Richard G Braungart & Margaret M Braungart. The International Handbook of Sociology. Editor: Stella R Quah & Arnaud Sales. Sage Publications. 2000.
Political sociology is an interdisciplinary field of inquiry developed by sociologists and political scientists to study the dynamic relationship between society (a complex web of social institutions and social behavior) and politics (the structure and exercise of political power). Although rooted in the classic works of de Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Mannheim, Mosca, Michels, and others, political sociology did not emerge as a distinct area of specialization until the late 1950s and early 1960s. Much of the impetus for the development of the field grew out of the turbulent events and trends of the twentieth century—mass politics, economic depression, two world wars, fascism, totalitarianism, the cold war, the nuclear age, modernization, nationalism, and the proliferation of new nation-states. Erik Allardt (1997a: 5; 1997b: 2), one of the founders of international political sociology, recounted that the aftermath of the Second World War:
opened entirely new vistas for a democratic mass politics. Many of us… can remember how a behavioral approach was absent in the studies in political science and how in sociology politics was hardly ever spoken about…. Great optimism was attached to the possibility of building a better world with the aid of social science and research.
Initially, the interest was in identifying the social roots of democracy, the organization and impact of the state, and the role of social scientists in building and testing theories, measuring people’s political attitudes and behavior, and applying the social sciences to public policy. By the late 1950s, leading sociologists and political scientists saw the need for a comparative perspective in trying to understand the interplay between social and political forces. The formal establishment of political sociology as an international field of study occurred during 1959-1960 with a proposal for a new Research Committee on Political Sociology (CPS) at the Fourth World Congress of the International Sociological Association (ISA) meeting in 1959 and the ISA’s acceptance of the proposal in 1960. For more than three decades, the CPS has been a center of cross-national research activity and communication for like-minded sociologists and political scientists. Now that the 20th century has ended and a new century has begun, it is a propitious time for taking stock of the history, contributions, and future of international political sociology.
With this goal in mind, the focus in this chapter is on the development of international political sociology both organizationally and substantively. First, the origins and growth of the field are described, emphasizing the early days of the CPS and the expanding scope of political sociology as a comparative area of scholarly interest. Next, the process of mapping out international political sociology is illustrated by describing how two landmark hypotheses that launched the field in the early 1960s have been scrutinized, researched, and modified over the course of three decades. More specifically, research findings and observations related to Lipset’s democratization hypothesis and to Lipset and Rokkan’s frozen cleavage hypothesis are tracked from the 1960s-1990s. To illustrate how international political sociology has been extended through debate and research, we use the example of Skocpol and others attempt to give the state more emphasis, thereby enriching political sociological inquiry. In the latter part of the essay, we discuss the current depiction of the field as being “at a crossroads,” and after identifying what a number of prominent scholars see as the dominant trends and issues facing the world at the turn of the century, we suggest some of the directions political sociologists may go in the future.
Growing and Nurturing the Field
Political sociology would not be where it is today were it not for the persistent efforts of a group of dedicated scholars in the late 1950s and early 1960s who gave the field form, substance, and organization as an interdisciplinary, cross-national area of specialization. Theoretical formulations, research investigations, and publications initiated and sustained political sociology as a legitimate and growing discipline, while face-to-face contacts with colleagues from different countries at international conferences and meetings did much to establish, stimulate, and expand the field.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, political sociology was being etched out as a distinct field of study partially through benchmark journal articles, books, and bibliographies (see Bendix and Lipset, 1967; Coser, 1967; Dowse and Hughes, 1972; Effrat, 1972; Eisenstadt, 1971). Lipset’s Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (1963), in particular, provided a significant catalyst for anchoring political sociology as a new discipline and pushing it in international and cross-cultural directions. While much of the work of political scientists and sociologists was devoted to studying politics and society in their own countries, life was breathed into what Rokkan (1970b) called the “hybrid discipline” through efforts to foster a global focus and network of CPS scholars. Together Committee members began to chart the macro and micro foundations that gave direction to political sociology—although the research focus in the early 1960s was clearly tilted in the direction of macro-sociology, quantitative data-gathering, and a search for “universal” social and political patterns. From 1961-1967, the CPS held four conferences, whose papers were published in several edited collections (Rokkan, 1970b). The early founders were a productive group, not only in publishing, but in what Lipset (1970: ix) described as “the emergence of a common theoretical and methodological perspective among a group with diverse cultural and intellectual backgrounds.”
CPS’s initial participation as a full-fledged ISA Research Committee occurred at the Fifth World Congress of Sociology in 1962. The CPS organized four sessions that largely focused on the topics of democratization, modernization, social and cultural cleavages, and political systems. Sponsored by the CPS and edited by Lipset and Rokkan, many of the papers were revised for a collection of essays entitled Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (1967). In this innovative volume, the introductory chapter by Lipset and Rokkan gave impetus to the field of international political sociology for decades to come; CPS members contributed chapters about Western nations, Eastern Europe, Japan, Brazil, and West Africa. As the first systematic cross-cultural examination of political parties and voting behavior, Karvonen and Ryssevik (1997) credit this landmark collection in general, and Rokkan’s (1970a) work in particular, with fostering the establishment of a data archives movement for conducting cross-cultural research.
International political sociology grew quickly. By the ISA’s Sixth World Congress in 1966, the CPS had become highly active and visible, with roundtable discussions, committee sessions that boasted the heaviest attendance of the entire Congress, and a joint meeting of the Research Committee officers that resulted in a proposal to the ISA to reorganize the Research Committee structure and draw up a new set of ISA Statutes (Rokkan, 1970b). In 1970, in recognition of CPS’s strong political science emphasis and membership, the Committee affiliated with the International Political Science Association (IPSA) as Research Committee 6 (RC-6). The CPS is unique in its joint association with both the ISA and IPSA.
The CPS has grown to approximately 180 members from 34 countries today, with one-third of the current CPS membership joining during the late 1990s (Karvonen, 1997). While the CPS membership continues to be dominated by Western European and American scholars, representation is increasing, albeit slowly, from Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The hope is to recruit younger members and women scholars along with more members from non-Western countries. The expansion of the CPS is also indicated by thematic panels and sessions held at the 1994 ISA World Congress of Sociology in Bielefeld, Germany (12 panels), and the joint international congress with the South African Sociological Association in 1996 in Durban, South Africa (16 CPS panels with over 60 panelists from 17 countries). In April 1997, the CPS held a special 30-year anniversary Festschrift to honor Lipset and Rokkan’s volume Party Systems and Voter Alignments (1967). During the two-day conference in Bergen, Norway, 20 prominent scholars from around the world presented papers and participated in four panel sessions, where they and a large international audience debated and discussed the strengths and weakness of Lipset and Rokkan’s 1967 book.
The substantive scope of the field is broadening as well. Originally construed as a “sociology of politics” (see Bendix and Lipset, 1967; Lipset, 1962), international political sociology has become a more comprehensive field of inquiry that now includes the “politics of politics” and “political economy” (see Braungart, 1974, 1981, 1990; Braungart and Braungart, 1990). More specifically, over the course of three decades, political sociologists have developed a more flexible and eclectic conceptual paradigm that provides greater opportunities to investigate a wider range of social and political phenomena around the world. The paradigm that has emerged gives focus to the social roots of politics and political institutions (Bollen and Jackman, 1990, 1995; Bottomore, 1979; Inglehart, 1997; Muller, 1995), the dynamic formulations and processes involved in political policy making (DiTomaso, 1990; Knoke, 1990; Knoke and Burleigh, 1990; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Shain and Linz, 1995), and the impact or consequences of public policy on society, its citizens and institutions (Buttel, 1990; Devine, 1990; Knoke, Pappi, Broadbent and Tsujinaka, 1996; Walsh and Cable, 1990). This broad, interactive paradigm continues to attract sociologists and political scientists who are interested in testing hypotheses and developing middle-range theories (Barnett, Hinich and Schofield, 1993; Bollen and Appold, 1993; Dye, 1995; Hicks, Misra and Ng, 1995; Janoski and Hicks, 1994). The utility and worth of this paradigm will continue to be evaluated by how well it allows researchers the opportunity to explain the origins, structure, and operations of the state.
Mapping the Field
A field of inquiry is mapped out by its theory, research, and debate. Political sociology was fortunate in its early stages to have scholars generating significant hypotheses and observations that laid a strong empirical foundation for international research and the future development of the discipline. While a rich array of hypotheses has been proposed within political sociology, two hypotheses were selected for discussion in this chapter: Lipset’s (1963) democratization hypothesis and Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) frozen cleavage hypothesis. These hypotheses resulted in more than 35 years of rigorous research and debate, and their predominance in the field had much to do with charting the course of international political sociology. Each hypothesis has been amended or modified by years of empirical and analytic scrutiny, providing an illustration of the importance of the slow, tedious task of data-gathering required of researchers to test and confirm their work. The introduction of new areas of investigation is another way to expand and refocus a discipline. As an illustration, we will discuss the efforts of Skocpol (1985) and others to give more emphasis to the state in political sociological investigations around the world.
Two seminal works can be credited with launching and having a sustained influence on international political sociology: Political Man, by Lipset (1963) and Party Systems and Voter Alignments by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Political Man has sold 400,000 copies and has been translated into 20 languages (Allardt, 1997b). The book is clearly the worldwide best seller in political sociology and continues to be read today. Party Systems and Voter Alignments was the first cross-national collection of essays concentrating on political parties and voting behavior and has become a classic in the field. Together these two works established a conceptual thrust and global research agenda that endure three decades later. In taking stock of the field of international political sociology, one question is how well these works and their hypotheses hold up in today’s modern, diverse world?
Lipset’s Democratization Hypothesis
A central thesis of Lipset’s Political Man is that “economic development correlates with democracy”—a hypothesis that continued to be discussed and tested in the 1990s. Rich with examples from a variety of nation-states, history, and research studies, Lipset’s wide-ranging analysis documented the significance of the association between economic development and democracy. Democracy was defined as a political system with a constitutional government, citizens rights and duties, and the free election of public officials (Lipset, 1963: 27). Readily acknowledging his Western and conservative bias, Lipset (1963: 31) stated the axiom: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” Other factors critical to democracy, said Lipset (1963), include the rise of intermediary organizations which act as sources of “countervailing power,” legitimacy and effectiveness which have much to do with democratic stability, and the strains between democratic and authoritarian political expressions within each stratum of society.
Lipset’s central contention is that societal cleavages are a principal feature of pluralist democracies, with economic class frequently the most important. While sometimes criticized for placing too much emphasis on the power of capitalism, Lipset did observe in Political Man (1963) that ethnic, regional, religious, age, rural-urban, and gender differences also may be significant for democracy, and in some cases, may be more salient than economic class divisions. In discussing voting and elections, he focused on cross-pressures and factors that correlate with voter turnout in Europe and the United States, along with the impact of class, age or generation, and other social cleavages on left-right political party support, continuity and change. Contending that “the problem of politics does not simply concern nation-states” (1963: 387), Lipset devoted one of the latter chapters in Political Man to democracy and the political process in trade unions.
Since the initial publication of Political Man in 1963, the study of democracy has generated a cottage industry of debate, research, and social criticism. As the 20th century closed, efforts to understand and track democracy remained all the more pertinent because of the dramatic struggles for democratic order in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, South Africa, and elsewhere. During the 1980s and 1990s, political sociologists began to develop a more sophisticated recognition of the divergent ways democracy is understood and implemented in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa when compared to Western nations.
What do the decades of research indicate about Lipset’s initial hypothesis? While continuing to be supported by empirical testing, the economic development and democracy hypothesis was modified, qualified, and reformulated in the late 1980s and 1990s. Modifications included the argument that researchers should not try to pinpoint a “single causal factor” but should engage in a more wide-ranging and complex exploration of multiple causes of democracy in different states and world regions. For example, Dahl (1971, 1989) identified seven “favorable conditions” for democracy, suggesting that “pluralism” was an especially important condition. In his quest to identify the forces promoting democracy over the last century, Huntington (1991: 37-38) reported that the democratization literature included discussions of at least 28 different independent variables related to democracy and concluded that “The causes of democratization differ substantially from one place to another and from one time to another.” And in a global study of 172 nations, Vanhanen (1997) found support for his argument that the relative distribution of power resources is more important than economic development or physical quality of life for democracy, with some notable exceptions. No small confounding effects in this search for the holy grail of democracy are the variety of methodological approaches, indicators, samples, timing, and measurements used by the data-gathers (Dogan and Pelassy, 1984; Dogan and Kazancigil, 1994).
In the 1990s, Lipset (1994) exercised his keen ability to synthesize wide-ranging information and research in order to put the economic development and democracy hypothesis into perspective. What do we know 35 years after the original statement of the democratization hypothesis? Lipset stands by the importance of economic development and the power of the middle class, which he says are necessary but not sufficient conditions for democracy. History and research also show that for democracies to be stable, the process must be gradual, where “opposition and individual rights have emerged in the give and take of politics” (1994: 4). In the which-is-the-most-important-variable debate, Lipset stated, “Cross-national historical evaluations of the correlates of democracy have found that cultural factors appear even more important than economic ones” (1994: 5). A political culture must support democratic ideas and practices, and cultural factors exert a strong influence on politics. As an illustration, Lipset discussed the role that religion plays, noting that Protestantism is positively related to economic development and democracy, whereas Islam and Confucianism, while favorable to capitalism, are not conducive to the promotion of a democratic state. Of course, democracy cannot be mentioned these days without discussing civil society. Observations about civil society are not new, Lipset remarked, and can be traced to de Tocqueville and Schumpeter’s writings and to his own work some 40 years ago. Lipset concludes his review of democracy by stating:
Democracy is an international cause…. There are a number of assertions we can now advance, with considerable confidence, about the structural, cultural, and institutional factors that are conducive to the development of democracy. But specific outcomes depend on particular contexts: on whether the initial electoral and other political institutions are appropriate to the ethnic and cleavage structures of the given country, on the current state of the economy, as well, of course, on the abilities and tactics of the major actors (1994: 16-17).
Lipset can be credited with defining, nurturing, and cultivating a hypothesis and research agenda that defined much of the discussion and work of political sociologists around the world for decades. Overall, the economic development-democracy hypothesis has been supported but has been qualified and enriched by numerous research studies. Much more is known now than when the hypothesis was first proposed (Bollen, 1980; Bollen and Jackman, 1990, 1995; Lipset, Seong and Torres, 1993; Lipset, 1995). Challenges to Lipset’s assumptions and approach have come largely from the advocates of dependency theory and from the postmodernists who eschew rationalism, positivism, and macro-level analyses in favor of cultural relativism, deconstruction, and discourse analysis.
Lipset and Rokkan’s Frozen Cleavage Hypothesis
A second hypothesis providing direction and continuity in political sociology is the frozen cleavage hypothesis put forth by Lipset and Rokkan in their classic volume, Party Systems and Voter Alignments (1967). In many ways, Lipset and Rokkan’s volume reflects the early thinking of the contributors to the volume and the CPS membership. When the book was originally published, most members of the CPS were Western, with the bulk of the articles focusing on Continental and Northern Europe, the English-speaking countries of England, United States, and New Zealand, and several latter chapters on “the emerging nations” of Japan, Brazil, and in West Africa. In the introductory chapter, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” Lipset and Rokkan applied Parsons structural-functional system theory to partisan politics and voting behavior. Although this “conservative” approach was later questioned by many political sociologists, it laid the foundation for the now-famous “frozen cleavage” hypothesis.
The principal contention of the frozen cleavage hypothesis is that political parties and the ideological divisions or cleavages differentiating party support have remained remarkably stable. More specifically, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) maintained that the unique historical transformations that shaped European and North American politics in the 18th and 19th centuries—in particular, the national revolutions that led to the establishment of constitutional democracies and the industrial revolution—produced deep, abiding tensions and conflicts between different members and sectors of society. These structural sources of social tension were identified as: (1) the powerful centers versus powerless peripheries (cultural, ethnic, linguistic); (2) church versus state (sacred-secular); (3) agricultural landed interests versus rising industrial cities; and (4) rich versus poor (class conflict and unionization). Out of these social and political cleavages and antagonisms, argued Lipset and Rokkan (1967), emerged modern political parties and mass politics, which by the second decade of the 20th century in the West had become frozen in place or stabilized. In Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967: 50) words: “the party systems of the 1960’s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s.” They further argued that these party “alternatives” and organizations predate the majority of the voters who participated in national elections, suggesting that party structure and cleavages would be stable for most of the 20th century. How well does the hypothesis hold, especially in light of the many changes that have taken place in Europe and around the world since the drafting of the hypothesis some 33 years ago?
This was the question posed at a 1997 CPS conference titled “Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Thirty Years After” held in Bergen, Norway. The conference was co-sponsored by the CPS along with the University of Bergen and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. Some of the contributors to the original volume as well as younger experts in comparative political parties convened in Bergen to assess and update the contributions of the 1967 volume, especially the reliability and validity of the party cleavage hypothesis. What were some of the findings of this informative conference?
Despite the passage of 33 years since the original statement of the hypothesis and the biases inherent in Parsons systems approach to electoral politics, some of the central tenets of the frozen cleavage hypothesis continue to be supported. The political party system in the West has remained stable over time: the left-right continuum still prevails, there is remarkable electoral and political stability, and political parties play an active role in mobilizing the electorate at the turn of the 21st century. As Mair (1997: 21) summarized, “to the extent that the freezing of a party system implies the establishment of a stable structure of competition, and hence a stable equilibrium; then to that extent the thesis still stands up quite well” (also see Deschouwer, 1997; Katz, 1997; Linz and Montero, 1997).
While political party systems are stable, significant changes have occurred in the original cleavage structures outlined by Lipset and Rokkan in 1967. More specifically, although the center-periphery, church-state, rural-industrial urban, and class politics divisions may have been salient in much of the 20th century, they became less important in the latter quarter of the century. There are several reasons why. The growth of the middle classes around the world and movement toward middle-of-the-road politics in regions such as Europe, the United States, and parts of Asia mitigated some of the old cleavage structures. Increased affluence and a rising standard of living have broadened the social base of political parties, particularly among the more educated, older, urban voters. In addition, new inequalities and cleavages have appeared. The most significant change is that class politics is being supplanted by cultural forms of politics, with heightened divisiveness and conflict based on race, ethnicity, gender, and religion. For example, although traditional parties appear relatively stable throughout Europe, they are being challenged by immigrants and ethnic minorities, especially those who are unemployed. Another new cleavage is generational, with a number of significant differences between the World War II generation and younger voters in the West as well as in Asia (Dogan, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; Pesonen, 1997).
Besides shifts in the cleavage structure, party politics has become less polarized but more fragmented and volatile. While the party system is firmly in place, especially in Western countries, considerable changes and fluctuations occur from election to election, with some of the current “fractionalization” attributable to cultural and generational differences (Deschouwer, 1997: 14). As Pesonen (1997: 12) explained, “In many countries the traditional position of political parties has been weakened, on the one hand by the volatility of the more individualized voters, and on the other hand by the more personalizing emphasis on political leaders rather than on party organizations and party identity.” Young people, in particular, express little interest in politics, political parties, or becoming personally involved with politics. Increasingly, the electorates in the modern world are more affluent, educated, and affected by the mass media, especially television, and they are more unpredictable. At election time, voters may well be influenced more by politicians personalities or sponsorship by interest groups (trade unions, big business, environmental, koenkai associations) than by the candidate’s party affiliation (Allardt, 1997a; Dogan, 1997; Watanuki, 1997).
Many of these generalizations about the stability and change in political parties pertain to the economically advanced states in Western Europe, North America, Israel, and Japan. More widely varying and deviant cases are evident in Eastern and Central Europe, the Third World, and the small island states. The inclusion of political sociologists interested in non-Western nations is relatively recent and contributes much to our understanding of the multifaceted and variegated relationships between society and politics throughout the world. This information is new and well worth reviewing. In examining Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, Lawson (1997) observed that there is no “freezing effect” of party systems due to the recent breakup of 40 years of communism and the struggle in the 1990s to institute a new democratic party system. Moreover, the cleavages identified in Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) essay were not helpful in understanding the Central and Eastern European states in the 1990s, since each state has its own history, culture/subcultures, and unique cleavage structure. For example, Poland divides along social and political lines based on education, economics, agriculture, religious-secular outlooks, and divergent perceptions about former communists and communist rule. Hungary’s cleavages have more to do with orientation to the West versus a traditionalist view, while the growth in civil society is central to understanding Bulgaria and the Czech Republic (Lawson, 1997). These kinds of observations and qualifications are important in developing more sophisticated theories and research in comparative political sociology.
The situation is somewhat different in third world countries—defined as those countries that are economically underdeveloped, predominantly agricultural, and post-colonial. Randall (1997) noted that there are well over 100 states that comprise the third world, each with its unique culture, history, and pertinent economic indicators. Most third world states are in Central and Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia—those vast regions of the world that have been peripheral to Western (Enlightenment) influence. Whereas both Europe and the United States have their democratic origins in national and industrial revolutions and are characterized by universal suffrage and mass party systems, third world states are much more numerous and heterogeneous. Neither capitalist nor ideological, third world states and their institutions are often steeped in ethnic and regional differences—many of which were transformed during periods of colonization, but whose cultural cleavages resurfaced once colonialism had ended. As Randall (1997) explained, it is not mass franchise and party politics, but clientelism and patronage that play an important role in third world politics, where political parties often lack autonomy from the state, and where authoritarian regimes or colonial powers create and control parties. Most third world states do not have a persistent system of competitive party politics, and opposition parties typically have a difficult time making electoral gains in places such as Mexico, much of Africa, and parts of Asia and Latin America. While social and historical cleavages influence party politics in the West, it is the reverse in many third world states where political parties were established by colonial rule or domestic elites (Randall, 1997).
Small island states are another special and distinctive case. For example, while political parties are considered essential in Western democracies, some island states are democracies without party systems. Another permutation is that “in the world of small island states there are often democratizations and parties but no nations and no industrializations” (Anckar, 1997: 2). Small in size, at election time, the emphasis in the island states is likely to be on personal qualities, family ties, and local issues rather than on parties, platforms, and national or “system” issues. Identifying 46 island states (32 of which are considered small), Anckar (1997) explained that almost all of the small island states were former colonies, which clearly had an impact on their political structure and institutions, with the British especially likely to have left a democratic legacy. Another factor to consider is that many indigenous people and cultures have their own democratic traditions and customs. For example, among the Tuvalu islanders, Anckar (1997: 16) reported, government and social affairs are to be conducted by “agreement, courtesy and the search for consensus, in accordance with traditional Tuvaluan procedures, rather than alien ideas of confrontation and divisiveness.” And, although political parties and parliamentary government are being introduced into small island states—and the structure may eventually take hold—island people may well ignore the structure and vote on the basis of personal ties. They then leave it to the winners of the elections to organize themselves in parliament or to govern. Thus, concluded Anckar, while a modern system may appear to be operating, it is the traditional one that counts!
The frozen cleavage hypothesis provides an example of how many features of the hypothesis may be supported in the West (stable party systems with more volatile electorates), whereas the hypothesis has limited utility in most non-Western nations. Globally, the hypothesis has partial support, but in the process of scrutiny and testing, political sociologists have come to recognize the complexity and uniqueness of the world’s diverse regions and states.
Skocpol Brings in the State
Identifying the relationship between society and politics (including the state) is the central focus of political sociology. The dominant international political sociological paradigm is the “sociology of the state” approach where the principal question addressed is which social, economic, and cultural factors have what kinds of impact on the modern states? Both the democratization and frozen cleavage hypotheses are reflections of this perspective. Yet, the social roots of politics approach has been criticized for dominating much of the conceptual and research focus in both sociology and political science. One of the foremost critics has been Theda Skocpol, and it must be said that one cannot discuss the state without mentioning her work and dedication to the state as a paramount concept and focus for research. Undoubtedly, the rapid growth of states since the 1960s has given impetus—if not a sense of urgency—to a better understanding of the state in an international system of competing nation-states. It might be argued that what Lipset (1963) did in pulling together and organizing information on the social correlates of democracy in the 1960s, Skocpol attempted to do for the state in her much-discussed essay “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” published in the edited volume Bringing the State Back In (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985: 3-37). At the time the book was written, the editors contended in the Preface that “the term state was rarely used” and that the “dominant theoretical paradigms in the comparative social sciences did not highlight states as organizational structures or as potentially autonomous actors” (Evans et al., 1985: vii). Given the wealth of discussion, debate, and research on the state, it could be argued that the state was never really “out” or neglected as a topic of historic and widespread interest (Weber, Hintze, Poggi). Nonetheless, this landmark work can be credited with bringing the state into sharper focus by highlighting some of the discussion and research on the subject, stimulating a clearer conceptualization of the state, and identifying topics pertinent to understanding the state.
In her essay, Skocpol (1985) questioned the conventional approach to studying the state for being too “society-centered” and called for a “theoretical reorientation.” She argued that instead of viewing the state as merely reacting to the many groups and demands from society, it is important to recognize that states formulate and pursue goals, they have some autonomy, and they are forceful actors. From what she calls a “Tocquevillian” perspective, Skocpol (1985: 21) contended that states are actors, and they “matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials. They matter because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others).” She also noted that state policies are not merely the reflections of social influences and societal actors; some state policies are intended to reinforce the state and its actors or to assure longevity. “The most basic research task for those interested in state autonomy surely is to explore why, when, and how such distinctive policies are fashioned by states,” advised Skocpol (1985: 15).
In what may be termed “the politics of the state” approach, the state (decision makers, political system, policies) has become one of the principal units of analysis in comparative political sociology. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, certain events stimulated interest in the state, such as the proliferation of new nation-states, the collapse of communism along with the rise of struggling independent states, and the crisis of confidence expressed by citizens in a number of states about their government’s operation and functioning. Topics of concern in examinations of domestic, national, international, and intrastate-interstate relations include citizen initiatives, institutional networks making up the state, and globalization. As an illustration, Bendix, Bendix, and Furniss (1990) described how the nature of the interaction between the state and civil society resulted in different types of welfare policies in three Western states, carefully noting the crisis nature and built-in tensions between the two institutional sectors. Horowitz (1990) identified various forms of militarism in Latin America and the complex relationship between the military and the state, observing that state control in the region may proceed from civil to military or from military to civil authority.
It is not only the state itself that has been featured and studied in the 1980s and 1990s; political sociologists were also giving focus to the impact of the state on society. Termed a “political-economy” perspective, the interest was on identifying, tracking, and evaluating state policies and practices as these affect the surrounding society, culture, and other states. For example, Knoke and Burleigh (1990) were able to cut through the bewildering variety of actors, events, and relationships to more clearly specify the patterns of policy decisions in advanced industrial democracies by building a model of national policy formation. In another highly original work, Gamson and Modigliani (1990) looked at the American government’s shifting policy on affirmative action over two decades by examining the changing interpretations of messages played out in various media sources such as television, news magazines, political cartoons, and opinion columns (also see Devine, 1990; Buttel, 1990).
What the research on the state suggests is that states are not isolated independent institutions or systems—their decision makers, political structures, and policies are influenced by both endogenous and exogenous forces. As the principal political institution the world over, states share many features in common (see Braungart and Braungart, 1990; Graubard, 1979; Knoke et al., 1996; Shain and Linz, 1995). At the same time, each state is unique, with its own special history, identity, and culture, and as such, cannot easily be compared with other states (Anckar, 1997; Bremmer and Taras, 1997; Randall, 1997). A plethora of topics have accompanied political sociologists attempts to successfully bring the state back in, including citizenship rights and duties, nation-states and nationalism, democratic-nondemocratic states, types of welfare states, ideology, comparative public administration and public policy, warfare-conflict, taxes, leadership, international relations, and civil society.
Political Sociology at the Crossroads and into the Future
Where did political sociology stand as the 20th century came to an end, and where might it head in the 21st century? Observations about the status of the field were highlighted in a special issue of Current Sociology (1996) entitled “Political Sociology at the Crossroads.” As we assess international political sociology, several principal issues are germane for political sociologists to consider. The second question about the future of the field is explored by summarizing some of the prevailing trends identified as carrying us into the 21st century, followed by a brief discussion of the implications and challenges for political sociologists around the world.
At the Crossroads
Why is political sociology characterized as being at a crossroads? One reason is that the field continues to suffer from an identity crisis. Political sociology has never been easy to define; for the most part, the split between sociology and political science has remained, perhaps largely due to the different orientations and training involved in becoming a sociologist specializing in politics, or a political scientist specializing in sociology. Allardt (1996: 16), a veteran of the field, remarked that political sociologists do not yet “form a group with a clear identity as political sociologists,” further arguing that studies are needed that focus on dominant social and political cleavages and on large-scale transformations and changes. Moreover, political sociologists typically restrict their investigations to either the social roots of politics, the structure of politics, or to the influence of the state on society, when there is a need to include all three dimensions of analysis within a single cross-national study design.
A second theme is that political sociology has become a more complex and sophisticated field of inquiry than was the case in the 1960s and 1970s. There are several dimensions to this generalization. First, political sociology is a comprehensive and critical enterprise. How much less complicated it is to work in the separate disciplines of sociology or political science than to try to fathom the intricacies, variations, and subtleties involved in the interplay between society and politics (Allardt, 1996). Second, the simple hypotheses and axiomatic assertions of 35 years ago have undergone careful examination over the years. Political sociologists have uncovered a host of topics, variables, and qualifications about observed relationships and have come to recognize that these relationships are likely to be altered in a rapidly changing global environment (Reis, 1996). Third, much of what was theorized, hypothesized, and found in political sociology in the past applies to the West. While the field continues to have its European-American bias and heavy representation of Western scholars, there is now a wider inclusion of political sociologists from other parts of the world (Khondker, 1996). Only recently have we begun to fully appreciate that political sociologists the world over conduct their work in a specific historical and social context; international political sociological inquiry varies widely among states and is strongly influenced by the culture, structures, and currents within its country of origin (Kubiak, 1996; Voronkov and Zdravomyslova, 1996). More explicit attention now and in the future needs to be focused on how theories, hypotheses, generalizations, and research findings apply, do not apply, or apply in unique ways to great variety of non-Western regions and states.
A third theme involves some of the current criticisms of political sociology. While the discipline has been chastised for its prevailing Western bias—if not arrogance—political sociology has undergone rough times in some Western countries. For example, conservative pundits and politicians in the West are not shy about ardently expressing their disdain for the social sciences and what they pejoratively refer to as “social engineering”/meddling in people’s lives. Moreover, political sociologists at Western European and North American universities are sometimes frustrated by today’s vocationally oriented students and the elevation of applied professional fields at the expense of the social sciences (Rootes, 1996). In the United States, political sociology has been criticized for lacking both coherence and any major guiding paradigm. In Orum’s (1996) view, American political sociologists are competitive and spend considerable time and effort debating, wrangling, tugging and pulling about what direction the field should go. Perhaps the most vitriolic salvo against traditional political sociology has been levelled by the radical feminists and postmodernists. Contemptuous of systematic empirical research, the postmodernist critique appears bent on “de-institutionalizing” the social sciences and offering itself as an alternative to political sociology. To put the latest challenge to the social sciences in perspective, social criticism has had a strong tradition in political sociology (Mills, Gouldner, Szymanski), and the postmodernists are simply another reflection of this tradition. By the mid-1990s, the postmodernist critique—especially its more radical, strident form—was on the receiving end of criticism and appears to have run its course (Allardt, 1996; Kimmerling, 1996).
Future Trends, Changes, and Paradoxes: The Global Context
It was out of the tumultuous events, trends, and changes surrounding the Second World War that international political sociology developed as a formal specialty area, and it will be the current and future trends that will direct the work of political sociologists in the new millennium. In the 1990s, a spate of books appeared assessing the 20th century, making predictions about the world’s future, and offering suggestions for coping with, if not improving, social and political life. The themes and generalizations are instructive for political sociologists to consider.
The predominant trend of the 20th century was the globalization of the economy and technology, which undoubtedly improved the quality of life for many people and promoted the rise of the middle classes. At the same time, the pervasive notion of “progress” as economic and technological has had some severe negative consequences, such as fostering excessive individualism, materialism, and environmental destruction at the expense of morality, spirituality, and the well-being of the community and earth’s future. Moreover, the gap between rich and poor nations appears to be widening rather than lessening. An accompanying trend has been the globalization of culture, made possible by the economy and technology. And while there has been a remarkable increase in the worldwide communication of ideas, values, and knowledge, the global cultural revolution has been accused of being overly intrusive, commercialized, manipulative, exploitative, and degrading, while undermining traditional and local or indigenous values (Ahmed, 1995; Kennedy, 1993).
Another international trend has been the strong push for democracy and citizenship, often spearheaded by social movements. Paradoxically, the goal of making societies and states more democratic occurred during a century that was declared to be the most violent and bloody in recorded history. In their quest for freedom, justice, equality, and self-determination, people around the world have struggled tragically against discrimination, totalitarian repression, and exterminations in what Brzezenski (1993) calls the century of “megadeath” and “organized insanity.” In the 20th century many more civilians than soldiers were killed by intent, aided by sinister arsenals of weapons of mass destruction.
As the world is becoming globalized and made more interdependent, it is also being fractured into smaller units. The latter decades of the 20th century, in particular, have been characterized by a proliferation of new nation-states and “statelets.” In yet another paradox, as the number of new states has been multiplying (approximately 200 states today), the authority of the state is in decline due to pressures from both external and internal forces. Major external threats and influences on states come from supranational markets and bureaucratic organizations such as multinational corporations, the United Nations, and European Economic Community, while the principal internal threat comes from ethnic or cultural divisiveness or what has been termed a “new tribalism” (Naisbett, 1994). Cultural differences and ethnic conflict have become the basis for the new political world order, in a clash of cultures or civilizations. The predictions are that the world will no longer be dominated by the West, whose authority many agree, is waning. According to Huntington (1996), the new fault lines are among at least 8-9 different civilizations: Sinic or Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Orthodox, Buddhist, Latin American, and African.
Forecasts for the 21st century are pessimistic, if not grim. If the current trends in globalization and splintering continue, the world will become chaotic and out of control—“pandemonium” is Moynihan’s (1993) characterization. Add to the mix of trends already discussed, an expected population explosion in the next century, with as many as five-sixths of the world’s population living in third world countries. As a result, migrations and the refugee problem already being experienced the world over will only escalate. The “new Barbarism” or degeneration of human conduct is expected to worsen due to the breakdown of civil society (Lukacs, 1993).
Is there hope? As the new century begins, the world appears to be at a turning point. As Kennedy summarizes:
… we do not know the future, it is impossible to say with certainty whether global trends will lead to terrible disasters or be diverted by astonishing advances in human adaption. What is clear is that as the Cold War fades away, we face not a “new world order” but a troubled and fractured planet, whose problems deserve the serious attention of politicians and publics alike…. If these challenges are not met, however, humankind will have only itself to blame for the troubles, and the disasters, that could be lying ahead (1993: 349).
What is to be done? A number of suggestions are being proposed. First, the time has come to impose limits on economic greed and the quest for cultural power and to give much greater focus to individual and collective responsibility. Second, individuals and nations will need to strive for balance and harmony in almost every facet of life than is currently the practice. Notions of what constitutes progress will have to be redefined, incorporating the criteria of voluntary restraints, balance, and respect for human dignity and the earth. Third, some experts advise salvaging the best that the West has to offer, which are its concepts of democracy and civil society, but they also maintain that no single Western or global model will likely be successfully imposed in any unilateral fashion. Respect and tolerance for cultural differences are essential, with some trend-watchers suggesting that we learn to relish and enjoy such distinctiveness and differences among the world’s peoples. Planning, sharing, cooperating, tolerance, morality and ethics need to be the watchwords and modus operandi for all kinds of social and political systems now and in the future (see Berlin, 1995; Heilbroner, 1995; Huntington, 1996).
Challenges Ahead for Political Sociologists
What are the implications of these discussions for political sociologists? Certainly the main drift toward globalization and interdependence signifies the necessity and value of cross-cultural studies of society and politics. In order to gain a clearer understanding of a complicated world, political sociologists have a significant role to play by gathering much-needed knowledge about crucial societal trends and by using the scientific method to debunk and de-mythologize disinformation and wrongheaded notions being promulgated by the media, politicians, and powerful interest groups. Moreover, the field of political sociology was initially established to examine sociopolitical patterns from historical, macro-level, and comparative perspectives. While heavily criticized—especially by the postmodernists—current indications are that political sociologists need not apologize for trying to identify similarities across cultures and nation-states. Large-scale, comparative investigations are called for, perhaps using teams and networks of political sociologists from all world regions. To aid in this task, Karvonen and Ryssevik (1997) point out that national data archives are under-utilized and could assist political sociologists in their international studies.
At the same time, the breakup of nation-states and the ascendance of cultural divisiveness as the basis for the new world order indicate the need for numerous intrastate studies that utilize a combination of micro and macro analyses. Understanding deviation and differences is becoming as pertinent to political sociology as identifying cross-national patterns, but, thus far, little explicit attention has been given to the former agenda. Broader methodologies are required that use multivariate, multi-method approaches within the same study design. Comparative intrastate analyses would be helpful, where findings are pulled together in systematic fashion while also highlighting variations and uniqueness.
With the field viewed as being at a crossroads, how are political sociologists to accomplish their challenging tasks? Instead of taking either a sociology of politics or a politics of the state approach, encompassing all aspects of the political sociological paradigm would prove fruitful in expanding the scope and depth of inquiry. Similarly, greater cooperation and collaboration by political scientists and sociologists would promote better integration and coherence within the discipline. The CPS already has benefitted from involving under-represented groups and younger colleagues, and in the process, its members are learning to give more attention to comparative history and culture in their work. The field also would be advanced by including additional perspectives—historians, political economists, political psychologists, political anthropologists, ecologists, and policy experts have much to share with political sociology. Due to the complexity and diversity of this demanding research agenda, skilled use of quantitative and qualitative research methods as well as the investigation of interaction effects become essential for international studies. In an era of rapid global and cultural transformations, static, cross-sectional survey designs appear less useful than more dynamic temporal approaches, such as longitudinal, time-series, panel, and life-history designs.
In every world region, the changes have been dramatic and are predicted to accelerate in the 21st century. The map of international political sociology will continue to be charted, modified, and filled in, and the demands on political sociologists will only increase to be more knowledgeable about other people’s cultures and political processes. One caveat is not to be sidetracked from political sociology’s purposes by narrow tradition, politicization, or professional squabbling. Lessons can be learned from Nedelmann’s (1997) analysis of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1945 to 1989. Identifying four distinct generations of political sociologists during this period, she cited the importance of the core values on which political sociology was constructed: a macro-sociological point of view, a historical orientation, empirical research, and theory building. Her cautionary tale is that when these values become blurred or disregarded—as they did for several generations in post-Nazi Germany—the contributions of political sociology were seriously weakened. Based on what has been learned over the past 40 years about the development of the field, the future of political sociology rests squarely on its core values, scientific tradition, and interdisciplinary exchange of ideas and scholars.