David R Segal & Nehama E Babin. The International Handbook of Sociology. Editor: Stella R Quah
& Arnaud Sales. Sage Publications. 2000.
Although the military as a social institution and war as a social process figured prominently in classical sociological theory, military sociology did not emerge as a field of empirical study until World War II. Then, for four decades, the field was dominated by scholars in the United States, whose research agenda reflected the concerns of the Cold War period. As we enter the twenty-first century, military sociology is being globalized. At the same time, the military institution is being transformed, as the end of the Cold War in Europe and the worldwide democratic revolution require nations to reconsider the structure, roles and missions of their armed forces. In this chapter we use movement toward a post-Cold War military as a developmental construct to describe the changes that have taken place in military organization and in civil-military relations. Lasswell (1951:11) described developmental constructs as specifications “of the institutional pattern from which we are moving and the pattern toward which we are going.” He suggested that “trend and [scientific] thinking are requisite to projective thinking…Projective thinking is carried out by developmental constructs, which we characterize as theoretical models of significant cross-sections of past and future” (Lasswell, 1958).
Background
In classical theory, Spencer (1908) argued that societies would evolve from primitive military structures to advanced industrial forms. In contrast, Lenin (1916) saw military forces as necessary for the imperialism that capitalist industrial societies would have to pursue as they exhausted domestic raw materials and markets. And Weber (1947) drew heavily on the example of the Prussian Army in his general model of bureaucratic organization.
Spencer’s expectations had not been realized by the Cold War period. The military, in one form or another, played a major role in most societies. Furthermore, most industrial societies were also military powers. In many modern industrialized nations, such as Switzerland, Israel, and the Soviet Union, the military played a major integrative role in society. In developing nations, such as those of Latin America, the military has been the central actor in both domestic social control and modernization, with the social control function shifting from counter-insurgency to drug interdiction. The literature (see Babin, 1986) describes how the military was often the only institution in developing societies capable of coalescing a population and molding it into a coherent, integrated modern nation. With the weaknesses of state and government apparatus, the military’s monopoly on violence, the inability of civilian leaders to act effectively and consistently, and the absence of institutional controls limiting military power, the military was able to move relatively unopposed into a position of authority in many Third World Nations. In fact the military, more than other agencies in developing nations, was able to gather resources and execute policies which contributed to economic development and modernization. It was often the only bureaucratic organization able to bring political stability and economic advancement to a society. Furthermore, in developing nations, the military provided social and economic mobility channels usually unavailable in the civilian sector to those who wanted education and advancement. In these countries military service not only was a form of human capital, but also became a channel for supplying a greatly needed technically trained and educated population.
Neo-Marxist scholars pointed to the role of the military in international capitalist expansion (see for example, Evans, 1979 and Cardoso, 1973). Organized force was used as an instrument to control and direct capitalist survival and expansion. Early writings discuss factors which drive advanced capitalist societies to geographical expansion of their economies through the application of organized force. Military force and violence were the means by which capitalism gained economic advantage (Lenin, 1916; Engels, 1939). Even in modern democratic nations, where the military played a less central role, it was likely to affect the lives of a large proportion of the population through its impact on economic, political, educational and familial institutions.
The military has been more central to society than to sociology. As early as the Franco-Prussian War, du Picq’s (1921) Battle Studies, and later Vagt’s (1937) classic work, The History of Militarism, pointed the way to structural themes that emerged later in military sociology. At the time of their publication, however, these books were regarded as social history rather than sociology, and decades passed before their influence on military sociology was felt. The same was true of Demeter’s (1935) pre-World War II pioneering study of the military profession in Germany, Das Deutsche Heer und Seine Offiziere, which built upon Weber’s insights. The military organizations described by classical theorists were the first modern armed forces, reflecting the citizenship revolution and the evolution of the modern state system. However, only recently has military sociology been comfortable with comparative historical analysis.
World War II and the Postwar Period
World War II was a turning point for the sociological study of the military (Segal and Segal, 1993). The United States mobilized large numbers of academic sociologists in a variety of research and analysis roles in support of the war effort. Thus, the new subfield was initially dominated by Americans. Because the problems studied were not contained within the boundaries of a single discipline, these sociologists established a pattern of interdisciplinary collaboration. Because armies tended to be the largest services and were the most labor-intensive, military sociology emerged primarily as the sociology of ground forces. Because World War II was a period of major military conscription on both sides, military sociology emerged largely as the sociology of conscript forces. And because the research was aimed explicitly at helping to manage the army and the war, it emerged largely as an applied subfield of sociology—one oriented toward organizational and small-group processes, rather than national or trans-national concerns.
Many of the sociologists who were mobilized in non-research roles in World War II recorded their experiences and observations in the sociological literature, including, for example, Homans (1946) observations of social relations on a small warship, which contained the seeds of what was to develop as social exchange theory, and Shibutani’s (1978) study of demoralization in a company of Japanese-American soldiers. In 1946, the American Journal of Sociology published a special issue on “Human Behavior in Military Society.” Hill (1949) conducted a landmark study of the stress that military service imposes on families. This became a major theme in military sociology. However, the major knowledge base of the field, as well as major conceptual and methodological advances in the discipline of sociology, came from the reporting of the results of experiments and surveys conducted by the Information and Education Division of the War Department. The four volumes of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, including the American Soldier studies authored by Stouffer and his colleagues (1949) covered a range of topics, including race relations, cohesion, leadership, primary groups, morale, communication, and persuasion, that helped establish the research agenda of sociology and social psychology for decades to come. Other research, such as the work of Shils and Janowitz (1948) on social dynamics of German army units based on interviews with prisoners of war, has had continuing impact on the field, but its importance was not immediately recognized.
The Korean and Vietnam Wars
Sociological research during the Korean War continued to focus on group processes in conscript forces. Little (1964) studied the importance of interpersonal relations in small units for motivation and support in combat. The Special Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University studied race relations in the newly integrated U.S. Army (Bogart et al., 1969). Both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force became principal sponsors of small group research (see Segal, 1983). This was in part a consequence of the army’s research on leadership and cohesion in World War II and Korea, and was also influenced by the apparent success of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in using principles of group dynamics in support of political indoctrination and the building of military morale, as well as demoralizing American POWs through “brainwashing” (Lifton, 1961). Between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, a new research theme emerged. Prior to the 1960s, there had been occasional attempts by scholars to describe the structural relations between military forces and their host societies in the modern world. Mills’s book (1956), The Power Elite, and Lasswell’s (1941) developmental construct of “the garrison state” were among the most important of these. However, it was not until the 1960s that military sociology emerged as a viable academic field.
At the turn of the decade, Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) published major analyses of the military profession, describing the social role of the officer and the structural relationship between military and civilian institutions, broadening the research agenda of military sociology from the study of conscript forces to the study of military service as a profession. Much of the comparative research of this period dealt with the degree to which American conceptions of military professionalism were applicable in other national settings. For example, although often military professionals in Latin America were trained in the United States, their role in their own societies diverged greatly from the U.S. model. While the American military was committed to political neutrality, in many of the newly independent developing nations the military leadership (i.e., officers) often moved relatively unopposed into positions of authority. They took on administrative and leadership roles which, more often than not, turned into political roles (Janowitz, 1960, 1969; Huntington, 1957; Pye, 1962). Military leaders had the educational background, administrative skills and cosmopolitan outlook which enabled them to unify a country, run a government, institute programs of controlled change, and negotiate with leaders of the developed world. Military leaders in the less developed countries were often more congenial to change than the traditional elite. Unlike the advanced nations, the military profession often went beyond their partnership with civilian authorities and moved into central positions of authority. Analysis of the economic, social and political development of Third World nations requires an understanding of the form of military professionalism.
Sociological research on the Vietnam War again focused on group dynamics in conscript forces. There were significant debates on the nature of leadership, unit cohesion (including the cohesion of the Vietnamese military (Henderson, 1985), and military professionalism in that conflict (e.g., Moskos, 1970; Savage and Gabriel, 1976; Gregory, 1977). One of the casualties of the Vietnam War in the United States was the process of military conscription, which declined markedly in legitimacy during the war (Segal, 1989). The end of military conscription in the United States in 1973, and the advent of large standing voluntary military forces, presaged similar changes in other nations. The conscription based mass armed forces of the first three decades of the Cold War were being replaced by the more voluntary and professionalized late Cold War armed forces (Segal, 1993).
The modern mass armed force, characterized by professional military cadres augmented by conscription, reserves, and cycles of societal mobilization and demobilization, had been a product of the American and French revolutions. These cycles, reflecting national security needs in times of war and both resistance to large military expenditures and distrust of large standing forces in times of peace, will continue to shape the military of the future. The mobilization phases represented societal commitment of resources—military manpower; industrial, agricultural, and commercial productivity; and the civilian labor force—to the waging of total war. The demobilization phases reflected the redirection of these resources to civilian production and consumption after a conflict.
The American and French revolutions also helped transform the relationship of the individual to the state from one of subjection to one of citizenship, reflecting a worldwide and ongoing citizenship revolution (Segal and Segal, 1983). The extension and derivatives of this revolution will likewise influence the military of the future, because the citizenship revolution has defined military service variously as a citizenship right and responsibility.
The Emergence of an Industrial Military after the Vietnam War
The social turbulence in Western industrial nations in the 1960s, including the anti-Vietnam War movement, and a range of civil rights, human rights, and feminist movements, contributed to the end of military conscription in the United States, and as this citizenship revolution spread internationally, the declining legitimacy of involuntary military servitude contributed to an international decline in mass armed forces, and an international trend from conscription to voluntary and more professionalized military forces. This trend raised questions about individual motivations to serve and the relationship between the citizen and the state. At the same time, increasingly complex technologies of warfare led to increased substitution of capital for labor in military forces, and an increasingly complex division of labor and specialization among military personnel, contributing further to the debate on the nature of the military.
Much of the debate has been framed by Moskos’s (1977) developmental construct of change from an institutional to an occupational military. The institutional military is the mass armed force of the early Cold War Period. The occupational military is the late Cold War armed force. The debate involves discussions of the nature of military service, the nature of the military as an organization and profession, and the nature of civil-military relations (Segal, 1986). The characteristics of the mass army and the late Cold War army as developmental constructs are presented in Table 10.1.
In the institutional military, service is viewed as a calling, and is legitimized by normative social values; in the occupational military, service is viewed as a job and legitimized by the dynamics of the labor market. The recruitment appeals of the institutional military focus on character and lifestyle (e.g., “The Brave, The Proud, The Marines”), while the recruiting appeals of the occupational military focus on pay and skill training (“It’s a good place to start”). Compensation in the institutional military is frequently in-kind (food, clothing, shelter) or deferred (veterans benefits), while compensation in the occupational military is reflected directly in salary and bonuses, and veterans get no special treatment. Compensation differences in the institutional military are determined by rank and seniority. In the occupational military they reflect market conditions for people with particular skills or aptitudes. The evaluation of performance of personnel in the institutional military is holistic and qualitative. In the occupational military it is segmented and quantitative. The basis of public esteem of the institutional military is the service rendered. The esteem of the occupational military, like that of other jobs in the labor force, is rooted in the compensation earned. The role commitment of personnel in the institutional military is diffuse: they are generalists. As soldiers, they expect to be called upon to do a wide variety of jobs. The role commitment of personnel in the occupational military is specific: they resent being asked to undertake tasks outside of their specific military occupations or trades. Reflecting this, the reference groups of personnel in the institutional military are within the service: they identify with other soldiers. Personnel in the occupational military, by contrast, identify with other workers in the same trade, whether or not they are in the military.
Table 10.1 Mass Army versus Late Cold War Army: Characteristics of Organizational Change
| Characteristic | Mass Army | Late Cold War Army | |
| Legitimacy | Normative values | Market economy | |
| Base of public esteem | Service | Compensation | |
| Role commitment | Diffuse, generalist | Specific, specialist | |
| Reference groups | Within military | Within occupation | |
| Recruitment appeals | Character, lifestyle | Pay, skill training | |
| Performance evaluation | Holistic, qualitative | Segmented, quantitative | |
| Compensation basis | Rank and seniority | Market conditions | |
| Compensation mode | In-kind, deferred | Salary and bonuses | |
| Legal system | Military justice | Civil jurisprudence | |
| Women’s roles | Limited | Open | |
| Spouses roles | Part of community | Removed | |
| Residence stabilized | Collocated with work | Separated from work, frequent relocation | |
| Postservice status | Veterans benefits | Same as nonserver | |
| SOURCE: Segal, 1993, p.14. | |||
The institutional military has its own legal system, while order and justice in the occupational military are rooted in civil jurisprudence. Women’s roles in the traditionally masculine institutional military are limited, while the occupational military reflects the ongoing gender integration of the civilian labor force. Spouses of military personnel are incorporated into the institutional military; the occupational military separates work and family. This is reflected in residential patterns: in the institutional military, work and residence are collocated, and service may involve frequent family relocation. In the occupational military, work and residence are separated, and service is more geographically stabilized.
Moskos’s formulation was initially meant to describe change in the post-Vietnam War American army as it moved from conscription to voluntarism. However, as had been the case with military professionalism over a decade earlier, a major item in the research agenda of military sociology from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s became the application of this formulation to the armed forces of other industrial nations (see Moskos and Wood, 1988). A 1985 conference on the institutional and occupational military models attracted analysts from eight Western nations in addition to the United States. While their analyses of their own countries do not represent a random sample of Western nations, they probably reflect the range of applicability of these models to the Western world.
Israel appeared to be the most institutional of the military forces considered, with the Israeli Defense Force being value-driven, manned predominantly by reservists and conscripts, with a clear sense of mission, and military roles defined in diffuse and general terms (Gal, 1986). Even with increasing administrative centralization, increasing social distance between leaders and followers, increasing public criticism of the military and involvement in aggressive wars, and a tendency among some officers to view their service in occupational terms, Israel seemed to be the prototype traditional institutional military.
Switzerland too was seen as having a value-driven institutional structure, rooted in universal male service, lacking even the small professional officer corps found in Israel. However, some occupational trends include the advent of modern weapons technologies that required increasing specialization of military personnel and civilianization of some military functions, and a declining willingness of higher status youth to serve beyond the minimum period required, depriving the military of a major traditional source of officer and non-commissioned officer citizen-soldiers (Haltiner, 1986).
The British military has historically been, and remains, institutional. While lacking a history of conscription or universal service, recruitment appeals have been value-driven, emphasizing self-sacrifice and serving the common good. At the same time, however, British forces have partially adopted pay comparability with civilian occupations, and offer specialty pay to needed technicians, thus admitting the dynamics of the labor market into the military personnel equation (Downes, 1986). Similarly, Australia has an all-volunteer military with strong institutional traditions, but seemed to be moving in an occupational direction more rapidly than Great Britain. (Jans, 1986).
West Germany and France had armed forces comprised of both conscripts and professional soldiers, but the nature of the mix was different in terms of the models being discussed here. The French have tried to maintain an institutional military, with the least technical branch, the army, being the most institutional, and the most technical branch, the air force, being the most occupational. However, there have been clear tendencies in an occupational direction, with career personnel living off base, and resenting military interference in their private and family lives (Boene, 1986), and France has subsequently ended military conscription.
The Germans, when they established the Bundeswehr in the 1950s, rather than building a uniquely military institution, used their civil service as their military prototype. Career soldiers are unionized, personnel receive overtime pay, civilian courts have jurisdiction over service members, and recruitment appeals are occupational. However, the continuation of conscription, and tendencies to avoid specialization at senior levels, have contributed institutional undercurrents (Fleckenstein, 1986). The Dutch have been very much like the Germans, with a unionized force, and a reputation for being unkempt and confining their service to the terms of their contract, but with a tradition of conscription, and efforts on the part of military professionals to reinstitutionalize the military (van der Meulen, 1986). However, the Netherlands and Belgium were the first two nations in continental Europe to abolish conscription after the Cold War (van der Meulen and Manigart, 1997).
By contrast, the Greek military has historically been almost archaically institutional. However, like the British, Australians, and French, it was moving in an occupational direction. Draftees were not allowed to wear civilian cloths, even when off duty. Promotion to senior officer ranks was limited to generalists. Salary was entirely determined by seniority and rank. All crimes by military personnel, including traffic offenses, were tried by military courts. However, competitive salaries had been introduced to recruit technicians, larger numbers of officers were being sent to civilian universities, officers wives were increasingly entering the civilian labor force, and the purview of the military justice system was being restricted (Smokovitis, 1986).
The Post-Cold War Army
The debate on institutional and occupational military forces assumed the continuation of a bipolar world order and threat perceptions associated with the Cold War that would encourage Western nations to maintain large military forces even as technological advances were making it increasingly difficult to raise these forces through conscription. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s decreased the willingness of Western nations to maintain large standing military forces, and turned the attention of military analysts to the nature of the force that was likely to evolve after the Cold War in Europe ended.
The post-Cold War period is characterized by the dramatic decline of the mass armed force. Haltiner’s (1996) comparative analysis of 15 Western European nations that recognized universal military conscription as recently as 1991 revealed the following patterns: 1. three of the fifteen nations that had conscription in 1991 had abolished it by 1996; 2. the mean Military Participation Ratio [MPR] (the proportion of a country’s population participating in the active or reserve military forces), which had been above 5% in the 1970–1990 period, declined to less than 4% subsequently; 3. the Conscript Ratio (the proportion of military personnel who have been conscripted) declined from more than 60% in 1970–1989 to about 50% in 1994; 4. the MPR of military age cohorts (aged 18–32), which was above 50% in the 1987–1991 time period (meaning that half of Western European male citizens in these age groups were drafted), declined after 1991, to slightly above one third in 1994; 5. the participation of women in the military forces of Western European nations increased markedly after 1989, particularly in air services.
Harries-Jenkins (1996) presents data (Table 10.2) on eight NATO nations that dramatically demonstrate these trends. In each country, defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product decreased between 1975 and 1995. In six of the eight countries, the 1995 defense budget as a percent of GDP was 75% or less of what it had been in 1975. In each of these countries, the size of the 1995 force had declined relative to its 1975 size, although the range of decline was considerable. In Belgium, the 1995 force was less than half its 1975 size, while the Italian force, which had increased markedly in the 1980s and early 1990s, was in 1995 still 95% of its 1975 size. And in all of these countries, the percentage of the labor force involved in defense had declined. In 1975, all of these countries except Denmark had more than two percent of their labor forces involved in defense. France and the U.S. had more than three percent so employed. By 1995, only two of these countries (France and Italy) had more than two percent of their labor force employed in defense.
One developmental construct that has been suggested to describe this military institution is what Moskos has referred to as the military in “the warless society,” “post-Cold War society,” and “post-modern society.” Table 10.3 presents the dimensions that Moskos has used to describe the stages in the decline of the mass armed force. The early Cold War period, preceding the evolution of the nuclear arms race, presumed nations that perceived threats to their security and were supportive of both armed forces and high military expenditures. The military still bore the vestigial structure of the mass force that was maintained by conscription and prepared to repel an invasion. While there were tensions among services and branches regarding their appropriate roles, the military professional was seen primarily as a warrior. The military was an institution of heterosexual males who were fulfilling a citizenship obligation. Women were excluded completely, or at least from offensive combat, and segregated in their own branches; homosexuals were punished; and conscientious objection was not valued. The families of professional soldiers were incorporated into the military community. Military personnel saw themselves primarily as soldiers. This was the military force that Moskos described as “institutional.”
Increasing demands for technical specialization and growing unpopularity of military conscription led to a shift from mass armies primarily manned by conscripts to large standing forces in a deterrence posture, increasingly manned by professional soldiers who saw themselves as managers rather than warriors, or by short-term volunteers, both of whom identified increasingly with the broader labor force rather than the military. This trend was fueled by the facts that military personnel increasingly had second jobs in the civilian sector and, when on duty, often found themselves working side by side with civilians, often doing the same job (Moskos, 1988).
Table 10.2 Change in Defense Expenditures, Change in Force Size, and Percentage of Labor Force Involved in Defense for Eight NATO Nations: 1975-1995
| Nation | 1995 Defense Expenditure as % of GDP∗ | Change in Annual Average Strength∗∗ | Change in % of Labor Force in Defense∗∗∗ | |
| Belgium | 57 | 45 | 1.2/2.8 | |
| Denmark | 71 | 81 | 1.3/1.8 | |
| France | 82 | 85 | 2.4/3.2 | |
| Germany | 50 | 71 | 1.3/2.5 | |
| Italy | 79 | 95 | 2.1/2.5 | |
| Netherlands | 72 | 67 | 1.4/2.7 | |
| U.K. | 56 | 68 | 1.3/2.5 | |
| U.S.A. | 72 | 77 | 1.9/3.4 | |
| ∗ Average of 1975–1979 = 100 | ||||
| ∗∗ 1975 = 100 | ||||
| ∗∗∗∗ 1995%/1975% | ||||
| Source: Adapted from Harries-Jenkins, 1996. | ||||
The public did not become more negative toward the military, but the military did become less salient in the public consciousness, and increasing criticism was directed at defense expenditures as real economic growth declined. This was also the case throughout most of Latin America which experienced economic decline in the 1980s and a decrease in the significance of the military in the civilian sector.
Competition among services for economic resources increased. As reflections of the ongoing citizenship revolution, conflicts among diverse segments of society came to the fore as major social issues. At the same time, women were accepted into the military, not on equal terms with men, but in larger numbers and more roles; and conscientious objection and homosexuality came to be treated with greater tolerance. The broader range of civilian roles played by military spouses contributed to increasing separation of the family and the military. This was the force Moskos characterized as “occupational.” The developmental construct of the post-Cold War military anticipates a smaller professional armed force, supported by a substantial reserve structure. Modern technologies of war and transportation require the maintenance of standing forces and deny nations the luxuries of time and distance from the battlefield that characterized demobilizations of the past. While the collapse of the bipolar antagonism between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance allows for smaller forces, subsequent events in Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, and Latin America demonstrate that the world has not been pacified. Indeed, the number of military operations seems to be increasing.
Four major organizational changes are emerging in this post-Cold War military organization (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000). First, there is increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, reflected not only in the privatization and outsourcing of military support functions, but in the legitimation of entrepreneurial military operations as well. For example, Executive Outcomes, a South African firm, offers to train soldiers for governments with ineffective armed forces, and in fact leads troops and flies combat missions against rebels and outlaws, with striking successes in Angola, Sierra Leone, and New Guinea. Similarly, Professional Military Resources, Inc., a U.S. corporation, has a contract to train the militaries of Croatia and the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia.
Table 10.3 Decline of the Mass Armed Force: Phases of the Post-World War II Army
| Variable Structure | Early Cold War | Late Cold War | Post-Cold War | |
| Mass army | Large professional army | Smaller professional army | ||
| Threat | Invasion | Nuclear war | Subnational/nonmilitary | |
| Public opinion | Supportive | Ambivalent | Skeptical | |
| Dominant issue | Security | Culture conflicts | Economic growth | |
| Defense Budget | Supported | Tolerated | Resisted | |
| Tension | Roles | Budget | Mission | |
| Professional role | Warrior | Technician/manager | Statesman/scholar | |
| Womens’ roles | Separate/excluded | Partial integration | Full integration | |
| Spouse & community | Integral | Partial | Removed | |
| Homosexuals | Punished | Discharged | Accepted | |
| Conscientious objection | Limited/prohibited | Permitted | Alternative service | |
| Identification | Institutional | Occupational | Civic | |
| Posture | Readiness | Deterrence | Flexible response | |
| SOURCE: Segal, 1993, p.18. | ||||
Second is the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank, and combat versus support functions. This is reflected in countries that have formally combined arms, such as Canada and Israel, as well as an increased emphasis on joint operations, as in the United States.
The third is the change in the purpose of the military, from a focus on fighting wars to missions that were at best secondary, such as humanitarian assistance, and frequently not regarded as military in the past, such as drug interdiction.
Fourth, national militaries are increasingly being used in multinational forces and authorized, or at least legitimized, by entities beyond the nation state. The linkage between the military and the state has been moved in a trans-national direction. For example, the German government allows male citizens of the Danish minority living in Schlesweg-Holstein the option of fulfilling their military service obligation in either the German or the Danish army. Military units are increasingly cross-national. For example, NATO now has a Franco-German brigade. Moreover, the United Nations has sponsored more peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War in Europe than it did during the first four decades of its existence. When Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed a permanent United Nations military force in his Agenda for Peace, the proposal received serious debate in many Western capitals.
However, the post-Cold War society is clearly not a warless society. Harries-Jenkins (1996: 6) notes that “the breaking of the link between potential nuclear conflict and the waging of conventional war means that the use of force to attain a political objective is once again an available option.” Von Bredow (1994) takes a similar position: “many conflicts taking place all over the world could in the future be decided by military means and organized forces more frequently than in the past, with diplomatic negotiations, peace compromises, and the non-violent settlement of disputes taking a back seat.”
Latin American Military Forces
The form and structure of military organization in Latin America has not radically changed over time. Moskos institutional-occupational formula would most likely characterize the military organizations of Latin America as “institutional”: they have remained isolated from the broader society and have validated and legitimated themselves in terms of their own system of values and norms. The military profession continues to be regarded by its members as a calling to maintain the status quo, values, and institutions of society. However, conditions in Latin America have moved the military from a politically central role in society, have rendered it ineffective, and left it with little or no mission. National defense, which has always been a secondary mission for Latin American militaries, has become even less significant as interstate conflict has declined. Consequently, on the face of it, Latin American military organizations, like Western European and North American military organizations after the Cold War, have little or nothing to do and are experiencing an identity crisis in terms of mission (Millett and Gold-Biss, 1996). However, to understand the changes in the role of the military organization in Latin America, it is more important to understand the structure of civil-military relationships in these societies and the function of the military as a “modernizing” institution.
The growth of military organizations in the industrialized nations after-World War II was in large part a consequence or outcome of the Cold War. In Latin America, the growth of the armed forces, as well as its increasing centrality in society, although a response to growing Marxist-Leninist movements inspired by the Cuban model (Marcella, 1994a), was a consequence of internal societal pressures—the inability of political parties to handle insurgencies, guerrilla movements, the need for a state agency to engage in nation-building and modernization, and establishing conditions amenable to economic development. Most important is the fact that Latin American military organizations saw themselves as the main actors in establishing conditions for economic development, internal peace, and social order. According to modernization theories, the military moved into its political role, handling state and government functions, instituting programs of order and change more efficiently than other segments of society (see Babin, 1986 for review of the role of the military in modernization of Third World nations). Latin America lacked strong penetrating political parties capable of checking the power or strength of the military and other societal institutions were too weak to manage the affairs of government. Consequently, the military assumed a role that in the nations of the industrialized world was not considered rightfully theirs.
However, in the early 1980s, after two decades of military rule in Latin America, the role of the military declined drastically. The decline parallels the downsizing of armed forces in Europe and North America, but occurred for different reasons. Whereas the end of the Cold War reduced the raison d’etre for large military organizations in the East and the West, the decline of the military organization in Latin America is primarily a consequence of indigenous factors and only secondarily external factors (such as U.S. policy, see Marcella, 1994b). Until the 1980s the swings between democracy and military governments seemed to be highly influenced by outside forces such as foreign trade, regimes considered favorable to the U.S. security and economic policies, etc. Also by the 1980s Cuba had been discredited as a political model and, therefore, no longer posed a threat to other countries. However, more salient in Latin America, was the fact that the 1980s began a sharp economic decline, an increase in narcotrafficking and insurgencies, and an urgent need to consider the future of the environment.
In spite of its central political role, the armed forces in Latin America have not succeeded in “militarizing” or “mobilizing” society (Wesson, 1986). Since 1978, the military has withdrawn from the government of nine Latin American countries. Generally, the armed forces represent a small percentage of the population, especially in relation to the political power they have held. Latin America spends a smaller fraction of national wealth on the military than any other region of the world and has a smaller proportion of men in the armed forces with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, in 1993, while most of the industrialized “Western” nations had a military burden of approximately 2–4.99% (military expenditures as a percentage of GNP), most of the Latin American countries had a burden of 1.99% or less (the only exceptions are Nicaragua, Colombia and Chile) (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996).
Since the 1980s the sharp decline in the role of the military is reflected in the decrease of military expenditures and the size of the armed forces in most Latin American countries. Generally, (see Table 10.4) there has been a decline in military expenditures and the size of the military over the ten year period between 1983 and 1993. In only two cases, Bolivia and Brazil, have military expenditures increased. Where the size of the armed forces has increased, the increase has been very small. In some Latin American countries the military budgets have been reduced to such a degree that it has created civil-military tensions (Marcella, 1994b). For example, in Brazil, military expenditures were reduced by 75% between 1985 and 1990, creating serious morale and readiness issues. The composition of the Latin American military organizations has for the most part remained the same over the years. Most often the enlisted ranks of Latin American armed forces have been primarily of lower class origin while the officer corps comes from the lower middle or middle classes. They usually serve for short periods of one to two years. Only in Argentina and to some extent in Chile has there been an effort to apply conscription to all socio-economic classes. Throughout Latin America, and within each country, the ranks have consisted of a combination of conscripts and volunteers. It is not unusual for national constitutions, such as that of Colombia which requires service from all when there is a need to defend the country, to require military service or at least registration for service. However, in reality only a very small proportion of the population serves and an even smaller proportion are drafted. A trend throughout most Latin American countries is the highly disproportionate number of enlisted who come from the lower classes. Usually the middle or upper classes manage to obtain exemptions from military service (Wesson, 1986).
Although there is not much prestige in being an ordinary soldier in most of these countries, the military continues to offer channels for advancement and improvement, mostly in the form of education and technical training. In this manner, the military has continued to be a “modernization” vehicle for the state (Babin, 1986). Training and reenlistment are the two methods of gaining non-commissioned officer status and a military career. However, it is very uncommon for noncommissioned officers (most of whom are volunteers) to make it into the officer ranks in Latin American armed forces (Wesson, 1986).
In Third World countries the military had little to do with the traditional structure of elites and was more congenial than other ruling classes to modernization. Unlike officer corps of Europe which came from aristocracy, those of developing nations were recruited from middle and lower middle classes (Babin, 1986). This has also been true in the Latin American countries. The military offers a vehicle to prestige, relative affluence, and possible political power. The officers, being middle class, have tended to be conservative—distrustful of politics, politicians, and political groups. They have consistently been inclined to be highly self-regarding and strongly socialized to their discipline (Wesson, 1986). Much of this is a result of extensive training programs. Training schools are of central importance and training has been a method of keeping officers busy, since there have been few, if any, national missions. Since the last part of the 19th and the early 20th century military schools of all types have proliferated (Wesson, 1986).
Table 10.4 Military Expenditures and Size in Latin America: 1983 and 1993 (in 1993 Constant US$)
| Country | 1983 (in 1993 Constant US$) | 1993 (in 1993 Constant US$) | Change 1983–93 | ||||||||
| ME∗ | ME/capita | ME/CGE∗∗ | Armed forces per 1000 pop | ME∗ | ME/capita | ME/CGE∗∗ | Armed forces per 1000 pop | Change ME/capita | Change size of armed forces | ||
| Argentina | 9202 | 311 | 14.9 | 5.9 | 4251 | 127 | 24.8 | 1.9 | -184 | -4.0 | |
| Bolivia | 52 | 9 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 126 | 17 | 7.6 | 4.2 | 8 | -0.4 | |
| Brazil | 3636 | 28 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 5852 | 37 | NA | 1.9 | 9 | -1.6 | |
| Chile | 911 | 78 | 12.7 | 10.8 | 1002 | 73 | 9.2 | 6.7 | -5 | -4.1 | |
| Colombia | 426 | 15 | 8.4 | 2.5 | 1232 | 35 | NA | 4.0 | 20 | 1.5 | |
| Costa Rica | 35 | 14 | 3 | 2.8 | NA | NA | NA | 2.5 | NA | -0.3 | |
| Cuba | 2082 | 211 | NA | 25.3 | +426 | 39 | NA | 16.0 | -172 | -9.3 | |
| Ecuador | 325 | 39 | 23.3 | 4.7 | 150 | 14 | 7.8 | 5.4 | -25 | 0.7 | |
| El Salvador | +230 | 50 | 22.8 | 6.9 | 100 | 18 | 10.1 | 8.7 | -32 | 1.8 | |
| Guatemala | +177 | 22 | 15.5 | 5.1 | 113 | 11 | 9.5 | 4.2 | -11 | -0.9 | |
| Guyana | 14 | 18 | 5.5 | 9.2 | ∗∗∗∗5 | ∗∗∗∗7 | ∗∗∗∗2.8 | 2.7 | -18 | -6.5 | |
| Haiti | 43 | 8 | 6.1 | 1.5 | +30 | 5 | NA | 1.3 | -3 | -0.2 | |
| Honduras | +57 | 14 | 10.9 | 4.8 | 44 | 8 | 7.6 | 3.3 | -6 | 1.5 | |
| Mexico | +1450 | 20 | 2 | 1.8 | 1656 | 18 | 2.8 | 1.9 | -2 | 0.1 | |
| Nicaragua | +225 | 75 | 15.7 | 15.3 | 37 | 9 | NA | 3.8 | –66 | -11.5 | |
| Panama | 105 | 50 | 5.5 | 4.8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4.3 | -5.0 | -0.5 | |
| Paraguay | 96 | 26 | 17.7 | 4.3 | ∗∗∗119 | ∗∗∗∗24 | ∗∗∗∗8.3 | 3.2 | -26 | -1.1 | |
| Peru | 1876 | 100 | 24.7 | 8.9 | 696 | 30 | 13.3 | 4.8 | -70 | -4.1 | |
| Uruguay | 324 | 109 | 12.4 | 10.1 | +256 | 81 | NA | 7.9 | -28 | -2.2 | |
| Venezuela | 1070 | 68 | 10.4 | 3.6 | 1029 | 51 | 7.8 | 3.7 | -17 | 0.1 | |
| ∗ Military expenditure | |||||||||||
| ∗∗ Military expenditures per capita | |||||||||||
| ∗∗∗ Military expenditures per central government expenditures | |||||||||||
| ∗∗∗∗ 1992 data, 1993 data not available | |||||||||||
| + estimate based on partial or uncertain data | |||||||||||
| NA Data not available | |||||||||||
| SOURCE: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996. “World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1983–1993.” Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office. | |||||||||||
Furthermore, the professionalization of military officers in Latin America has put forward a value system which has encouraged political involvement of the military in state affairs. In Mexico where civil-military relations have been tranquil, the education and professionalization of officers have emphasized a value system which has inhibited the political behavior of officers (Ackroyd, 1991). Stepan’s “new professionalism” model of officer education (1973) distinguishes between those systems that focus on extranational factors, which depoliticize the military by forcing officers to devote study to international war, and those systems whose focus is internal, which teach officers that threats to nations result from inadequate national development. Mexico’s education of officers emphasized the external focus, providing officers with a value system placing the nation above the political efficacy of the military.
Despite its lack of mission, increased isolation, and reduced role in national affairs, the Latin American military has reserved some degree of political power for itself as well as its ability to intervene in national political affairs. Across Latin America there is a spectrum of civil-military relations ranging from what Marcella (1994a) calls “subordination” of the military to civilian authority (as in Colombia, Mexico and the Dominican Republic) to autonomy from civilian control as in Chile, Guatemala and Nicaragua. However, the majority are in transition—Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
With the majority of armed forces making this transition, interstate conflict in decline, reduced budget appropriations, and the decline of security assistance from the U.S., the mission and rationale for maintaining a military in Latin America is of issue. Argentina has coped somewhat with this through its extensive peacekeeping commitment in Bosnia (Marcella, 1994b). However, throughout the region, Latin American countries will need to define a mission that will validate and legitimate the need for armed forces.
Discussion
As Western industrial nations move toward a post-Cold War model, and Latin American (and other developing) nations move toward a post-praetorian model, the two regions have increased participation in multinational military operations other than war. Participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations has become the lingua franca of the international community, and even nations that since World War II have eschewed or been constrained from participation, such as Germany and Japan, have felt obliged to contribute to these efforts. Military forces do not necessarily embrace these operations cheerfully, and the current era has left them with an organizational identity crisis. However, these are the major missions on the cusp of the twenty-first century.
Such multinational missions raise interesting questions regarding civil-military relations. To the extent that many nations still maintain conscript forces, they may find themselves legally, normatively, or constitutionally constrained against using their military personnel outside of their national territories (as France did during the Gulf War), and thus unable to participate in the missions that currently define both the role of the military and the position of the state in the international system. Even if they have volunteer forces, they may find that using their military organizations on missions whose relationship to their own national interest is not clear may lead to a politicization both of their armed forces and the processes by which military deployment decisions are made. Both of these processes have occurred in the United Sates.
Peace operations are inherently political, and the utilization of military personnel on such missions obscures the distinction between that which is military and that which is civilian. Indeed, just as we see civil-military relations in Latin America (and in other developing areas) approximating the traditional Western industrial model, with the military receding from influence, the impact of new missions may be moving civil-military relations in the industrial west (and perhaps in Eastern Europe as well) toward the politicization that has been more characteristic of Latin America.