ideas within Ukraine, and Russia’s role in such competition, tend to revolve around the national myths of both countries—and further, Russia’s rejection that they are separate. Bogomolov and Lytvynenko describe the Ukrainian national myth to be based on three key components:
the ethno-national one—a state that embodies the historical aspirations of the Ukrainian people; the liberal-democratic one—a state that protects the liberty of all citizens, irrespective of nationality; and the European one—a state that is an inalienable part of the European civilization. (2012, p. 2)
For its part, Russia has relied on its own national myths emphasizing Russia and Ukraine’s common origins to devise narratives that attempt to link Ukraine’s future to its own. One such linkage has been through the discourse of ‘modernization’ that attempts to link the socio-political order in Ukraine to that of Russia. Such discourse can indeed be interpreted as serving larger Russian foreign policy goals:
Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has developed a form of state nationalism incorporating neo-imperial discourses such as neo-Eurasianism and the concept of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkii Mir), whose boundaries are assumed to correspond, at the minimum, to the borders of the core territories of the Russian empire. (Bogomolov & Lytvynenko 2012, p. 3)
These conceptions have indeed impacted the Russian approach to soft power and public diplomacy in Ukraine, in that the approach views the Ukrainian myths and nation with hostility, whereas the Russian diaspora and those sympathetic to Russian aims are viewed as ‘kindred people’. This has been particularly evident as President Putin ‘underscored the point when he quoted the words of General Anton Denikin, who referred to Ukraine as “Russia Minor” and said that attempts to separate Ukraine from Russia were a “crime”’ (2012, p. 4). Thus, the Russian approach tends to invoke hostility towards Ukrainian nationals and friendship towards sympathetic Russian diaspora populations.
No region of Ukraine has been more impacted by Russian soft power and public diplomacy resources than the Crimean peninsula. This is in part due to the fact that Crimea is the only region of Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority (Sasse 2007). The prevalence of pro-Russian groups in Crimea is noteworthy, and includes political groups and parties, parishioners of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian cultural clubs, naval and military associations, and various think tanks. The Russian government has facilitated the mobilization of such groups for various purposes, such as opposition to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession and joint exercises between Ukrainian and NATO forces, opposition to recognition of the 1932–1933 Ukrainian famine as a genocide, supporting the declaration of Russian as an official language, along with other issues that provided political and financial support to Russian communities (Bogomolov & Lytvynenko 2012, p. 14). The high population density, lack of alternative political structures, and generally Russia-friendly media in the region are all enabling factors for the exertion of Russian soft power influence. Thus, Crimea generally tends to be ripe for and receptive to the messages that the Kremlin desires to convey.
The manner in which Russia communicates in the regions with a high presence of its diaspora tends to focus on three overarching themes—common identity, common destiny, and Russian political and intellectual primacy. Russian culture is often portrayed as superior to that of Ukraine:
Russian high culture is usually contrasted with the rural, parochial, and marginal—terms that encapsulate Ukrainian culture as seen through Russian eyes. For these reasons, it is not surprising that Russian culture is used as an instrument of soft power in Ukraine. (Bogomolov & Lytvynenko 2012, p. 8)
This has indeed been a major emphasis for Vladimir Putin, who has argued that ‘the Russian World can and should unite all those for whom the Russian language and culture is dear, whether they live in Russia or beyond its borders. Use this term, Russian World, more often’ (Laurelle 2015, p. 13). This sort of approach tends to emphasize a Russian superiority over Ukrainian identity, and is thus used as a method of attraction for Russian policy goals among the diaspora.
Perhaps the most effective tool that the Kremlin has to exert soft power within Ukraine is the high presence of Russian mass media. Russian mass culture is widely available on Ukrainian television (TV) with regard to TV dramas, soap operas, nostalgic films, and news programmes. As Sherr explains, these programs ‘are strongly political in emphasis, concrete and detailed in terms of their reference and intellectually serious. They are also full of misstatements, distortions, and half-truths’ (2008, p. 17). Given the wide access to established information networks, Russia is able to carry out its ‘informational approach’ to public diplomacy to a far greater extent in Ukraine than in many Western countries, where the Russia Today network remains one of the only outlets available for the Kremlin to communicate to foreign publics.
Furthermore, efforts by Ukrainian officials attempting to reduce the Russian mass media influence under the banner of ‘information security’ have largely been counter-productive. As Bogomolov and Lytvynenko argue, such efforts:
play into Russia’s policy of acting as if the geographical sphere where the Russian language continues to be a dominant medium of communication defines Russia’s true political borders … [such policies also] alienate the large number of Russian-speaking citizens who are not instinctively pro-Russian in their political views. (2012, p. 9)
Although such policies have not been very effective in countering Russian mass media, Bogomolov and Lytvynenko do point out that one area where Russia has been ‘losing’ is with regard to the internet. Russian authorities have attempted to exert influence by state sponsorship of certain bloggers and even cyber warfare (such as denial of service attacks), but ‘on balance, the web is an area where Russia suffers more losses than gains’ (2012, p. 9).
Another avenue for Russian messages to travel into Ukraine has been through the Orthodox Church. Although 62.5% of Ukrainians claim to be unaffiliated to an organized religion, the demise of Soviet atheism has led to a recent religious revival of sorts, as has been the case in Russia (Razumkov Centre 2006). Consequently, the Russian Orthodox Church has attempted to bring the major Ukrainian Orthodox denominations under its jurisdiction. The current Russian Orthodox Patriarch, Kirill, has intimated at this by stating,
The core of the Russian world today is Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia, and … regardless of state divisions, or certain discords in politics, we spiritually, and I would like to emphasize again, spiritually continue to be one people, and the majority of us are children of the Russian Orthodox Church. ( 2009)
Patriarch Kirill has not shied away from political statements, which are evident in quotations, such as:
It is, therefore, important to establish durable systemic relations among the elites of the Russian World countries. … Individually, even the largest countries of the Russian World would not be able to safeguard their spiritual, cultural and civilizational interests in the globalized world. I am confident that only a consolidated Russian World may become a powerful subject in global international politics, stronger than all political alliances. ( 2009)
Thus, the political and civilization goals of the Russian Federation have an added spiritual element that tends to be carried out through the Russian Orthodox Church.
The Russian public diplomacy approach, however, has notable limitations. Nye describes soft power as ‘getting others to want what you want’, but the Russian approach, while perhaps economical, limits itself to locating and mobilizing those who already want it (2008, p. 95). Thus, there is a lack of emphasis on building partnership with those who at present do not necessarily want the same things as the Russian state and create new opportunities. Instead those who oppose Russian aims are often decried as dangerous ‘Ukrainian nationalists’. The Russian approach also lacks channels of feedback from the bottom to the top and limits local initiative. These factors can lead to a lack of innovation and opportunities for soft power influence to grow. Russia has been unable, and for the most part unwilling, to quell fears of Russian imperialism, which undermine soft power and public diplomacy initiatives. Ironically, the inability to do so is likely a contributing factor to the popularization of Ukrainian ‘ultra-nationalist’ factions that Russia tends to view as a threat. Laurelle has written that, ‘So far, Moscow has not demonstrated its ability to elaborate a structured doctrine legitimizing this Russian voice and its path of development, and has failed to adopt policies that can be both successful, sustainable and non-coercive’ (2015, p. 25). Furthermore, one could argue that Russia’s soft power failures and inability to persuade those not already in agreement with Russian aims are contributing factors that have led Russia to resort to the exercise of hard power, as in the case of the Russian annexation of Crimea.
Russia’s public diplomacy since the Euromaidan protests and Crimean annexation
Russian tendencies to locate and mobilize sympathetic diaspora populations, yet make little effort to persuade others, has been exemplified in the case of the 2014 Crimean crisis. The Russian public diplomacy strategy in reaction to the Euromaidan protests has been to mobilize those already in support of Russian causes, but diminish and declare illegitimate those who are in opposition. Oftentimes, these claims are made based on the argument that those in opposition are doing so primarily due to intervention by Western intelligence agencies and Western-financed NGOs. This is similar to how many Russian, and even a number of pro-Russian Ukrainian, officials explained the Orange Revolution as an elaborate Western plot (Bogomolov & Lytvynenko 2012, p. 6). As has been described, Russia often views ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ as a security and economic threat, especially when considering Russian ambitions of creating a Eurasian Union, and has treated it as such. This conception has made negotiation and persuasion less viable and appealing options, thus limiting Russia’s ability to expand soft power influence.
It must be noted that the concepts of ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, Sherr argues that Russian policymakers tend to confuse the terms ‘attraction’ and ‘pressure’, and thus terms Russia’s public diplomacy initiatives as ‘soft coercion’ (2013). The annexation of Crimea and potential interventions in Eastern Ukraine indeed reinforce Russia’s aggressive image in the post-Soviet region, and outright undermine Russian narratives about its promise as a cooperative international partner of the West. Nonetheless, such actions do indeed exemplify Sherr’s description of Russia’s tendency to exercise ‘hard diplomacy’ and ‘soft coercion’.
This is particularly true with regard to other post-Soviet countries, especially those who are ambivalent about joining Russia’s Eurasian Union project. The Russian socio-economic model does not necessarily have the capacity to act as a pole of attraction on par with that of the European Union, which is likely a contributing factor to Russia’s tendency to use pressure, in many cases as a substitute for attraction, as a major component in its public diplomacy strategy. Vladimir Putin has hinted at this course of action by stating, ‘we may encounter and, in fact, face [attempts to] slow down the integration work [on the Eurasian Union]. And in that case, a variety of tools of pressure can be used, including the mechanisms of so-called “soft power”’ (Huseynov 2014). Russia’s stance in the Ukrainian crisis is likely to serve as a warning to other potential members of the Eurasian Union who remain uncommitted to membership, such as Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Russian intervention in Crimea is a signal that Russian military capabilities remain a real threat to their territorial integrity and sovereignty, particularly if they decide to make policy shifts geared towards enhancing relations with Western-Transatlantic institutions. Moldova is one area where such intervention remains a top concern, given that the breakaway region of Transnistria has a substantial ethnic Russian population and already contains a Russian troop presence. So while the Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea may have indeed reinforced Russia’s image as an aggressive neighbour to these countries, the pressure and military threat that Russia poses for non-compliance is certainly a message clearly conveyed.
As was the case before the crisis, mass media remains Russia’s most readily available and accessible tool for soft power influence within Ukraine, and the post-Soviet space in general. These mediums have tended to emphasize the plight of ethnic Russian populations within Ukraine due to what are often deemed ‘fascist’ elements of the Euromaidan protests and new Ukrainian government. Such a narrative is without a doubt one-sided, but nonetheless resonates with particular segments of the Russian, Ukrainian, and other populations within the post-Soviet space. As Masha Lipman, editor of the Moscow Carnegie Center’s Pro et Contra journal, explains,
Given this country’s history—in particular the Soviet Union’s 25 million casualties at Nazi Germany’s hands during World War II—there is no more effective appeal to the emotions of Russians than to rally against the threat of fascism. And this is how our people see the picture. (Weir 2014)
Furthermore, such broadcasts often attempt to diminish the size and motivations of the Euromaidan protests as a ‘tiny, militant neo-fascist minority’. Some commentators have described this portrayal as ‘pushing on an open door’ by appealing to prejudices of Russian populations across the region (Weir 2014). These reports indeed exemplify the Russian narratives regarding the threats of ‘Ukrainian ultra-nationalism’ to Russian peoples and the Russian state.
It is noteworthy, however, that the methods of reporting modern crises, such as the one in Ukraine, are markedly different in today’s Russian media than in the Soviet times. As Weir explains:
Today Russian TV looks completely different. It incorporates all the latest innovations of US cable news, with attractive, animated anchors and lots of on-the-ground reports. Where Soviet TV would have erected a wall of silence, Russian TV went out and covered the revolt in Kiev intensively. Much of its narrative is constructed from on-the-ground reporting—but from what Western audiences would regard as unfamiliar angles, and with shifted emphasis and quite a bit of cherry-picking. (2014)
This approach often appears more credible to audiences given the ability to air footage of violence-prone neo-fascists, some of who are occasionally among the demonstrations. But obtaining and airing selected footage also allows for media to exaggerate the influence of such factions. Consequently, the Ukrainian government has severely restricted access to Russian media sources in the country and in December 2014 created the Ministry of Information Policy as part of the ‘information war’ between the two countries. In fact, Ukrainian Information Minister Yuriy Stets stated as one of his main goals, ‘active counteraction to the Russian information aggression’ (National Radio Company of Ukraine 2014). So while Russian media networks may in some cases be an important means of delivering messages abroad, in the case of Ukraine there are substantial obstacles that may limit the ability of these sources to reach target audiences. In other words, there may be limits to the soft power and public diplomacy benefits of media networks, particularly in areas of hostility and conflict.
However, one must acknowledge that with advances in technology there are also alternative sources of media, which may or may not comport with the narrative desired by the state. This has caused the Kremlin to increase its own censorship and restrictive policies, particularly with regard to online sources. The TV station Dozhd was dropped by most major cable providers in February 2014 for airing content not in accordance with the Kremlin’s desired narrative. Also, a number of websites run by dissidents and journalists critical of Kremlin actions, such as those operated by Gary Kasparov and Alexei Navalny, were officially blacklisted for posting what were deemed ‘extremist materials’ (Weir 2014). So while, the Kremlin’s preferred narrative on the Ukrainian crisis has indeed reached and likely influenced certain populations in the region, the presence of alternative media has worked to counter these narratives and it is unlikely that simply restricting such sources will be able to keep up with the spread of information in the twenty-first century. As Masha Lipman argues,
Let’s not be mesmerized by the power of the Russian media to shape public opinion. It’s early days in this Ukraine crisis … and the majority of Russians seem to support it. In other words, Russians don’t feel they are paying any cost for this. It would not be so easy to sell if the circumstances turn bad. (Weir 2014)
There is no doubt that Russia’s ability to exercise soft power in the post-Soviet space has been impacted by the Ukrainian crisis and Crimean annexation. Russia’s stance on the issues has only added to perceptions of Russia as an aggressive neighbour. The effects of such actions, however, are unclear at this point as to the ramifications on the prospects for constructing the proposed Eurasian Union. Russian aggression and pressure could perhaps coerce uncommitted states, such as Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to commit out of fear for their territorial integrity, or perhaps compel them to search for less threatening options in the West. Russian mass media has remained Russia’s most visible exercise of soft power with regard to the Ukrainian crisis and has been the primary source for conveying the Kremlin-led narrative. These sources have emphasized, and arguably over-exaggerated, the influence of neo-fascist elements among Euromaidan demonstrators in order to play off memories of Nazi German destruction in the region. However, such narratives have in fact been countered by a number of alternative media sources, many of which are on the Internet, and although the Kremlin has attempted to restrict such sources, their ability to do so remains difficult due to the ever increasing multitude of twenty-first-century information outlets.
Conclusion
Russia’s public diplomacy initiatives have been of increasing importance to the Kremlin since Vladimir Putin came to power, however, these initiatives have a number of challenges and limitations resulting from contradictory messages, an inability to engage new audiences, and a lack of a coherent Russian identity. In many ways, the turmoil of the 1990s put Russia at a distinct disadvantage in this respect. But Russia’s soft power approach of attempting to locate and mobilize sympathetic diaspora, while paying a lack of attention to the perceptions of other audiences, offers little opportunity for Russia to expand its soft power influence. Furthermore, the top-down, centralized nature of Russian public diplomacy allows little opportunity to receive feedback and develop innovative ways to respond to sceptical audiences. These characteristics are evident in the case of Ukraine, where Russia has attempted to forge bonds with Russian diaspora populations through mass media, cultural and linguistic institutions, and the Russian Orthodox Church, while dismissing, or even disparaging, other potential audiences that are not already as stridently aligned with Russian foreign policy goals.
Indeed Russian nationalism has been of increasing importance in the wider context of Russian foreign policy, and this is no different in its public diplomacy and exercise of soft power. The recent crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea have impacted the direction of its soft power influence in the post-Soviet region, and are likely to have ramifications on Russia’s ability to attract, or pressure, potential member states to the proposed Eurasian Union project. Russian media has been the primary outlet for the Kremlin to perpetuate its narrative and stance on the crisis by portraying Euromaidan demonstrators as violent neo-fascists, a claim, that while maybe true among some factions, is often exaggerated to suit the Kremlin’s messaging objectives. However, the ability to control media is something Russian officials have struggled with, as the rapid twenty-first-century expansion of alternative information sources continues. Russia’s public diplomacy and soft power influence face even greater challenges, given the recent use of hard power in Crimea, and thus far the Kremlin has shown little ability or willingness to change the direction of its approach. Therefore, it is likely that Russia’s public diplomacy initiatives will continue the tendency of attempting to locate and mobilize sympathetic diaspora populations in the post-Soviet space with minimal efforts to respond to the perceptions of other, more sceptical audiences in a coherent and consistent manner.