Nehginpao Kipgen. International Journal on World Peace. Volume 37, Issue 1. March 2020.
Introduction
Undoubtedly the issue of Rohingya has been one of the most talking points in the last few years, especially since 2017 when the Myanmar security forces launched clearance operations which led to the massive exodus of Rohingyas. Because of the scale of violence and the massive movement of refugees across the border, Myanmar came under intense international pressure and scrutiny. The deplorable situation of the Rohingyas has also prompted the United Nations (UN) and some governments to condemn Myanmar in the strongest possible terms. In his statement to the UN Human Rights Council 36th session on September 11, 2017, the UN high commissioner for human rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, called the treatment of Rohingyas a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” And on December 5, 2017, the UN Human Rights Council opened a special session on the situation of human rights of the Rohingyas and other minorities in Rakhine state in Myanmar. During the session, Pramila Patten, the special representative of the UN secretary-general on sexual violence in conflict called the Rohingyas, “the most persecuted minority in the world.” Then the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission, established by the UN Human Rights Council, in its report released on August 27, 2018 stated that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed by Myanmar’s security forces with “genocidal intent” and called for the prosecution of senior officials of Myanmar’s armed forces, known as Tatmadaw, on charges of genocide.
On November 22, 2017, the United States (US) government described the military crackdown against the Rohingya as “ethnic cleansing” and threatened to impose sanctions on people who were responsible for “horrendous atrocities.” And on August 26, 2018, the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, called for accountability to those who were responsible for an “abhorrent ethnic cleansing” of the Rohingya Muslims. In another development, the Canadian House of Commons unanimously voted on September 20, 2018 to call the atrocities against the Rohingyas an act of “genocide.”
While many in the international community, including the UN, have publicly denounced the Myanmar military for perpetrating one of the worst human rights abuses in recent history, Myanmar has defended itself by telling the world that its security forces were only responding to the terrorist attacks of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) who attacked several security posts across the Rakhine state. Moreover, Myanmar has denied committing ethnic cleansing or genocide on the Rohingyas. In April 2017, Myanmar’s state counsellor and foreign minister, Aung San Suu Kyi, in her interview with the BBC reportedly said, “I don’t think there is ethnic cleansing going on … I think ethnic cleansing is too strong an expression to use for what is happening.” On March 14, 2018, a day after the UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide, Adama Dieng, said that there was an intent to cleanse the Rohingya or even the possibility of genocide, the chief coordinator of the Myanmar government body dedicated to the Rohingya crisis, Aung Tun Thet, said, “There is no ethnic cleansing or genocide in our country…Accusations are very easy to make, but we are not involved in anything at all.”
Again on August 29, 2018, Myanmar rejected a report by the UN factfinding team which called for Myanmar’s senior military generals to be prosecuted for possible genocide over their brutality on the Rohingya Muslims. The government spokesperson, Zaw Htay, said, “Our stance is clear and I want to say sharply that we don’t accept any resolutions conducted by the Human Rights Council…If there is any case against human rights, just give us strong evidence, record and date so that we can take legal action against those who break the rules and regulations.” Along similar line, the Myanmar military chief, Min Aung Hlaing, told Japan’s Asahi Shimbun daily in February 2019 that “Criticism without any certain proof hurts the nation’s dignity.” The military chief also questioned the number of Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh and their motives by saying that “It’s possible to think that the reasons they moved to Bangladesh were things like living with relatives or fleeing to a third country…All of them are saying the same thing, which I believe somebody told them to say.” Earlier on February 28, 2017, Min Aung Hlaing had defended the military’s operations and said that “the security troops are discharging their duty in line with the law. Correct information on the incidents is released on time.”
From the above statements, it is clear that there are two different narratives on the Rohingya issue—the narrative of the international community versus that of Myanmar. The objective of this article is to understand Myanmar’s narrative about the origin of the people, the crisis and solution. The paper discusses the position of Myanmar’s military, civilian government, and the general public. It analyzes Myanmar’s perspective since the era of U Nu, the first prime minister of independent Myanmar, and the policies implemented by the successive governments—both civilian and military. However, the paper does not claim it to be a comprehensive study that captures the detailed policies and agendas of the successive governments.
The Military Government
The Rakhine (formerly Arakan) is one of the restive areas in Myanmar since before the country’s independence from Great Britain on January 4, 1948. The country’s various ethnic nationalities struggled for their political rights. Like others, armed movement was active in Rakhine state. While the Rakhine people campaigned for an autonomous state within Myanmar, a Muslim group launched a separatist movement with the goal to establish an Islamic “frontier state” in the northern part of Rakhine. The movements did not succeed with the country’s independence. Moreover, the 1947 constitution failed to address the demands of both Rakhine and the Muslims. After Myanmar’s independence, the Muslims continued their struggle for the establishment of an independent state. Following the military coup in 1962, many Rakhine, who were Buddhists, and the Muslims fled the area for the more prosperous areas of the country. The Muslims who were left behind lived in constant fear of persecution from the authorities. Their status as legitimate residents were questioned by the government authorities and those who did not have the necessary documents of citizenship faced uncertainty over their right to remain in the country. When the Ne Win-led military government conducted census from 1963 to 1964, the massive emigration from Rakhine was discovered.
Subsequently, the government prohibited the travel of Muslims from Akyab district, which was situated in the northern part of Rakhine state close to the Bangladesh border. The government even prohibited the movement of Muslims between villages within the same township. The authorities gave the Rakhine Buddhists the power to enforce the restriction, which added suspicion and inter-ethnic tension between the Rakhine Buddhists and the Muslims. Soon after, the government designated the Rohingyas as illegal immigrants. The government claimed that the Rohingyas illegally crossed from Bangladesh and they were trouble makers who did not belong to Myanmar. Following the government’s repression, organizations such as the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) and other opposition groups including the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front were formed. The most brutal government’s repression happened from 1978 to 1979 during the Naga Min, also known as Operation Dragon King, which involved murder, rape, and torture that led to the exodus of thousands of refugees across the Naaf river into neighboring Bangladesh.
After years of persecution and discrimination, the Rohingyas were made officially stateless with the introduction of the 1982 Citizenship Act by Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) government on October 15, 1982. The 1982 citizenship law was based on the principle of jus sanguinis repealing the Union Citizenship Act of 1948, which was based on how one’s forebears obtained citizenship. The steps taken by Ne Win government between 1974 and 1982 was to establish a racially pure Myanmar society by treating the Rohingyas as Bengali illegal immigrants. One scholar writes that: “The 1982 citizenship law, introduced twenty years after the 1962 military coup, stripped the Rohingya of citizenship. Even after the introduction of the 1982 citizenship law, the Rohingyas had been able to register as temporary residents with identification cards known as the white cards, which the military junta issued to many Muslims—Rohingya as well as non-Rohingya—in the 1990s. Though holding of the white cards was not a full proof of citizenship, it provided recognition for temporary stay.”
Under the 1982 citizenship law, citizens were grouped into three categories: full, associate and naturalized. Citizens were also classified into 135 national races. Full citizens were descendants of residents who lived in Myanmar prior to 1823 or were born to parents who were citizens at the time of birth. Associate citizens were those who acquired citizenship through the 1948 citizenship law. And naturalized citizens were the ones who could produce conclusive evidence of entry and residence before the country’s independence, who could speak well one of the national languages, and those whose children were born in Myanmar. For someone to be eligible for naturalized citizenship, he or she had to live in Myanmar before independence and then applied for citizenship after 1982. The 1982 citizenship law not only rendered the Rohingyas officially stateless but it also restricted their movement within and outside the country. The persecution of Rohingyas took different forms, such as confiscation of farmlands, forced displacement from their homes and settlement of Buddhist population in the vacated lands, demolition of Mosques, houses, villages and Islamic schools. An estimated 200,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh as a result of the 1978 military operation, and an estimate of another 250,000 fled again during the 1991 operation.
While the 1978 military operation was considered a genocidal extermination in some circles, the Myanmar Department of Immigration and Manpower claimed that this was an exercise to examine the illegal entry of Bengali migrants. The Ne Win government on April 30, 1978 issued a lengthy but unsatisfactory statement in connection with the mass exodus of the Muslims into Bangladesh and described it as a routine immigration check in the border areas. On July 9, 1978, Bangladesh and Myanmar signed an agreement to settle the problem of Muslim refugees. The basic agreement was that those who could produce evidence of their legal residence in Myanmar would be accepted back by the Myanmar government. Evidence would include a variety of certificates, tax receipts, educational papers, rent receipts, residential addresses, etc. The other agreement was to resume talks on the demarcation of boundary between the two countries. It was agreed that the missing markers on the Naaf boundary which were raised as a result of Ayub-Ne Win agreement of 1996 would be replaced. It was also agreed that the repatriation of refugees would begin on August 31, 1978 with the first batch of 200 refugees. The first batch of repatriation would then be followed by a regular repatriation of 2,000 refugees twice a week. The entire repatriation would be completed within six months from the date of the first repatriation. The Myanmar government’s statement on July 11, 1978 said that repatriation would be implemented in three phases: the first would cover refugees who could produce Myanmar’s national registration cards and foreigners’ registration documents. The second and third phases would include people who could produce documents about their earlier residence in Myanmar. The statement also said that the refugee problem was not related to either social or religious discrimination but rather because of a sinister instigation against the collection of data for the purpose of implementing a socialist system.
The Ne Win government claimed that Rohingyas were interlopers or recent migrants from Bangladesh. They were systematically ostracized and excluded from the national census. Prior to 1962, the Rohingyas held the government-issued identity cards and the British-issued ration cards which affirmed their Myanmar citizenship. But on the pretext of checking the cards, the government took them away. The 1978 Operation Dragon King resulted in mass killing and forcible expulsion of Rohingyas from their land. During the military era from 1962 to 1995, not a single Rohingya had held the post of either a minister or deputy minister. For administrative convenience, the military junta divided the country into district councils, township councils, and village ward councils. In Muslim-majority villages in Rakhine state, military intelligence officers were stationed in the offices of councilors to closely monitor and/or bully the Muslims. The 1978 military operation was followed by another operation called “Operation Pyi Thaya” in 1991-1992 which forced thousands of Rohingyas more to flee.
Myanmar was ruled by military since 1962 until it handed power over to the quasi-civilian government in 2011. During those decades, the position of the military on Rohingya Muslims was more or less the same. The restrictions and other discriminative measures imposed were maintained by the military leadership. Since the 1991-1992 military operation, there was no major conflict in Rakhine state at least until 2001 when tensions erupted between the Buddhist and Muslim communities, sometimes erupting into violence. The violence was caused by a number of factors, including the destruction of Buddhist images in Bamiyan, Afghanistan in March 2001, and the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC in the US which apparently fueled increased Buddhist resentment against the local Muslims. Economic crisis also contributed to the conflict between the two communities. The fact that the Muslims were businessmen, shopkeepers and local money changers, they were often the target during economic crisis. In May 2001 when more than a thousand people led by Buddhist monks attacked Muslim shops, homes and mosques in Taungoo which was just over 150 kilometers from the capital Yangon, the military government of State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) did little or nothing to intervene to stop or prevent the attacks.
While the military’s position has not changed over the years, they were in the limelight again following the most recent wave of violence in Rakhine state in 2017. The Myanmar security forces launched clearance operations in response to ARSA’s coordinated attacks on 30 police posts and an army base on August 25, 2017, which according to Myanmar military, resulted in the death of at least 59 insurgents and 12 members of the security forces. The Myanmar army in a statement said, “In the early morning at 1 a.m., the extremist Bengali insurgents started their attack on the police post…with the man-made bombs and small weapons.” The military used a derogatory term of Bengali, which implied that the Rohingyas are interlopers from Bangladesh. The military estimated that around 1,000 insurgents took part in the attack. The ARSA staged a similar attack on Myanmar security posts in October 2016. In response to that attack, the security forces launched clearance operations which resulted in the exodus of about 87,000 Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh.
Following the ARSA attack in August 2017, the Myanmar military resumed its clearance operations targeting not only the insurgents but the whole Rohingya population which led to the exodus of more than 400,000 people by mid-September 2017. The Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh said the Myanmar security forces engaged in killing civilians and burning down of entire villages. Because of the excessive use of force and brutality by the security forces, the UN officials described the offensive campaign as having all the hallmarks of “ethnic cleansing” and accused the military of carrying out a systematic purging of the Rohingya population. In response to international condemnation, the Myanmar military chief in his Facebook post urged the country to unite and said, “They have demanded recognition as Rohingya, which has never been an ethnic group in Myanmar. (The) Bengali issue is a national cause and we need to be united in establishing the truth.” The military also said the clearance operations were aimed at the militants who attacked the security posts on August 25.
In August 2018, the UN-appointed international independent factfinding mission on the Rohingya crisis concluded that six top military commanders of Myanmar, including the commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, should be investigated for the “gravest” crimes against civilians following the mass exodus of over 700,000 Rohingyas from Myanmar. The fact-finding team recommended, among others, that the situation in Myanmar be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the UN Security Council (UNSC). The full report, which would be submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in September of 2018, said the crimes Myanmar security forces committed included murder, rape, sexual slavery, persecution and enslavement. The investigators included Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia, Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka and Christopher Sidoti of Australia. Speaking to journalists in Geneva, Christopher Sidoti said:
The fact-finding Mission has concluded, on reasonable grounds, that the patterns of gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law that it is found, amount to the gravest crime under international law…These have principally been committed by the military, the Tatmadaw…The Mission has concluded that criminal investigation and prosecution is warranted, focusing on the top Tatmadaw generals, in relation to the three categories of crimes under international law; genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes…In Myanmar, there is a very clear chain of command…There is no doubt in our minds whatsoever that what we saw happen in Rakhine as a whole, would not have happened without it, firstly, being within the knowledge of the senior military leadership and secondly, under their effective control. And it’s because of the clarity of the chain of command in Myanmar that we have recommended the investigation and prosecution of these six.
The Civilian Government
Prior to Myanmar’s independence from the British, a group of Rohingya leaders appealed to the colonial administrators to incorporate the northern region of Rakhine with what was then East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh. However, their appeal did not materialize, and the independence of Myanmar did not guarantee their citizenship rights. The first prime minister, U Nu, gave a ray of hope to the Rohingya, as he believed that the absence of citizenship rights was temporary. But he did not address when the temporary status might end. U Nu was of the view that “the Rohingya has the equal status of nationality with Kachin, Kaya, Karen, Mon, Rakhine and Shan,” but it was not followed up by any concrete action. Nevertheless, the Rohingyas believed that their citizenship issue would be addressed under a new democratic constitution. The optimism of Rohingyas was short-lived, mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, the U Nu government did not initiate any concrete measures to bring the community within the political mainstream during his years in office. Secondly, a military coup by General Ne Win in 1962 made it even more complicated. Though some Rohingya politicians happened to be members of the country’s parliament and were supportive of the Ne Win regime and its vision of Myanmar’s way to socialism, it was of little or no use for the integration of Rohingyas into Myanmar’s political mainstream. The 1974 constitution worsened the uncertainty of the Rohingyas by identifying them as foreigners residing in Myanmar, and accordingly, advised them to accept identity cards.
USDP Government
The next non-military administration after the U Nu government was the quasi-civilian government of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) under the presidency of Thein Sein from 2011 to 2016. Since President Thein Sein and his cabinet members were former military generals, their position on the Rohingya Muslims was more or less the same as that of the military. It was during the Thein Sein government that conflicts erupted between the Rakhine Buddhists and the Rohingya Muslims in 2012. The tension started off with the rape and murder of a Rakhine woman on May 28, which was then followed by a retaliatory killing of 10 Muslims by a Rakhine mob on June 3. Following the two incidents, violence broke out between the two communities in three different townships in Rakhine state—Sittwe, Maungdaw and Buthidaung. The government came under severe criticism from various rights groups and members of the international community for not taking the necessary steps to prevent the violence. Subsequently, the Thein Sein government formed a 16-member committee on June 6 to investigate the violence. The government promised its commitment to the rule of law and appealed to the people to support and cooperate with the investigating committee. The government then declared state of emergency in Rakhine to prevent further violence and to restore law and order. The committee concluded that the violence was a result of mutual mistrust and religious differences that triggered hatred and vengeance between the two communities. Following the report, representatives from both the union and state governments and civil society groups visited the affected areas and engaged in resettlement and rehabilitation activities. The government received cash and kinds worth more than 3 billion Myanmar kyats (approximately over US$3.3 million at the time) and set up 89 relief camps in the three affected townships to accommodate 30,740 Rohingyas and 14,328 Rakhines. The authorities rejected the criticism that it had used excessive force to deal with the violence. The government also rejected the attempts by some organizations and groups to politicize and internationalize the conflict as a religious issue. The government said the violence was neither a religious oppression nor a discrimination against a particular group.
After the introduction of the 1982 citizenship law, the Rohingyas were allowed to register as temporary residents with identification cards known as the white cards. Though possession of the white cards was not a full proof of citizenship, it granted the card holders a temporary stay. During the UN-backed census in 2014, the Muslim minorities were initially allowed to identify themselves as Rohingya. But after the Buddhist nationalists and ultranationalists protested and threatened to boycott the census, the Thein Sein government changed its policy and said the Muslims could only identify themselves as Bengali. Again in 2015, the Buddhist nationalists protested the Thein Sein government’s plan to allow temporary card holders to participate in the constitutional referendum. Due to heavy pressure, the government canceled temporary cards in February 2015 which effectively revoked their right to vote. During the 2008 constitutional referendum and the 2010 election, white card holders were allowed to vote which gave advantage to the USDP. Like the previous government, the Thein Sein government practiced a systematic and institutionalized discrimination against the Rohingya Muslims, including marriage, family planning, employment, education, religion and movement. The Rohingyas were required to seek permission for marriage and to travel out of their townships. The Rohingya couples in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships were required to follow two-child policy.
While President Thein Sein’s government took some initiatives to address the conflicts between the Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists, there was no substantive action taken to address the Rohingya crisis. In fact, the president’s office on July 11, 2012 issued a statement saying that the government was willing to give the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Rakhine state the responsibility of the Rohingya Muslims to provide shelter in the form of refugee camps, food and aid. For the Thein Sein government, the Rohingyas were brought to Myanmar by the British to do agricultural works. After the country’s independence, many settled down in Rakhine and did not return, and many others also entered the country illegally. The statement also said that the Rohingya migration was a “threat to national stability and peace” but the government “will handle the problem seriously and be responsible for the ethnic people.” The statement further added that “it is impossible for Burma to accept people who are not ethnic to the country and who have entered illegally” and the government was “willing to send the Rohingyas to any third country that will accept them.” The statement was made after Myanmar president, Thein Sein, held talks with the UNHCR chief, Antonio Guterres, in Naypyidaw for possible bilateral cooperation on the situation of Myanmar refugees along the Thai-Myanmar border, Kachin war refugees in northern Myanmar and the Rohingya refugees in Rakhine state. In response to the statement, regional spokesperson for the UNHCR in Asia, Kitty McKinsey, said, “These people are displaced in their home country and are not UN-recognized refugees. Therefore, they are not eligible for resettlement in a third country… What the UNHCR is doing is to get better conditions for these stateless people.” Along a similar line, UNHCR chief, Antonio Guterres, said, “The resettlement programs organized by UNHCR are for refugees who are fleeing a country to another, in very specific circumstances. Obviously, it’s not related to this situation.”
NLD Government
The National League for Democracy (NLD) was the first non-military government since the civilian government of prime minister U Nu. Myanmar pro-democracy groups as well as the international community had high expectation from the NLD government, particularly from its leader Aung San Suu Kyi, especially the fact that she had been campaigning for democracy and human rights. She was widely seen as a democratic icon and a beacon of hope for the long-repressed people of the country, especially the ethnic minorities. The NLD government inherited, among others, the sensitive and controversial Rohingya issue from the previous government. Speaking for the first time after assuming the role of state counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi on May 22, 2016 said she did not support either the use of the term “Rohingya” or “Bengali.” During her meeting with the US secretary of state, John Kerry, in Naypyidaw, Aung San Suu Kyi said arguing over the nomenclature was not helping the government’s efforts to address the conflicts in Rakhine state. She said the usage of either of the terms created greater division between the two communities. She also said “The reason why I said ‘you’ve got to be very firm about not using emotive terms’ is because such terms make it very difficult for us to find peaceful and sensible resolutions to our problems…The Rakhine Buddhists object to the term ‘Rohingya’ just as much as Muslims object to the term ‘Bengali’ because they have all kinds of political and emotional implications, which are unacceptable to the opposite party.” The controversy surrounding the nomenclature came into spotlight following the US embassy in Yangon issued a statement in April 2016 expressing sympathy for the victims of boat sinking accident. The Buddhist nationalists gathered outside of the US embassy and protested the use of the term “Rohingya.” Following the protest, a senior official from Myanmar’s ministry of foreign affairs asked the US embassy not to use the term.
Later in February 2018, a USDP member of parliament, Tin Aye, raised in the parliament that the NLD government must tell the world that there is no Rohingya race in Myanmar. Tin Aye asked Myanmar’s immigration minister, Thein Swe, what the government has done to inform the international community that Rohingya does not exist in the country. In response, the minister said the government must respond “calmly and wisely” when the term Rohingya is used to describe the group and added that “As we all know, the term Rohingya has never been used in speeches and messages made by leaders of the state…In national censuses taken before and after independence, there is no name of the Rohingya in the national races. Rohingya has never been used in state-owned media.” In fact, the term Rohingya was used by the first government of independent Myanmar. Prime Minister U Nu in his radio speech broadcast on September 25, 1954 described the Rohingyas as “national brethren.”
The US ambassador to Myanmar, Scot Marciel, had said on May 10, 2016 that “Our position globally and our international practice is to recognize that communities anywhere have the ability to choose what they should be called… and we respect that.” The Myanmar ministry of information letter dated June 16, 2016 ordered the state media not to use Rohingya and instead use the term “Muslim community in Rakhine state.” The order was issued a few days before a visit by the UN special envoy on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, from June 20 to July 1, 2016. The government said it had submitted the new term to the UN. Aung San Suu Kyi had also reportedly told the vising UN official not to use the term Rohingya. Yanghee Lee was visiting the country to assess the country’s human rights situation which she would submit a report to the UN General Assembly in September of that year. The government’s order was opposed by the Arakan National Party (ANP), a political party which claimed to represent the interests of the Rakhine people in Rakhine state. The ANP said it would continue to use the term “Bengalis” to refer to the Muslims in Rakhine state. The government also issued new national verification cards or green cards to the Rohingyas as part of citizenship verification pilot program in three predominant Muslim townships in Rakhine state. But some Muslims in the capital Sittwe refused to accept the green cards which did not state their race or religion, and were afraid of accepting those cards for fear of losing the right to become citizens. Some Muslims complained that the authorities had violated the law by issuing green cards to some young people when their parents already have the national identification cards which make them full citizens of Myanmar. The government’s stated plan was that those who possess green cards must go through citizenship verification process before they can apply for Myanmar citizenship.
The NLD government has taken several initiatives to bring a solution to the problems in Rakhine state. One notable initiative was the appointment of a nine-member State Advisory Commission on August 24, 2016, which was headed by former UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan. The commission was tasked with finding conflict-prevention measures, ensuring humanitarian assistance, rights and reconciliation, establishing basic infrastructure, and promoting long-term development plans in the restive Rakhine state. The NLD government’s appointment of the commission was not the first of its kind. In February 2014, President Thein Sein appointed a 10-member commission to probe the death of a policeman, which had sparked what was described as revenge killings of at least 40 Rohingya Muslims by Buddhist mobs in western Rakhine state. Prior to the formation of the commission, Myanmar foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, announced a separate inquiry by three government-appointed groups into the circumstances that led to violence in Rakhine state. The Central Committee for Rakhine State Peace, Stability, and Development Implementation; the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission; and the Rakhine Conflict Investigation Commission conducted separate investigations into the killings. The Annan commission made several recommendations, including a path to citizenship, equality before the law, the situation of internally displaced people, and freedom of movement for the Muslim population. In response to the report, the government established a 10-Member Advisory Board for the Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine to advise on implementing the Kofi Annan commission’s recommendations.
One major humanitarian initiative of the NLD government was the establishment of the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development (UEHRD) on October 17, 2017 with Aung San Suu Kyi as its chairperson. The objectives of UEHRD were: to carry out the effective provision of humanitarian aid, to coordinate the resettlement and rehabilitation efforts, and to carry out regional development and work towards durable peace. Speaking at a function to mark the first anniversary of the UEHRD in the country’s capital, Aung San Suu Kyi thanked the businessmen for providing assistance to the displaced people and promoting economic development. The chairperson also called for overcoming the challenges with a collective strength while the government was planning to implement development projects such as building infrastructure, establishing agriculture and livestock breeding economic zone, developing information technology and media, creating jobs, conducting vocational training, promoting healthcare services and tourism, and establishing micro-finance schemes.
One other initiative of the NLD government was reaching a bilateral agreement with Bangladesh for repatriation of the Rohingya refugees. Myanmar and Bangladesh reached an agreement on November 23, 2017 to begin repatriation of refugees in two months. The two sides met again on January 15, 2018 to discuss the repatriation deal agreed earlier. But there were many who were skeptical about the actual repatriation, including the UN secretary-general who emphasized the need for the involvement of the UN refugee agency. Subsequently, Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with two UN bodies—UNHCR and UNDP—in June 2018. Myanmar had agreed to accept up to 1,500 refugees each week in an attempt to bring back over 740,000 people who fled to Bangladesh since the October 2016 violence. Part of the agreement was that repatriation would be on voluntary basis and in accordance with the 1992 repatriation pact the two countries signed, that is, the refugees need to prove their residence in Myanmar. Since Myanmar did not guarantee, among others, security, freedom of movement, equality before the law, and citizenship, the refugees were unwilling to return to Myanmar. Despite the government’s efforts, the initiatives did not bring a lasting solution to the Rakhine problems because they largely lacked substantive plans to address some of the core issues, including security, identity and citizenship. In fact, at a meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark on June 8, 2018, Myanmar’s social welfare minister, Win Myat Aye, told a group of diplomats, analysts and members of the Kofi Annan commission that eight of the Annan commission’s recommendations, including amendment of the 1982 citizenship law, were difficult for implementation under the present political environment in Myanmar.
The August 2017 ARSA attack and the counter operations conducted by the Myanmar security forces had complicated the Rakhine problems. Things further deteriorated after the UN and governments accused Myanmar of committing a systematic campaign against the Rohingya Muslims, including ethnic cleansing, war crimes, possible genocide, and a call for the ICC to prosecute the country’s top military leaders. Despite all the accusations, the NLD is defiant against the international criticism and pressure. On September 19, 2017, in her first public speech since the army crackdown on the Rohingya Muslims, Aung San Suu Kyi said, “I’m aware of the fact that the world’s attention is focused on the situation in Rakhine state. As a responsible member of the community of nations Myanmar does not fear international scrutiny…There have been allegations and counter-allegations…We have to make sure those allegations are based on solid evidence before we take action.” Not long after that speech, the Myanmar government denied the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar a permission to enter the country. Yanghee Lee was told that she would no longer be given cooperation and access to Myanmar because “her end-of-mission statement in July was biased and unfair.” Yanghee Lee stated that Myanmar was not cooperating with the Human Rights Council-appointed international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, which was established in March 2017. The UN rights expert added that “The Government has repeatedly denied violations of human rights are occurring throughout Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine state. They have said that they have nothing to hide, but their lack of cooperation with my mandate and the fact-finding mission suggests otherwise.” On January 14, 2019, the Myanmar government said it would not rescind its ban on the UN rights expert. The government had earlier asked the UNSC to replace Yanghee Lee citing lack of objectivity in her mission.
The General Public
Many in Myanmar hold the same view as that of the military and the previous USDP government that Rohingyas are interlopers, meaning that they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Unsurprisingly, the more vocal ones are the nationalists and ultranationalists, including the Rakhine Buddhists and the country’s radical Buddhist monks. There are obvious reasons as to why the Rakhine Buddhists are more vocal on the Rohingya issue, including the fact that there have been several instances of conflicts or violence between the two communities in Rakhine state. The two communities have been competing for scarce resources and limited opportunities in one of the poorest states in the country. Though the Rakhines form the majority of the state’s population, there has been a lingering fear in the minds of many Rakhine Buddhists that someday the Rohingya Muslims may overtake them. There is also an explicit or implicit fear among the Rakhine Buddhists that the Rohingyas would demand a separate state out of Rakhine.
In June 2016 when the NLD government proposed to use “Muslim community in Rakhine sate” to refer to the Rohingyas, the ANP said in a statement that they would not accept the new terminology and continue using Bengali. The secretary general of the ANP, Tun Aung Kyaw, said, “Saying ‘Muslim community from Rakhine State’ makes it sounds as if they have always lived in the state. It’s like saying Rakhine is their place of origin…It will create more opportunities for them to attain citizenship and it’s like already accepting they are Myanmar nationals from Myanmar.” Amyotha Hluttaw or upper house of the country’s national parliament and an ANP member, Aye Thar Aung, criticized the government’s plan to change the term and said, “We always knew them as Bengalis. They speak Bengali language so we will continue to call them Bengali.” The National Prosperity Party also urged the government to reconsider its decision on the ground that the change could cause the international community to “mistake the origins of the Bengalis.” On the other hand, a patron of the National Development and Peace Party, a Muslim political group, welcomed the government’s move and called it a step forward. The party’s patron, Muhammad Salim, said, “It is best if the community had a right to self-identify, but I think this name change [to ‘Muslim community in Rakhine State’] is good.” However, the secretary of the Muslim Lawyers Association, Khin Maung Cho, criticized the government for focusing too much on the name and too little on improving the situation in Rakhine state and said, “The government needs to resolve the issues immediately, but it seems like the government is prolonging the issue.”
In November 2016, about 100 protesters led by Buddhist monks marched through the Rakhine state capital to oppose the planned repatriation of refugees from Bangladesh. The protesters used red banners and chanted slogans calling the Rohingyas “runaway refugees” and broadcast it live on Facebook. One of the monks said, “All the people of the nation are responsible to protect the security of the country…There will be no benefits to us or our country if we accept the Bengalis.” The protesters also called on the authorities to take action against what they called illegal immigrants and do not allow them to resettle in Rakhine state. The demonstration was organized 10 days after Bangladesh and Myanmar were to officially start repatriating the Rohingyas who fled the country. A similar protest was organized in Sittwe in October 2017 demanding the authorities not to take back the refugees.
The influence of nationalists and ultranationalists was also witnessed during the 2014 census, which was the first in 30 years. The Muslim minority were initially permitted to identify themselves as Rohingya but after the Buddhist nationalists and ultranationalists threatened to boycott the census, they were told that they could only register as Bengali. Again in 2015, the Buddhist nationalists protested President Thein Sein government’s plan to allow temporary identity card holders to participate in the constitutional referendum. Because of heavy pressure, the government cancelled temporary identity cards which effectively made them ineligible to vote. During the 2008 constitutional referendum and the 2010 general election, temporary or white card holders were allowed to vote which gave electoral advantage to the USDP. But in 2015 general election, no Muslim candidate was nominated by political parties, including the NLD. The reason was that no political party wanted to be seen as sympathetic to the cause of Muslims at a time when there was a strong anti-Muslim sentiment across the country.
There are also people who have faith on the NLD government and Aung San Suu Kyi to resolve the Rakhine problems. In September 2017 when heavy criticism was targeted against Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government, one citizen said, “We, the majority of the people, stand with her and we strongly believe that she can solve this problem.” In fact, there has been a number of rallies organized in support of Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government. One such event was on September 19, 2017 when thousands of people gathered in Yangon, the commercial capital of Myanmar, to watch Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech in English language on the issue of Rakhine problems which was broadcast live on television. One supporter said, “I don’t understand her speech as well but I trust and support her…I just came and to show my involvement as a Myanmar citizen on Rakhine issues. She stands for Myanmar and we stand with her.” Another supporter said, “The State Counsellor’s address is a kind of State level speech. It was in English as she would like to describe the realistic conditions in Rakhine State to the international community. I won’t understand her speech as well and I don’t understand English. But It’s okay as the international audience just need to understand the issues and we just need to trust and support her.” One monk supporter said, “The objective of my coming here is to show to the people that the monks also support Daw Aung San Suu Kyi…People think that all of the monks didn’t stand with her. My coming proved their thoughts were wrong.” One other supporter said, “I came here to stand with Mother Su by doing what I can do. I trust and I support her all the way.”
But not all support Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD government’s policies and practices. On December 1, 2018, a youth activist and television host, Thinzar Shun Lei Yi, who once considered herself as one of Aung San Suu Kyi’s greatest fans became one of her most vocal critics. She said, “I lost my idol, I’m confused, frustrated and lost…Most of the activists and youths are now thinking: ‘What is next’, ‘What will happen?’, ‘What can we do?’ At this stage, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is going her own way and nobody can intervene, and she won’t listen to civil society organizations.” Another activist said, “We acknowledge Rohingya. We totally denounce the fact that they are referred to as ‘Bengali’…We haven’t seen any acknowledgement or punishment for the things that happened…The refugees will not come back as long as these people think of them as less than humans, and that it is not a crime to kill them.” One researcher for an NLD lawmaker, who disagreed with Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech that all residents of Rakhine state have equal access to education and healthcare services without any discrimination, said, “My own nephew and nieces are still living in the Sittwe camps and they don’t have those rights…I was shocked. How can she say that in her speech?” In protest against Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech, the researcher quit her job.
Conclusion
The Rohingya crisis has been simmering for the past several decades in Myanmar. The issue has undeniably tarnished Myanmar’s international image. At the same time, it has also brought together different stakeholders in the country. With the growing criticism and pressure from the international community, there are two different narratives from Myanmar and many in the international community. The paper analyzes the narrative of Myanmar. The research shows a historical pattern that Myanmar has systematically discriminated against the Rohingya population. While there have been some attempts made by the successive civilian or quasi-civilian governments to address the Rohingya problems, there was and is little or no firm commitment to address the substantive issues of the Rohingya community, including freedom of movement, security, equality before the law, and citizenship.
The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government of prime minister U Nu had suggested to integrate the Rohingyas into the political mainstream but it did not materialize. Both the USDP and NLD governments have also made some attempts to address the issue but they were and/or are unwilling or unable to go beyond the threats from the country’s nationalists and ultranationalists. Since from the first military government in 1962, there has been a consistent pattern that the military considers and calls the Rohingyas as Bengalis, who have illegally settled in Myanmar. It is uncertain, at least in the near future, whether Myanmar will be taking back the refugees, despite a repatriation agreement with Bangladesh. It is also uncertain whether the Rohingya themselves will be willing to return without any guarantees for their safety, freedom of movement, equality before the law, and citizenship, among others.
While the international community can help in short-term needs such as food, healthcare, and shelter or even repatriation, a long-term solution to the Rohingya conundrum largely depends on how the Myanmar civilian government, the military leadership and the general public are willing to accept and accommodate them. Though the UNHCR has previously ruled out the possibility of third country resettlement, this can be explored as another solution. One other possibility, to which Bangladesh objects, is local integration of the refugee population into the Bangladesh society and or appropriating them different settlements across the country. Or, a comprehensive strategy inclusive of all these options should be explored.