Katrina Lee-Koo. Australian Journal of International Affairs. Volume 68, Issue 3. June 2014.
Introduction
Australia’s campaign for a 2013-14 temporary United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat was founded in part on the platform that it had a demonstrated commitment ‘to advancing gender equality both at home and abroad’ (Australian Government, 19). The government claimed that its credentials were especially strong with regard to the UN’s work on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This strength, it was argued, was demonstrated through Australia’s international activism on gender issues: a commitment to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and UNSC Resolution 1325; its co-sponsorship of UNSC Resolutions 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009) on sexual violence in armed conflict; and its international aid efforts in promoting women’s role in all peace processes and gender equality. In 2012, this was further reinforced with the launch by the government of its Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018. This 58-page document outlined a whole-of-government approach to implementing UNSC Resolution 1325 and its associated Resolutions in Australia’s domestic and international peace and security work. Contributing to the efforts to promote Australia as both a good international citizen and a strong supporter of the UN, the National Action Plan’s (NAP’s) release reinforced the campaign for the UNSC seat. The purpose of this article is to examine the NAP and efforts to implement it in its first 18 months, a period which has overlapped with the first half of the UNSC term. In doing so, it will investigate whether Australia has so far lived up to its campaign slogan for the UNSC seat—’Australia: We do what we say’.
This article argues that the NAP, like most policy documents, has both strengths and weaknesses which directly impact on its implementation success. The strengths of the plan lie in its rhetorical commitment to the UN’s WPS agenda. The NAP and the early speeches on the issue by Australian representatives to the UN community reflect a good understanding of the challenges faced by men and women in conflict zones, and the importance of including women in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. This discourse also reflects sound principles of women’s rights and equality, and the central role that these issues play in efforts to fulfil the UN’s (Article 1) primary mandate ‘to maintain international peace and security’. In this sense, Australia endorses a global vision of security that recognises an interdependent relationship between women’s rights and the possibilities of a sustainable global security practice. These are all extremely important outcomes that should not be underestimated. This discourse contributes to a growing norm within the UN community of ensuring that gender issues are effectively mainstreamed throughout its work. Although global activism for women’s rights in conflict and peace has a much longer history, this represents a significant achievement in the two decades since commencement of the Beijing Platform for Action. In terms of Australian policy, it is an important step forward in Australia’s thinking on its role in contributing to global security. Recognition of the gendered politics of peace and security will create more sophisticated peace and security policies in Australia’s own operations in its region and abroad. Furthermore, its growing attention to the gendered politics of peace and security may also assist in addressing the difficult cultures of misogyny that exist within pockets of Australia’s Defence establishment.
The primary weakness of the NAP, however, is the failure to date to translate this promising discourse into action. As this article will demonstrate, the stumbling blocks to successful implementation are evident in at least three areas: first, in the bureaucratic difficulties in coordinating a whole-of-government approach; second, in persistent and widespread misperceptions amongst the broader foreign policy and security community as to what the goals and claims of the WPS agenda are; and, finally, in providing a challenge to what Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick has detailed as a culture within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) that includes ‘sexual misconduct, harassment, bullying, victimisation and sexual abuse’.
In order to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of the NAP in its first year, this article draws primarily on three sources. First, the burgeoning feminist research on the WPS agenda provides a rich analysis of the UN’s work on the gendered politics of global peace and security. Second, this article draws on Australian government publications and policies pertaining to the UNSC seat bid, the NAP, and associated peace and security policies. Third, it draws on the pronouncements of policy makers, politicians and members of civil society with regard to these issues. This includes interviews and conversations between the author and Australian government representatives, ADF personnel and members of civil society. These interviews and discussions took place between January 2012 and July 2013, and involved informal conversations, engagement in public forums and formal interviews where a semi-structured interview approach was taken. In all cases, permission has been sought to publish the comments, and the interviews have been approved by the Australian National University’s Human Research Ethics Committee.
Australia, UNSC Resolution 1325, and the UNSC Seat
Australian government representatives uniformly describe Australia as being ‘a proud and long-time supporter of UNSCR [UNSC Resolution] 1325’ (see AusAID). The unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 in 2000 is a landmark moment for the UN and for feminists worldwide. Its goal is to highlight the gendered politics associated with armed conflict and peace, with particular emphasis on the neglect of women in global security practices. It advocates for an understanding that women and men have different experiences of armed conflict and different contributions to make to peace processes. It suggests that, until this is recognised, international efforts to end conflict and build peace will fall short of being complete and sustainable. The Resolution provides a comprehensive foundation for the global WPS project around its four main pillars of prevention of armed conflict, protection from violence, participation at all levels of decision making, and the incorporation of a gender perspective into all policies. Furthermore, it has been the impetus for five supporting UNSC Resolutions on WPS: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013). Four of these Resolutions address issues of sexual violence in armed conflict, while UNSC Resolution 1889 examines the obstacles to women’s involvement in peace processes and requests ‘a set of indicators for use at the global level to track implementation of its [the UNSC’s] resolution 1325’. While all of these Resolutions are not without their critiques (see Skjelsbaek), they nonetheless indicate the UN’s sustained commitment to the WPS agenda.
The successful implementation of the WPS agenda requires the commitment of UN agencies and UN member states. In the words of Felicity Hill, former director of the UN Office of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom: ‘The primary challenge faced by UN departments and specialized agencies is the translation of the statement of principles and commitments outlined in 1325 into the actual, mundane, daily procedures of the United Nations’ (quoted in Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings, 133-134). This requires that military and civilian personnel of member states and UN agencies understand the WPS and are obliged to implement it in their daily operations. Campaigning for such an eventuality began in 2004 and again in 2005 when the president of the UNSC called for UN member states to develop NAPs to implement UNSC Resolution 1325 (see UNSC). To date, there are 41 such plans, with Denmark having been the first country to implement one in 2005. The lobbying for Australia’s NAP was driven by civil society, in particular by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and UNIFEM Australia (now the UN Women National Committee Australia). In August 2011, the Minister for the Status of Women, Kate Ellis, officially launched the consultation draft of the Australian NAP. The UN Women National Committee Australia’s executive director, Julie McKay, noted that ‘Australia has dragged its feet on introducing a NAP’, being the thirty-sixth country to do so and taking over a decade since the passing of UNSC Resolution 1325 to begin the process. While the NAP process was welcomed by civil society advocates, McKay (ibid.) described it as nonetheless ‘disappointing that it has taken so long for us to make any firm moves towards meeting our international obligations regarding women’s peace and security in conflict situations’.
On International Women’s Day in 2012, Australia launched the Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018. The plan contributed to a growing discussion within Australian civil-military circles on how it might consider the gendered politics of conflict, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in its regional engagement programs and military operations abroad. The purpose of the NAP is to provide a roadmap for the Australian government to implement UNSC Resolution 1325 at the national and international levels. The plan deals with five areas—prevention, participation, protection, relief and recovery—and incorporates a gender perspective. It cross-cuts five strategies designed to mainstream the WPS agenda into all areas of the government’s peace and security work. These strategies are, first, to integrate a gender perspective into Australia’s peace and security policies and, second, to embed the WPS agenda into the government’s human resource management of defence, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and deployed personnel. Third, the NAP calls for the government to support civil societies which are working in this area and, fourth, it seeks to promote the WPS agenda internationally. Finally, it seeks to take a coordinated and holistic approach to WPS both domestically and internationally. The plan was initially coordinated by the Office for Women within the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs. It adopts a whole-of-government approach, which divides responsibilities for implementation between Australia’s relevant peace and security institutions and agencies: the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defence, AFP, Australian Agency for International Development, Australian Civil Military Centre and Attorney-General’s Department.
Analysing Australia’s NAP
As a policy document, the NAP has a number of strengths. One of these strengths is the connections that it makes between gender politics and peace and security. A central goal of the early architects of UNSC Resolution 1325 was to create clear links between women’s rights and the possibilities for global peace and security. It is for this reason that efforts were made to connect women’s experiences of armed conflict with the work of the UNSC in particular (Cook, 127-131). This is part of a much broader project to mainstream gender issues into all areas of the UN’s work (see Moser and Moser). Importantly, the Australian discourse recognises the central connections between gender equality and peace. Australia’s UNSC seat candidacy brochure states that:
Involving women in ways to resolve conflicts is not just an exercise in gender equality, it is a key strategy to improve the chances of peace and development. The more involved women are in the peace process as peacebuilders, the greater the likelihood of lasting peace and development (Australian Government, 19).
This is also recognised in the NAP, which argues that: ‘Notably, equality between men and women is also a pre-requisite for sustainable peace, security and development’ (FaHCSIA, 7).
In this sense, the NAP advocates a sophisticated understanding of the gender politics of armed conflict. It avoids many of the common or romanticised stereotypes regarding women’s experiences in war and their connections to peace. For instance, it is at pains to acknowledge that ‘women are not a homogenous [sic] group’ (FaHCSIA, 6). It notes that age, physical abilities, ethnicity, religion and cultural backgrounds can all shape women’s experiences and capacities in conflict and peace processes. Second, it is careful to avoid the presentation of women as only ever victims of conflict, pointing out that while the protection of women in conflict is an important agenda, women ‘are also active agents in perpetuating conflict and building peace’ (7). Third, the NAP is tempered in its discussion of sexual and gender-based violence. It notes that there are various forms of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls beyond rape, which include forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, genital mutilation, and forced abortion and sterilisation (6). Furthermore, it notes that not all gender-based violence is sexualised, and that women and girls experience conflict in ways that affect their ‘physical and mental health, well-being and economic security’ (ibid.). Fourth, the plan recognises that gender-based violence affects men and boys as well as women and girls, and that it is problematic to equate gender with women. On this point, the NAP explains that women’s experiences in conflict are often a product of socially constructed gendered relations that see women disadvantaged in society (see Leatherman, 116-148; True), noting that: ‘women and girls rarely have the same resources, political rights, authority or control over their environment in the same way that men and boys do, and this is exacerbated in times of armed conflict’ (FaHCSIA, 7). Finally, this points to an understanding that the transformative capacity of UNSC Resolution 1325 lies in its ability to reshape socially constructed gendered relations in societies beset with conflict. In this sense, there is a role for both men and women in ensuring that gender equality is achieved. Moreover, there are benefits to both men and women in terms of sustainable peace and security. The NAP states that:
The benefits of advancing gender equality are far reaching and operate on a number of levels. Gender equality is essential for ensuring that women and girls’ needs are met and human rights are protected, in times of both peace and conflict. It enables men to break away from often limiting and rigid gender roles and expectations of masculinity, which can be amplified in conflict-affected settings. It helps communities to raise healthier, better educated children and enhances countries’ economic prosperity (ibid.).
The language of the NAP reflects the intent of UNSC Resolution 1325’s architects (see Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings). It also challenges the problematic and simplistic conceptualisations of gender and gender politics that have emerged around 1325 debates and discourses (see Shepherd).
While the NAP’s analysis of the problem is comprehensive, there are a number of technical deficiencies with the plan that have so far stifled its implementation. The first of these is the housing and the coordination responsibilities of the plan. Implementation requires a whole-of-government effort, but the effort was originally coordinated by the Office for Women, which at that time was located within the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs. This in itself implies a conceptualisation of UNSC Resolution 1325 as being predominantly about women rather than gender issues, and predominantly about social inclusion rather than about global peace and security. The Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (which was restructured under the Abbott government as the Department of Social Services) described itself as a department dedicated to building ‘a strong and fair society for all Australians … by collaboratively developing and implementing excellent social policy’ (FaHCSIA). Indeed, the housing of this role was the consequence of much debate, as the Office for Women has rarely invested itself in foreign policy concerns. Furthermore, outside the traditional group of security institutions, the Office for Women has little authority over the key implementing departments such as Foreign Affairs, Defence or the AFP, whose budget, resources and government influence are far greater. One government representative explained:
other departments didn’t want the bother of the report—it would tarnish their ‘tough guy’ image—so the Office for Women drew the short straw even though it has very little control over what happens on deployment or capacity to direct other agencies (Interview, February 28, 2013).
In a similar vein, McKay explains that: ‘The NAP currently sits within the responsibility of the Office for Women for coordination which faces the challenges of being under-resourced and continually de-funded by Governments of all stripes’. Initial suggestions that the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet should coordinate the NAP, having more gravitas, resources, experience and the mandate to do so, were originally rejected. In September 2013, however, under the new Abbott government, the Office for Women moved into the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. While this provides some of the opportunities previously lacking in the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, the move also saw the loss of the dedicated Minister for Women and is instead led by the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women. Furthermore, while the Office for Women now highlights ‘international engagement’ as one of its six priorities, it does not focus on the NAP or on UNSC Resolution 1325 in its UN work (see PM&C).
A coordinated whole-of-government implementation of the NAP has faced further challenges. In part, this is because individual departments have yet to demonstrate significant commitment to implementing the entirety of the plan. This is evident in a number of areas: departments have not developed their own programs to implement the plan; few have appointed or advertised a contact person who is the focal point for the plan; departments have not received or allocated funding to implement the plan; some departments have chosen to implement only certain elements of the plan; and most departments have not been proactive in sharing information with other departments or civil society. In addition, government departments have not set themselves targets or time frames against their responsibilities to the NAP, at least not ones that have been publicly communicated. Instead, it has been largely the responsibility of individual entrepreneurs or gender champions within organisations to raise awareness of the plan and their department’s responsibilities in relation to it (Interview, April 23, 2013). This was evident at the first Annual Civil Society Dialogue on Women, Peace and Security, held at the Australian National University on April 15, 2013. Designed in part as a forum whereby government departments could communicate with each other and with civil society on their efforts to implement the NAP in its first year, it became clear that many government representatives were only peripherally aware of the plan (see also Rhiannon), choosing instead to focus their comments on what their department was doing generally in terms of gender-mainstreaming, gender awareness or the recruitment, retention and promotion of women within their organisation. While these points are related to the NAP, they do not speak specifically to all of the strategies or action points outlined in the NAP document (FaHCSIA, 21-25). This deficiency points to a concerning trend regarding implementation of the plan and communication with civil society—two of the key strategies of the NAP.
Unlike other NAPs, the monitoring and evaluation framework of the Australian plan does not set targets. This is a major weakness. Instead, the plan has a ‘report-back’ system to federal parliament every two years. This involves both qualitative and quantitative reporting components. In the first instance, agencies and departments are required to ‘describe’ the work that they do in response to the five strategies. For example, against Strategy 4—to promote the WPS agenda internationally—the Department of Defence is asked to provide a ‘description of the international assistance provided for activities pertaining to Women, Peace and Security’, the ‘institution-building strategies Australia has been involved in’, and its ‘initiatives to contribute to the development of best practice guidance on issues relating to Women, Peace and Security’ (FaHCSIA, 29). The second monitoring and evaluation mechanism is a quantitative requirement: it asks departments to list the number of personnel involved in, or activities undertaken in support of, WPS. For instance, in Strategy 2’s goal to embed the WPS agenda into the government’s approach to human resource management, the AFP is required to list the number of deployed personnel who have received WPS training; provide sex- and level-disaggregated data on all staff, including staff deployed to conflict and post-conflict zones; and report the number of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by employees (FaHCSIA, 28).
This monitoring and evaluation framework has a number of shortcomings. In terms of its evaluation of qualitative operations, it simply requires departments to describe their activities. In doing so, it does not provide for evaluation of whether those activities are sufficient in number or if they demonstrate that they have had a significant, positive or sustainable impact on organisations or post-conflict zones. In this sense, there is no requirement, for instance, to ensure that local women’s participation in peace processes is meaningful or builds the capacity for women to be politically transformative (Lee-Koo, 46-50). Similarly, the quantitative measures set neither aspirational nor actual targets for departments. For instance, in terms of presenting the gender-disaggregated data for overseas deployment, there is no requirement in the monitoring and evaluation framework to have increased the number of women deployed by a particular amount, or to justify limited or lack of significant progress. Finally, in both the quantitative and qualitative measuring, there are no sanctions for a failure to improve either policy or numbers. The issue of targets and time frames has been a sticking point between civil society and the government. As McKay explains, it ‘currently lacks clear targets, timeframes or indicators, all of which are crucial to ensuring that the NAP would be effectively implemented and measured’.
There is provision in the monitoring and evaluation framework for relevant departments to report on the number and percentage of staff who have received WPS training (FaHCSIA, 21). However, despite the sophisticated account of gender politics given in the NAP itself, information on the ground about the purpose and goals of the WPS agenda remains poor. This is the case even for those who are aware of the NAP within the militarised communities of the ADF and the AFP. In eight interviews and ongoing discussions undertaken between January 2012 and July 2013 with male and female current and former members of the ADF and AFP, it became clear to the author that few were aware of the more complex nuances of the gendered politics pertaining to conflict zones. There was nonetheless significant, but not unanimous, support for the WPS agenda among members of this group. Yet, many understood the WPS agenda as being primarily about protecting (local) women in conflict zones and increasing the number of women in their own organisations. Within these two priority areas, mainstream accounts of race and gender remained largely unchallenged. For military and police personnel, the discussion on protection (from both men and women) was largely paternal. Most of the Australian personnel interviewed for this project had been on deployment in the Pacific and their attitudes towards local women in conflict/post-conflict societies were sympathetic, but paternalistic, speaking of women’s vulnerabilities, weaknesses and poverty. The major theme of these discussions was the inability of women to protect themselves from physical violence, which largely came in the form of domestic violence (see AusAID). Based on this evidence, many had formed a strong biological-determinist attitude towards gendered identities. One former AFP member spoke confidently about what men and women in Papua New Guinea were like:
The men still see themselves as tribal warriors and take their frustrations at their poverty and lack of development and status out on the women. The women are uneducated and have no opportunity to leave to make a better life for themselves and their children (Interview, March 20, 2012).
Australians scripted themselves into a protector role for local women, based on gender and race dynamics. In this representation of Australia’s role, Australia becomes the masculine protector—economically developed, capable, professional and required to assist the undeveloped, weak and dishevelled nations to its north. This was particularly the case with those who had spent time in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, where there is a much older discourse of Australian masculine protection and paternalism (Fry).
The focus on the protection agenda within the WPS program has been at the expense of the issue of participation, particularly local women’s participation. Among those interviewed, it was clear that militarised organisations in particular have developed a narrow interpretation of their responsibility to facilitate the participation of local women in post-conflict settings. The NAP describes the obligation to ensure women’s participation as ‘working with international partners to empower local women to be involved in formal peace and security processes’ (FaHCSIA, 17). One ADF contact explained that participation meant protecting women so that they could attend meetings. When I asked whether they thought that women could use that presence to be politically transformative, they responded: ‘That’s up to them. I don’t see it as my job to tell them what to say!’ (Interview, April 17, 2012). In this sense, the participation mandate is interpreted narrowly as safeguarding women’s safety in attending meetings or ensuring that village halls or meeting spaces are made available to women’s groups. However, the issue of participation is essentially detached from notions of agency or political transformation (Shepherd, 509).
Alternatively, the NAP does have a strong focus on increasing the participation of Australian women in peace and security activities—whether it be on deployment or in leadership and management roles. It is important to recognise that the release of the NAP coincided with increasing public debate about Australia’s Defence culture, particularly with regard to its attitude towards women. The ADF is one of the key implementing institutions of the NAP, but seeks to do so while simultaneously attempting to address violence and discrimination against women within its own ranks. Whilst gender-based misconduct and abuse claims have bedecked the ADF’s history with little resolution, a number of recently revealed scandals led the Minister for Defence to launch a major inquiry into Defence culture in Australia. The 2011 so-called ‘Skype scandal’ involving the transmission over Skype of a sexual encounter between a male and a female Australian Defence Force Academy cadet without the woman’s consent was one of the triggers for a series of reviews into Defence and ADF culture. The reviews investigated a range of issues such as personal conduct, the use of alcohol, sexual and other forms of abuse, the use of social media by Defence personnel, and employment pathways for women. Importantly, a review led by federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick into the treatment of women at the Australian Defence Force Academy and in the ADF more broadly identified what could be described as pockets of misogynist behaviour within the military establishment. Such behaviour not only facilitated violence against women, but also influenced structures and processes that precluded women from seeking redress or justice for crimes committed against them. The resulting 2012 Pathways to Change report offers over 130 recommendations for the department (Department of Defence).
The implementation of the Pathways to Change report cannot be disentangled from the NAP. Successful implementation of the NAP requires an understanding of and commitment to the principles of gender equality, particularly among personnel who are deployed abroad and frequently in contact with local civilians. Thus, there has been a strong focus within the Defence community on linking the NAP with the Pathways to Change program to create a sturdier platform on which to promote women’s roles in the ADF. To this end, there has been a commitment to recruit women into the ADF, including the release of an ‘Action Plan on the Recruitment and Retention of Women’ and the September 2011 removal of gender restrictions from combat roles. While there is clearly an overlap between the Pathways to Change program and Strategy 2 of the NAP, it is important, however, that the two are not conflated. It is undeniable that confronting and changing Defence culture is essential: gender equality within the ADF is the first principle in terms of its capacity to promote the WPS agenda. However, it is not the last step. The NAP has a much broader agenda, which includes the participation of local women in peace processes and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective across the breadth of Australia’s peace and security work. For these reasons, it should not be seen solely as a platform for internal departmental reform, but also as a means to connect this agenda with a much broader, global approach.
Promoting the NAP Through the UNSC Seat
In the early days of the NAP, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade intended to fulfil Strategy 4 (to promote the WPS agenda internationally) through strong advocacy of the WPS agenda during Australia’s 2013-14 UNSC term. According to the Australian Ambassador to NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Duncan Lewis: ‘Our upcoming memberships in the UN Security Council and the UN Women Executive Board … are opportunities for Australia to further strengthen our commitment to women’s empowerment, both domestically and internationally’. Indeed, civil society and advocates within the government pushed for the WPS agenda to be a strong focal point of Australia’s first presidency of the UNSC in September 2013. An announcement that this lobbying had been successful was made on June 26, 2013, when Foreign Minister Bob Carr stated: ‘A key priority for Australia on the Council—particularly during our Presidency in September—will be to highlight the important leadership role women can play in ensuring long-lasting peace in fragile post-conflict societies’. The same day, the UN Women National Committee Australia celebrated the decision, observing that the ‘Foreign Affairs Minister confirms Australia will use its Presidency in September to highlight the leadership role of women in peace and conflict situations’. The decision to focus on women’s leadership and participation in peacebuilding is an important balance to previous UNSC work, which has focused heavily on the prevention of sexual violence against women in armed conflict. For instance, the UK presidency of the UNSC in June 2013 focused on issues of impunity and justice in relation to crimes of sexual violence in armed conflict (UNSC), and hosted an open debate on the topic, which produced UNSC Resolution 2106. Australia’s contribution to this ongoing discussion in the UNSC would do much to ensure continued momentum for the WPS agenda, and facilitate the breadth of discussion to include women’s roles as leaders and agents of peace.
Disappointingly, Australia backed away from its commitments just prior to assuming its September presidency. WPS advocates hoped that Australia would use the presidency, as the UK has done, to host an open debate on the topic of promoting women’s roles in peacebuilding that might lead to a dedicated Resolution, or to make a strong representation on the issue in a presidential statement. In August 2013, however, the Guardian newspaper reported that: ‘Australia’s upcoming Security Council Presidency has already been tarnished by the government’s broken promises to women and girls’ (Rhiannon). It became clear on the eve of the presidency that the Rudd Labor government would choose instead to hold a series of side events on the WPS issue, rather than address the issue directly in the UNSC. These events included hosting a meeting between civil society, field practitioners, and peacebuilding and gender experts working with UNSC delegations. They also included the launching of a report entitled Women Building Peace by the London-based non-governmental organisation Conciliation Resources. While these events are welcome, they fell far short of the efforts anticipated in Carr’s June promise.
Conclusion
The NAP holds much promise for Australia’s implementation of the UN’s WPS agenda. However, its first few years have faced a number of stumbling blocks. First, better efforts need to be made towards ensuring that the NAP does enjoy a whole-of-government approach. McKay explains that: ‘For a NAP to be successful it needs to be prioritised on the Government agenda across all portfolios’. More than this, it needs to be a coordinated priority, and implementing departments need to develop clearly articulated and publicly communicated strategies for their own implementation frameworks. Second, there needs to be greater awareness and understanding not just of the NAP, but also of the principles that underpin the WPS agenda. This is the foundation for ensuring that gender issues are streamlined throughout peace and security work, and that programs designed to ensure WPS commitments are meaningful and effective. This may also go some way to addressing the pockets of Defence culture which embody the antithesis of gender equality. Finally, Australia needs to do better in fulfilling its commitment to promoting the WPS agenda internationally. The September 2013 presidency was a missed opportunity. Rhiannon argues that unless attitudes and practices towards the implementation of the NAP change, ‘the real world impact will be zero and Australia will have failed to live up to its international responsibilities to protect women and girls and to honour one of the reasons that it sits in the UN Security Council’. This is not an opportunity that Australia should miss.