Ko Young-gun & Kim Jin-young. The Journal of Psychohistory. Volume 34, Issue 1, Summer 2006.
In an address in 1931 Albert Einstein mentioned: “Concern for man himself and his fate must always form the chief interest of all technical endeavors … in order that the creations of our mind shall be a blessing and not a curse to mankind.” At that time the audience could never imagine a situation wherein the fate of humanity would be in the hands of a human creation. Still we may hardly predict what details of doomsday would be like; nevertheless, today we know the birth place of the tragedy that we will face if we start Armageddon. That is Los Alamos, the heart of the Manhattan Project.
In August 1945 Henry D. Smyth, chairman of the Department of Physics at Princeton, wrote in his governmental report on the Manhattan Project that numerous problems resulting from the impact of the atomic bomb, that “may affect all mankind for generations,” “must be answered in the near future.” However, even though 60 years have passed, we are still living “under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or madness,” as vividly described by President Kennedy. Therefore, it is clear that still today there are enormous problems originating in Los Alamos.
James Garfield, the twentieth President of the United States, stated: “History is but the unrolled scroll of prophecy.” In this sense, understanding the lessons from the history of Los Alamos has significant bearing on our future.
Go, a popular game in East Asia, has a tradition that players examine relaxed or defeated moves, realize correct moves, and reconstruct the position on the board together after their match in order to enhance their skills. In the same context, this study intends to conduct a historical reconstruction of the protagonists at Los Alamos.
Los Alamos may be regarded as a historical stage that challenged human wisdom. The protagonists on the historical stage, Los Alamos, were facing a dilemma: they wanted to end the cruel war that demanded endless killing but at the same time wanted to avoid the use of the atomic bomb that would be recorded as the most atrocious weapon in human history. On this dilemma, the opinions of the participants in the Manhattan Project diverged sharply. One group emphasized the laws of war: defeat the enemy while minimizing damage to our forces. The other group stressed ethical problems that would be created by dropping the bomb.
How is this difference emerged? This difference of opinion does not reflect any difference at the level of rational thinking, since a problematic but still soluble situation does not necessarily constitute a dilemma. By definition a dilemma refers to a situation wherein one cannot choose any option. Thus, by its nature a dilemma may be influenced by emotion. In this context, this study reviews the nature of the dilemma confronting the protagonists at Los Alamos and their coping strategies, and analyzes the emotional processes that “orchestrate[d]” “the historical moment” behind the scenes. The results of this study are expected to provide useful information regarding what future efforts should be made in the process of coping with the nuclear dilemma that threatens the life of humanity.
The Los Alamos Dilemma
In December 1943 the scientists who participated in the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos “were beginning to worry about what the future might hold for a humanity” in possession of an atomic weapon. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the research director, expressed the dilemma they were confronting: “The physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose.” The Los Alamos scientists had been afraid that their years of effort would come to naught, and simultaneously feared the success as well. According to Oppenheimer, “these affairs are hard on the heart.”
At that time Niels Bohr, the winner of the 1922 Nobel Prize in Physics for the study of the structure of the atom, visited Los Alamos and taught the young scientists “to think constructively and hopefully about that situation.” Victor Weisskopf, one of the junior scientists, recalled the situation at that time:
In Los Alamos we were working on something which is perhaps the most questionable, the most problematic thing a scientist can be faced with. At that time physics, our beloved science, was pushed into the most cruel part of reality and we had to live it through. … But suddenly in the midst of it, Bohr appeared in Los Alamos.
It was the first time we became aware of the sense in all these terrible things, because Bohr right away participated not only in the work, but in our discussions. Every great and deep difficulty bears in itself its own solution, and therefore the greater the hardship, the greater would be the reward that would come out of it. This we learned from him.
The Atomic Bomb and Bohr’s Complementarity
According to Bohr, “contradictory phenomena must be regarded as complementary.” Bohr was confident that the atomic bomb “might be one of the greatest boons to mankind or might become the greatest disaster.” At one point Oppenheimer quoted Bohr as follows:
He spoke with contempt of Hitler who with a few hundred tanks and planes had hoped for to enslave Europe. He said nothing like that would ever happen again; and his own high hopes that the outcome would be good, and that in this the role of objectivity, friendliness and cooperation incarnate in science would play a helpful part, all this was something we very much wanted to believe.
After the war Oppenheimer expressed appreciation to Bohr for the marvelous effect of Bohr’s visit. He believed that Bohr’s contribution to the Los Alamos lab was spiritual than technical. In the language of Oppenheimer, Bohr “made the enterprise which often looked so macabre seem hopeful.”
At Los Alamos Bohr had a presentiment of the opening of a new world. He was sure that the only way to prevent the ending of the world due to an atomic war would be an agreement ensuring complete openness of the major powers: no country would secretly manufacture an atomic bomb. He thought that politicians must open their eyes to this changing situation.
Bohr did not only voice his political opinion, but in 1944 devoted his efforts to personally persuade Franklin Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill of his firm belief. However, his efforts met with serious resistance. His assertion that powerful countries must openly share information on their scientific progress involving a possible atomic bomb made Churchill suspect him of being a Soviet spy. Insisting that “Bohr might have been dealing improperly with the Russians,” Churchill demanded a special surveillance of Bohr’s activities to ensure “no leakage of information, particularly to the Russians.” Thus, most of what Bohr tried to do during wartime was blocked.
The Atomic Bomb and a Miracle of Deliverance
A rationale for the military use of the atomic bomb was provided by George C. Marshall:
We regarded the matter of dropping the [atomic) bomb as exceedingly important. … We had just gone through a bitter experience at Okinawa. This had been preceded by a number of similar experiences in other Pacific islands, north of Australia. The Japanese had demonstrated in each case they would not surrender and they would fight to the death … It was expected that resistance in Japan, with their home ties, would be even more severe. We had had the one hundred thousand people killed in Tokyo in one night of [ordinary] bombs, and it had had seemingly no effect whatsoever. It destroyed the Japanese cities, yes, but their morale was not affected as far as we could tell, not at all. So it seemed quite necessary, if we could, to shock them into action. … We had to end War; we had to save American lives.
Winston Churchill endorsed this point of view, “To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance.”
The Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee
Not all people who knew of the Manhattan Project supported military use of the atomic bomb. Dwight D. Eisenhower and William D. Leahy were generals who opposed this as a choice that would create ethical problems.
Opinions on military use of the atomic bomb varied among the four scientists of the Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee: J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Ernest O. Lawrence, and Arthur H. Compton. Though in May 1945 when gathered at the Pentagon they unanimously supported the military use of the atomic bomb, their unanimity at the meeting held by Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, does not seem to be authentic. When they met again at Los Alamos on June 16 according to Oppenheimer’s proposal, their opinions turned out to be “not unanimous: they range[d] from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender.” When they had the opportunity of “a freewheeling discussion,” “each of the four reacted characteristically.”
Lawrence, who had “the most instinctive love of life,” actively argued “a bloodless demonstration” in the Interim Committee. He made the same argument at the May meeting, but Oppenheimer criticized him, indicating the technical difficulty of developing a device for demonstration only and that such a device could not guarantee the Japanese surrender. Hence Lawrence was no longer able to voice his opinion. However at the meeting in June, Fermi clarified his position in support of Lawrence. Fermi “had remained mute on the subject” because of his tendency not to be clear about his position on political problems in public. In this sense, Fermi “often seemed cold and aloof to people who were emotionally involved” because his interest was solely scientific.
Unlike Fermi, Compton did not agree with Lawrence. Instead he supported the military use of the atomic bomb on condition that it would be for a demonstrative purpose only. His eclectic conclusion was to “give a military demonstration in Japan, to be followed by a renewed opportunity for surrender before full use of the weapons is employed.” Like Lawrence, Compton supported a technical demonstration at first, but later concluded that a technical demonstration would not be strong enough to force Japan to surrender, as Oppenheimer indicated.
Unlike the other three scientists, Oppenheimer supported “the military use of the atomic bomb instead of a bloodless demonstration.” Like Bohr, Oppenheimer was convinced that the complementarity concept provided a useful perspective on the atomic bomb, which “was a weapon of death that might also end war and redeem mankind.” But the specific meaning of the notion seemed to be quite different for each.
As for the political stance on the atomic bomb, Oppenheimer chose a way different from Bohr’s. Oppenheimer believed that Bohr’s argument was similar to Alfred Nobel’s “vain hope, that dynamite would put an end to wars.” He chose “redemption through destruction,” as may be confirmed by his code naming of the first atomic bomb test as Trinity which was derived from the title of his favorite poem by John Donne.
Batter my heart, three person’d God; for you
As yet but knocke, breathe, shine, and seeke to mend;
That I may rise, and stand, O’erthrow mee, and bend
Your force, to breake, blowe, burn and make me new.
Oppenheimer believed that the phrase, “So death doth touch the Resurrection,” in Donne’s another poem gave the symbolic meaning to the atomic bomb’s effect on humanity. Applying Bohr’s concept of complementarity, Oppenheimer wanted to believe that the enigmatic irony of the atomic bomb was beyond the capacity of human cognition; even though it was a weapon of death, it could yet save hundreds and thousands of lives by stopping the deadly war.
An Opinion Poll Among the Scientists and Oppenheimer’s Critical Report
However Oppenheimer’s stance was different not only from the other members of the panel but also from most of his colleagues who participated in the Manhattan Project. In July 1945 an opinion poll among the scientists “who knew what was going on” was conducted to decide the optimum use of the bombs. Of the 150 scientists who responded, only 15% argued to use them in the manner that was most effective from the military point of view. A majority (83%) of responders supported a demonstrational use to bring about Japanese surrender, and 2% agreed that they should not be used under any circumstances, even as a demonstration.
Although “there are not sufficient agreement among the members of the panel to unite upon a statement as to how or under what conditions such use [of the bomb] was to be made,” Oppenheimer submitted a formal report to Stimson:
We find ourselves closer to these latter views [immediate military use of the atomic bomb]; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we can see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.
In the middle of the memorandum Oppenheimer admitted that the opinions of his scientific colleagues at the June meeting were “not unanimous;” nevertheless, in the conclusion his report confirmed the previous unanimous decision at the May meeting.
In his memoirs President Truman clearly identified: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me.” However in the process of introducing the background to the decision about dropping the atomic bomb on Japan, he also cited Oppenheimer’s conclusion in the report submitted to Stimson. Therefore, it is evident that Oppenheimer’s report played a crucial role in Truman’s final decision.
No Path Back
At 5: 30 AM on July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb test was conducted in the middle of the New Mexico desert. The strong flash and shock wave were much more powerful than the research staffs had expected. Right after observing a pillar of flames rising over the Trinity test site, Oppenheimer said, “I am become death, the destroyer of worlds,” a quote from Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita, in which he was totally absorbed.
Finally on August 6, 1945, “a thousand suns” rose to the skies of Hiroshima in a flash that was 3,000 times brighter than the rays of the sun over leaves. In the five years following, the resulting casualties totaled 200,000. On August 9, Nagasaki became the next target and entirely covered with the smell of deaths and decomposition. In the five years following, the casualties in Nagasaki were calculated at about 140,000. As those who advocated the military use of the atomic bomb anticipated, even having lost hundreds thousands of their own people by two atomic bombs, the tough elements in the Japanese military kept clamoring to fight in the face of death. They carried out an unsuccessful military coup to hinder the Emperor from surrendering. On August 15,1945, however, the imperial proclamation of surrender was broadcast and the Pacific war was finally ended.
The Anachronistic Judgements Concerning the Atomic Bomb
Truman was confident about using the atomic bomb “as a weapon of war in the manner prescribed by the laws of war.” He asserted that the atomic bomb is nothing but “one of our weapons” and believed that “it can be made the most useful.” Churchill also argued: “After all this new bomb is just going to be bigger than our present bombs.” By misunderstanding the nature of the atomic bomb, their arguments were anachronistic and incompatible with the changing times.
However, they may not be fully responsible for their misjudgments. Navy lieutenant Commander Norris E. Bradbury mentioned: “Most experiences in life can be comprehended by prior experiences, … but the atom bomb did not fit into any perceptions possessed by anybody.” Leo Szilard tends to agree by saying that “this situation can be evaluated only by men who have first-hand knowledge of the facts involved, that is by the small group of scientists who are actively engaged in this work.”
As Bohr and Szilard indicated, the atomic bomb was a weapon of a totally different dimension, distinct from conventional weapons whose use could be determined by circumstances. The nature of the atomic bomb itself dose not allow its use in any situation, making it a cursed weapon. As President Kennedy stated, the “weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.” However, an alternative would be to keep the atomic bomb under international control until a measure, which could prevent a war-maniac such as Adolf Hitler from possessing the atomic bomb, is made. In any case the use of the atomic bomb could not be justified ethically under any pretext as indicated the following Szilard petition:
Once they were introduced as an instrument of war it would be very difficult to resist the temptation of putting them to such use. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.
Atomic Warfare on Japan and Its Political Background
In The decision to drop the bomb, Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed argued that the dropping of the atomic bomb over Japan was a matter of choice not an inevitable occurrence. If the bomb was dropped simply to defeat Japan, it would not have been necessary. According to Richard Rhodes, “the atomic bombs were authorized not because the Japanese refused to surrender but because they refused to surrender unconditionally.” G. E. M. Anscombe, one of the representative moralists at Oxford University, asserted that “it was the insistence on unconditional surrender that was the root of all evil, … [and] in itself the proposal of an unlimited objective in war is stupid and barbarous.”
Although America’s leading politicians struggled with Japanese political leaders over “the surrender terms,” however, Japan’s unconditional surrender does not appear to have been a central issue with them. The dropping of the atomic bombs obviously was a major factor in concluding the war; nevertheless, this military action did not lead to an “unconditional surrender” by the Japanese. Even with the consequences of the devastation following the dropping of two atomic bombs, Japan insisted that it would surrender only on the condition that it be permitted to preserve “the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” Eventually, America accepted the Japanese will, the conditional surrender with the guaranteed status of the emperor. Objecting to this decision, Jimmy Byrnes, secretary of State, raised the following question: “Why we should go further than we were willing to go at Potsdam when we had no atomic bomb, and Russia was not in the war.”
If it was not the purpose of the atomic bombs to achieve a Japanese unconditional surrender, what was the political intent behind this agreement? In order to answer this question, the following two points should be considered.
The first point to consider is America’s relationship with the Soviet Union. According to Patrick Blackett, a Nobel laureate, the atomic bombs’ “main target was not Japan but the Soviet Union.” He has argued that atomic weapons were used as American political weapons to secure military and psychological superiority over the Soviet Union.
The second point to consider is the role of America’s domestic politics. A significant political factor leading to the use of atomic bombs was “the psychology of the American people,” as cited by Isidor Rabi, a Nobel laureate. According to the historian Herbert Feis, at the time of the dropping of the atomic bombs, Americans “were angry at the defiant, crazed, useless prolongation of the ordeal” and were eager for victory and a hasty end to the war. At the end of the war in particular, retaliatory feelings against Japan were pervasive among Americans. For example, immediately before the dropping of the atomic bombs, Life magazine presented six postcard-sized photographs of Japanese soldiers burned to death by flamethrowers with an accompanying explanation justifying this cruel military action. This hatred for the Japanese people seems to have grown from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, America’s “worst military disaster,” an event that President Franklin D. Roosevelt categorized as, “December 7, 1941 a date which will live in infamy.”
Sensitive to the mood of its public, American politicians had to weigh on whether they could accept a Japanese conditional surrender “in the light of some of the public statements by Roosevelt and Truman.” American leaders ultimately accepted a conditional surrender as a result of political sensitivity to public sentiment and the national desire for a proper retaliation against the ringleaders who masterminded the day of infamy.
In sum, the Japanese conditional surrender was acceptable to America’s politicians because the bombing itself, in addition to fulfilling America’s wish to cripple Japan, had delivered a clear and decisive message of military superiority to the Soviet Union. To Americans, Japan’s conditional surrender was of secondary importance.
Question Over the Practical Effect of the use of the Atomic Bombs
As mentioned previously, the use of the atomic bombs might be an anachronistic decision. If using such a weapon could be advantageous to a nation once, the temptation would be to use it again. At this point, approximately sixty years after the dropping of the bombs, what America has gained from using the bombs seems to be much less than what it has lost:
First, the atomic bombs did not guarantee America’s military superiority very long because the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons four years after the end of World War II. In this regard, according to Blackett, “The dropping of the atomic bombs was actually not the final military operation of [the] Second World War but the first diplomatic move in the Cold War.”
Second, as various historical data have revealed, the view that America’s military retaliation against Japan was justified has lost its base of support. After reviewing various governmental records, Robert S. Thompson and Robert B. Stinnett have proved that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was the result of a sophisticated political strategy designed by the American government. According to Thompson and Stinnett, the “terrible truth” about the attack on Pearl Harbor is as follows: The Roosevelt government kept secret the fact that America had provoked the Japanese attack through an elaborately planned eight-step program in order to justify American entry into the war; in fact, America actually knew of the attack beforehand through its cracking of Japan’s military codes. These historical data place America’s justification for its atomic bombing of Japan in a difficult position.
Third, although the use of atomic bombs concluded the war earlier than may otherwise have been the case, it did not lessen the fear of war that people, including Americans, continued to experience. On the contrary, nuclear competition between America and the Soviet Union generated a worldwide fear that the human race might perish as a result of this race for world domination.
The Different Coping Strategies on the Los Alamos Dilemma
George M. Elsey, in charge of the top-secret tasks of the Naval Intelligence Officer at that time, recalled the circumstances wherein the decision of dropping the atomic bomb was made: “Truman made no decision because there was no decision to be made, … He could no more have stopped it than a train moving down a track…” In an interview Oppenheimer also mentioned: “The decision was implicit in the project. I don’t know whether it could have been stopped.”
Even from the standpoint of the present wherein we can reflect on the past, it may be the abuse of the privilege of posterity to call a particular individual to account for the dropping of the atomic bombs. We may accept Oppenheimer’s claim that there was no way to stop it; however, it is possible to prevent such an event from repeating itself. In particular, the nuclear weapons issue is a matter of life that we must take seriously. Therefore, it is essential to examine thoroughly any measure to prevent a misjudgment that may threaten the survival of humanity.
As Szilard indicated, the scientists at Los Alamos were the experts who could make the best judgments on the atomic bomb issue. This may apply to the present situation as well: scientists are the experts who can understand any circumstances wherein the future of humanity may be endangered. In this context, it is instructive to compare the difference of viewpoints between Oppenheimer and Bohr who exhibited the most contrast in dealing with the Los Alamos dilemma. This comparison is expected to assist in the search for effective measures to deal with possible dilemmas in the future.
Oppenheimer’s argument required the sacrifice of lives as well as the guilt felt by the Los Alamos scientists. In contrast, Bohr’s argument did not need the sacrifice of lives and freed the scientists from their possible guilt feelings. The aforementioned results of the military opinion poll revealed that most of the scientists supported Bohr’s argument rather than Oppenheimer’s. Understanding the reasons why Bohr and Oppenheimer came to opposing stances on the same dilemma may provide significant suggestions for choosing a different path from Los Alamos in dealing with the nuclear dilemma.
Many psychohistorical studies have demonstrated that political strategies related to wars tend to be closely connected to emotional events in the childhood of those who made the decisions. Especially Lloyd DeMause, one of the representative psychohistorians, argues that “wars are results of our failed search for love.” In this regard the fact that Bohr chose a bloodless way, while Oppenheimer selected a bloody way when confronted with the same dilemma appears to be related to emotional experiences with loved ones that had accumulated from the beginning of their lives.
Assimilation as Psychological Metabolism
While introducing the Harvard Study of Adult Development, George E. Vaillant, a psychiatrist, has asserted that whether one has an affectional relationship or destructive relationship with the world is closely related to one’s “ego capacity”—the ability to seek out loved ones and take them into one’s psychological world. According to him, this ability may be evaluated by a psychological metabolism, “assimilation.”
In biology, assimilation refers to the process wherein an organism takes foreign substances and converts them into nutrients and its own living tissue. Psychological assimilation refers to the process through which an individual makes an experience a part of oneself. While biological assimilation happens in the physical world, psychological assimilation comes in the psychological world. Psychological assimilation, by the means of taking others into one’s psychological world, makes people capable of “reach[ing] back into the past for memory of special sources of strength and keep[ing] in mind the hope of finding love in the future.”
According to Vaillant, psychological maturation of an individual is closely connected to the process of psychological digestion of various life events. According to the level wherein one’s social transactions are digested in one’s psychological world, this psychological metabolic process-assimilation-is classified into six categories, “6i”: incorporation, introjection, imitation, internalization, idealization, and identification.
Level 1: Incorporation
Incorporation refers to the state wherein one’s social transactions are contained inside of oneself almost without any psychological metabolism. The Little Prince by Antoine de Saint-Exupery begins with a painting of a boa constrictor that contains a wholly unmetabolized elephant, presenting a vivid image of incorporation. An example is when one becomes severely depressed or even attempts to commit suicide out of emptiness after separation from a loved one.
Level 2: Introjection
Introjection denotes the state in which some parts of social transactions have been digested only minimally so that one experiences them as if they were an alien substance in one’s own body. In this sense those who use introjection might describe their suffering as having an undigested thorn in their body. An example of introjection is when a broken-hearted one tries to forget the painful feelings of rejection only to keep on recalling the past lover.
Level 3: Imitation
Imitation refers to one’s acting as if one is a different person just like an actor performing his part. Imitation is illustrated in such cases as children playing house and imitating their parents or people unwittingly resembling the manners and taste of loved ones. Just as an actor gives up his personality while performing a certain part, imitators may feel that an alien being, whom they are imitating, is operating inside of them.
Level 4: Internalization
Internalization denotes the state wherein social transactions have been digested to some degree in the thinking dimension but not in the emotional. People who use internalization may look as though they have no problems or past problems have been completely solved, nevertheless, they are more likely to have been enduring their suffering with their teeth clenched.
Level 5: Idealization
In idealization, exterior subjects are accepted in the form of idolization or deification in the process of social transaction. People behave as if idolized others do not have any human weaknesses, which results in painful relationships on the both parties very often.
Level 6: Identification
Identification refers to taking external objects into one’s psychological world and making it the foundation of new personality structure. Just as a student’s violin performance reflects a teacher’s lessons, in identification one has integrated external objects. Those who use identification may utilize the psychological resources of alien objects, as if the resources are their own, through a kind of psychological transference process (e.g., transference of learning). By this change process identification may heighten one’s self-esteem and adaptability.
Comparison of Assimilation Between Bohr and Oppenheimer
This study examines the biographies of Bohr and Oppenheimer in order to identify the reasons they took opposite political positions, which may have been affected by their accumulated assimilation experiences from childhood. In particular, their modes of transaction with their parents, spouses, children, and friends are evaluated.
Relationship with father
Oppenheimer’s father, an affluent merchant, was always his strong supporter but “tried to apologize for being Jew[ish],” implying a deeply-rooted sense of inferiority which contributed to Oppenheimer’s shrinking from social life. For example, during his school days he once asked Herbert W. Smith “if he could travel under the name of Robert Smith to disguise his Jewishness.” After moving to California at the age of 23 Oppenheimer lived apart from his father in New York. This seems to suggest that he “never overcame a sense of incompatibility with his father.” Although he did not appear to have any overt problem with his father, the psychological distance between them seems to have been as distant as between California and New York.
Bohr also experienced a serious conflict with his father because of the religious duality of his family. While his father had a Danish Lutheran background, his mother was of Jewish origin. His parents baptized young Bohr into the church, worrying that he would be “the only one in the class who hadn’t been christened.” From adolescence, Bohr harbored strong ill feelings against the Danish church of his day and became displeased with his father’s religious double attitude. But as an adult, he seemed to be able to accept his ambivalent feelings toward his father. Instead of causing conflict regarding their religious differences, he chose to withdraw “his membership in the Lutheran Church” only after the death of his father whom he admired to the end. After his father’s death, he hung his father’s portrait next to his own. The portraits at his house were “grouped reverentially together” centering around his own. Therefore, Bohr seems to have used identification in his relationship with his father, while Oppenheimer seems to have used internalization.
Relationship with mother
According to Frank, Oppenheimer’s younger brother, Oppenheimer “had had difficulty in finding things to talk about with his mother,” even though in the eyes of others their relationship was very close. In contrast Bohr was always thankful for his mother who was “incomparably unselfish” and capable of showing “her warm interest” in every family member. Thus Bohr seems to have used identification in his relationship with his mother, while Oppenheimer seems to have used internalization.
Relationship with younger brother
Having experienced a lonely childhood, Oppenheimer relied psychologically on Frank to a considerable degree. For this reason he did not welcome the marriage of Frank and Jackie who was 8 months older than Frank. Oppenheimer quarreled with Frank over her age and criticized him severely for marrying a humble waitress, since Jackie had worked at a café on campus. In the language of Jackie, “Oppenheimer seemed afraid of losing his brother.” After Frank’s marriage the two brothers gradually became estranged.
From their childhood Bohr and his younger brother Harald were like twins; the two brothers “were almost inseparable in whatever they did.” After receiving the Nobel Prize, Bohr contributed to establishing Harald’s institute for mathematics next to his institute for theoretical physics, in an effort to maintain their inseparable and constant relationship. Therefore, Bohr seems to have used identification in his relationship with his brother, while Oppenheimer seems to have used incorporation before his brother’s marriage, switching to internalization thereafter.
Relationship with spouse
Oppenheimer’s wife Kitty had an alcohol problem and continued to make trouble throughout their marriage. She often drank to the point of unsteadiness, inability to speak logically and at times to lose consciousness. She had periodic traffic accidents and burned numerous cigarette holes in their bed sheets and blankets, even setting fire to their bedroom on one occasion. But Oppenheimer displayed “stoic resignation” instead of actively intervening in Kitty’s problematic behaviors. Frank thought it was “perhaps because he couldn’t admit failure.”
In contrast, Bohr could create “the invigorating atmosphere of warmth and harmony” wherever he stayed with his wife, Margrethe. Even after the age of 70 Bohr worked so energetically that young scientists could hardly keep pace with him. His wife played a critical role in enabling him to work so energetically. Some of these intense work sessions, Bohr disappeared in the middle of meetings saying, “I’ll be straight back. I just have to speak to my wife,” giving people the impression he needed to take care of some urgent matters. In fact “it was merely his need to gain from her the strength and inspiration for continuing the work.” Thus Bohr seems to have used identification in his relationship with his spouse, while Oppenheimer seems to have used internalization.
Relationships with children
Although Oppenheimer loved his children, what he wanted to share with them was not what they wanted but what he himself wanted: Indian philosophy and classical music. As a result, he and his children could hardly enjoy their time together. While introducing Oppenheimer’s family as a model family, Life magazine published the picture of “a pipe-smoking father reading a book to his two young children as his pretty wife looked over his shoulder.” However, as a celebrity with a heavy schedule Oppenheimer could not provide the concern for his children that they needed, resulting in his becoming more estranged from them to the point of his having no meaningful conversation with them after puberty.
Although Bohr had a deep interest in taking care of his children, his heavy schedule prevented him from spending as much time as he wanted. Yet he used the dinner times as teaching times with his children. He always presented them thought-facilitating problems, for example, “The cat that has three tails.” Bohr explained the reason as follows: “No cat has two tails, one cat has one tail more than no cat, so one cat must have three tails.” They liked not only those problems but also the Icelandic sagas and the classical literature that Bohr told them. Abraham Pais reported in his biography of Bohr: “I was witness to the strong and happy ties between parents and children.” Thus Bohr seems to have used identification in his relationships with his children, while Oppenheimer seems to have used internalization.
Relationships with friends
When Oppenheimer was 14 years old, in order to improve his poor social skills, his parents decided that summer camp activities would help him. He, however, was bullied by a group of peers in the camp because of his obstinate “Messiah complex.” When a boy faces with a practical joke or blows, usually it is quite natural for him to take physical actions to defend himself against future bullying. Unfortunately Oppenheimer was different. He always tried to solve conflicts with only words instead of physical force. The more he acted like a martyr by refusing to fight back, the more he was bullied by his peers. Finally the boys captured him on his walk and dragged him to an icehouse where they tormented and released him with his bottom painted green. “They, as it were, crucified him.” Oppenheimer wrote about this incident in a letter to his parents, mentioning that “he was glad he had come to camp because the other boys were teaching him the facts of life.” But it seems that his emotional injury by his friends was repressed only to be expressed later in a form of strong hostility.
While studying at Cambridge, Oppenheimer experienced a psychological crisis and, while hallucinating, tried to poison Patrick Blackett, a colleague and future Nobel laureate. Blackett was a handsome, brilliant, and highly skilled experimenter. Oppenheimer seemed to have had ambivalent feelings of strong jealousy as well as respect. Oppenheimer’s friend John Edsall regarded this event as evidence of Oppenheimer’s rivalry with Blackett, believing that Oppenheimer’s hallucination must have had something to do with his jealousy of Blackett.
In his relationship with his friends Bohr achieved “deep mutual admiration.” For example, Bohr evaluated his best friend, Ole Chievitz, as follows: “In his school-days his independence and love of truth won him the spontaneous respect of everybody, as did his ability to get to the root of every matter.” Similarly, celebrating Bohr’s sixtieth birthday, Chievitz mentioned in a press interview: “I am not exaggerating just because it’s his birthday when I say that I consider him [Bohr] the best human being in the world!” Therefore, Bohr seems to have used identification in his relationships with his friends, while Oppenheimer seems to have used introjection and continuously suffered from emotional hurt originating in childhood.
Coping with the Los Alamos Dilemma and Assimilation
Oppenheimer and Bohr ranked at the highest level on the Creative Achievement Scale (CAS) by Arnold M. Ludwig who, in order to evaluate geniuses’ levels, examined 1,004 world famous people including most influential people of the 20th century. Thus their intellectual genius may be regarded as on the same level. According to the criteria of William Strauss and Neil Howe, they belonged to the same cohort group (persons born within a limited span of about twenty-two years). Also they shared similar societal, economical, and cultural family background as Jews raised in affluence. However, this study demonstrates that in interpersonal relationships Bohr consistently used identification, the highest level of assimilation, while Oppenheimer used the lower levels of assimilation (incorporation, introjection, and internalization). Therefore, in their taking opposing political positions on the same dilemma, psychological assimilation seems to have exerted a greater influence than societal, economical, and cultural factors based on intellectual giftedness, a generation gap, and family background.
No More Hiroshima
After Nagasaki, Truman ordered no further use of the atomic bomb, saying: “the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible.” When the Korean War broke out, he said:
I don’t want to see it [atomic bomb] used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used.
Hence, it seems that even Truman, who once believed that the atomic bomb “can be made the most useful,” came to realize that the atomic bomb is a cursed weapon that could be possessed but not used.
Blood on Oppenheimer’s Hands
About 20 years after the Trinity test, Oppenheimer mentioned the Manhattan Project during an interview: “I never regretted, do not regret now, having done my part of the job.” But unlike his remarks there were gradual changes in his behavior following a series of atomic bomb-related events.
With the success of the Trinity test, he displayed “high-noon strut” which gave the impression of a great deal of self-confidence. Also, on the day Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima, he seemed to remain “excited and elated.” Three days later, however, upon the dropping of Fat Man on Nagasaki, he began to suffer psychologically. And an FBI document written on August 9, 1945 reported that he was a “nervous wreck.” And a few days later, a bureau informant reported that “Oppenheimer kept looking under the table and all around.”
As a matter of fact, Oppenheimer gave an impression of feeling more guilt than Truman, the final decision maker. In 1946 Oppenheimer revealed his guilt feelings about the development of the atomic bomb to President Truman: “Mr. President, (…) I feel I have blood on my hands.” Upon hearing his remark, President Truman got furiously angry and later said to Dean Acheson: “Don’t you bring that fellow around again … After all, all he did was make the bomb. I’m the guy who fired it off.” As President Truman indicated, Oppenheimer was burdened with guilt feelings exceeding his responsibility.
In January 1946, Oppenheimer was the only scientist on a committee formed to establish the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission for international control of nuclear weapons. However, because of differences with President Truman, Oppenheimer was unable to persuade President Truman to consider his views regarding nuclear weapons. As a result, the committee proceeded in a direction that “horrified” Oppenheimer.
Repression of Oppenheimer
One of the methods that Oppenheimer used for reducing his psychological burdens was to erase the painful memory. He behaved like one who believed the following: “Feelings arise out of memory. If there is no memory, feelings will dissolve as well.” For example, Oppenheimer’s memories regarding atomic bomb-related matters were vague and even inconsistent with those of other scientists. Oppenheimer recalled the opinions of Los Alamos scientists on the issue of direct military use of the atomic bomb:
It was evident that the bomb was going to play some part in the future of Europe. … But there was no public discussion of such questions. There was in fact remarkably little public discussion of such questions. There was in fact remarkably little public discussion of whether and in what way the bombs would be used; whether they would be used in the war at all.
In a postwar interview, Oppenheimer was asked the following question: “Could you tell us whether any scientists at Los Alamos had any kind of discussion about their attitudes against the use of the bomb or were you told that they would like to go on record against the use of the bomb?” He gave the answer:
Well, I could have forgotten. My answer would be no. There were certainly many who were appalled and very many people who said why the second one so soon [the bomb dropped on Nagasaki) and I remember people being physically sick from it. But to the question you have asked, I have no recollection.
By the way, George Kistiakowsky, a colleague at Los Alamos, reported a completely different story. According to Kistiakowsky, indeed a meeting was held on a large scale in order to discuss that issue at Los Alamos.
As I recollect … the staff members of the Los Alamos Laboratory had argued with Oppenheimer against the military use of the bomb. Exactly where the argument took place I am not sure. I think there was actually a meeting of the staff members in a large hall at which this issue-I wouldn’t say publicly-was discussed in the presence of hundreds of people and Oppenheimer was there.
Oppenheimer’s repression, that is his unconscious efforts not to remember thoughts that could cause suffering, brought about his “creative blocks.” According to Hans A. Bethe, his colleague and Nobel laureate, Oppenheimer never published any scientific paper after 1950. In a depressive state he once confessed to his colleague: “I am bankrupt of further idea. And I find that physics and the teaching of physics, which is my life, now seems irrelevant.” In consequence, “the most famous physicist in the United States” became incapable of conducting his vocation.
Roosevelt’s Choice
If humanity had been able to cope wisely with the Los Alamos dilemma, it would have been possible to prevent our being trapped in terrifying nuclear competition, as Blackett indicated. He argued that “the dropping of the atomic bombs was actually not the final military operation of [the] Second World War but the first diplomatic move in the Cold War.” Although obtaining such wisdom is very difficult, the fact that it is a truly difficult mission does not necessarily make it impossible to complete.
Early in 1945 before the atomic bomb was completed, the Pentagon secretly schemed to “sanitizefd] the island [Iwo Jima of Japan] with artillery shells loaded with poison gas lobbed in by ships standing well offshore.” At that time those who supported the scheme tried to persuade President Roosevelt of its strategic values. They emphasized that the United States did not join in the conclusion of the Geneva Convention which prohibited the use of poison gas. Also they stressed the possibility of an early ending of the war with fewer casualties of American forces. But Roosevelt resisted their arguments even at the sacrifice of American forces instead of deciding on a basically vicious and inhumane strategy to minimize causalities. Nuclear weaponry such as the atomic bomb should not be considered less disastrous than poison gas. As the terrible truth about the attack on Pearl Harbor suggests, Roosevelt’s political decision in this regard has not always received complimentary evaluations. However, he may be considered to have made a historically valuable decision with regard to the issue of poison gas. Therefore, if humanity would confront a situation similar to the Los Alamos dilemma in the future, Roosevelt’s coping strategy would be a guiding precedent.
Emotional Competence Matters
Einstein stated: “Never do anything against conscience, even if the state demands it.” Although his remarks illustrate good common sense, sometimes a special situation of war, for instance the Los Alamos dilemma, compels us to mistakenly believe that the desirability of a particular end may justify any means. The results of this study demonstrate that the assimilation level may influence decision-making based on the justification of end’s justifying the means in a dilemma.
Szilard argued that “world peace” is impossible to reach as long as people’s psychological world does not change. This study’s results suggest the importance of educational efforts to enhance emotional competence in order to prevent the world from endangering itself. As would have been the case in the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, the efforts to improve the emotional competence of scientific elites are expected to contribute to minimizing the possibility of making the same errors in future dilemmas. We must indicate at this point that emotional competence is not a fixed entity but can be improved by psychological and educational interventions. Kennedy’s statement still stands: “every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable.” As Einstein mentioned, however, “the real problem is in hearts and minds of men.”