Pavin Chachavalpongpun. Journal of International Affairs. Volume 68, Issue 1, Fall-Winter 2014.

The Thai military staged a coup on 22 May 2014—the nineteenth coup since the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932. Since the coup, the military has attempted to take full control of politics ahead of the uncertain royal succession. King Bhumibol Adulyadej has been on the throne since 1946, serving as a symbol of political stability through many tumultuous periods in the history of Thailand. But the era of Bhumibol is coming to an end and the only heir apparent, crown prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, is unpopular, thus raising the level of anxiety among the traditional elite whose interests have long been invested in the powerful monarchy. This article argues that the recent putsch was primarily a scheme to ensure that the military and the traditional elite would dominate the royal transition; yet, it was carried out in the name of protecting democracy. This process has weakened democratic institutions and stripped away people’s basic rights, including the right to assemble and freedom of expression. Thailand has arrived at yet another political deadlock. The response from the international community has been crucial. Some Western countries have imposed “soft sanctions” on the regime. In the aftermath of the coup, Thailand expected a series of sanctions from its Western allies, but the sanctions have so far been rather limited and target specific. Yet, as this article will show, the Thai military junta has responded to them with great anxiety. The release of a number of political detainees might reflect the military’s strategy to seek a degree of understanding from the international community.

To defend its regime, the military has developed ways to gain legitimacy at home. It has concentrated on developing economic policies similar to populist projects first implemented during the Thaksin Shinawatra administration from 2001 to 2006. Today the military is doling out economic perks to the population to procure loyalty and satisfaction. Among other efforts, the military has ordered payments owed to poor farmers under a rice subsidy program by the deposed Yingluck Shinawatra government, which was in power from 2011 to 2014. The ability of the military to provide economic benefits to the people was a key element in maintaining stability and power.

The efficacy of this plan depends heavily on how Western governments respond to the lack of democratic freedoms in post-coup Thailand. Western sanctions have the ability to undercut this stability, directly affecting the Thai people and the Thai economy writ large. Effective sanctions could trigger the discontent of the Thai people and may challenge military rule. Should the West run out of patience with the worsening human rights situation in Thailand, it may intensify economic sanctions which could shift the political dynamic in the country.

More so than many other countries, Thailand’s economy is particularly sensitive to sanctions because it is highly integrated into global supply chains for some of its crucial commodities such as rice, automobiles, machinery, and electronics. More severe sanctions would affect the economic livelihood of Thais and surely the legitimacy of the military regime. This article argues that while sanctions are often derided as symbolic and ineffectual, in the case of Thailand, they have proven useful against the coup leaders because of the interwoven relations between the military’s legitimacy, its domestic support, and the pressure from the international community. It concludes that the Thai military, despite firmly monopolizing power, is not totally free to conduct its own domestic affairs and is forced to heed the actions of the international community.

Political Deadlock

Coups are a common phenomenon in Thai politics. Indeed, they are considered a component of Thailand’s political culture. The fact that most coups in the past several decades were endorsed by the monarchy seemed to increase the confidence among Thai military leaders who continue to employ coups as weapons to eliminate enemies and to protect their own power interests. This time, too, the coup was blessed by King Bhumibol, and was accepted as a legitimate solution to the political deadlock. The military claimed that the coup was necessary to restore peace and order after months of relentless protests by Bangkok’s predominantly middle and upper classes and big business community. The initial agenda of the protesters was clear: They condemned and opposed the ruling Pheu Thai Party’s proposal for blanket amnesty, citing that it would set former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra free from his corruption conviction and other charges. Thaksin faces corruption charges related to the purchase of state land by his wife and was sentenced to a two-year term of imprisonment in absentia. Under extreme pressure, Prime Minister Yingluck, Thaksin’s sister, dissolved the parliament. But protesters, led by the opposition Democrat Party’s Suthep Thaugsuban, were not satisfied by her move since the ultimate goal was to completely remove the Shinawatras from politics. Consequently, they continued to create a situation of instability so as to invite the military to intervene in politics. The result was the recent coup. It is clear that the protesters worked closely with the military to disparage electoral politics.

The royal transition and the ever-growing popularity of the Shinawatras frightened the elite, especially now that the reign of King Bhumibol may soon come to an end. Rumors of a possible political alliance between Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn and Thaksin further deepened the elite’s fear that the choice of the Crown Prince may not benefit their political, economic, and social status. Ernest Bower, a Southeast Asia expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies succinctly asserted, “It is like a musical chairs game. When the music stops—when the King dies—whoever has power gets to organize the next step.” Thus, it can be said that the 22 May coup was a royal coup, designed to reverse the political trend towards democracy in Thailand back to royal political dominance. Despite the fact that Thailand abolished absolute monarchy in 1932, the royal institution has been able to maintain its political power and influence thanks to the backing of the military.

So far, the coup makers have taken a number of bold steps toward perpetuating their political position. For example, an interim constitution was drafted that guarantees the staying power of the military. Article 44 of this interim constitution grants the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)—the governing body of the coup makers—power to unilaterally intervene regardless of its effects on the legislative, executive, or judiciary branches in the name of defending Thailand against threats to public order, national security, the monarchy, national economy, or sovereignty. Moreover, the interim constitution also indicates that any actions taken by the NCPO will be “completely legal and constitutional,” particularly in ordering the removal or appointment of the previous government, and that it will be “exempted from any wrongdoings, responsibility and liabilities.” Meanwhile, the roster for the newly established National Legislative Assembly (NLA) of 200 members laid bare the military’s crude tactic of reserving a large political space for itself. Of the 200 members, 106 are military men (both active and retired); this is eerily similar to Myanmar where 25 percent of the parliamentarian seats are reserved for members of the army. Coup leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha was later approved by the NLA to become Thailand’s 29th prime minister. Shortly afterwards, a cabinet was formed, revealing its members to have close connections with the old establishment.

As political machinations have been put in place to ensure the political longevity of the military, the NCPO has cracked down on its critics through arrests and detentions. The NCPO issued a series of orders summoning individuals to report for speaking out against the coup, ultimately to “adjust” their attitude about the political situation. Colonel Winthai Suwaree, spokesperson for the NCPO, guaranteed that the detention would not exceed seven days. However, those refusing to answer the summons could be faced with arrest warrants, up to two years of imprisonment, and/or a fine of 40,000 baht ($1,250). Most of those summoned were released after three to seven days of detention. Their political positions and previous participations in political activities determined how they were treated by the army. In high-profile cases, they would be interrogated by military officers, instructed not to further engage in any political movements, and be forced to sign agreements confirming their well-being under detention. Once freed, most of them have refrained from speaking out publicly to avoid being re-arrested. In low-profile cases, the interrogations were more excruciating. In one account, a female detainee privately revealed to the author that she underwent extreme psychological torture, and was threatened with lese-majeste charges that carry prison terms of up to fifteen years. She was ordered to her knees while being interrogated, had her head covered by a paper bag, and was stripped and locked in a tiny, window-less room for days.

Military detentions were not restricted to those names on the list. The army sent its troops to the far-flung north and northeast regions, the strongholds of Thaksin and the power bases of the Red Shirts, to annihilate networks deemed hostile to the elite. The Red Shirts are Thaksin supporters who primarily reside in rural villages in the north and northeast regions of Thailand. In interviews conducted by the author, Red Shirt activists revealed that members of their group, as well as anti-coup academics, and NGOs have been harassed, intimidated, and detained arbitrarily. Some had their houses searched and belongings confiscated. Political units, such as Red Shirt “villages,” were forced to shut down; red flags on their houses were burnt. Some leading village heads were placed under detention without revealing any information on their whereabouts and when they might be released. The NCPO has also actively cooperated with the Thai Foreign Ministry in hunting down its critics overseas by pressuring foreign governments to deport them.

Responses from the International Community

As a treaty ally of Thailand and according to its laws, the United States is obliged to penalize the Thai junta for undertaking a coup that overthrew an elected government. This is true with regards to any country receiving military aid from the U.S. when it experiences a coup. On the day of the coup, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said in a statement,

I am disappointed by the decision of the Thai military to suspend the constitution and take control of the government after a long period of political turmoil, and there was no justification for this military coup. […] We are reviewing our military and other assistance and engagements, consistent with US law.

Accordingly, the U.S. government suspended $4.7 million in financial assistance to Thailand, halting joint programs for Thai police training, which included firearms handling and a trip to the U.S. for senior officers. (It is now unclear whether the largest military exercise in the Asia-Pacific region between the United States and Thailand, under the codename Cobra Gold, will be cancelled, or moved to other locations like Australia, as a part of “soft sanctions” against the kingdom. Initiated in 1980, Cobra Gold serves as a platform where now up to 13,000 American and Thai soldiers meet annually and conduct joint military exercises, bringing in both large paychecks and technological transfers to the Thai army. Already, Thailand was excluded from the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)—the largest international military maritime exercise in the world—held in June 2014 in Hawaii, in response to spiraling human-rights abuses in the wake of the military coup. In a recent interview, American Ambassador to Thailand, Kristie Kenney, said, “We take very seriously the whole human-rights aspect to this coup in Thailand. One of the things our government has done is look at our military engagements.” In addition to sanctions, the United States adopted several punitive measures to chastise the Thai junta. On 20 June 2014, Washington announced that, due to the continued allegations of human trafficking especially in the Thai sex and fishing sectors, Thailand would be relegated to the lowest rank in the U.S.’s Trafficking in Persons Report (TPR), the same category as Syria, Iran, and North Korea. This announcement was another blow to Thailand’s reputation and could result in further economic sanctions both at the government and business levels. It should also be noted that during the U.S. Independence Day party hosted by Ambassador Kenney in Bangkok on 4 July 2014, none of the coup makers were invited; this was meant to send a strong message of the U.S.’s rejection of the coup.

The American position towards Thailand triggered other democratic nations to use international sanctions as a way to pressure the junta to loosen its firm grip on power. The European Union initiated its own sanctions against the NCPO by announcing that it would freeze ongoing bilateral cooperation, including the suspension of all official visits to and from Thailand. In more specific details, the EU has halted its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Thailand, which was finalized in November 2013, but had yet to be ratified. According to Reuters, the agreement was designed to strengthen cooperation in a variety of sectors including “tourism, employment, education, migration, transport and environment.” It also aimed to promote a political dialogue between the two sides. Additionally, the EU has shelved the negotiations with Thailand on the Free Trade Agreement. Bilateral trade between the EU and Thailand stood at 32 billion euros, or $42 billion, in 2012. Such a move would cost Thailand many business opportunities in Europe. The EU has also imposed a travel ban for all members of the NCPO. The Council of the European Union released a statement on 23 June 2014, urging the military to restore the legitimate democratic process and to respect and uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms by freeing all political detainees. Failing to do so could result in “further possible measures” against the NCPO. The EU has been known for its periodic uses of sanctions to address a myriad of issues. In the context of Southeast Asia, the EU had long imposed stiff sanction measures against Myanmar when it was under military rule. As a part of the EU’s attempt to change the behavior of Myanmar’s regime, it exploited international platforms to alienate the generals in Nay Pyi Taw, such as exclusion from the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) process. The results were of course a mixture of successes and failures. In the case of Myanmar, it was obvious that the EU sanctions imposed a burden on Myanmar’s civilian population.

Meanwhile, the Australian government, on 31 May 2014, issued a statement confirming the postponement of bilateral military operations with Thailand. It said in part,

Australia has postponed three activities for coming weeks in Thailand: a military operations law training course for Thai military officers; a reconnaissance visit for a counter improvised explosive device training exercise; and a reconnaissance visit for a counter terrorism training exercise. The Australian Government has also put in place a mechanism to prevent the leaders of the coup from travelling to Australia.

Japan also voiced its concern about the grave situation in Thailand. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida released a statement on 22 May 2014, stressing that it was regrettable that the coup took place and urged that democracy should be restored in the country quickly. Japan, as a major trading partner of Thailand, had been treading carefully in its policy towards the country. Although Japan has not imposed official sanctions against the junta, it was reported that a study tour of a group of Thai police to Japan was cancelled almost at the last minute, purportedly because of the coup. In the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Thailand is a member, the group has remained silent about the coup and the violation of human rights, despite the fact that ASEAN has agreed to uphold democracy as part of community building by the year 2015 and that the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) is part of the body. Even Indonesia, arguably the most democratic state in ASEAN, had refrained from interfering in Thai domestic affairs. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said only that Indonesia would keep a watchful eye on the situation. “Without meaning to intervene in the domestic affairs of Thailand, the development of the situation [there] should be a concern of Indonesia, together with the ASEAN,” he reiterated.

The Politics of International Sanctions

International sanctions are often viewed as a symbolic, and at times futile, gesture. In the Thai case, as this article observes, although international sanctions have up to this point remained rather restricted, the coup makers have reacted with a great sense of nervousness. On the one hand, Prayuth employed a nationalist rhetoric to dismiss sanctions by the United States and the European Union. “In the light of international sanctions, Thailand must stand on its own dignity,” Prayuth said. Sihasak Puangketkaew, permanent secretary of the Thai foreign ministry, also expressed disappointment with the EU’s sanctions and criticized it for not taking into account Thailand’s latest developments and instead rushing to implement unilateral measures. On the other hand, the NCPO demonstrated its ability to compromise by announcing that many detainees were freed after a maximum seven-day period in army custody. The NCPO even went further by planning to set up a committee to manage problems related to human rights. Prayuth asserted that the NCPO had no policy to endorse any kind of abuses against the people, crimes against humanity, to cause humiliation against human dignity, or to use murder, torture, or rape against political opponents. The inconsistency on the part of the NCPO in regards to the international sanctions reflects its insecurity and vulnerability. This is directly related to the coup makers’ dilemma between their seriousness about their claimed objective of restoring democracy, and the desire to maintain their grip on power.

As alluded to earlier, the coup’s fundamental objective was to maintain the power position of the traditional elite at this critical period leading up to the royal succession. In the process, the military seemed to have relied on three strategies: first, eliminating the supposed threat of the Shinawatras from politics; second, cracking down on supporters of Thaksin—most of whom identify themselves as Red Shirts who represent a majority of eligible voters; and third, discrediting electoral politics as a source of corruption and dirty politics. The coup was thus considered “legitimate” as the junta moved to achieve those strategies. Since the coup, it has been reported in Thai media that the army has embarked on dismantling the Red Shirt networks in the north and northeast regions of Thailand—the two regions that have served as power centers for Thaksin. Many accounts revealed the harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary detention of Red Shirt activists at the hands of the Thai military. Some core Red Shirt members have had their houses searched and properties seized. Village leaders were sometimes abducted, often locked up, without any chance to inform their family about their circumstances and whether they would be set free. Crucially, the army did not want to repeat the mistake it made in the 2006 putsch when the mission to topple Thaksin failed, because proxies of Thaksin kept returning to politics. In 2014, the army tried harder to deracinate Thaksin’s influence in politics. This included dismantling Red Shirt networks. These crackdowns, combined with the delay of new elections, posed a challenge to the military’s claim to the outside world that democracy was the primary motivator for the latest coup.

Concerned with its precarious legitimacy, the NCPO has, ironically, implemented a number of Thaksin-initiated populist policies to satisfy citizens. The combination of “hard and soft powers”—cracking down on critics while showering others with economic benefits—unveils a reality in which the approach of the military has remained strangely paradoxical. Part of Thaksin’s success through the electoral process was the fact that his populist policy was tangible and effective. From cheap, universal healthcare to low-cost loans, Thaksin’s populist policy tremendously improved the standard of living among his supporters in the poor provinces. Such policies became an important element of Yingluck’s election campaign, which became the formula for her own electoral triumph in 2011. One of the new projects endorsed by Yingluck was a rice subsidy scheme in which the government purchased rice at a premium from local farmers and withheld it from the global market. But this project was sullied by allegations of state corruption that almost removed her from the premiership. Today, the investigation is ongoing and Yingluck is still not free from corruption allegations. Despite this, the junta has found it politically useful to take advantage of the rice subsidy situation by disbursing $2.7 billion to poor farmers, not previously paid by Yingluck’s government. This policy has served as the bedrock of the junta’s populism, based on the logic of distributing quick economic benefits to the population to secure its support. In particular, the role of the military in the rice subsidy scheme echoes its bold attempt to aid recovery in the badly depressed agricultural sector, which involves a large majority of the grassroots supporters loyal to the Shinawatras.

The military’s populist craze does not end at the rice pledging scheme. The NCPO has injected close to $30 billion, or 40 percent of the budget for this fiscal year, into various infrastructure projects in remote areas, including the high-speed train construction plan which was first drawn up by the Yingluck team but later shot down by the Constitutional Court on the dubious grounds of the project being “inappropriate and untimely.” From a broader perspective, Thaksin’s populism was purposefully renewed by the military in order to revitalize a poorly performing economy. Many months of street protests followed by the coup caused plunging confidence among foreign investors. Among other populist projects endorsed by the junta was a rubber subsidy project for $193 million, a satellite education project for $41 million, and a basic infrastructure and computers for students project for $6.2 million. On top of these projects, the military pulled tricks to satisfy Bangkok residents in particular, ranging from offering free patriotic movie tickets, free broadcasts of the World Cup, free outdoor movies at Sanam Luang (to celebrate two months after the coup), as well as other smaller-scale entertainment performances throughout the country. All of these have been carried out under the theme of “Returning Flappiness to Thais,” which has become the catchy motto to promote the legitimacy of the coup.

Analytically, the military seems to assume that its survival and legitimacy depends on its popular appeal. As Pavida Pananond, an economist from Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University, asserts, “It is clear that the generals need economic growth to justify political legitimacy … The NCPO also puts economic reform high on its priority list.” That, in turn, depends on the military’s ability to deliver economic benefits through Thaksin-like populist projects, so as to win the hearts and minds of those who may have ambivalent attitudes towards the NCPO.

Part of the success of these programs rests on whether some Western countries are satisfied with the progress of political reforms and respect for human rights on the part of the Thai military. Existing sanctions, or more in the future, could impede the populist schemes of the military, particularly if Western sanctions have a large impact on the Thai people and their economic livelihoods. Quite possibly, they could react with mounting frustration and that could threaten the junta’s wobbly legitimacy. With an economy fully exposed to international markets, Thailand is susceptible to Western sanctions simply because of its integral role in the global supply chains of critical agricultural products and hardware goods. The Thai economy predominantly depends on exports, which account for nearly 70 percent of Thailand’s overall GDP. Therefore, international boycotts against Thai exports will hurt the Thai economy and the Thai people. While it is true that international buyers are also dependent on Thai supply chains, they can more readily turn to other markets in the region if they see the need to impose further sanctions on Thailand. For example, for commodities like rice, buyers can purchase from Vietnam and Myanmar as alternative markets.

The uncertain political situation in Thailand has already scared Japanese investors. One of their strategies has been to gradually relocate manufacturing factories from Thailand to other countries in the region, as seen in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing opening its new plant in West Java, Indonesia. In another example, the Japanese business community has recently launched a new policy, called Thailand Plus One, as an alternative strategy to transfer labor-intensive sectors from Thailand to new locations in the region. Equally important is the fact that this policy could also alleviate risks of political uncertainty in the kingdom. Sanctions could cause similar effects, should foreign companies decide to temporarily cease their operations in Thailand in protest against the junta’s refusal to reinstate true democratic processes. International sanctions, with the right quantity and approach, have the potential to influence the behavior of the Thai military.

As Dina Esfandiary argues, “Sanctions work by coercing, constraining or signalling a target. The goal of coercion is to modify the target’s cost-benefit calculation of pursuing a certain policy, while constraint restricts a target’s capabilities. Both goals are intended to encourage a target to change the direction of a current policy.” Thus, one way is to ensure that sanctions will attack the junta’s most vulnerable point; and that is its popular support. So far, existing sanctions have specifically targeted the NCPO and the army. The U.S.’s suspension of financial assistance to the Thai army and the EU’s travel ban against Thai coup makers have generated a certain degree of uneasiness at the top level of the NCPO and the military, but not so much at the people’s level. Elowever, freezing all bilateral cooperation between the EU and Thailand, as well as the disruption of Thai-EU FTA could affect more actors in the people’s sector, particularly those with businesses involving exports to Europe. Time will tell if such sanctions by the EU could become adequately powerful in stirring frustration among those affected; it will also tell if they will be willing to stand up to challenge the legitimacy of the NCPO.

For now, while the NCPO may seem willing to negotiate with the international community, it has also sought other policy options to protect its regime. The U.S. and the EU have moved to financially constrain the NCPO as a way to put pressure on the relations between the military and the Thai public. But such sanctions have also compelled the junta to look elsewhere for the support of its legitimacy that has been rejected by Western countries. The NCPO has made overtures to Beijing to offset the effects of sanctions from the West. Just two weeks after the coup, Prayuth met with Chinese business leaders to discuss trading opportunities in Thailand. The meeting was also perceived as a symbolic gesture that the NCPO had enjoyed backing from China for its needed legitimacy. Meanwhile, China is enthusiastic to play a role in the domestic politics of its neighbors, particularly in legitimizing otherwise dubious regimes.

China’s role as a legitimacy provider to the NCPO must be evaluated in the context of great power competition between China and the U.S. in maintaining their political footholds and influence in Southeast Asia. The economic and military rise of China has fiercely contested American interests in this part of the world. As China has been actively increasing its visibility in many countries as the dominant power in this region, this has begun to worry the United States. In response, the United States has recently launched the Asia Pivot policy, ostensibly designed to reconnect with Southeast Asia, but in reality more to offset the growing influence of China. Thailand, at the same time, has turned the rivalry between China and the United States into its own political benefit, particularly in diversifying its foreign policy alternatives, instead of being compelled to solely depend on the U.S. as in the past. For several decades, Bangkok and Beijing have forged intimate relations, with Thai leaders willing to keep their Chinese counterparts happy. This is because China has been a market for Thai products and has increasingly served as a source of the kingdom’s foreign direct investment. At this critical moment in Thai politics, China has proven to be a trusted friend of Thailand. The Chinese government has readily embraced the Thai junta, as the promotion of democracy has never been on the agenda of leaders in Beijing.

Apart from China, Thailand’s friends in the immediate neighborhood have come to the rescue of the Thai military elites. On 4 July of this year, Myanmar’s government sent its military strongman, Supreme Commander Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to Bangkok. A possible candidate for the next president of Myanmar, he became the second top leader from ASEAN to meet the Thai junta after the coup, following the visit of Malaysia’s Defense Minister and Supreme Commander General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Bin Mohd Zin in June. In Bangkok, he paid a visit to Prayuth during which talks on consolidating bilateral relations were held. Ominously, Min Aung Hlaing praised the Thai junta for “doing the right thing” in seizing power. Meanwhile, he recalled Myanmar’s experience dealing with its own political turmoil in August 1988, to rationalize the Thai coup as a way to break political deadlock in Thailand. On 31 May 2014, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister General Tea Banh also turned up in Thailand to offer his government’s support for the Thai coup. It was reported that Tea Banh conveyed the message from Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia to the Thai military leaders of his confidence that they would restore peace and order to Thailand. Hun Sen said that he “understood the situation in Thailand very well.” The visit from Cambodia’s top delegate was meaningful in several ways. Thailand and Cambodia have long suffered from bilateral territorial conflicts over the Preah Vihear Temple. Furthermore, Thailand has always been suspicious of the Hun Sen government for its support for the Red Shirts. Thus, the meeting between Thai and Cambodian leaders served many political purposes for the two sides.

From this perspective, the Thai political interests seemed to converge with those of its neighbors, from China, Myanmar, and Cambodia. A mini quasi-democratic axis between these Southeast Asian states, with strong backing from China, has appeared to emerge, but this may damage the credibility and reputation of ASEAN, particularly as this regional organization is striving to achieve community building in 2015. As Myanmar declared that it would lend its support to Thailand within the framework of the ASEAN community, observers were disappointed by the fact that Myanmar, as the chair of ASEAN in 2014, did not even pretend to disapprove of the Thai coup. The new alliance among Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia could negatively affect the peace and stability of the Southeast Asian region. It will certainly jeopardize the interests of the international community. The U.S. and the EU may consider broadening their reach to ensure the impact of their sanctions. Increasing the economic costs of the junta’s illegitimate hold on power could loosen the generals’ grip.

Conclusion

Since the coup, the international community led by the U.S. and the EU has imposed soft sanctions against the Thai military for its seizure of power in an illegitimate way and for its continued abuse of human rights. In contrast to arguments elsewhere that sanctions are ineffectual, the Thai case demonstrates that they have had considerable bearing on the behavior of the Thai military. Domestically, the junta seems to have adopted a paradoxical approach, cracking down on its critics mostly in the Red Shirt movement, while at the same time buying the people off with aggressive populist policies. The junta has relied on popular appeal in order to secure legitimacy, but this could crumble when international sanctions are felt. This explains how even soft sanctions may drive the military to loosen its grip on power, illustrated by the release of political detainees after a short period of interrogation, as well as the willingness to set up the NLA and draft an interim constitution, no matter how artificial these processes might be.

In some cases, however, the military has refused to be manipulated by international sanctions. It has played power politics by involving China and neighboring countries in Southeast Asia to buoy its own political legitimacy in the face of international condemnation. Such alliances with Thailand will, at the core, threaten democratic development in the region and hence stymie the interests of the international community. Harsher sanctions represent a solution in counterbalancing such a quasi-democracy axis.