Christopher A D Charles & Danny Roberts. Round Table. Volume 108, Issue 3. June 2019.
Introduction
Donald Trump’s victory over his rival Hillary Clinton in the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States (US) stunned academics, pollsters, the media, political commentators and the Americans who voted for Clinton. Trump survived repeatedly after breaking all the political rules and conventions during the campaign Trump’s victory also shocked people in many countries including Commonwealth Caribbean countries where many citizens are desirous of living in the US and receive remittances from their relatives residing there. Moreover, America’s foreign policy in the region, driven by its national interests, influences the domestic and foreign policies pursued by Caribbean governments. Therefore, President Trump’s ‘America first’ ideology begs the question of what are the likely effects of the Trump Presidency on the small dependent developing states of the Commonwealth Caribbean. This article assesses some of the likely effects of President Trump’s domestic and foreign policies will have on the Anglophone Caribbean. The Anglophone Caribbean here refers to the English-speaking members of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), which excludes French-speaking member Haiti, and Cuba with its observer status. However, a few comments will be made about Cuba and Haiti insofar as America’s foreign policy towards these countries impacts or influences CARICOM.
The article commences with a brief discussion of the notion of national interests, which is used to frame the study. A synopsis of some exemplars of American foreign policy driven by its national interests in the Commonwealth Caribbean follows and it ends with a discussion of some of the ways in which the Trump Presidency is likely to impact the Anglophone Caribbean.
National Interests
National interest is a tangible common good which states project in their foreign policies, some using power politics (Morgenthau). Clinton (p. 50) makes the case for the continued use of the national interests concept by cogently arguing that it is for the good of the group:
A large group … with common standards of political ethics, with ties of mutual respect and appreciation (not only coinciding interests) binding its members together, and with a real common good that in the long run benefits all those within the group, in their role as members of the whole, if not always in their capacity as members of the subgroup
Clinton (p. 53) argues, further, that ‘the society as a whole is granted a reality other than that of the sum of its contending parts, then it becomes difficult to deny that the group defined by the society has its interests.’ The political context of this national interest should be taken into account if one is to grasp the concept in terms of its specific goal, its appeal to emotions, the accompanying right to make a moral judgement and laying the basis for foreign policy action (Morgenthau; Navari). Therefore, national interests simultaneously define a nation’s identity and threaten the order and stability of the international system. These issues that citizens of nations are willing to die for are enduring and fundamental. However, it should be noted that the security of a nation is much more than dealing with the traditional threats (Liotta).
National interests can be seen as objective, which means they are permanent and guided by power politics. Scholars who view national interests as subjective argue that it involves values other than power such as human rights and freedom from disease and so on. Moreover, the subjectivity of national interests is evident in the fact there are competing national interests in all nations. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the system to achieve what it considers valuable. Therefore, the nation’s prerogative is the achievement of national needs so it is objective in this sense because there are tangible national needs and interests. It should be noted that statesmen sometimes in statecraft conflate interests with passion (Kaplan). Although foreign policy is made best when national interests are unambiguously defined and articulated, statesmen are not always precise in how they define national interests. Some of these statesmen take a middle ground between the objective and subjective definitions of national interests (Miskel). A counterview suggests that in the case of the United States, national interests are not vague because they are longstanding and pervasive abstract principles that are etched in its constitution. Moreover, security strategies are not just expressions of national interests but presidential declarations, policy aims and means to achieve ends. Also, some of these policies continue across presidential administrations because national interests are enduring (Liotta).
However, America’s power (driven by its national interests) is waning in the post-Cold War international system because states politely listen to American demands and then continue, undeterred, on their chosen foreign policy path. The United States no longer exerts its resources as it did during the Cold War when it pursued the containment of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, there is a gap between American power and American influence because it has moved from its power politics phase of expending resources externally to the phase of hegemony where it uses its power to attract. Despite the benefits of this power to attract, this soft power is contingent on the willingness of countries to send their goods, children and money, among other things, to the United States. The relative American move from hard to soft power in many instances in the post-Cold War era is symptomatic of the erosion of its national interests (Huntington). The interpretation of national interests is crucial because this determines how policy makers act (Nincic). President Trump feels that the United States has been taken advantage of in international affairs. For example, he has asked America’s European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to take on a larger share of the funding of the organization. President Trump interprets America’s national interests in a way that counters how previous American presidents viewed America’s financial contribution to NATO as vital to the country’s national security interests. Trump, and conservatives generally, view the perceived erosion of America’s national interest as a threat to American national identity. The president’s populist thrust to power in 2016 signalled the rebirth of foreign policy nationalism in the United States (Carpenter) which may be a threat to Caribbean relations with the United States, especially since the Americans have, in the past, used power politics and big stick diplomacy to exert their influence in the region.
The United States in the Caribbean
The US defence of its national interests in the Caribbean was evident in the blockading of Soviet ships from reaching Cuba in 1962 to prevent the development of nuclear weapons on its door step. Although Cuba is not a part of the Anglophone Caribbean, the blockade that brought the world close to experiencing a nuclear war was a potent message to Caribbean governments of the United States’ willingness to use force to defend its strategic national interests in the Caribbean (Dobbs). Therefore, the United States was hostile to the democratic socialist government of Michael Manley during the 1970s in Jamaica because of its close relationship with Cuba. The Manley led People’s National Party Government was defeated by the Edward Seaga led Jamaica Labour Party in the 1980 General Election. Hundreds of Jamaicans were killed in political violence during that campaign as Cold War rivalry unfolded in Jamaica (Kaufman).
The regional security system (RSS) was developed in 1982 in the Eastern Caribbean with the support of the US to bolster stability in several countries and sub-regional security. The states in the RSS became willing accomplices in the American invasion of Grenada a year later. The infighting in the Marxist New Jewel Movement (NJM) in Grenada in 1983 which led to the assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, was used by the US as a pretext for its military to invade Grenada, on the ‘invitation’ of the Governor General, and overthrow the NJM and restore the status quo of liberal democracy (Lewis).
Moving closer to the present, the US imposed the Shiprider Agreement in 1998 on governments because it was concerned about the flow of illegal drugs reaching its shores from Latin America through the Caribbean. The agreement stipulated that American law enforcement had the authority to board certain ships in the territorial waters of respective Caribbean states to combat the trafficking in illegal drugs by sea. Caribbean governments knew they would face devastating economic sanctions if they resisted America’s violation of their sovereignty in support of its national security interests (Vasciannie). The US also publishes annual reports on the human rights and human trafficking record of Caribbean states. Caribbean governments, over time, have aligned their domestic policies in keeping with America’s foreign policy preferences on these issues (Department of State). The American Government also actively uses the Mutual Assistance Treaties it has signed with Caribbean governments to request the extradition of drug lords of various Caribbean states who export illegal drugs to the US (Lewis)
The American Government also diffused the free trade ideology in the region in support of market-led development, which was why it opposed the democratic socialist and communist governments mentioned earlier. The international technical bureaucracies like the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially the latter, in which the Americans are dominant, espouse capitalist development. The IMF has provided balance of payment support with a dictated agreement for countries in the region such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana among others through the disbursement of loans in tranches after the governments pass various tests guided by free market dogma. The governments of Caribbean states and other developing countries know that if their economies require balance of payment support and they refuse to pursue the free market ‘solutions’ of the IMF, they will be denied access to much-needed capital in the international financial markets (Bartilow). However, it should be noted that the Caribbean political elite would not refuse IMF support because they have internalised the free market ideology of Capitalism led by the US.
The foregoing exemplars of American foreign policy in the Anglophone Caribbean provide a useful contextual background to understand some of the possible effects of President Trump’s domestic and foreign policies on the region in several critical issue areas. Some of these are tourism, trade, climate change, the deportation of illegal immigrants, taxing of remittances, Caribbean integration and development assistance to the region.
Trump Politics and the Commonwealth Caribbean
The Tourism Industry
The Tourism industry comprises a large part of the economy of many Caribbean states notwithstanding the mining and manufacturing industries in the larger countries like Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. The importance of the industry has led to a concerted effort by Caribbean governments to market the English-speaking Caribbean as one destination. The fortunes of the tourism market in the Anglophone Caribbean will be closely tied to President Trump’s review of President Barak Obama’s Cuban policy. Long before the Obama Administration’s overtures to the Cuban Government, Caribbean tourism interests were worried that improvement in US-Cuba relations would see Americans flocking the resorts of Cuba to the detriment of the tourism products of CARICOM states (CARICOM).
Tourists’ arrivals in Cuba grew by 15 per cent in January and February of 2017 according to the country’s Ministry of Tourism. Several factors accounted for this growth such as the gradual opening up of travel links between the US and Cuba, which was a consequence of the partial rapprochement between the two countries under President Barack Obama. There was also a stronger marketing campaign by tour operators and airport improvements by the government. Moreover, the government also made the effort to boost the quality of services provided to visitors. The arrival figure in 2018 was 1.3 per cent above the previous year.
However, in early February 2017, the US announced that a ‘full review’ of its foreign policy with Cuba would be undertaken, with the results likely to be known shortly. Trump’s view on Cuba has flipped-flopped over time, but some important changes have already taken place in relations, perhaps making it harder for a significant reversal of the policy to occur. For example, a Miami-based cruise line has started to sail to several Cuban ports and commercial airlines are flying from several US cities to Cuba. In addition, the Marriot has entered into a joint venture to manage a number of Cuban hotels. Commercial links, more broadly, are also growing (Whitefield). Despite the growth of tourist arrivals in Cuba in 2018, the Trump Administration’s continued hostility to Cuba has reversed many of the foreign policy gains Cuba experienced with the Obama Administration.
For the Caribbean as a whole, better US-Cuban relations going forward would be a very welcome development. Caribbean leaders have long called for Cuba to be brought in from the cold of the American trade embargo. Yet, the Caribbean tourist industry has been competitive, rather than cooperative for many years, but with Cuba likely to attract more US visitors in the future and signs of a slow-down elsewhere, CARICOM leaders and the tourism lobby are starting to think about advancing a regional tourism agenda beyond the Anglophone Caribbean to include Cuba.
Plans for a more coherent regional approach to tourism were presented at the CARICOM heads of government meeting held in mid-February 2017. Several measures were proposed including the establishment of an interim Tourism Working Group to bring together key stakeholders to develop responses to the challenges facing the sector. The planning of a pilot public relations and marketing campaign for 2017–2018 for the entire region was slated for consideration at the next CARICOM meeting. A meeting was also held to discuss air transportation issues related to the tourism sector. There were also plans for more regional marketing of the eco-tourism destinations in Suriname, Guyana and Belize.
Although Cuba was not part of this meeting, talks were held in late January 2017 between CARICOM and Cuba, where exploratory discussions on trade in services took place. Both sides agreed to exchange information and attempt to deepen co-operation in this area, particularly in regard to tourism. By undertaking this twin-track approach CARICOM hoped to strengthen its own position in the tourism market; better coordinate tourism links with Cuba; and lock Cuba more broadly into the Caribbean mainstream at a time when the government in Havana was unsure which way relations with the US would turn.
This foreign policy move towards Cuba was a crucial CARICOM strategy. American presidents regard the country’s national interests based on their perception of America’s role in the global system. If a democratic president inherits the post-Trump White House, it is likely that there will be a return to friendly relations with Cuba and the country having a competing tourism policy, which would do more harm than good to the tourism industry in Anglophone Caribbean states. Therefore, it is in the economic interest of CARICOM countries to cooperate with Cuba on Caribbean tourism rather than compete with it (Caribbean360). The 2018 CARICOM heads of government meeting was held in Jamaica and regional tourism and its marketing was again given priority treatment.
CARCIOM has moved in this direction because the Republican right and the Cuban-American lobby continue to be hostile to communist Cuba despite the reforms that the Cuban Government has undertaken. These conservative groups are the key supporters of President Trump, driving the foreign policy reversals towards Cuba. President Trump, given his domestic and foreign policy failures to repeal Obama Care (The Affordable Care Act) and to impose a comprehensive travel ban on residents from six Muslim countries, among other polices, cannot ignore his conservative base which is against continued friendly relations with Cuba. Therefore, President Trump’s hostility towards Cuba is a response to the concerns and demands of key domestic interests that in turn have impacted how CARICOM responds to an industry of critical importance to the region. The important issue area of trade relations is discussed next.
Trade Relations
US-Caribbean trade relations may suffer as a consequence of Trump’s America first rhetoric, which was another major campaign promise. Before taking office and since President Trump has heavily criticised various trade arrangements including the North American Free Trade Agreement. CARICOM (except Suriname) has its own agreement with the United States – the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) (later enhanced by the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act). There has been little discussion of the CBERA by the Trump Administration, but it may well be viewed more positively as it is an agreement that benefits the US economic interests. In other words, it would seem to fit in with Trump’s ‘America first’ approach because CBERA provides a healthy balance of trade surplus for the US. In 2015 it amounted to US$4.2 billion a move up from US$3.2 billion the previous year (US International Trade Commission).
However, one potential threat to this trade relationship is the continuing concern over the withdrawal of corresponding banking relations (CBRs) from Caribbean banks by US banks. CBRs facilitate several payment systems, including for international trade. Over the last few years some large international banks, including those based in the US, have ended or restricted CBRs with banks in the Caribbean, including Belize and Jamaica. These relationships continued to be uneven across the Caribbean in 2018. These measures have been enacted to reduce exposure to risks associated with money-laundering and terrorist financing. The process known as ‘de-risking’ could have very negative impacts on Caribbean trade and the economy more generally if it continues. It would prevent CARICOM importers from paying for US goods and services. It is not clear whether the US government will do anything to encourage further de-risking, but, in a sign of concern, the Board of Directors of the Caribbean Development Bank approved (in mid-March 2017) funding of US$250,000 to strengthen financial transparency, and assist in preventing the loss of CBRs in the region (Jamaica Observer). The thrust to improve financial transparency continued in 2018.
Three other related economic issues are a reduction in corporation tax, the Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act (FATCA) and reparation of overseas funds. President Trump, in relation to the reduction in corporation tax, has promised to lower corporation tax to 15 per cent, and this could undercut the attractiveness of tax rates in some Caribbean countries, and reduce investment in these states. The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has, for several years now, requested that banks in the Caribbean verify if their clients are US citizens because they have to report to the IRS the US citizens who are account holders for tax purposes. President Trump has not spoken about this policy publicly but it is in keeping with his ‘America first’ rhetoric and is likely to continue. Therefore, Caribbean banks will continue to lose revenue because there is an economic cost attached to the reporting requirements. There are also plans to repatriate a significant amount of funds from abroad, which, if successful, would reduce the amount of US assets held in the Caribbean offshore sector.
The CBERA, CBRs, the reduction in corporation tax, FATCA and the repatriation of overseas funds reiterates that the US is fixated on its national interests in dealing with Caribbean states in the context on its free market ethos, and operates in this context to increase the growth of the American economy and by extension its entrepreneurs at the expense of the economies of these small dependent states (Sanders). The likely negative impacts of these foreign policies on the Caribbean suggest that despite the friendly and compliant relations that CARICOM states have with the US over the many decades since receiving their independence from Britain, the US has no permanent allies in the Caribbean but only permanent national interests. This sobering power position is also evident in the Trump Administration’s position on climate change.
Climate Change
President Barack Obama not only articulated commitments and implemented policies to protect the environment and deal with the impact of climate change but the US Government also signed the Paris Agreement in 2015. The Trump Administration is starting to roll back previous efforts to address climate change and the American Government’s contribution to it. This policy change, which is evident in the lack of support for the Paris Agreement in 2017, is another example of how US foreign policy sometimes varies based on who occupies the White House (Shear).
The effects of increasing global warming on the small vulnerable developing states of the Caribbean arising from Trump’s retreat from the Paris Agreement is a serious cause for concern. The US will likely increase its emission of greenhouse gasses because the president tweeted against the agreement and the US did not sign the new Paris Agreement. This dramatic shift in foreign policy may influence some states that signed the agreement to also renege on their commitment to decrease emissions. The continued increase in global temperature will continue to melt the glaciers in the Arctic leading to a greater rise in sea level. Climate change will tremendously impact these island states, especially their beaches and resorts that are critically important economic assets. Global warming will lead to coral bleaching which undermines the development of barrier reefs to protect the coastline and beaches of the Caribbean from erosion. The rise in temperature will also continue to influence frequent development of powerful hurricanes leading to loss of lives, disruption of the economies and the destruction of crops and critical infrastructure (Taylor).
This new American foreign policy position on climate change is an excellent example of the America first policy. The Trump Administration went against decades of scientific research and international consensus about the need to curb climate change. The administration took this position in order to support the Republican business interests, who argue that global warming is fake news. Moreover, curbing the global warming ‘myth’ restricts entrepreneurial activities and profits that drive economic growth. This policy position also reveals that the United States has competing national interests because the green lobby, which largely supported President Obama on the Paris Agreement, argues that preserving the environment leads to sustainable economic growth and long term profits. The controversial policies of President Trump also involve undocumented immigrants.
Deportation of Undocumented Immigrants
The Caribbean is a region of migrants. Many citizens continue to migrate overseas for a better life, preferably to England, Canada and the US, more so the latter. President Trump railed against immigrants during the presidential campaign and has largely failed (because of a court order) to implement his promised travel ban on the residents from six Muslim countries as mentioned earlier. However, President Trump has signed several executive orders aimed at increasing the pace of deportations of illegal immigrants. Caribbean nationals residing in the US illegally will certainly be affected. Specifically, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was mandated by the White House to take tougher actions against illegal immigrants.
Deportation of Caribbean nationals from the United States has been the chagrin of many Caribbean governments over the years. These governments argue that many of these nationals left for the US as children and many do not have any relatives in the home country so deporting them is unjust. Moreover, many of these governments have accused the deportees of significantly increasing the crime rate of the home country. Therefore, the anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies of President Trump that also target illegals have sent a ripple effect of fear throughout the Caribbean community at home and abroad. Large numbers of deportations will place the receiving countries under great pressure because the respective governments will be tasked with providing training, and finding jobs and housing for possibly large numbers of returnees in order to reintegrate them in society (Charles).
President Trump is adamant that he needs $5 billion from Congress to build the wall along the southern border with Mexico (fulfil his campaign promise) to close the open borders and stop illegal immigration from Latin America. Congress has refused to fund the wall so Trump, between December 2018 and late January shut down the government for almost two months, which is the longest government shutdown in American history. This shutdown affected consular and other diplomatic services in the Caribbean region and delayed grants and technical assistance in the foreign policy pipeline.
Large-scale deportations of illegal immigrants by the Trump Administration would fulfil a campaign promise of the president and further endear him to his working class supporters. Saving American jobs was another major campaign promise of President Trump. Many working class Americans, including Trump’s supporters, believe that immigrants are getting American jobs at the expense of Americans, another plug for the border wall. However, the fact is that immigrants who accept working class jobs tend to get the jobs that American refuse to do. These immigrants take any job they can get because they have to send remittances to take care of their relatives in the home country.
Tax on Remittances to Build the Border Wall
Latinos, in general, and Mexicans in particular, who President Trump called ‘rapists’ also came under attack with his anti-immigrant rhetoric during the 2016 presidential campaign. The message was that these immigrants were criminals. President Trump stated that the Mexican Government would have to pay for the construction of the border wall mentioned earlier. Although this stance angered the Mexican Government and populace, President Trump visited Mexico during the campaign and met with President Enrique Nieto. Trump on his return to the US announced that the Mexican president had agreed to pay for the wall but the Mexican leader denied this. Trump in his struggle to get congressional funding for the wall, which led to the unpopular shutdown of the government, argued that he never said Mexico would pay for the wall but that it would cost the country.
President Trump has been unable to convince the Democratic-controlled congress to fund the border wall. Therefore, the president placed a tax on remittances to the Caribbean and Latin America to help fund the wall. Remittances to the Caribbean and Latin America moved from US$ 66.7 billion in 2015 to US$69.3 billion in 2016 (Jamaica Observer). The remittance figure to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2018 was US$83 billion. Remittances account for a significant portion of the GDP of Caribbean states so a reduction in remittances because of the border wall tax will have repercussions for foreign exchange inflows into the region.
Preventing illegal immigration was framed as national security issue during the campaign. The US is wielding its economic might against the mostly friendly neighbouring countries of the Americas. This act is to secure funding for a wall that the president and his supporters believe will improve national security and reduce crime. National security concerns are of paramount importance in national interest politics especially when it has a conservative leader at the helm. CARICOM states are also concerned about their national security as well as regional integration in which resources are pooled to enhance national and regional security.
Caribbean Integration
The West Indian Federation lasted from 1958 to1961 and was the first attempt at political integration in the Caribbean. Since then regional integration has taken the form of functional cooperation starting with the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973 (revised in 2001) which established CARICOM. Functional cooperation has been relatively successful with the establishment of the Caribbean Examination Council, the growth and expansion of the University of the West Indies, the longevity of the West Indies Cricket team, the CARIFTA Games, the role and work of the Caribbean Hotel and Tourism Association, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, and the Caribbean Court of Justice among other successes. Despite these successes, CARICOM has, on several occasions, felt perplexed about its existence because at least one member state questioned the relevance of the organization (Charles).
Several problems in CARICOM have contributed to the criticisms. Some of these are the increasing ‘nationalization’ of the various campuses of the University of the West Indies; not all member states have accepted the Caribbean Court of Justice established in 2001 as their final court; the restrictions on the freedom of movement within the region because the smaller territories are fearful that their citizens may not be able to compete for jobs with the nationals of the larger territories who may have more education and training; the discrimination and mistreatment faced by Guyanese and Jamaican nationals traveling to Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago (Charles).
See Charles for a detailed discussion of some of the likely effects of Brexit on the Caribbean. Some Jamaican critics of CARICOM have argued that Brexit is not only a challenge to the economic interests of the region but it has also provided convincing evidence that leaving regional movements is the way to go. Therefore, Jamaica should leave CARICOM because it is not benefitting the country. Interestingly, President Trump has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership because, according to the critics, the partnership would send American jobs overseas. The critics of CARICOM following the lead of the Trump Administration may once again point to the American position as another example that regional groupings are detrimental to some member states. Such criticisms would reinforce anti-regional sentiments, thereby undermining CARICOM. This criticism when understood within the context of competitive party politics in the region reveals that large groups of people in some member states would support their political party’s stance of anti-regional cooperation. This is one of the reasons why Grenadians supported the opposition by voting against accepting the CCJ in 2018 much to the chagrin of the government. This victory may spur the anti-CARICOM political parties and their supporters to strategically use the United States’ argument in favour of its national interests as their moral weight in support of their anti-CARICOM position. This position would be even more attractive when the benefits that the countries receive from the United States are contrasted with the benefits received from regional cooperation.
Reduction in Development Assistance
The final set of threats comes from President Trump’s ‘budget blueprint’ released on 16 March 2017. Of course this is just an initial set of aspirations for the federal government. However, it is likely that some of what is proposed will pass including the reduction in government expenditure. The developing states of the Caribbean rely on development assistance and grants from their international partners such as the US, England and Canada among other countries. The largest share of assistance comes from the US.
Therefore, for the Caribbean, the proposed cuts to the US Coast Guard budget would undermine the 1998 Shiprider Agreement and America’s capability to fight drug trafficking in the region as well as funding to train personnel, repair and upgrade the equipment and/or fleets of those countries with a coast guard. Less money for the Inter-American Foundation would also mean a reduction in funding for many Caribbean non-governmental organizations that are very important players in the civil societies that espouse American values and policy positions and, as such, play key roles in these emerging democracies. Cuts to the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund would also limit the provision of humanitarian support in the region that is vulnerable to increasingly powerful hurricanes and so on. In addition, a downsizing of the State Department’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs would put funding at risk for the Organisation of American States and other key regional groupings that promote regional and hemispheric cooperation, development and security.
The foregoing suggests that budgetary cuts in the US that are beneficial to the country are detrimental to the economic survival of the Caribbean because of their economic relationship with the US. This economic relationship with the US gives it unbridled influence in the domestic and international affairs of these small states. The Caribbean countries have fragile economies despite their economic relationships with the US. These fragile economies are especially problematic for the Caribbean when the president is an ultra-conservative like Donald Trump who espouses the America first worldview. Trump’s 2019 budget blue print is likely to be even more conservative when the federal government reopens.
The Caribbean, in its attempts to achieve economic growth and development through trade, has been operating in other parts of the world in addition to their relationship with the US. The Caribbean Forum-European Union (CARIFORUM-EU) partnership agreement gives the region some leverage in Brussels. The agreement not only covers the traditional area of trade but also issues such as the synergy between trade and sustainable development including better labour standards and environmental practices. It also covers public procurement and competition policy. However, the parties to the agreement have noted that moving beyond negotiations there are many challenges to implementation that needs to be addressed despite some positives. CARIFORUM, in this regard, needs capacity building support from the EU (Singh et al).
Despite the implementation challenges that hurts CARIFORUM more than the EU, and the possible impact of Trump’s policies, there are other opportunities elsewhere that Caribbean states should be able to exploit to serve their economic interests. Some of these are a growing range of choices such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) (Nye) as well as Mexico, and Spain. Investors from latter have met key stakeholders in the Caribbean tourism industry and have built five-star hotels in several Caribbean countries that have boosted the tourism products. China with its own imperialist ambitions has been very active building infrastructure in Africa and the Caribbean and making other large investments. Another major alternative for Caribbean governments to consider and tap into is the global south (the developing countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia) by negotiating trade agreements with these countries for export-led economic growth and development. There are still other opportunities to make use of such as sovereign wealth funds and the development grants provided by new foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, among others. The Caribbean also stands to gain from the opportunities for trade and technical assistance that will arise from the decriminalization of Cannabis in several states in the region and the legalization of cannabis in Canada (Nye; Bernal; The Star).
Conclusion
Caribbean states, given their small size and population, their limited resources, their fragile economies, the high rates of violent crimes and their relatively close proximity to the US, will be severely impacted by the America’s domestic and foreign policies. However, Caribbean governments should take consistent and coordinated principled foreign policy positions towards the US that serve their national and regional interests and look elsewhere for economic opportunities such as with BRICS, China and the Global South and exploit them. Despite the challenges faced by Caribbean states, it is the responsibility of the government of these states to create the right mix of free market and government policies, train their human capital for the globalized world, reduce the high rate of violent crimes and corruption, modernise and improve the efficiency of the civil service, and improve the productivity and the quality of governance to generate economic growth and development. These achievements will not free these small states from the influence of America’s national interests but they will significantly increase their standing with the US, in particular, and the world in general.