Hennadii Yefimenko. Harvard Ukrainian Studies. Volume 30, Annual 2008.
The goal of this paper is to examine the anatomy and essence of the changes that were introduced to the nationality policy in Ukraine in 1933, as well as to determine its similarities to or differences from the nationality policy as implemented prior to the Holodomor. Particular attention is given to the actions of Joseph Stalin, Mykola Skrypnyk, and Pavel Postyshev that were implemented after the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (CC AUCP[b]) issued the following two critical resolutions: “On the State Grain Deliveries in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Western Oblast” (approved 14 December 1932) and “On the Strengthening of the Party Organizations of the CC CP(b)U” (approved 24 January 1933). In this paper I will also examine the degree to which Stalin influenced the CC CP(b)U resolutions in the sphere of the national question and personnel changes, and clarify the status of the Ukrainization policy in the Ukrainian SSR after the Holodomor of 1932-33.
Prior to the opening of the Ukrainian and Russian archives, these problems were most thoroughly analyzed by Hryhorii Kostiuk and James Mace. Among later works devoted to this topic, the first significant monograph was written by Yuri Shapoval. The causes and fundamental nature of the changes in the basic principles of Bolshevik policies on the national question are explained in greater detail in the works of Terry Martin and my own, and in an article by Valeriy Vasylyev that was published in the monograph Komandyry velykoho holodu (Commanders of the Great Famine). Questions pertaining to the change of course in the nationality policy in general, and the repressions of Galician emigres in the Ukrainian SSR in particular, are thoroughly examined by Oleksandr Rubl’ov. However, these studies should not be regarded as the last word on the fundamental nature and consequences of the change of course in the Bolsheviks’ nationality policy. According to Stalin, the close interconnection between the nationality policy and the peasant question was axiomatic.
His point of departure was the principle that “… the peasant question is the basis, the quintessence, of the national question. That explains the fact that the peasantry constitutes the main army of the national movement, that there is no powerful national movement without the peasant army….” Since the Ukrainian peasantry’s dissatisfaction with the communist assault was an undeniable fact, Stalin’s fear that the national liberation in Ukraine could escalate was entirely rational. In order to prevent such an occurrence, the leaders of the AUCP(b) needed to point the finger at the parties who were responsible for the failure of the agricultural campaign in Ukraine in 1931-33. Simply to “correct the situation” was not feasible from a political standpoint, because that would have entailed owning up to their mistakes, which could have had a negative impact on Stalin’s image. The Kremlin leaders understood this only too well. Therefore, in telegrams dispatched to local Ukrainian leaders in late 1932, in which they expressed their displeasure at the unsatisfactory pace of the state grain deliveries, they emphasized: “Either you do not know how to work, or the party’s collectivization policy is incorrect.” It goes without saying that the first assumption was the preferred one.
In order to steer the people’s dissatisfaction in the opposite direction—away from anti-Moscow attitudes—it was crucial to uncover some sort of hostile force that was somehow impeding the successful and “correct” implementation of collectivization and the state grain procurements, and seriously harming the material conditions of the peasantry. Therefore, the Stalinist leadership reached a decision that was most advantageous to it: in combining the task of unifying ideological life in the USSR with an explanation of the causes behind the failure of the state grain delivery campaign in Ukraine, it introduced a sharp turn in the nationality policy. The CC AUCP(b) resolution of 14 December 1932 emphasized that one of the main reasons behind the unsatisfactory pace of the grain procurements was the incorrect implementation of Ukrainization, which “enabled bourgeois-nationalistic elements, Petliurites, and others to create their legal covers, their counterrevolutionary centers and organizations.”
From that moment it became essential to find (or invent) concrete guilty parties who were behind the anti-Moscow attitudes in Ukraine. The specific individuals who were responsible for the spread of pro-Petliurite sympathies were not immediately identified. During a meeting of the Politburo of the CC AUCP(b) that took place on 10 December 1932, “Stalin subjected the Ukrainian leaders to harsh criticism, which at times spilled over into blatant abuse.” He launched a concerted attack on “M. Skrypnyk for his ‘non-Bolshevik’ policy of Ukrainization and his links with ‘nationalistic elements.'” Nevertheless, as Vasylyev noted in his article, it would be premature to assume that the decision to focus on Skrypnyk as the main party responsible for these failures had already been made.
For a time Skrypnyk was above suspicion. Perhaps Stalin’s “enduring patience,” as the historian Valerii Soldatenko put it, may be explained by Skrypnyk’s “militant” position, his support for the socioeconomic policies of the AUCP(b), and his vigorous struggle against various types of “deviations” within the Communist Party. This explains why Skrypnyk is not mentioned in a negative light in Stalin’s correspondence with Lazar Kaganovich in the summer of 1932, which pays considerable attention to “Ukrainian affairs” The sole reference to the commissar of education of the Ukrainian SSR appears in the following sentence: “All the Politburo members, including Skrypnyk, were in favor of lowering the plan” (the state grain deliveries from the 1932 harvest). The event to which this quotation pertains took place on 6 July 1932, and the reference to Skrypnyk proves, in this author’s opinion, that the Kremlin did not anticipate any differences of opinion from Ukraine’s education commissar. That summer the Moscow leaders were already alarmed by the “Petliurite” danger—that is, the potential emergence of a powerful Ukrainian national movement. In a letter to Kaganovich dated 11 August 1932, Stalin focused on the existence of a substantial number of “rotten elements, conscious and unconscious Petliurites” among the members of the CP(b)U, and reached the conclusion that the leadership was weak along party, Soviet, and GPU lines. The letter mentions the danger of “losing Ukraine” and the need to recall Stanislav Kosior, Vlas Chubar, and Stanislav Redens from Ukraine. But neither Skrypnyk nor his spheres of responsibility are mentioned.
For the purpose of uncovering organizations of “nationalists” and “Petliurites” and to justify the application of repressions against them, in November 1932 an OGPU investigative commission headed by Vsevolod Balyts’kyi was dispatched to Ukraine. In late December, after studying the results of the commission’s activities, the top party leadership led by Stalin concluded that there was a “Petliurite organization in Ukraine, whose goal is to carry out sabotage of the state grain deliveries and to organize peasant uprisings in order to separate Ukraine from the USSR and to restore capitalism there” In a memorandum Balyts’kyi reported that a broad-based Polish-Petliurite underground had been uncovered in Ukraine, which was operating in sixty-seven raions of the republic. He noted that “collective farms, state farms, and Machine- Tractor Stations [MTSs] are clogged with Petliurite elements” and hindering the state grain procurements in every way. He emphasized the vigorous activities of the “national-chauvinistic segment” of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which, in a number of cases, ideologically and organizationally was forming and heading “counterrevolutionary insurgent organizations that have now been exposed” The offensive against the Ukrainian national communists was set in motion.
Initially, the Kremlin leaders were in a quandary as to who should be blamed for spreading “Petliurite sentiments.” Evidence points to the fact that Stalin sought above all to proclaim Andrii Khvylia and Panas Liubchenko, both of whom were former Borotbists (Ukrainian national communists), as the “main culprits.” In a letter to Stalin in early 1933 Liubchenko mentions that during a meeting of the CC AUCP(b) held on 14 December 1932 (it took place most probably four days earlier, on 10 December, because the CC AUCP[b] resolution was approved by means of a questionnaire—that is, without the party leaders gathering especially for this meeting), Stalin had reprimanded him unfairly for his supposedly incorrect implementation of the nationality policy. The search for the individuals responsible for the breakdown in the state grain procurement campaign also entailed Kosior’s replacement, which was planned as early as the summer of 1932. However, events began unfolding according to a somewhat different scenario.
On 11 January 1933, at the plenum of the CC AUCP(b), Stalin gave a speech entitled “Work in the Countryside,” in which he declared: “The reason for the difficulties of grain procurement must be sought not among the peasants, but among ourselves, in our own ranks. For we are at the helm; we have the resources of the state at our disposal; it is our mission to lead the collective farms; and we must bear the whole responsibility for the work in the countryside.” In other words, what was being emphasized here was the need to seek out the guilty parties within the leadership of those regions that were experiencing “difficulties.” This primarily concerned Ukraine. There was no mention at the plenum about the economic lunacy stemming from the peasants’ total indifference to the results of their labor, which was the direct result of the new communist assault that the Kremlin had initiated.
On 24 January 1933 the CC AUCP(b) issued a resolution about the unsatisfactory situation in the Ukrainian party organization, the replacement of three oblast committee secretaries, and Postyshev’s appointment as second secretary of the CC CP(b)U. Even though the Ukrainian communist leaders attending the meeting of the CP(b)U Politburo held on 28 January recognized that this resolution was one that “offers a correct assessment of the situation,” they sought to avoid publicly broadcasting the criticisms that were being directed at Ukraine’s Communist Party leadership. It may be that they hoped to convince the highest party leadership that its assessment of the activities of the CC CP(b)U was unjustly harsh, inasmuch as the Ukrainian communists were merely carrying out the directives of the top party ranks. They may also have believed that this resolution would somehow be “brushed under the carpet” In any event, during the Kharkiv oblast plenum held on 29 January 1933 the change of the entire oblast leadership was presented as a simple personnel rotation. As Postyshev noted in his speech at the February 1933 plenum of the CP(b)U, the entire meeting, which was devoted to the change of leadership in Kharkiv oblast, took no longer than twenty minutes.
These new developments failed to appease the top party leaders. In Stalin’s view, a simple change of leadership was not enough; he needed “wreckers.” Thus, on 31 January, perhaps after a final attempt by the leaders of the CP(b)U to convince the Moscow center that they had indeed acted correctly, a harshly worded telegram arrived in Ukraine, cited here in part: “The CC AUCP(b) considers it incorrect that the plenum of the Kharkiv oblast committee carried out Postyshev’s election silently and did not expand on the criticisms of the shortcomings in the oblast committee’s work on the basis of the CC AUCP(b)’s resolution of 24 January of this year” It was impossible to ignore this order. As a result, a campaign of criticism, directed at the actions of the Ukrainian party leadership, was launched in early February. (Incidentally, the Kharkiv party leadership was the last to be criticized.) However, even at this time the question of specific guilty parties had still not been decided.
In order to inform the broad masses about the new accents in the Kremlin’s policies, a plenum of the CC CP(b)U, which was initially planned for 20 February, was convened on 5-7 February 1933. However, even at this meeting, despite acknowledgment of the “attempt by the former leadership of the Kharkiv oblast committee to conceal the 24 January 1933 resolution from the masses,” there was no criticism of Skrypnyk personally or of his activities as Ukraine’s education commissar, just as there was no mention of him in that fateful resolution. Quite the opposite: according to the memoirs of Iakiv Bludov, the first rector of Kharkiv State University, whose operations were revived in March 1933, “when the discussion at the plenum turned to the state of affairs on the ideological front, Postyshev said approximately the following: ‘If the leadership is in firm, reliable Bolshevik hands along the government line (Skrypnyk was responsible for the ideological sector of the Soviet front), then the same cannot be said of the control of the ideological front along the party line. And, as is generally known, at the time the CC CP(b)U secretary for ideology and the editor of the organ of the CC CP(b)U, the newspaper Komunist, was P. Liubchenko, and the head of culture and propaganda was Andrii Khvylia, both former Borotbists.'”
Additional confirmation of the critical attitude to the ideological and personnel work in the CC CP(b)U is the decision handed down by the Ukrainian Politburo on 10 February 1933 about the dismissal (as proposed by Kosior and Postyshev) of Khvylia from his post as head of the Department of Culture and Propaganda (on the invitation of Mykola Popov). Time was also running out for Liubchenko, as attested by his letter to Stalin: “And when the matter of my dismissal from the Secretariat of the CC is considered in relation to the rectification of errors that were committed—about which I learned only recently, [and] the question of my being the main guilty party has been raised, this seems incorrect and unjust to me” However, Liubchenko was not dismissed. According to Bludov’s memoirs, as soon as the plenum ended, Liubchenko left for Moscow, where he had an audience with Stalin and Kaganovich. And even though Liubchenko’s meeting with Stalin was not recorded in any documents—for example, his name is not listed among those individuals who were granted audiences with Stalin during the first six months of 1933—their communication in one form or another is attested by the following events. On 16 February 1933 Komunist published an editorial by this former Borotbist, in which he harshly criticized the earlier course in national-cultural construction, noting in particular the predominance of “Petliurite elements” in various branches of this work. And, even though the resolution that was approved by the Ukrainian Politburo on 23 February acknowledged the incorrectness of the harsh criticism of the leaders of national-cultural construction and ordered the oblast party committees not to implement any concrete measures, Liubchenko was not punished. This is incontrovertible proof that his actions had the Kremlin’s stamp of approval.
Faced with having to “rectify the errors that had been committed,” Mykola Skrypnyk conducted himself differently. In rejecting all blame laid on him, Ukraine’s commissar of education refused to justify himself. According to Emanuil Nol’s’kyi, who had been sent by the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U to the Stalin Metallurgical Plant in Donetsk oblast on 8 February 1933 “in order to strengthen party work,” after Postyshev’s arrival Skrypnyk lodged a protest with the CC AUCP(b) against Kosior’s removal (which, as the extract from the above-cited correspondence indicates, was being planned in Moscow) and against the mass dismissals of secretaries of raion party committees for “sabotage of the state grain deliveries” Skrypnyk was also planning to make a decisive rebuttal to Postyshev at the February plenum of the CC CP(b)U. But, according to a letter that Boris Volin, the head of Glavlit, wrote to Kaganovich on 9 July 1933, Skrypnyk decided against this plan of action after his wife Maria threatened to commit suicide.
Skrypnyk’s former decisiveness also failed him with regard to the implementation of the party center’s appeals, which were now aimed at the struggle against “Petliurite” Ukrainization in the republic. At a meeting of the heads of public education on 14 February 1933 Skrypnyk, who had accepted the CC AUCP(b)’s thesis about the shortcomings of Ukrainization, emphasized that “Petliurization” was indeed taking place in the Kuban region and agreed that it must be suspended. He explained this decision by noting that throughout the Kuban the “enemies of Soviet power had become ensconced in ‘Ukrainized’ institutions—Petliurites expelled from Ukraine, feeling the pressure of Bolshevik Ukrainization there” Commenting on parallel phenomena in Ukraine, he emphasized that they were indeed taking place, offering as an example the fact that 9 percent of Russians were studying in the Ukrainian language. The very acknowledgement that so few Russians in Ukraine were doing their schooling in Ukrainian seemed to belie all the accusations. Moreover, the percentage of non-native nationalities in other Soviet republics was considerably higher.
On 12 February 1933—that is, after the CC CP(b)U plenum—the Ukrainian Politburo ordered a commission consisting of Kosior, Postyshev, Chubar, Skrypnyk, and Liubchenko to draft a resolution summarizing the results of Ukrainization and to submit it for authorization within 48 hours. However, this directive was not completed by the deadline because there was little consensus among the commission members, especially Skrypnyk and Liubchenko. These differences of opinion were reflected in Skrypnyk’s speech at a meeting of republican educational leaders, held on 14 February, and in Liubchenko’s above-mentioned editorial in Komunist, which was published on the 16th. The Ukrainian Politburo intended to make its final decisions on this question at a later date, after Postyshev, Kosior, and Chubar, all of whom were members of this commission, returned from Moscow where they had been sent according to a resolution of the Ukrainian Politburo on 14 February 1933. Postyshev and Kosior went to Moscow on 14 February, Chubar on 15 February. Kosior and Postyshev (on 15 February) and Chubar (on 16 and 18 February), had audiences with Stalin lasting many hours, at which Viacheslav Molotov, Kaganovich, and Genrikh Yagoda, the deputy head of the OGPU, were also present. It was decided to delay issuing a resolution because Skrypnyk still wielded considerable influence, and also because many key positions had still not been filled by a critical majority of his opponents. Preparing its offensive against “bourgeois nationalists” on 18 February 1933 the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U consented to Balyts’kyi’s appointment as the head of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR. The new secret police chief then returned to Ukraine together with his entire team.
These personnel changes, which were decisive for the Ukrainian party organization, were made during a meeting of the Ukrainian Politburo on 23 February 1933. Skrypnyk was not present: he was in Moscow, where he had a forty-minute audience with Stalin and Kaganovich. That very day the final assignment of roles was completed in Kharkiv. Those influential members of the CC CP(b)U who had sided with Postyshev were forgiven their past “transgressions” including membership in other parties. Khvylia, who had seemingly been in disfavor, was appointed deputy commissar of education of the Ukrainian SSR, while Liubchenko not only retained his post in the CC CP(b)U, but was also appointed first deputy head of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) of the Ukrainian SSR. These former Borotbists later fully repaid their debt of gratitude for their salvation: their statements served as the basis of a campaign of accusations that was soon launched against Skrypnyk.
Other personnel changes had a significant impact on subsequent events. Volodymyr Zatons’kyi was appointed commissar of education and accepted as a member of the Ukrainian Politburo. Mykola Popov was also elected to the CC CP(b)U and the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo), and was named a candidate member of the Politburo. At this time Skrypnyk submitted his resignation and was relieved of his duties as Ukraine’s commissar of education. Also dismissed was his first deputy commissar, Oleksandr Karpeko, who had directly overseen the Ukrainization process in the republic; at the next Politburo meeting two more of his deputies were dismissed.
Regardless of the fact that Skrypnyk remained a member of the Politburo and was even officially promoted (becoming head of Gosplan [Ukr. Derzhplan], Ukraine’s State Planning Commission, and deputy head of the Sovnarkom), he was still under attack. Initially, he was criticized for his theoretical writings and the various decisions that had been made on his watch, but later the attacks became personal. Could Skrypnyk have managed to dodge this baiting campaign in 1933? The answer to this question is a qualified “yes.” According to Nol’s’kyi’s memoirs, which were written in the 1960s, “Stalin and Kaganovich planned to change the party leadership of Ukraine, replace Kosior with Postyshev, and lay all the blame for the 1932 famine on him [Kosior]. Skrypnyk was against this. Then the decision was made to recall him to Moscow, which move, killing two birds with one stone, would preempt Skrypnyk’s objection to the creation of an all-Union Prosecutor’s Office. Skrypnyk viewed this as a violation of Lenin’s nationality policy” (43) Skrypnyk’s refusal to head the all-Union Prosecutor’s Office and his categorical objection to the plans to establish such an institution did not impede the centralization process. On 20 June 1933 the Prosecutor’s Office of the USSR was organized according to the Soviet fashion, and its first head was Ivan Akulov, who, prior to this appointment, had been the chief of the Donetsk oblast committee of the CP(b)U. Nevertheless, Skrypnyk’s demonstration of disloyalty to Stalin’s plans accelerated and intensified Postyshev and his associates’ hounding of the former education commissar of the Ukrainian SSR.
Although Postyshev became the official second secretary of the CC CP(b)U, he was the de facto party leader by virtue of being the secretary of the CC AUCP(b). His main task was to destroy, once and for all, the “Ukrainian spirit”—those signs of autonomous national and cultural life that hindered the strengthening of totalitarianism and therefore represented a very real threat to the Stalinist regime. It is thus no surprise that one of the first decisions to be adopted by the Ukrainian Politburo after Postyshev took control of the situation in the CC CP(b)U was the March 1933 resolution entitled “On Textbooks,” which was the first step toward the accelerated unification of Ukrainian educational programs and texts with Russian ones.
The Kremlin leaders devised an effective plan to help Postyshev achieve victory in the struggle against Skrypnyk. In addition to the concrete changes that were made to the economic principles governing life in Ukraine’s rural areas—in keeping with the CC AUCP(b) resolution of 19 January 1933, the former unlimited state grain procurements were abolished and a fixed tax was instituted, which revived the peasants’ material interest in the results of their labor—after Postyshev arrived in Ukraine, the Soviet government officially announced the suspension of the state grain deliveries, and part of the grain that was procured earlier was returned to Ukraine. As Nol’s’kyi put it vividly, “in the wake of his arrival trainloads of grain that had been shipped out literally the day before were sent back.” As a representative of the CC AUCP(b), Postyshev was proclaimed the “savior” of the Ukrainian countryside, and the blame for all the difficulties in Ukraine’s rural regions was laid on “nationalists” and “national deviationists.”
Stalin personally oversaw the destruction of “Ukrainian nationalism.” In addition to the above-mentioned CC AUCP(b) decisions of 14 December 1932 and 24 January 1933, and the resolution of personnel questions in Ukraine, the “Father of the Peoples” continued to keep close watch over the ideological formulation of the pressure exerted on “Ukrainian nationalism.” The decision of the Ukrainian communist leadership concerning the crucial need to approve a resolution summarizing the results of Ukrainization was reflected in a resolution passed by the Ukrainian Politburo on 3 March 1933 entitled “On the Draft of the Resolution on the Results of Ukrainization.” According to this document, the draft resolution that was proposed by a commission attached to the Ukrainian Politburo had received general approval, and Postyshev and Popov were ordered to make some minor editorial changes.
The approved draft was sent to Stalin on 4 March 1933. After reviewing it, the general secretary was still dissatisfied. “This won’t do,” was his opinion of the proposed document, written in his own hand on the typewritten copy of the resolution. Stalin made a considerable number of emendations to a revised draft of the resolution; Stalin highlighted its main points on a separate sheet of paper:
(1) Bolshevik Ukr-[ainiz]ation; (2) Petliurites; (3) rabble as a hotbed of Petliurite elements; (4) We fought and undermined the bases of Great Russian chauvinism in order to establish nat.[ional] equality. But, in view of the fact that this struggle was frequently waged by nationalist. [ic] elem[ents], not always in a Bolshevik manner, not always in the name of internationalism, quite often Great Russian nationalism was supplanted by Ukrainian-Galician nationalism and instead of nat.[ional] equality there emerged another inequality, Ukrainian chauvinism and Ukrainian centrism, not internationalism but nationalism [emphasis and abbreviations in the original].
These comments of Stalin’s became the pivot around which the new course of the nationality policy in Ukraine was formed. With the goal of “exposing” the Skrypnyk-style nationality policy throughout the country, the Kremlin launched a wave of criticism aimed at the earlier course of the policy. Accordingly, Skrypnyk’s chief critic in the theoretical domain of the national question was Oleksandr Shlikhter. Popov attacked Skrypnyk’s views on the history of Ukraine and the CP(b)U; Khvylia condemned the former education commissar’s views on linguistics; and Zatons’kyi slammed his views on education. Skrypnyk was most harshly criticized for his “distortions”—above all, his “theory of a mixed dialect,” according to which children of ethnic Ukrainians who spoke surzhyk (a dialect that mixes elements of Ukrainian and Russian) were supposed to begin their schooling mostly in the Ukrainian language, and ethnic Russians, in the Russian language. Skrypnyk’s recommendations could have transformed Ukraine into a completely Ukrainian-speaking republic. The former commissar of education was also accused of the crime of introducing a nationwide orthography of the Ukrainian language that included the linguistic features of both Soviet-ruled Ukraine and Western Ukraine. This orthography confirmed the separateness of the Ukrainian language and impeded the process of bringing it forcibly in line with Russian. Another point that was used to attack Skrypnyk was his thesis about the dual roots of the CP(b)U, which sought to equalize and reconcile the former members of various Ukrainian parties with the “native” Bolsheviks, thereby eradicating enmities based on earlier affiliations in the ranks of the CP(b)U.
Leaving aside all the ideological verbiage, one may reasonably conclude that all the accusations against Skrypnyk came down to a critique of those of his activities that were aimed at the formation and organic development of the Ukrainian nation and the creation of a national content for Ukrainian culture. A telling example attesting to the low theoretical level and anti-Ukrainian thrust of the wave of criticism aimed at Skrypnyk is a remark made by Shlikhter, who was a member of both the VUAN (the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences) and the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U. In July 1933, at an open party meeting of VUAMLIN (the All-Ukrainian Association of Marxist-Leninist Institutes), which he headed, Shlikhter declared indignantly: “On what should contemporary Ukrainian music be based? On the heroic construction of socialism, do you think? On the mighty enthusiasm of workers and collective farm workers? Comrade Skrypnyk holds a different opinion. ‘Not a single nation, not a single culture can develop without relying on its own historic past. Ukrainian music is grounded in the ancient musical creativity of the Ukrainian people, in our songs, in our dumy [historical and epic songs].'”
Skrypnyk’s position truly did not correspond to the principles of the nationality policy as envisaged by the CC AUCP(b), nor did it conform to the goal of indigenization. In contrast to Skrypnyk’s line, the Bolshevik leadership sought, by means of the korenizatsiia (indigenization) policy, to liquidate the historical traditions of the Ukrainian people—even the very mention of their historic past—and to change the mentality of the Ukrainian people by adapting them to the leadership’s own needs.
After the CC CP(b)U plenum in June 1933, Postyshev, with the support of the other Politburo members, tried his utmost to persuade Skrypnyk to acknowledge his errors. But his efforts were only partly successful. Although Skrypnyk agreed that his work was marred by a number of shortcomings, he refused to betray his principles. The proposal that the former commissar of education of the Ukrainian SSR should write a letter of repentance was broached four times in various resolutions issued by the Ukrainian Politburo. But none of the documents that Skrypnyk submitted for examination by the leadership of the CP(b)U satisfied Postyshev, who did not obtain the necessary “confession.”
On 3 July 1933, the members of the Ukrainian Politburo received a third letter from Skrypnyk. Without even examining it, they approved a resolution convening a meeting of a large number of leading party activists in Kharkiv on 7 July 1933. Mykola Popov was slated to give a speech entitled “On Nationalist Deviations in the Ranks of the Ukrainian Organization and the Tasks of the Struggle against Them.” It was expected that Skrypnyk would repent at this meeting, and efforts were being made to publish his letter (article) before it convened. It became clear the next day that Postyshev was still not satisfied with Skrypnyk’s latest “confession” On 5 July the Politburo issued a final resolution urging Skrypnyk to write a letter of repentance. Such a letter was to be based on “the principles laid down by Comrade Postyshev” The authors of the resolution warned that the meeting in Kharkiv would take place no matter what.
But things did not turn out as expected. On 7 July 1933, following the morning meeting of the Politburo, at which members launched a concerted attack on Skrypnyk and demanded that he repent, he committed suicide. When he left the meeting, the members of the Ukrainian Politburo expelled him from this ruling body. After shooting himself, Skrypnyk died in the arms of Kosior, to whom the dying man addressed his last words—a request for forgiveness for this final—and genuine—mistake.
The suicide of the leading Ukrainian communist, who enjoyed great authority in the country, highlighted the cardinal change that had been introduced into the party’s nationality policy: the rejection of its earlier principles. Now Skrypnyk’s entire life’s work, and even his death, made it impossible for the Soviet leaders to conduct an openly chauvinistic line on the national question. His death undermined the Kremlin’s plans to organize his public hounding at the upcoming CC CP(b)U plenum (after the Kharkiv meeting), where it was expected that this prominent Ukrainian figure would finally own up to his mistakes. Skrypnyk was a popular and respected politician in Ukrainian society, and his death sparked many questions. When Chubar delivered a speech in Dnipropetrovsk in July 1933, he fielded a number of questions from the audience, including: “There is talk among the workers that Skrypnyk killed himself in protest against what has been done to Ukraine. Is this really so?” Chubar’s reply was very pointed: “Can a communist ask such a question?”
It should be emphasized that all attempts to get to the bottom of this matter were dealt with in precisely this manner—e.g., “Only an enemy can ask such a question.”
In order to thwart all signs of dissatisfaction with the new course of the national question and to appease the party membership somewhat, on 10 July 1933 the Ukrainian Politburo approved a resolution “Concerning Lecturers Who Are Active on the Question About Nationalist Deviations and the Tasks of the Struggle against Them'” This document discussed the crucial need for members of the Politburo to travel to oblast and large-city party organizations in order to explain Skrypnyk’s mistakes and elucidate the further implementation of the nationality policy. The following individuals were assigned to lecture on questions pertaining to the nationality policy: Liubchenko (Odesa and Tyraspil), Popov (Kyiv and Chernihiv), Chubar (Dnipropetrovsk), Zatons’kyi (Stalino), and Mykhailo Killeroh (Vinnytsia). The only one missing from this group was the nominal chief communist of Ukraine, Stanislav Kosior, above whom storm clouds were gathering.
During the late summer and early fall of 1933 the power structures were planning to summarize the results of the struggle against “Ukrainian nationalism.” This work was not done by the designated deadline. At first, the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, where the party’s nationality policy was supposed to be discussed, was planned for 25 September. It was later postponed to 10 October because the appropriate preparatory work had not been completed. The plenum finally took place from 18-22 November 1933.
The main reason why the plenum had been postponed was the Ukrainian party leadership’s weak grasp of the fundamentals behind the changes introduced into the nationality policy, and, to make matters worse, the fate of Kosior, the official head of the CP(b)U, was hanging in the balance. Stalin had all along wanted to remove Kosior from the Ukrainian party leadership, and this intention was well known. Therefore, after Skrypnyk’s death the members of the Ukrainian Politburo began to blame the “excesses” of Ukrainization on Kosior. During a meeting attended by leading members of the Kharkiv party organization the same kind of pressure was put on Kosior as had been brought to bear on the late Skrypnyk at the June 1933 meeting in Kharkiv and later at the CC CP(b)U plenum.
Stalin responded with a letter to the Ukrainian Politburo, in which he emphasized the following: “The attempt of the other members of the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U to shake off their responsibility for the mistakes made by the Politburo as a whole is completely incorrect…. Comrade Kosior’s dismissal may be interpreted as disagreement with the nationality policy of the AUCP(b), and, at best, it may be viewed within the party as a departure at a most complex time, when a serious, extensive ideological-political struggle against nationalistic and chauvinistic elements is required.” One thing was now clear: the scenario had been changed.
While destroying all possible manifestations of Ukraine’s “separateness” the Kremlin sought to demonstrate the immutability of its policy of supporting national development, which was so appealing to various nations and peoples. In order to prove that nothing had fundamentally changed in Ukraine, the general secretary of the CC AUCP(b) decided to designate Kosior, arguably the member of the Ukrainian Communist Party leadership who had been Skrypnyk’s closest associate, as the main speaker on nationality policy questions at the CP(b)U plenum. But Stalin had resolved to take direct control over Kosior’s actions. Analysis of the changes made by Stalin personally toward the end of September 1933 (sent out on 24 September) to Kosior’s theses on the national question and to the text of the CP(b)U chief’s speech at the November plenum help trace the direction of Stalin’s thoughts.
The struggle against “national deviationism” in the ranks of the CP(b)U was actively waged right up until the November 1933 plenum. However, the Ukrainian party leaders had not forgotten that, in keeping with party directives, great-state chauvinism was regarded as the chief danger in the national question. Therefore, Kosior’s thesis on the struggle against “nationalist deviations” was formulated in this manner: “Great Russian chauvinism is still the main danger throughout the Soviet Union and the entire AUCP(b). However, this in no way negates the fact that in certain republics of the USSR, particularly in Ukraine, lately we have seen a significant increase in local nationalism stemming from the kulak’s desperate resistance to the victorious socialist offensive, which demands an escalation of the party’s struggle against it” [emphasis added]. After crossing out these lines, in his own hand Stalin inserted words defining the essence of the Kremlin’s nationality policy not only for the near future but to the very end of the USSR’s existence. After Stalin’s amendments the sentence looked like this: “However, this in no way negates the fact that in certain republics of the USSR, particularly in Ukraine, the main danger at the present time is Ukrainian nationalism, which is allied with the imperialistic interventionists.” There is a crucial difference between the two versions: for Stalin, it was not enough simply to wage an active struggle against every national Ukrainian manifestation. It was vitally important to show that the destruction of Ukraine’s national “separateness” was, at the present stage, the main task of the communists in Ukraine.
In the USSR, qualifying great-state chauvinism as “bourgeois” was not an accepted practice. Such Leninist-era epithets (as in the case of the Borotbists) were used only in relation to local “nationalism.” Stalin turned out to be a worthy pupil of his teacher, and even though he had done it indirectly, he had accused Mykola Skrypnyk of espousing bourgeois notions. On the margins of Kosior’s theses Stalin wrote: “It must be said that: (1) Skrypnyk’s position is a reflection of the dissatisfaction with the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the part of those classes that are dying out; (2) Skrypnyk’s position means a call to withdraw from the USSR, where socialism is being constructed, and to turn toward Galicia, where the landlords and capitalists are oppressing the Ukrainian people.” The “Father of the Peoples” was thus accusing the former education commissar of the Ukrainian SSR of the most grievous sins that a communist could commit: abetting “hostile” classes.
In a very real sense Stalin believed that Skrypnyk’s greatest transgression was nurturing the idea of the Ukrainian nation’s “separateness.” Any kind of diversity, even cultural, infuriated the Kremlin. An important role in the preservation and development of the national content of the Ukrainian culture in the Ukrainian SSR was played by Galician Ukrainians, considerable numbers of whom had immigrated to Soviet Ukraine before 1933. By no stretch of the imagination were they advocates of cultural unification and the complete “merger” of Ukraine and Russia. Furthermore, noncommunist-oriented Ukrainian forces in Galicia devoted considerable attention to shedding light on the Holodomor of 1932-33. Thus, Galician Ukrainians, both emigres and those who remained on the territory of Poland, became enemies of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, Kosior made no mention of them in his theses, an omission that could not have pleased the “Father of the Peoples,” who made the following notation on the margins of Kosior’s theses: “About the Galicians, some of whom are drawn to the German landlords and others to Polish ones! Besmirch all the Ukrainians’ anticommunist parties, including the s.d. [Social Democrats] and the s.r. [Social Revolutionaries] as traitors of the Ukrainian people” [emphasis added]. This defamatory “tradition,” which Stalin personally initiated, remained in force even after the Second World War. Particular attention should be focused on the phrase, “traitors of the Ukrainian people,” which, in the case of the accusations leveled against Skrypnyk, was directed at precisely those individuals who sought to champion the rights of the Ukrainian nation.
In contrast to the question of Ukrainians residing outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR, Stalin did not dare take the step of officially renouncing the policy of Ukrainization. Therefore, another of Stalin’s definitive amendments to Kosior’s theses was the distinction drawn between “Petliurite” (i.e., pro-Ukrainian) Ukrainization and Bolshevik Ukrainization, whose earlier implementation had been allegedly hindered by Skrypnyk’s predecessor, Oleksandr Shums’kyi, and in 1931-32, by Skrypnyk himself. On the one hand, the change of course in the nationality policy was thereby conveniently masked. On the other, it should be recognized that Skrypnyk’s Ukrainization did indeed surpass the limits of the indigenization policy that was proclaimed in 1923. The goal of indigenization was to “enroot” Bolshevik power in Ukrainian society—not the independent development of Ukrainian culture beyond the Kremlin’s control. Thus, there were certain grounds for this “split in Ukrainization.”
Kosior’s speech at the plenum contained all of Stalin’s changes. Since the intensification of personnel and linguistic Ukrainization in 1931-32 coincided with the fundamental turning point in the socioeconomic principles governing the existence of the Ukrainian people, Stalin skillfully exploited this circumstance in the party’s mass agitation work (there is no proof of what he planned). The propaganda of the time frequently repeated the thesis that the “dispatching to Ukraine of the then secretary of the CC AUCP(b), Comrade Postyshev, the mobilization for battle of Ukraine’s Bolsheviks, and the rout of the nationalistic counterrevolution put an end to the rupture in Ukrainian agriculture as early as 1933.”
In order to convince Ukrainians that “Ukrainian nationalists” were responsible for the famine, the Kremlin leaders even organized open trials of national communists. For example, Andrii Richyts’kyi, a former member of the (non- Bolshevik) Ukrainian Communist Party, who was a member of the CC CP(b)U during the famine and scrupulously carried out the center’s directives, was accused of “Ukrainian nationalism” (the case of the Ukrainian Military Organization [UVO]). On 27 March 1934 this “Ukrainian nationalist” was publicly condemned to death for his inhumane treatment of the peasants living in the village of Arbuzynka, Odesa oblast, during the state grain deliveries of 1932-33. Stalin followed the progress of this show trial: Zynovii Katsnel’son, the deputy head of the Ukrainian GPU, personally reported on the trial to the general secretary of the AUCP(b), suggesting that this practice be expanded. To ensure that the essentially propagandists nature of this case is clearly understood, an explanation is in order here: the authors of the December 1932 resolution of the CC CP(b)U praised the very actions for which Richyts’kyi was now being tried—the confiscation of homesteads and land belonging to twenty collective farmers—as having “boosted the state grain procurements.”
Like Skrypnyk before him, Richyts’kyi fully grasped the utter absurdity of the accusations being leveled against him, which boiled down to his being punished for a job well done. Yet, he did not dare accuse the Communist Party center of having engineered the catastrophe in the Ukrainian countryside. In a letter that he wrote to the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (VUTsVK) after the court sentenced him to death, Richyts’kyi emphasized his innocence, declaring: “In the victorious advance of socialism and the unfolding of the decisive and ultimate battle between labor and capital for the victory of communist society as a whole, the interests of personal justice should give way to the interests of the higher class justice.” Similar arguments had been wielded by Skrypnyk, who fully understood the made-to-order and unsubstantiated nature of the accusations of nationalism against him. According to Nol’s’kyi’s memoirs, when Skrypnyk was asked why he was not struggling for the truth, he replied: “One cannot! That is the entire crux of the matter. This will do great damage to the party. Right now the entire truth cannot be told to the party and the people. This may lead to a rupture, to a catastrophe. This will arm the enemies and push many away from us.” In other words, the unity of the party and its grip on power, as well as the class position, were more important to Skrypnyk than legality and justice. To paraphrase Richyts’kyi’s words, class interests were more important to him than the interests of the nation.
Despite the identification of Ukrainian nationalism as the main threat in the national question, in 1933-34 the question of the ultimate “merger of nations” was still not on the agenda of the Communist Party leadership. There were insufficient cadres for this, and there was no theoretical formulation of the question. Skrypnyk’s ouster and the relegation of the national question to the back burner allowed the party leadership to nourish the hope of producing the kinds of cadres in Ukraine that could carry out Lenin’s long-cherished wish of seeing local communists aspiring to the merger of the Ukrainian and Russian nations. But this required time.
In order to rectify the economic situation—a matter of the utmost urgency— and to introduce correctives into the process of cultural construction in Ukraine in 1933, the Kremlin required a large number of devoted executors. But it was impossible to find such individuals quickly in Ukraine. Thus, after Postyshev’s arrival in the republic the key positions were assigned to the people who had arrived with him, as well as to individuals who had been scrupulously vetted. Between January and October, the top party leaders dispatched 1,340 people to Ukraine to carry out important work on the raion level, at the same time replacing 237 heads of raion party committees, 249 heads of raion executive committees, and 158 heads of raion control commissions. This took place after an increase in the number of raions, when there were only 367 raion party committees in Ukraine. Since the warriors against Ukrainian nationalism devoted particularly keen attention to the cultural and educational sphere, Postyshev had cause to comment with pride: “In the last ten months we provided the cultural front with a total of no fewer than 1,200 vetted communists for [carrying out] the most important work.”
Refusing to entrust this matter to the lowest ranks of the party and government apparatus, in January 1933 the CC CP(b)U had already approved a resolution to create political departments in all Machine Tractor Stations (MTSs) and state farms “with the goal of politically strengthening the MTSs and state farms, [and] enhancing the political role and influence of the MTSs and state farms in the countryside.” These political departments were tasked with maintaining political control over all spheres of life and work not only at MTSs but also on collective farms that were serviced by MTSs. The heads of these departments were not subordinated to the raion party committee in which they were located, but were directly answerable to the political sector of the oblast land administration, its members appointed or dismissed from their positions by the CC AUCP(b) on the recommendation of the Central Committee of each republican Communist Party. The heads of the MTS-based political departments were duty-bound to monitor the state of affairs in raion party committees, because they were automatically members of the leadership. In the period from January to October 1933 political departments were established at 643 MTSs and 203 state farms, where more than 3,000 leading workers were dispatched for work. Once the Kremlin managed to regain control over the situation in the countryside, these departments were abolished in November 1934.
The extent to which the CC AUCP(b) needed to take full control over Ukraine’s rural areas is illustrated by the following incomplete data. According to a CC CP(b)U report covering the period between the 11th and 12th Ukrainian party congresses, 15,929 communists were dispatched to collective farms in the Ukrainian SSR between late January and 15 October 1933. Ninety- five percent of them were appointed as secretaries of party centers and party organizers on collective farms and brigades. Since these new officials were arriving mostly from Russia or large Ukrainian industrial cities, their lack of fluency in or even rudimentary knowledge of Ukrainian, or basic familiarity with Ukrainian culture, was a foregone conclusion. Even though by far most of the communists throughout the various party centers were ethnic Ukrainians, all work was carried out in Russian because the imported party organizers did not know the Ukrainian language. This widespread situation only exacerbated the Ukrainians’ feelings of inferiority.
The processes of assigning the new cadres to various key positions took place concurrently with the destruction of those who did not fit into the new scheme of things. This is illustrated by the fact that between May and December 1933, a total of 84,653 communists (out of 267,907) were expelled from the party during a purge that was carried out in four oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian party leadership even admitted that 48.1 percent of those who had been expelled from the party had joined the CP(b)U in 1931-32. In 1933 alone the Ukrainian republic’s party organization shrank by 109,556 people, despite the arrival of that large army of communists dispatched from outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR.
Nevertheless, despite this immense changeover of cadres, the leading members of the Communist Party fully realized that it would not be possible to dispense with the support of at least a fraction of the Ukrainian population. The Soviet government thus resolved to demonstrate that the rout of the nationalists was not to be equated with the end of the policy of Ukrainization. Furthermore, as Postyshev declared in his speech at the plenum of the Kyiv oblast committee of the CP(b)U in October 1934, “it is convenient to portray this rout as a repudiation of Ukrainization, as a rout of Ukrainian culture.”
The party leaders understood that blatant Russian chauvinism might produce results that were diametrically opposed to those that were hoped for. After all, the 12th Congress of the RCP(b) had passed a resolution declaring that the biggest threat represented by Russian chauvinism was that it was the main cause of the spread of local nationalism. Therefore, it was necessary, even if formally, to continue Ukrainization and to propose Ukrainian candidates for the most important party and government work. With this goal in mind, immediately after the crushing defeat of the “nationalist deviation” in January 1934 the 12th Congress of the CP(b)U issued a resolution transferring Ukraine’s capital from Kharkiv to Kyiv. The Kremlin continued to monitor the implementation of this goal in order to ensure that the percentage of Ukrainians in the CP(b)U did not fundamentally decrease and that vetted Ukrainian cadres would be proposed for leading party and government positions. The party leadership sought to avoid duplicating the situation that had emerged during the civil war years, when Ukrainians regarded the Communist Party as a foreign power. This would have been a very real threat during the Second World War, because in the period of Soviet power the percentage of urban Ukrainian residents increased significantly.
The Bolshevik leadership needed to prepare Ukrainian cadres that would be identified by nationality as Ukrainians and who spoke Ukrainian well. However, it was of crucial importance to destroy Ukrainian traditions, the distinct features of their daily existence, and their historical memory. After eliminating Skrypnyk’s supporters in 1933-34—that is, Ukrainians who had a well-developed national self-awareness—the party elite set about continuing the policy of Ukrainization. On the surface this appeared to be a logical step: after all, in 1933 the main idea of the struggle against Skrypnyk’s “deviation” was the replacement of “Petliurite” Ukrainization by the “Bolshevik” version of this policy. In order to dispel any doubts among the communists of the Ukrainian SSR concerning the future course of the national question, the resolution of the November 1933 plenum of the CP(b)U included a reminder that “for the party the nationality policy was and still is a tool of internationalism, that its ultimate goal is the establishment of communism and the merger of nations.”
The resolution also stated that the “plenum deems it necessary to carry out a selection and nomination of the best Ukrainian collective farm workers, as well as party and nonparty [workers] for work in soviets on the republican, oblast, and raion scale” It also mentioned the crucial need “to accelerate the training of Bolshevik Ukrainian cadres of party workers,” for which 18-month courses on Marxism-Leninism were being created in Kharkiv at the CC CP(b)U for 150 people. During the registration process the Communist Party leadership made sure that Ukrainians comprised the preponderant majority of applicants. During the first selection stage, 61 percent of all applicants were Ukrainians, and during the second, 73.6 percent.
The CP(b)U’s efforts to build up Ukrainian cadres continued apace. Throughout 1935 the party nominated Ukrainians for leading positions in various state bodies. On 26 February 1935 the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U approved a resolution “On the Nomination of Ukrainian Cadres,” which recommended that the “department of leading party organs, together with oblast committees, submit to the secretariat the names of no fewer than 120-150 Ukrainians for nomination as secretaries of raion party committees and 120 people for nomination as heads of raion executive committees.” The resolution also discussed the need to select from among the Ukrainian heads of raion party committees and raion executive committees candidates for oblast and central party and government work. It also proposed that with this goal in mind Ukrainian candidates should also be sought among the students of the Higher Communist Agricultural School at Artem Communist University in Kharkiv. “There were plans to find [no fewer than 300 Ukrainians from among] the most literate, politically vetted, and capable youth in the higher educational institutions of the Ukrainian SSR. The Central Committee of the Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol) of Ukraine was also ordered to carry out similar actions.
On 5 July 1935 the CC CP(b)U approved a resolution ordering the representatives of various People’s Commissariats to put forward, as soon as possible, their own plans for raising the percentage of Ukrainians in their administrations. On 19 August the CC CP(b)U expressed its dissatisfaction with the ineffective work of a commission headed by L. Kapelins ‘kyi, which was responsible for nominating Ukrainian candidates for the People’s Commissariat of Justice. On 10 July this commission had been tasked with finding Ukrainian candidates for the positions of assistant to the Procurator-General, prosecutors for the People’s Commissariat of Justice, and oblast-level prosecutors and their deputies. At this time similar resolutions were approved for the People’s Commissariats of Health, Communal Economy, Communications, Local Industry, etc. Since it proved difficult to find Ukrainians quickly for leadership posts, on 28 September 1935 the Orgburo of the CC CP(b)U approved a decision prolonging the work of these commissions. During their meeting on 5 October the members of the Orgburo criticized the unsatisfactory state of Ukrainization even in the system of the People’s Commissariat of Education.
In the spring of 1936 the party leadership of Ukraine began to summarize the work of nominating Ukrainian candidates. On 8 March 1936 the CC CP(b)U declared itself satisfied with the process of nominating Ukrainians for positions in the central apparatus of the People’s Commissariat of Health, while emphasizing the need to continue this work throughout Ukraine’s oblasts. On 15 March the leaders of the CC CP(b)U voiced similar satisfaction with the work of nominating Ukrainians for key positions in the People’s Commissariat of Justice. They noted, however, that law faculties still needed “to recruit mainly Ukrainians (75-85 percent).” But the Ukrainian communist leaders were still displeased with the state of affairs in the People’s Commissariat of Education.
The plenum of the CC CP(b)U took place in late January 1936, at which time the results of the verification of party documents in 1935 were discussed. The participants approved a resolution “On the Need to Intensify Work in the Matter of Nominating Ukrainian Cadres” which declared, “In recent times the rout of the nationalists, who were hindering the preparation and nomination of truly Soviet Ukrainian cadres, helped considerably to increase the number and relative weight of Bolshevik Ukrainian cadres [engaged] in party, economic, cultural work in soviets, and all other areas of the building of socialism.”
Despite these optimistic pronouncements on the improvements to the personnel situation, statistics told a different story. As of early January 1936 Ukrainians comprised only 31 percent of all first secretaries of raion party committees in Kharkiv oblast, compared to 59 percent in 1933; 46 percent in 1934; and 44.5 percent in 1935. A similar situation existed in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Whereas in early 1933 one finds that 55 percent of all first secretaries of raion party committees in this oblast were Ukrainians, in 1936 their numbers had dropped to 34 percent; in 1933, 66 percent of all heads of raion executive committees were Ukrainians, compared to 53 percent in 1936. These figures are all the more puzzling if one recalls that a Ukrainian ethnic background was a distinct advantage in climbing the career ladder, so much so that at one time the future general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, declared himself a “Ukrainian” retaining this status until the 1940s.
Publicly, the Soviet government tried to hide the fact that their attempts at closing the gap between the Ukrainian population and the ruling party were not going well. Various publications listed only those figures that handily reflected the party’s nationality policy. At the 1936 CC CP(b)U plenum, which was devoted to summarizing the work of verifying party documents, Postyshev declared:
All this time [our] enemies were trying, and are still trying, to paint a picture showing that we here in Ukraine are not beating nationalists, or counterrevolutionaries, or spies and saboteurs, but Ukrainians, as it were…. We always said that as soon as the nationalists were crushed, it would be possible to open the way to real Ukrainian cadres in a genuine fashion. That’s how it turned out. With respect to this matter, we have had considerable successes in the last couple of years. As of 1 January 1934 there were 179 Ukrainian secretaries of raion committees; as of 1 January 1936, there were 431 Ukrainians serving as secretaries and vice-secretaries of raion committees. In 1933, 250 [Ukrainians] headed raion executive committees and rural soviets, and now, 332.
From these self-congratulatory figures given by Postyshev, the current study selects only those figures that were analyzed earlier in the text. Closer scrutiny of Postyshev’s statements reveals a totally different picture from the one he sought to portray. First of all, he listed only the number of Ukrainians who were secretaries of raion party committees as of 1 January 1934—that is, after the main phase of the struggle against “national deviationism” had been completed. Second, in citing data from 1936, he mentions not just first secretaries of raion party committees but their deputies. In fact, the real number was nearly two times smaller. The third point, arguably the most important one, is that Postyshev “neglected” to mention that new raions had been created in early 1935. The fact is that after the process of expanding the number of raions was completed, there were no fewer than 515 raions, whereas in 1933 there were only 367. As of 1 January 1934, Ukrainians comprised 48.7 percent of all raion-level officials and in 1936, 42 percent, whereas at the end of the first quarter of 1932, 57 percent of all secretaries of raion party committees were Ukrainians—numbers that the CP(b)U leadership clearly regarded as being too low. As far as the nomination of Ukrainian candidates after Skrypnyk’s downfall is concerned, there were no successes to speak of.
Even though Ukrainization was never suspended, in contrast to the indigenization policy on national minorities, the percentage of Ukrainians in the higher echelons of power remained unchanged. According to the results of the 1939 census, a total of 312,848 people worked as “heads of party organizations [and] state, cooperative, and civic institutions and enterprises,” 59.6 percent of whom were Ukrainians. Out of the 8,888 people working in the republican sector, only 3,744 (42.1 percent) were Ukrainians; and out of the 27,629 working in the raion and city sectors there were 18,742 (67.8 percent) Ukrainians. There was a higher percentage of Ukrainians among the heads and deputy heads of rural soviets: 10,401 out of 11,737, or 88.6 percent.
Whereas the leaders of the CP(b)U had clearly not forgotten about the cadre aspect of Ukrainization even in 1933-34, which was the period of the most intensive struggle against Ukrainian nationalism, linguistic Ukrainization reappeared on the agenda only in 1935. On 29 August 1935 the Ukrainian Politburo passed a resolution “On Ukrainization in Oblasts,” which noted that “the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblast party committees are inadequately engaged in the Ukrainization issue.” The Politburo instructed Zarmair Ashrafian, the head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department at the CC CP(b)U, to carry out a special study of these oblasts. The resolution states: “During the study, investigate the soviets’ apparatus: what language is used for correspondence, in what language meetings are held. In addition, pay attention to city soviets, schools, trade unions, party education, and cultural institutions, as well as Komsomol and Pioneer work, the work of the party apparatus of oblast, raion, and city committees. Report the results of the study to the Politburo.” The investigation was completed, and the oblast party organizations named in the study were harshly criticized.
After analyzing the memoranda that were sent from the three oblasts, the staff of the Propaganda and Agitation Department reached the following conclusion.
Despite the CC’s special instructions, the oblast party committees underestimated the political significance of these instructions; they have still not begun implementing them properly, and have still not made the proper breakthrough in the cadres of our party and soviet workers…. Everything regarding Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian society is saturated with the spirit of irony and skepticism.. Individual city committees, party committees, heads of individual enterprises have not only not understood to this day the gigantic sweep and unprecedented U-turn of Ukrainian Soviet culture and statehood (particularly after the rout of the nationalists and Skrypnyks national deviationism) [emphasis added], they have also not reached any political conclusions relating to the practical mastery of this movement.
In other words, the Soviet leadership was promoting the thesis that it was specifically “Ukrainian nationalists” and “national deviationists” who had hindered the Ukrainian people’s cultural and state development.
The apogee of this latest wave of “Ukrainization” rhetoric was reached in early 1937. Shortcomings in the sphere of the national question formed the basis of accusations that were now aimed at Postyshev, who was dismissed from his high-ranking positions in Ukraine. Lazar Kaganovich, who had no compromising materials that could be used against Postyshev, arrived in Ukraine in early January 1937 to remove him from his positions as second secretary of the CP(b)U and secretary of the Kyiv oblast committee of the CC CP(b)U. Kaganovich proceeded to use the national question to criticize Postyshev. At the CC CP(b)U plenum held on 5 January 1937 Kaganovich declared that it was precisely the sphere of the national question that requires “an especially sensitive, especially friendly, especially diligent, and especially careful and correct approach.” He went on to say, “One cannot consider that the national question has been removed, is being removed from the list of priorities. I would say that the national question is at a new stage, on a new level, it has been filled with new, rich content.” This statement is followed by a number of phrases taken straight from the playbook of sincere national communists like Oleksandr Shums’kyi or Mykola Khvyl’ovyi: “Can one deny that along with a Ukrainian’s pride in his Donbas, in his Dniprohes, in his factories in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, etc., pride in his Ukraine has also grown? This is not chauvinistic, not nationalistic pride, but pride in one’s language, in one’s country.”
Later in his speech Kaganovich declared that “a peaceful nationalist at heart can work in a harness,” emphasizing that, even if such a “nationalist” does not fully approve of the measures introduced by the Soviet power, “even if a wisp of nationalistic feeling remains in you, no harm will come to us from this.” All the same, one should not overrate these words, which were uttered by Stalin’s closest associate. After all, he was only calling for permission to allow the Ukrainian language to be spoken, emphasizing that this was not Ukrainian chauvinism at all. And to pose “a question in Ukrainian” in no way meant taking into consideration the interests of Ukraine as a state or national entity. It only meant literally, to ask a question in the Ukrainian language.
Kaganovich’s remarks about the shortcomings in the resolution of the national question found support among his listeners. One of those present in the hall was the Ukrainian writer Ivan Mykytenko, whom Kaganovich had mentioned in exclusively positive terms during his speech. Mykytenko rebuked Osval’d Dzenis (who had already been arrested as a Trotskyite) for bringing in a large number of literary critics from Russia. “Why, all of a sudden, should one search in other places when [we] have the Ukrainian people before us?” He went on to emphasize: “In his wonderful speech Lazar Moiseevich spoke to us about national pride. I listened to this part with deep emotion. I believe that this is one of the central parts of the speech, which we must adopt for all time. What national pride did I have when I had neither my own language nor my own culture, [when] everything was forbidden, when I myself, in order to consider myself a person, had to master the Russian language, and shunned my own? [emphasis added]. What national pride could I have had when my people were in a yoke, and I myself was harnessed to the same yoke?” Noting Mykytenko’s enthusiasm, Kaganovich did not forget to remind his listeners that “our contemporary national pride is the result of our social proletarian pride,” meaning that there could not have been genuine national pride in the prerevolutionary society.
Similar principles were reflected in the plenum of the CC CP(b)U held from 31 January-2 February 1937. During the course of its work critical comments flew fast and thick at Postyshev, Popov, and Kosior, who, it was claimed, had allowed Trotskyites to occupy important ideological posts and then hindered the correct implementation of the nationality policy. In his speech at this plenum Postyshev admitted to mistakes, noting in particular his inadequate control over the building of Ukrainian culture. He noted in particular: “This burden was more than I could handle. I am speaking about my leadership, about my participation in the management of Ukrainian Soviet culture. To my shame, I had a poor knowledge of the history of the Ukrainian people, for one; second, I did not know much about its culture; third, to this very day I did not master the language of the Ukrainian people, as is required of leaders. And these qualities are crucial for each one of us.”
With regard to mistakes that had been made in connection with the implementation of the nationality policy and, in particular, the cadre question (the penetration of “Trotskyites”), the plenum approved a resolution on 3 February 1937. It stated: “Even if these people had not turned out to be enemies, in any event they could not be entrusted with executive work on the cultural- ideological front because they did not understand anything about questions relating to the Ukrainian culture and absolutely did not meet the demands that should be made of leading workers on the ideological and cultural front in Ukraine. In this respect, the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U turned out to have misjudged the national question in Ukraine, which is a significant political error.” The rhetoric surrounding Ukrainization was maintained until mid-1937, when the Kremlin launched a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism, among whose victims were Liubchenko, Khvylia, Zatons’kyi, Mykytenko, and others.
***
To summarize, between 1933 and 1937 Pavel Postyshev, Stanislav Kosior, and other members of the Ukrainian party leadership frequently held forth on the specific features of the “class struggle” in Ukraine. The first feature, according to Postyshev, lay in the fact that “in Ukraine the class enemy wages his struggle against socialist construction under a nationalistic flag.” This meant that anyone who was dissatisfied with Ukraine’s subordinate status and sought to establish real—as opposed to declarative—equality could automatically be accused of harboring sympathy for the “class enemy” This pertained to all those who did not agree with the Kremlin’s agricultural policies.
According to the Communist Party leadership, another feature of the “class struggle” stemmed from the fact that “the largest number of remnants of various counterrevolutionary organizations and parties had become ensconced in Ukraine,” and a merciless struggle had to be waged against them. First and foremost, this meant former members of the Borotbist faction, the Ukrainian Communist Party, and the Bund. Postyshev admitted that the 1931-32 breakthrough “was not only a breakthrough in agriculture, not only in the implementation of the nationality policy, but also a breakthrough in the understanding of the exceptional disorder in the ranks of the CP(b)U in these years. The years 1931-32 were marked by exceptional disorder in the ranks of the CP(b)U, which were filled with hostile anti-Soviet, nationalistic, spying, [and] sabotaging elements.”
Analysis of the events of 1933 and later years leads to the conclusion that the main goal behind Postyshev’s arrival in Ukraine was not to rectify the critical situation in agriculture. Local Ukrainian leaders could have done this without him, considering the changes that had been introduced into the economic policy in the countryside and the existence of the material and human resources that Postyshev used in 1933. His main task was to correct the course of the nationality policy and to purge the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine of nationally aware elements and those who occasionally dared to voice their opinion on various developments.
Stalin, with the assistance of his inner circle, was able to find a reliable method for keeping Ukraine under total control. Hereafter, the myth of “Ukrainian nationalism” as a phenomenon inimical to the Ukrainian people was, like a favorite child, nurtured by the Kremlin and protected from propagandistic and ideological attacks as though it were a precious treasure. To this day Ukrainian society is still powerfully affected by the fear of famine, which became engrained in popular consciousness during the Stalinist era, and onto which was grafted the harsh epithet of “traitorous”—a label applied, first and foremost, to any attempts of the Ukrainian people to strive for the independent development of their country.