Andrzej Szeptycki. The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs. Volume 19, Issue 3, 2010.
Given their shared history, present potential and position in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, relations between Poland and Ukraine are sometimes likened to those between Germany and France. Those countries, too, were once deeply divided by the past, and yet in the name of common interests they have managed to overcome disputes and establish cooperation for a united Europe.
Poland and Ukraine have been and remain divided by major differences. The first, even if not the most important, area of argument is their common history, which, quite obviously, both peoples perceive differently. For Poles, the Volhynia tragedy of 1943-1944 was an instance of genocide for which Ukraine should unconditionally apologize. But as our neighbors see it, Western Ukraine in the 1940s was the scene of a Polish-Ukrainian conflict which left victims on both sides. Moreover, Poles and Ukrainians do not assign the same significance to the past, which also results in misunderstandings. Poland often perceives its eastern neighbor through the prism of history: the historical novel With Fire and Sword, the Lwów Eaglets (teenage defenders of the city in 1918-1919), the legacy of the Paris-based émigré magazine Kultura, etc. Ukraine is more pragmatic, giving more weight to visa facilities or economic cooperation, which partly reflects the fact that for most of the country’s political elites, often hailing from its eastern regions (Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk), the history of Ukraine’s western reaches is a fairly remote subject.
Another problem has been posed by both countries’ diverse development paths over the past 20 years. Poland formed a stable democracy and a market economy in a process crowned with its accession to NATO and the European Union. Ukraine, on the other hand, has not embarked on any determined policy of reform, and the question about its future is still an open one, whether in terms of civilization choice or geopolitics. Those tempted to praise the Polish elites for this state of things and chastise those in Ukraine should be reminded, though, that the success of independent Poland and the “failure” of samostiynaya Ukraine partly reflect exogenous circumstances: the evolution of the international environment for each of them, and of their perception by this environment. Just as other Central European countries, Poland found itself after 1989 in the sphere of the EU’s interest, and it was right in the mid-1990s that the country was given a clear membership prospect. As for Ukraine, it remains part of the post-Soviet area, which is often perceived in Russia and in Western Europe as the Russian Federation’s “near-abroad.”
And finally, mutual relations are affected by slightly different positions the partners take in the other country’s foreign policy. Poland has increasingly been perceiving its international environment through the prism of its membership of the EU, while viewing Ukraine (at least until not long ago) as the most important non-EU neighbor, if only on account of that country’s potential and aversion to Russia’s imperial ambitions. But for Ukraine, the most important roles are played by two major actors it borders on: the European Union and the Russian Federation. Poland is only a single member of the former, one that is indeed friendly towards Ukraine, but not always effective.
From Independence to Revolution
Poland was the first to recognize Ukraine’s independence after the 1 December 1991 referendum, and in the course of the 1990s Ukraine became the country’s closest partner in the CIS area. With Polish-Russian encounters marked by major disputes, and relations with Belarus deteriorating after Alexander Lukashenka’s takeover in 1994, the rapprochement with Ukraine was a major success of Polish policy after 1989, one that was also noticed abroad.
Polish-Ukrainian relations were obviously by no means free of problems. Initially, the major challenge was both partners’ weakness and the poor offer they had for each other. Poland, hit in the 1990s by an economic crisis, pursued a single overarching goal: integration with the Western world. Ukraine’s position was much more difficult: the country not only had to extricate itself from an economic collapse, but it had to lay the groundwork for independent existence. In both areas, success hinged on how Ukraine conducted its relations with Russia and whether it managed to win over the international community to the idea of a Ukrainian statehood. Poland and Ukraine were still divided by the remnants of history, but initially none devoted any considerable attention to the matter. But certain foreign policy differences did emerge: Ukraine called for a development of cooperation among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the so-called Kravchuk Plan) and feared becoming a buffer state between an enlarged West and Russia. Hence it approached the prospect of Poland’s membership of NATO with some concern. And Poland was worried by President Kuchma’s policies, as reflected, first, in calls for getting closer together with Russia and, second, in his growing authoritarianism.
Those factors notwithstanding, it was precisely during the presidencies of Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) and Aleksander Kwasniewski (1995-2005) that both countries genuinely got closer together. Having joined NATO in 1999 and seeing an increasingly clear prospect of EU accession, Poland sought an expansion of these two blocs’ relations with the Ukrainian neighbor. Dialogue on common history was undertaken and in May 1997 the two presidents adopted a statement on understanding and reconciliation, calling on their compatriots to “remember the past but think about the future.” In July 2003, in Pavlivka, Volhynia region, the two leaders attended ceremonies to commemorate victims of the tragic events of 1943-1944. While the sincerity of the Ukrainian authorities’ intentions was, perhaps, not quite beyond doubt-bearing in mind that Kuchma’s position was on the wane, domestically and internationally, and that he was most likely seeking Poland’s support by taking up the Volhynia subject-that was nonetheless a daring gesture indeed. A Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion was formed and in 2000 it joined NATO’s force in Kosovo (KFOR). In 2003, at Ukraine’s initiative, both countries began soliciting the right to hold the European football championship in 2012. An attempt was made to stimulate economic cooperation, where the flagship project was to be the Odessa-Brody-Plock pipeline to carry Caspian Sea oil along a route bypassing Russia: from the Black Sea to Poland and, potentially, further on to Western Europe. The Ukrainian portion of the pipeline (Odessa-Brody) was provided in 2002, but it was not continued to destinations in Poland. In the end, starting from 2003, it was used to ship Russian oil towards the Black Sea. Coming as an important element of bilateral relations was the presence of Ukrainian immigrants on the Polish labor market, and in this context the prospect of Poland’s accession to the EU and the Schengen zone proved to be a challenge indeed. In 2003, Poland introduced a visa regime for Ukrainian citizens, but the visas were issued free of charge, and in return Polish citizens retained the right to travel in Ukraine visa-free.
The Significance of the “Orange Revolution”
The “Orange Revolution” of November-December 2004 was of overarching importance for political developments in Ukraine and its relations with Poland. In the preceding period, during Kuchma’s second term in office, Ukraine’s system was becoming more and more like Russia’s, with the freedom of speech constrained and democracy on the retreat. An important role, politically and economically, was increasingly played by oligarchic clans, and the president took centre stage in the country’s political system. That tendency was to be beefed up with the presidential election in 2004, when the Russian scenario of 1999-2000 was to be repeated: outgoing president Kuchma designed his successor, Viktor Yanukovych, who was then to win the election, leveraging support from the administrative apparatus, oligarchs and the media, plus electoral fraud. But that scenario was not to be. When after the election’s second round Yanukovych was declared winner, crowds of Ukrainians took to the streets to protest against manipulation, corruption and oligarchs’ increasing role in the country’s political life-and to express support for the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko. The country split, largely along geographical lines, into supporters of the official candidate and of the opposition leader. The protests were essentially peaceful, even though the authorities wanted to attempt resolving the conflict by force.
Polish society was deeply interested in, and supportive of, the “Orange Revolution.” Demonstrations of support were held almost daily in Warsaw and other major cities. A tent was set up in front of the Ukrainian Embassy to commemorate the tents pitched on Kyiv’s Maidan Square, where protesters held on through the revolution. The example of the public was followed by politicians. The legendary leader of the Solidarity trade union and former Polish president, Lech Walesa, President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Warsaw Mayor Lech Kaczynski were at one in supporting the Ukrainian people.
The position taken by the head of state was of the utmost import. President Kwasniewski, drawing on his good relations with Leonid Kuchma, established contacts with both the government and the opposition, and he then joined “round table” discussions in Kiev which sought to find a peaceful settlement to the crisis. The Polish president’s action was backed by many EU member states, including the heavyweights, who in the past had often shown skepticism towards the Union’s involvement in the post-Soviet area. Along with Kwasniewski, the Kyiv negotiations were attended by Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus and EU High Commissioner for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. Under a compromise reached at the round-table talks, the second round of the presidential poll was repeated towards the end of December. In early 2005, Viktor Yushchenko was declared Ukraine’s new head of state. As part of the compromise settlement, constitutional amendments were introduced, aiming to change the country’s political system (not later than in 2006) from presidential to one safeguarding a transfer of power to Parliament and the cabinet.
Poland’s contribution to solving Ukraine’s political crisis was a major foreign policy success. First, it was a perceptible achievement scored in the EU forum. Second, it was a success of Polish policy towards Ukraine. The Polish involvement contributed to achieving a peaceful settlement to the Ukrainian crisis and preventing the neighboring state from sliding into authoritarianism, along the Russian or Belarusian lines. The “Orange Revolution” strengthened democracy and freedom of speech. It brought to power politicians who, it was believed, genuinely embraced the cause of Euro-Atlantic integration. Third, the revolution laid the groundwork for the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations-even though, obviously, the Polish involvement in Ukraine was mentioned more often by Poles than by Ukrainians, who saw the revolution primarily as the achievement of Maidan Square protesters. Fourth, Ukraine’s image among Polish society has improved. The events in Ukraine aroused great interest in Poland, as reflected in the demonstrations staged in support of Ukraine’s people and the presence of 3,000 Polish observers during the repeated second round of the Ukraine election. Following the “Orange Revolution,” more Poles declared friendliness towards the Ukrainians (29% of respondents at the end of 2004 against 19% in 2003). Fifth, hopes arose in Poland that the country’s eastern neighbor would follow Central Europe’s example and take the road of swift, democratic, market-oriented reforms, to be crowned with accession to Western institutions. And sixth, Poland’s involvement in Ukraine brought about a major deterioration of relations with Russia, although this did not provoke any serious doubts in Poland at the time as to the rationale behind cooperation with Ukraine.
Towards Strategic Partnership
“Poles’ widespread solidarity with democratic Ukraine,” Foreign Minister Adam D. Rotfeld told the Sejm in January 2005, “is a good starting point for a breakthrough in relations between our two peoples. … We will do everything in our power to create a solid and at the same time practical basis for the development of mutual relations at the people-to-people level, so that the change can be perceived by millions of citizens of our states on both sides of the border.” Bilateral relations grew considerably tighter after the revolution, even if mostly at the top level. Presidents Kwasniewski and Yushchenko met at least seven times during 2005, with the frequency of contacts slightly reduced in the following years. Working to the advantage of the contacts was the fact that each of the presidents commanded a great deal of support and sympathy in the other country, at least initially. In 2005 Wprost weekly awarded Yushchenko with the “Man of the Year” title, and in 2007 the Ukrainian web portal Glavred found Kwasniewski to be the most influential lobbyist for Ukraine’s interests in the world. In the autumn of 2005, the presidential election in Poland was taken by Lech Kaczynski, and after the parliamentary election held that year the Law and Justice (PiS) party became the country’s major political force. But Polish policy towards Ukraine did not change, as the new president in fact cooperated in this respect with his predecessor, despite the political differences between them.
With two-way relations tightening up, the process of reconciliation continued to unfold. The issue of Lwów Eaglets Cemetery in Lviv was resolved in 2005. Poland’s activities during the “Orange Revolution” and the contribution to the argument’s settlement from President Yushchenko-highly respected in Lviv-prodded Lviv councilors to take a more conciliatory stance, which made possible a compromise on the cemetery’s final layout. In June 2005, both presidents attended the official opening ceremony of the Lwów Eaglets Cemetery at Lychakiv and a nearby memorial to servicemen of the Ukrainian Galician Army. In May 2006, Viktor Yushchenko and Lech Kaczynski met in Pawlokoma (Pokarpackie voivodship) to unveil a monument commemorating 366 Ukrainians who in January 1945 died at the hand of the Polish underground forces, and also to paid homage to the Polish and Ukrainian victims of past conflicts between the two peoples. In April 2007 both leaders took part in a ceremony held in Warsaw on the 60th anniversary of the Vistula Operation. But unlike the previous commemorative events, the 2007 ceremony was a closed-door event, indicating that the 1947 expulsions of Ukrainians and Lemkos continued to be a sensitive issue.
Both countries also made an attempt at cooperation in the post-Soviet area, especially by coordinating their policies towards Belarus and collaborating with Georgia. A number of meetings on Belarus were held in 2005, attended by representatives of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and, occasionally, Georgia. Their only outcome was the formation by the first four of these countries of a joint working group for the Belarusian situation, although the group was not particularly active. In August 2008, the leaders of Poland, Ukraine and the three Baltic republics went to Tbilisi to back President Mikheil Saakashvili during the war with Russia. Soon afterwards, in Washington, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski issued a warning against a repetition of the Georgian scenario in Ukraine. He also expressed the opinion that another attempt at changing borders in Europe would pose a threat to European security and he de facto called on NATO to provide guarantees of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
But the main line of cooperation in foreign policy was Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. President Yushchenko said that his country would take the “road of united Europe” and that “its place was in the European Union.” Poland unequivocally supported these aspirations, arguing that “reforms in Ukraine required support, and the country’s political turn towards Euro-Atlantic structures should be reciprocated.”
In the European Union forum, Poland focused on three major issues. The country steadfastly advocated the EU’s further enlargement and, eventually, admission of Ukraine. This effort brought about partial results. The European Parliament twice adopted resolutions mentioning the possibility of Ukraine’s accession (in January 2005, directly after the revolution, and in July 2007). Both documents were drawn up with active participation of Polish MEPs. Significantly, Poland did not call for Ukraine’s speedy entry or a rapid start of accession negotiations-such unrealistic demands were initially voiced in Ukraine-but rather for the EU to recognize the prospect of Ukrainian membership. Poland’s position was that Ukraine, as a democracy, did enjoy such a right, and that the prospect of EU membership would provide a perceptible modernization impulse for the country. Poland also sought a strengthening of the European Neighborhood Policy’s Eastern dimension. Addressing the Sejm, Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga cautioned that the EU should not to confine its interest to cooperation in the Black Sea region once Romania and Bulgaria were admitted. “We expect the Eastern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy to involve, in equal measure, relations with the societies of Belarus, and also states such as Ukraine or Moldova.” Poland, just as Ukraine, was critical of the shape of European Neighborhood Policy, arguing that this policy should not prevent Ukraine from fulfilling its European ambitions. Poland sought an increase in funding for the eastern neighbors under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, and criticized the situation whereby more resources under that instrument were channeled to the EU’s southern-rather than eastern-neighbors. And finally, Poland wanted the EU’s visa regime to be liberalized for Ukrainian citizens. In July 2007, Ukraine and the EU signed an agreement exempting certain Ukrainian groups (e.g. members of official delegations, journalists, students, athletes) from visa fees.
An effort to bring Ukraine closer to NATO was taken in both the political and the military field. Poland often called on the Alliance to go on with its open-door policy, also towards Ukraine. The Polish position was that “in the event of that country’s accession, not only NATO would be strengthened but, most importantly, there would be a fundamental change in the neighboring area’s geopolitical situation, to a great advantage of Poland, Ukraine and many other states.” The first step in that direction would be to grant Ukraine MAP (Membership Action Plan) status. Initially, it was hoped that target might be reached in 2006, making it possible to present Ukraine with an invitation to join NATO in 2008. Those hopes proved futile after a change of guard in Ukraine, when Viktor Yanukovych had taken over as prime minister for the second time (August 2006). Following the revival of an “Orange coalition” (December 2007), Poland resumed efforts to extend the Plan to Ukraine in the run-up to NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008. In the course of that meeting, Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries firmly demanded from their more skeptical allies (France, Germany, Southern European countries) that Ukraine and Georgia be covered by the Plan. Their effort was only partly rewarded: the North Atlantic Council confirmed that both countries would become members of the Alliance in the future, but did not provide them with MAP status. Poland’s military cooperation with Ukraine took diverse forms, including programs to assist in the Ukrainian armed forces’ adjustment to NATO standards. Common principles were agreed for troops’ participation in NATO and EU operations, and in 2008 a decision was taken to form by 2011 a joint Polish-Ukrainian-Lithuanian military unit (a battalion was initially mentioned, and later a brigade).
Both countries sought to expand economic cooperation. In terms of trade volumes, Poland was usually among Ukraine’s top five partners, and Ukraine was in the top ten of Polish partners. Investment proved to be an important field of cooperation, with Poland becoming in 2005 the second largest destination for Ukraine’s outward investments globally. The largest investor was the Industrial Union of Donbass (ISD), which bought Huta Czestochowa steelworks in 2005, and two years later acquired a majority stake in the Gdansk shipyard. At least to some extent the Ukrainian investments in Poland were politically motivated, with ISD owners Vitaliy Hayduk and Serhiy Taruta closely linked to President Yushchenko.
Poland and Ukraine undertook measures aimed at developing genuine cooperation in the field of energy, especially with a view to lessening their dependence on Russian supplies. The main energy-related initiatives were about reviving the Odessa-Brody pipeline project and creating a broader platform for energy cooperation among countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and, potentially, Central Asia. In 2005 the new Ukrainian authorities declared their intention to use the pipeline in accordance with the original plans, i.e. to transport Caspian Sea oil to Europe. Consequently, Poland, Ukraine and the European Commission agreed to resume work on the pipeline’s extension to Poland. A major impulse to enhance cooperation came with the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis in January 2006. Soon afterwards, Presidents Kaczynski and Yushchenko signed a declaration on the development of cooperation in the field of energy, expressing their will to modernize the existing transmission infrastructure and examine the opportunities for building new routes for the transport of Central Asian gas to Europe. They also described energy cooperation as “one of the priority components of Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership.” In May 2007, an energy summit of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Azerbaijan was held in Kraków, discussing the idea of a transit corridor from Baku to Gdansk. A year later, another such meeting was held in Kyiv, attended by presidents of Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The concept was then espoused of a Black Sea-Caspian Sea-Baltic Sea energy transit area to link Caspian Sea producers with European consumers through the territory of the Southern Caucasus and Ukraine, bypassing Russia. An important element of that space was to be provided by an Asia-Europe oil transportation corridor, including the Odessa-Brody pipeline.
Between 100,000 and 500,000 Ukrainians were estimated to be working in Poland, illegally for the most part, in 2007. Employer organizations, construction companies and farmers were demanding regulations allowing Ukrainians to work legally. In October 2007, Poland lowered the work permit fees for foreign nationals, and in February 2008 Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian citizens were granted the right to work without a permit for six months each year. The resulting change in Ukrainian citizens’ situation on the Polish labor market was only limited. With Poland’s accession to the Schengen zone came further change, as the holders of employment confirmation letters could then be pretty much assured of being let into Poland.
An important achievement for both countries was the UEFA’s decision granting Poland and Ukraine the rights to host the European football championship tournament in 2012. That opened up new opportunities for cooperation in both the economic field (expansion of sport-related, tourist and transport infrastructure) and the political field (promotion of both countries, especially Ukraine, in Europe).
The recent period has at long last seen an improvement in the way both peoples perceive each other. As shown by the findings of annual polls, the earlier temporary dint in Poles’ sympathies for the Ukrainians (probably reflecting disappointment with the policies of the new Ukraine government) has been reversed, with the proportion of those declaring sympathy for the Ukrainians rising from 25% in 2007 to 34% at the turn of 2009. No such systematic research is conducted in Ukraine, but it should be noted that in a Razumkov Center poll in 2006, the respondents gave Poland 6.43 points out of 10 (the best scorer was Belarus, with 7.89 points; and the worst-the United States, with 5.13). More interesting results were produced by an IFAK Ukraine survey, which found Poland to be the most friendly country towards Ukraine.
Limits to Strategic Partnership
During the inauguration of his term, President Kaczynski suggested that “the strategic alliance with Ukraine should take a more concrete shape.” That goal was not achieved. Many joint initiatives only brought disappointment, other ones did not materialize, and both countries were faced with new problems emerging in the meantime. Blaming Ukraine for the fiasco of strategic partnership is fairy popular in Poland, but this view is somewhat simplified. Obviously, the weaknesses of a post-revolution Ukraine were among the major challenges in 2005-2010, but there were other problems too. Polish policy towards Ukraine was largely declarative, ignoring issues of fundamental importance for that country, such as the consequences of Schengen zone expansion. Poland paid too little attention to the interdependence between its policy towards Ukraine and its EU membership, nor did it succeed in building an effective coalition of “friends of Ukraine” (the Polish-Swedish concept of the Eastern Partnership being an exception here). And finally, a weighty role was played by external determinants: the unwillingness on the part of the European Union (and more broadly, the Western states) to engage in the post-Soviet area and Russia’s strengthening position. No success has been reached in overcoming an international pattern that developed over the past 20 years whereby the Bug river remains a dividing line between the EU and NATO on the one hand and Eastern European states on the other.
It is hard to pinpoint precisely when a conviction has surfaced that Polish-Ukraine cooperation fails to meet the hopes pinned on it. An important turning point came at the turn of 2007. Following a parliamentary election in September, the “Orange coalition” returned to power in Ukraine, but that-against Polish expectations-did not stabilize the situation in the country. Soon afterwards, the Polish election in October was won by the Civic Platform (PO), which opted for a more pragmatic Eastern policy. In December 2007, Poland joined the Schengen zone; coupled with a protest action among the Polish border services, this resulted in a paralysis on the Polish-Ukrainian border.
The overriding problem in mutual relations, as mentioned above, was the political situation in Ukraine. While bringing to Ukraine democracy and freedom, the “Orange Revolution” also resulted in chaos, which threw the country into a state of nearly permanent political crisis. Under the circumstances, the Ukrainian authorities failed to conduct reforms to dismantle the oligarchs’ hold on the economy, weed out corruption, modernize the country and adjust it to EU standards. In the period to 2008, Ukraine’s economic situation was relatively good, but that reflected in part the favorable trends on international markets. Later, the country was painfully hit by the international economic and financial crisis, with the GDP falling by an annualized 17.8% (the first half of 2009 against the same period in 2008), according to official data. In some sectors the drop was perceptibly steeper (43% in metal industry, 54.9% in construction).
The process of historical reconciliation proved to be shallow and, to some extent, reversible. In February 2009 Presidents Kaczynski and Yushchenko met at the site of Huta Pieniacka village (Lviv district), where a pacification action during World War II had brought death to between 600 and 1,500 Poles. But in September 2009, Lech Kaczynski and Viktor Yushchenko did not-as planned -travel together to Sahryn (Lubelskie voivodship), whose Ukrainian inhabitants had been killed in 1944. This reflected Kaczynski’s concern for voters’ support in the elections planned for 2010, and also disapproval of Ukraine’s history policy, an area where 2009 saw problems piling up. In early July, the head of Ukraine’s secret service, Valentin Nalivachenko, compared the pre-war Polish police to the Gestapo and NKVD, arguing that all of them sought a common objective of destroying the Ukrainian identity. Later that month, the Sejm adopted a resolution to commemorate Poles from the eastern borderlands, depicting the Ukrainian underground’s anti-Polish action as conducted in the spirit of ethnic cleansing and showing signs of genocide. In early August, a rather obscure Ukrainian NGO launched a hike “In the footsteps of Stepan Bandera”–and in Poland indignation was caused by the fact that supporters of the OUN-B leader accused of responsibility for the Volhynia events were planning to cross into southern Poland. In the end, participants in the hike were refused entry on the grounds that they had “obtained their visas under false pretences.” And finally, in January 2010, the outgoing president, Viktor Yushchenko, posthumously conferred on Bandera the title of Ukraine’s Hero, which seemed to provide a graphic illustration of the fiasco of reconciliation policy. And indeed, that policy had certain weaknesses. First, it was motivated by political exigencies, seeking to forget the problem-ridden past in the name of current cooperation. Second, it was fragmentary, with no overall attempt made at an assessment of Polish presence in the East or the activities of the OUN and the UPA. Third, the process of reconciliation was primarily an affair of the elites, or even a fraction of the elites, with the majority of both societies remaining uninvolved. And fourth, both societies saw a rising interest in history and willingness to defy political correctness in that field. In Poland, this tendency manifested itself under the government of the Law and Justice (PiS)–even if that party’s history policy was directed mainly against Russia and Germany. And in Ukraine, Yushchenko sought to strengthen his compatriots’ historical identity by cultivating memories of the Hetmanate, Great Hunger, or the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), generating conflicts not only with Russia but also with Poland. Under the circumstances, radicals in both countries saw their popularity on the rise. In the social and media dimension, Father Tadeusz Isakowicz–Zaleski should be mentioned, and in the political dimension–the successes of the Svoboda nationalist party led by Oleh Tiahnybok.
Ukraine’s “post-Orange Revolution” relations with the EU and NATO have been a disappointment. The Europe Union failed to react properly to the revolution. On February 2005, an EU-Ukraine Action Plan of activities within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy was adopted-a document largely negotiated back at the time of Leonid Kuchma. It called for the development of multifaceted cooperation and it imposed on Ukraine a series of commitments, offering only limited benefits in return (trade liberalization, “constructive dialogue” on visa regime). But the European Neighborhood Policy did not provide a sufficient instrument for modernization. Despite Polish efforts, the EU did not choose to recognize Ukraine’s membership perspective. A January 2007 negotiating brief on the new agreement between Ukraine and the EU only contained a passage about the EU’s backing for “Ukraine’s European aspirations.” The new accord was aimed at tightening relations with Ukraine through deeper political cooperation and gradual economic integration, but it was in no way to determine the future development of Ukraine-EU relations.
Poland gradually came to realize the unrealistic nature of demands that the EU recognize Ukraine’s membership perspective and the fact that focusing on that goal alone was making Poland’s Eastern policy less effective in the EU forum. The Eastern Partnership initiative was an attempt to move forward. Given that the initiators did not want the partnership to be an alternative to membership, its institutional structure was to be light-weighted and goal-oriented. Initially Ukraine approached the Eastern Partnership from a distance, fearing that it may substitute for the prospect of EU enlargement. Polish diplomats managed in part to dispel those fears and persuade Ukraine that the project might actually make it easier to bring Ukraine closer to the EU. In December 2008, the European Commission presented proposals for fleshing up the Partnership concept, under which six eastern neighbors would in the future benefit from a free trade zone, visa-free travel and energy cooperation. The proposals represented a success for Poland interested in tightening up the Union’s collaboration with its eastern neighbors, but their importance was less substantial for Ukraine, which had been offered such arrangements earlier.
On the NATO front, the major problem was posed by the opposition to membership on the part of a majority of Ukrainian society-ranging between 52% and 63.9% in 2005-2010. Viktor Yanukovych, on his return as prime minister in September 2006, suspended efforts to win Membership Action Plan status for his country. In late 2007 and early 2008, the “Orange coalition” resumed the endeavors, but to no avail, and the Bucharest summit brought no progress either. Over 2008-2009, the prospect of the Alliance’s enlargement was further put off by the following sequence of events: Russia-Georgia war (confirming the West’s weakness in the post-Soviet area), Barack Obama’s victory in the presidential election and the United States’ new policy to reset relations with Russia, and the Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis of January 2009.
Problems emerged in the economic sphere as well. Despite repeated declarations, the idea of prolonging the Odessa-Brody pipeline failed to materialize. Undoubtedly Ukraine was its more vocal advocate, seeing in the project a means to increase its energy security. In Poland certain doubts emerged as to the venture’s economic viability. According to some commentators, Caspian Sea oil would be more expensive than Russian because of transport costs, and its parameters would not suit the requirements of Polish refineries. Besides, no private investor could be found to finance the pipeline extension.
A lot of doubt also surrounded the sale of the Gdansk shipyard to ISD. The transaction was made in a hurry, skipping the competitive selection procedure (using legal gimmickry, as some industry watchers argued), for fear that the new Polish government expected after the 2007 election would prevent the deal from going through. The Ukrainian investor was aware of the dispute with the European Commission over whether or not the shipyard had benefited from unlawful public aid. In early 2008, the Commission estimated that aid at more than 700 million zloty (several times the amount suspected by the investor), and it demanded that the shipyard either return the money obtained in breach of EU rules or cut its production capacity. Under the circumstances, a restructuring plan was drawn up for the shipyard, providing for the liquidation of two out of the yard’s three slipways and a 150-million zloty injection of refundable state money. As a result, the transaction, which otherwise could have helped bring the two nations together (with Poland ceding to Ukrainians the “cradle of Solidarity”), became an exercise in “buck passing,” with the Polish government selling the shipyard to ISD in the hope of getting rid of the problem. When that had come to light, Poland had to transfer major financial assistance to what was by then a privately held shipyard in order to save it from bankruptcy.
Last but not least, Polish-Ukrainian relations were affected by the economic crisis. Even though the climate for foreign (European) investment in Ukraine had never been favorable, Polish companies were eager to enter and seek tapping the market’s opportunities. But the crisis slowed the dynamics of Polish investments.
Socially, the biggest challenge was posed by Poland’s accession to the Schengen zone. It meant that Ukrainian citizens (except for those covered by the 2007 agreement on the liberalization of visa regime) were now to pay euro35 for a visa, whether national or Schengen. Added to the introduction of stricter visa issuance criteria, that led to a major fall in the number of Ukrainian citizens travelling to Poland, with the number of visas issued by Polish consulates in Ukraine down by 58.8% between 2007 and 2008. The number of foreign nationals (mostly Ukrainians) crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border dropped by 48%, which was accompanied by an increase in illegal immigration from that country. There was also a decline in border-region trade and in the revenues of Polish tourist centers catering to the citizens of Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe. The adverse consequences that Poland’s Schengen accession had brought for Ukraine were to be mitigated by a March 2008 agreement on border-region traffic, permitting visa-free travel in areas close to the border by the people living there. But the European Commission presented its reservations to the deal. One was about the size of the visa-free border-region strip, which under the agreement was to be up to 50 kilometers wide, against the Community’s rules, putting the width at no more than 30 km from the border, and allowing 50 km only in specified cases. In December 2008, the parties signed a protocol to the agreement on border-region traffic, and the agreement itself did not come into force until July 2009.
Both countries began preparations for the Euro 2012 football championship tournament. The first three years revealed a host of problems, especially in Ukraine. Initially, the partners lacked proper coordination, but that was remedied with the signing of a relevant agreement in 2008. It is to be regretted, however, that-contrary to the original expectations-Euro 2012 is seen in each country largely as a national project, only rarely talked about in terms of a joint venture. In Poland, some sports representatives even contemplated the possibility of holding the championships without Ukraine’s participation.
These problems were reflected in the policy pursued towards Ukraine, especially after the Civic Platform’s electoral victory. President Kaczynski and the Law and Justice party, notwithstanding their critical position on the Ukrainian authorities’ history policy, proceeded from the assumption that Polish support for Ukraine reflected not so much some special affection for Ukraine as the Polish raison d’état. The new Polish authorities approached the eastern neighbor in a more pragmatic way. Earlier, relations with Ukraine had been regarded as a value in itself (largely for reasons of geopolitics and mutual historical ties), while the Tusk government perceived Polish-Ukrainian cooperation somewhat differently-understanding that country’s importance, but also believing that cooperation should pursue realistic goals, built into the overall Polish foreign policy framework, and that it should produce concrete results. In the absence of such results, Poland began moving away from Ukraine-with EU membership providing the principal azimuth for the country’s foreign policy. “European integration has increasingly been defining the main principles of Polish foreign policy and the circle of our closest partners and allies,” Minister Sikorski wrote in 2009. Ukraine’s status as a country outside the Union was a natural constraint on room for mutual cooperation. The vision of a Jagiellonianera Poland had to be abandoned, remembering that in 1939 that vision ended up in defeat. Closer relations with Ukraine tended to weaken our position within the EU and rendered normalization with Russia more difficult. Therefore, the Polish authorities reasoned, the goals pursued by the policy towards Ukraine should be less ambitious or, some would say, more realistic. Also important for the Polish authorities was the time horizon. There can be no doubt that the involvement in Ukraine on the part of Poland and the European Union must be of a long-term nature if it is to be effective. But that does not fit in with the election cycle, which demands quick successes. Consequently, the Polish authorities have made several attempts over the past years to open up to Belarus, which could easily be turned into a political success-while pushing cooperation with Ukraine into the back seat. Characteristically, in October 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lowered to euro20 the price of a national visa for Belarusian citizens, but not for the citizens of Ukraine and other eastern neighbors of Poland.
The developments of early 2010-Viktor Yanukovych’s win in the presidential election in February, and the consequences of the Smolensk air crash in April-logically rounded off the retreat from Polish-Ukrainian “strategic partnership.”
For some commentators, Yanukovych’s triumphal come-back and the spectacular defeat suffered by Yushchenko (just over 5% in the first round) spelled an end to Poland’s earlier policy towards the eastern neighbor and the fiasco of a policy founded on faith in “Orange” Ukraine. Many are just fine with this situation-and part of the blame should be put on Yushchenko himself, as his decision to confer the Ukraine Hero title on Bandera came under strong criticism in Poland. In this context, opinions were heard that Yanukovych, after wining the election, would remove from power all the heirs to Ukrainian fascism, supporters of the OUN, the UPA, etc. The new president did in fact meet those expectations and promised to take away the title which his predecessor had granted to the OUN-B commander; soon afterwards the regional court in Donetsk did make such a ruling-using the pretext that Bandera had had no Ukraine citizenship, and finding the controversial title to have been unlawfully awarded by Yushchenko.
President Yanukovych will seek-at least formally-to develop his country’s relations with the European Union, but he will not demand the EU’s recognition of membership prospects as vocally as his predecessor did. Nor is it clear how sincere his policy towards the Union will be and to what extent it will be confined to declarations alone, as was the case in Kuchma’s time. One way or another, the expansion of Ukraine-EU cooperation will continue to be impeded by the close links between politics and business persisting in Ukraine and also, in a sense, by the Ukrainian-Russian rapprochement. Such a situation suits many politicians in Europe, including in Poland. It will be easier to cooperate with a Ukraine which does not raise sensitive questions about membership and which accepts the more constrained forms of cooperation within the Eastern Partnership framework. This will make it possible to overcome the contradictions burdening Polish foreign policy in the past years: between a desire to collaborate with Ukraine and support the country in the European forum on the one hand, and, on the other, a desire to integrate fully with the EU and strengthen Poland’s position therein. Polish policy towards Ukraine is already fully Europeanized. In an address to the Sejm in April 2010, Minister Radoslaw Sikorski spoke exclusively about the policy towards eastern neighbors, including Ukraine, as pursued by the EU, leaving out Polish-Ukrainian relations almost entirely.
And finally, there is Russia. An improvement in relations with the Russian Federation was among the major goals of each cabinet taking over power in Poland. But their efforts usually failed to produce tangible results-and the Civic Platform is no exception in this respect. Normalizing relations with Russia was to be part of the drive to clean up the foreign policy mess left behind after the Law and Justice rule. An influential country in Europe, Civic Platform politicians seem to reason, should not have bad relations with Russia. In a report on the balance of forces in Russia-EU relations written in 2007, Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu listed Poland and Lithuania among the “Cold War warriors,” or Russia’s most pronounced opponents. This image, coupled with radical opinions on Russia coming from Poland and difficult relations with that large EU neighbor, had the effect of weakening Poland’s position in the Union, so this had to be changed, the government argued. These expectations were met half-way by Russia, which also felt the burden of difficult relations with an important EU member state (suffice it to mention disputes over the embargo on Polish meat). Under the circumstances, the process of reconciliation had begun and accelerated after the 10 April tragedy. Russia seems to accept the Polish vision of history, at least in respect of the Soviet era, and it counts us among important players in the European Union. In exchange, it most likely wants a go-ahead to its energy expansion plans (Nord Stream pipeline) and weaker presence in Eastern European countries, including Ukraine. Russia has been restoring its influence in the region, and Western countries concur. Seeking to keep good relations with the European partners and with the Russian Federation, the Polish government will most likely choose to follow the same path.
This is not a good solution. Poland must not turn its back on the neighbor to the east. We cannot afford losing Ukraine. Our engagement in that country is not a question of Polish political elites’ “Ukrainophilia,” as some writers want us to believe, but rather of the Polish national interest. A Ukraine that is friendly to Poland, stable, democratic and linked to Euro-Atlantic institutions will strengthen Poland’s security. Increased cooperation with that state will also serve Polish citizens-those living in poorer, south-eastern voivodships who are engaged in border region trading, and those who give employment to workers from across the eastern border. A strong, independent Ukraine will be a safeguard against a return to Russian hegemony in the Baltic/Black Sea region. Another important element of Polish policy within the European Union, the Eastern Partnership as Poland’s first major initiative that has found recognition in the EU, would make no sense without Ukraine either. On the other hand, a revival of “Little Russia” would serve the restoration of Russia’s imperial position, strengthening divisions in Europe, undermining Polish security and making Poland the Western world’s frontline country for a long time to come. This is something that should always be borne in mind.