Anna Wieslander. Defence Studies. Volume 22, Issue 1, 2022.
This article analyses how Sweden has adapted to the worsened security situation in its vicinity following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine. The paper builds on security policy research focused on neoclassic realism and small state strategies in order to explore how the, broadly unknown, security policy from 2009 has been implemented in practice since 2014, through what observers call the “Hultqvist doctrine.” The aim is to bring clarity to how the Hultqvist doctrine best can be understood – as a non-aligned or an integration policy? – and how the strategy relates to both systemic forces and domestic circumstances. The paper addresses the puzzle posed by structural realism, that the systemic forces would work to encourage Sweden to align in face of the threat that emerged in 2014. Still, Sweden has resisted NATO membership. To this end, I construct and apply an analytical framework that not only reveals the degree of novelty in the doctrine, but also allows for an evaluation of integration in three dimensions – openness, inclusiveness and comprehensiveness – in combination with a screening dimension. Following neoclassical realism, the study furthermore identifies domestic conditions that hinder policy flexibility.
1. Introduction
In 2013, an incident, called the “Russian Easter” in mass media, caught international attention. Russian aircraft practiced bomb attacks, according to NATO these were nuclear bomb attacks, close to the Swedish border after midnight on Good Friday. The Swedish Armed Forces had no jet fighters ready to scramble the Russian aircraft (Holmström 2016b; Stoltenberg 2016, 19). This was due to low levels of readiness for territorial incidents and reflected the perceived Russian threat level at the time. A year later, Russia had illegally annexed Crimea and commenced a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine. These events drastically altered the perception of Russia among the Nordics, from a “difficult partner” to a “ main security challenge” (Lunde Saxi 2019, 659). For Sweden, it was a brusque awakening, which triggered rapid adaptation to the worsened security situation in its vicinity. Sweden was to navigate in this turbulent setting guided by its official security policy, with far-reaching solidarity declarations. However, since threat perceptions were low at the time of its adaptation by Parliament in 2009, the actual response and practical implementation of the policy did not start until 2014 through what scholars have called the “Hultqvist doctrine” (Nordgren Christiansen 2015; Wieslander 2017, 97-98, 19; Robert 2017, 23). The doctrine is named after Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist (in this position from 2014 to present).
The paper builds on security policy research focused on neoclassic realism and small state strategies in order to explore the development of Swedish security policy and to examine how the official security policy has been implemented in practice since 2014 through the Hultqvist doctrine. The doctrine has three main components, as defined by Wieslander (2017, 97-98): “(1) a focus on building deterrence and national defence capabilities; (2) a patchwork of deepened bilateral arrangements, as well as an enhanced partnership with NATO, but no security guarantees; and (3) strong support for a rule-based security order and a tough stance against Russia, who has broken that order.”
The Hultqvist doctrine has been described by the Defence Minister himself as “the natural evolution of non-alignment,” and military non-alignment, in turn, as the “self-evident foundation for international defence cooperation” (Hultqvist 2015, 2020). The rhetoric connects to a Swedish tradition of non-alignment and neutrality that goes back more than 200 years, implying long-term policy continuity. Official declarations on foreign policy also make a special effort to mark continuity by repeatedly stating that “Sweden’s security policy prevails. Military non-alignment serves Sweden well and contributes to stability and security in Northern Europe” (Löfven 2020; Linde 2020). Even the epithet as “neutral” tends to stick among outside observers, although Sweden has abandoned it (Vaicekauskaite 2017, 13; Cottey 2018).
This paper challenges the proposition that the Hultqvist doctrine is, in fact, “the natural evolution of non-alignment.” Already a quick look at the main components of the doctrine, as described above, casts doubts on the validity of its official label, bearing in mind that a non-aligned policy, which aims at neutrality in case of war, requires that a country is cautious and restrictive on international cooperation and integration, as illustrated by Switzerland who is not a member of the EU and only joined the UN as late as 2002, and that it carefully navigates in between great powers in order not to provoke either side, as did Norway in inter-war period and Sweden during the Cold War. Rather, the Hultqvist doctrine appears to contain a range of integrative and collaborative measures with other states, which indicates a preference toward alignment and collective defence in case of war. Even though the Hultqvist doctrine strives to combine non-alignment with integration into collective defence, there is consequently an apparent discrepancy between the two from the perspective of alliance theory and small state strategies, which makes the doctrine´s proposition problematic.
In order to address this discrepancy and to make an in-depth analysis of the doctrine, I construct and apply an analytical framework, which not only reveals the degree of novelty in the doctrine, but also allows for an evaluation of integration into a collective defence system in three dimensions – openness, inclusiveness and comprehensiveness – in combination with a screening component from dependency on a great power and its institutional structures.
Furthermore, this article addresses the puzzle posed by structural realism, that the systemic forces would work to encourage Sweden to align in face of the threat that emerged in 2014. Several scholars have pointed at the embedded ambiguity and instability of Sweden´s posture as military non-aligned (see for instance Salonius-Pasternak 2018; Westberg 2016; Axelsson et al. 2016; Dalsjö 2015; Dahl 2019; Brommesson 2016). As will be illustrated in chapter 3, the systemic level provides sufficient information on the threat, in this case Russia. However, Sweden still emphasizes the value of its military non-alignment and rejects NATO-membership. The resistance can only be explained if domestic circumstances are reviewed. Here, neoclassical realism provides useful guidance by allowing for policy deviation from the requirements of systemic imperatives. Such deviations can be expected under domestic conditions that hinders policy flexibility.
The paper contributes to research on security strategies of small states, following a neoclassical realist approach, by analysing the components of the Hultqvist doctrine along the spectrums of continuity versus change, as well as the levels of integration versus screening.
More specifically, it provides for new findings regarding how small powers navigate to increase their security in times of increased great power tensions, without necessarily taking the step to formally join alliances. Thus, it also contributes to theories of alliance formations. Furthermore, by providing a new case study of Sweden, this article contributes to the inductive development of neoclassical realism with regard to its predictability, since the mediating variables at the domestic level are assumed to routinely disrupt systemic-incentivized behaviour and encourages deviation. Empirically, there is a limited amount of research conducted on the implementation of Swedish security policy since the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea, which caused a major distraction to the post-Cold War European security order. The analysis, not least through its interviews, therefore contributes to a knowledge build-up also in this regard (Wieslander 2015, 2016a, 143, 2016b, 2019; Gotkowska 2017; Kunz 2015; Robert 2017; Ydén et al. 2019; Wither 2020; Moeller 2019).
The article is structured as follows. First, neoclassical realism, security strategies for small states and current security policy research applicable to Sweden are overviewed, based on the scholarly literature on the subject. Some theoretical and conceptual observations are made in order to provide guidance to the construction of the analytical framework applied on the Hultqvist doctrine. Thereafter, the geopolitical setting, including Sweden’s threat perceptions, is briefly sketched, before the main components of the doctrine, and its levels of integration versus screening, are described and analysed. I then turn to explore the unique domestic circumstances, which allow for policy deviation from the requirements of systemic imperatives, using Sweden as a case study. The material used consist of official documents and inquiries, debate articles, speeches, mass media reporting, scholarly literature and interviews on the subject. Through interviews with key persons in politics and government, the Swedish domestic setting is explored. The persons interviewed have been chosen because of their extensive insight into the political dynamics of both internal party politics, as well as governmental and parliament affairs within the major national political blocks. In conclusion, some suggestions are made on how the findings on small state strategies in times of increased great power tensions could be applied ahead in order to deepen and broaden the scope of research in this field.
2. Theoretical and conceptual observations
The analysis of the Hultqvist doctrine is focused on the state as an actor in an environment in which military power and military threats are at the core, and tensions are on the rise. Hence, the analysis mainly builds on the realist approach, in which great powers dominate the international system, and small powers have to relate to that. Following structural realism as developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979, 194-195), a great power can preserve its autonomy in the face of external force, and has “more to say about which games will be played and how” and “the ability to act for its sake.” Small states, on the other hand, have “modest goals and limited means” (Fox William 1968, 24). Fundamentally, there are two main policy choices for a small power to ensure its security: either “draw on the strength of others” or “remove or isolate itself from power conflicts” (Rothstein 1968, 37). Structural realism with its focus on systemic imperatives, would predict that in case of an external threat, states would strive to find allies to counter the threat in concert. Following Walt (2009), threats are viewed as “a function of power, proximity, specific offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions, and the expected response to an emerging threat is to attempt to balance against it.” An alliance is a formal – or informal – commitment for security cooperation between two or more states against some external actor and in response to an external threat. For small states, the strategy to seek alliances to ensure their survival, to “draw on the strength of others,” as stated above has become an integral part of the international system (Rothstein 1968, 34-36). Neutrality builds on the choice of a state to seek and “remove or isolate itself from power politics,” in order to avoid being drawn into war. Non-alignment is hence a prerequisite for neutrality. As Bailes (2014) point out, neutrality has always been risky since it depends on the acceptance of the great powers. A broader security agenda and growing international interdependence has since the end of the Cold War made the pursuit of neutrality even more dangerous, since it risks trapping the small state into marginalization. Instead, small states, in order to make up for their limited capacity, tend to seek solutions through external engagement and partnerships, even if that brings a permanent external dependency (Bailes 2014, 32). That dependency is easier for small states to accept if the greater power is geographically further away, but still has a capacity to provide the collective good at low cost and risk (Walt 2009, 103). In this context, international institutions and rules facilitate self-interested cooperation, by providing information, as well as reducing uncertainty and transaction costs (Keohane 1993), thus providing a possibility also for small states to guard their self-determination. To have an “active” foreign policy in the interests of international peace has in various ways served as a tool for neutral states, with otherwise limited possibilities to manoeuvre (Boczek 1989, 9-11).
What then, determines the security policy choice of a small state, given an external threat in the vicinity? Structural realism gives little guidance, since it does not deal with the level of foreign policy. Hence it is not suited to explain state behaviour, which often stems from domestic political factors, so-called unit-level factors, even though the systemic imperatives shape state behaviour (Mearsheimer 2009, 245). Neoclassical realism makes a useful contribution here, since it recognizes that domestic political considerations almost always influence a state´s foreign policy, but with limited effect, “and when they do, they do so in ways that are consistent with balance-of-power logic” (Mearsheimer 2009, 246). In other words, unique domestic circumstances can lead states to select particular balancing strategies, that is, strategies consistent with balance-of-power logic, “from a range of acceptable alternatives,” that is, the strategy choice does not imply that a state fails to balance against a hostile power (Ripsman et al. 2009, 282). The state acts as a mediator between the two realms of politics, domestic and international, which gives it a special role. The state then, is “the manager of the nation´s resources for competition in the anarchic international environment” (Brawley 2009, 97). Neoclassical realism expects policy to deviate from the requirements of systemic imperatives under domestic circumstances that impede policy flexibility. Mediating variables, such as “entrenched national strategies from past periods” or “ideological constructions within which national foreign policy must be justified” (Brawley 2009; Dueck 2009), routinely disrupt systemic-incentivized behaviour and encourages deviation (Ripsman et al. 2009, 281). There is a similar tradition among small states scholars to include unit-level factors to explain the relationship between the relative distribution of power in the international system and the foreign policies of states (Lundqvist 2017, 54).
Rolf Tamnes (1986) builds on the logic of “particular balancing strategies” when introducing two choices for small powers to increase security within the balancing spectrum – integration and screening. Tamnes does not define the concepts, but explains them within a Norwegian context. Tamnes argues that both integration and screening were used in Norwegian alliance policy after World War II, with an emphasis on integration (1986). On one hand, Norway was integrated into the Western defence system by joining NATO. There was co-operation on security policy and preparations in peacetime to enable assistance in a future war, hence abandoning its previous isolationist posture. On the other hand, the Norwegian government attempted to screen Norway from these structures in order to maintain a certain space for manoeuvre, and to prevent NATO from using Norway for offensive operations against the Soviet Union, mainly by not allowing permanent stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons on its territory. This screening was driven by both external and domestic factors: both out of regard to relations with Moscow, but also in consideration of public opinion at home, which was shaped by prior decades of neutrality policy (Tamnes 1986, 67; Archer 2014a, 107). Hedling and Brommesson (2017) draw similar conclusions of policy ambiguity as they identify integration versus autonomy as two competing strategies of small state strategies in regard to security through European integration, using the Swedish policy towards the Eastern Partnership as a case study. Integration, Hedling and Brommesson argues, means that state structures are shifted toward joint and distinct forms of governance, while autonomy is connected to self-determination; both the right as well as the capacity to have it. Furthermore, by definition, a small state does not have capacity to enjoy full autonomy; thus, integration versus autonomy cannot be viewed as mutually exclusive empirically, but rather measured in terms of degrees: “an increase in autonomy will result in a decrease in integration efforts and vice versa” (2017, 3). My analysis borrows from Tamnes’ concept pair of integration and screening, but for the purpose of creating an analytical framework I put them into a general context, which links to a broader theoretical integration-autonomy understanding of small states as described by Hedling and Brommesson. Accordingly, I refer integration to such measures that a state pursues through peacetime security and defence cooperation in order to draw on the strength of others, and to prepare to meet external threats in concert. Screening refers to measures taken by a state to ensure national self-determination and to reduce dependency on a great power and its institutional structures.
In this article, “small power” and “small state” are used interchangeably, and the definition builds on the assumption that the security challenges of small states typically originate in its nearby geopolitical setting, rather than from generic systemic ones, and that power is a relative, rather than an absolute, term. Hence, a small power is defined as “the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own.” This also implies that a small state cannot affect the power configuration and its institutional expression, regardless of its specific relationship to it (Archer 2014b, 9).
2.1. Research questions and analytical framework
Following the theoretical and conceptual observations outlined above, the main questions that this article aims to answer are:
- How can the Hultqvist doctrine best be understood: as a “non-alignment policy”, as officially claimed, or as an integration policy?
- Can the Hultqvist doctrine be explained by unique domestic circumstances that has led Sweden to select a particular balancing strategy “from a range of acceptable alternatives”?
The analytical framework that is constructed and applied in the paper to explore the Hultqvist doctrine and its proposition of being “the natural evolution of non-alignment,” builds on the assumption that, given Sweden’s history as a non-aligned state, such a policy would mainly include elements of continuity, rather than change. On the other hand, a substantial quantity of new elements would indicate a clear shift of policy. Furthermore, the balance between integration and screening would be different in respective policy choices. It can be assumed that (a) a small state that chooses to integrate, would conduct a policy with a high degree of integration and few elements of screening, and that its deterrence would rely on the knowledge by the potential adversary of such integration, and (b) a small state that chooses non-alignment, would conduct a policy with a low degree of integration, and a high degree of screening. Deterrence toward the potential adversary would focus on the ability of the small state to defend itself without having to request political or military assistance from others. Since the degree of integration is key to verify the degree of novelty of the Hultqvist doctrine, I elaborate the analysis in this dimension by making three assumptions. It is reasonable from a balance-of-power logic to assume that integration is stronger when it is (1) marked by openness and transparency, allowing for reassurance towards the friendly states and deterrence towards the adversary (2) involves a broad range of states and institutions that can come to a state’s support, i.e. inclusiveness and (3) embraces not only peacetime cooperation but conflict and war which allows for necessary preparations to meet a threat in concert, i.e. comprehensiveness.
3. The Hultqvist doctrine
In this chapter, I first outline the nearby geopolitical setting of Sweden, that provides the context for the Hultqvist doctrine, and briefly describe the official security policy from 2009, which defines the foundation and space for manoeuvre for the Hultqvist doctrine. I then proceed to analyse the main components of the Hultqvist doctrine from the perspectives of continuity versus change, and integration versus screening, in order conclude how the doctrine best can be understood. I also examine if the Hultqvist doctrine can be explained by unique domestic circumstances that led Sweden to select a particular balancing strategy “from a range of acceptable alternatives.”
3.1. The geopolitical setting
In 2014, the peaceful Baltic Sea region entered into a state of a “new normal” with an intensive submarine hunt in Stockholm’s archipelago and frequent violations of Nordic and Baltic air space by Russian aircrafts. Suddenly, the Baltic Sea region was characterized by tensions and uncertainty, at the frontline of systemic competition between Russia and the West (Wieslander 2015, 2019, 207). President Putin himself warned Sweden from joining NATO and claimed that Russia would “interpret that as an additional threat for Russia and we will think about how to eliminate this threat” (Sharkov 2017).
The shift took Sweden by surprise. Prior to 2014, threat perceptions in Swedish national security analysis followed what Barry Buzan has called the wideners, as opposed to the old military and state-centred view of the traditionalists. From the end of the Cold War and onwards, national security was gradually widened to include threats stemming from non-state actors such as terrorist groups and organized crime, as well as allowing non-military issues such as economic and environmental concerns to achieve security status (Buzan et al. 1998, 1-5; Andrén 2002, 13-20). As a consequence, the Armed Forces were diminished and re-oriented towards smaller expeditionary forces for international missions. National defence was to a large extent dismantled, conscription was abandoned as was total defence planning, and renewal of defence equipment put on hold. Calculations by the inquiry on defence materiel estimated that amounts up to 168 billion SEK would be needed during the coming decade to make up for the dismantling of defence capabilities to meet antagonistic territorial threats (The Government Offices of Sweden 2018a). The deteriorated security situation in the Baltic Sea region in 2014 abruptly brought antagonistic state threats back to the core of security and defence policy.
In the current situation, Sweden´s concern with Russia is not that of an immediate threat of an armed attack, but rather that a crisis or conflict in the region would affect Sweden as well, in that an adversary would aim to extend its freedom of movement, either through military or hybrid operations (Bydén 2016). The Swedish island of Gotland could be of particular importance in such a situation, since Russia could increase its capability to deny NATO the possibility to use airspace over the Baltic Sea by deploying air defence systems on the island. Such a deployment could come very early in an operation, before the main attack against the Baltic States (The Government Offices of Sweden 2016, 3). Russia is also a concern for Sweden due to its ongoing hybrid operations (Bydén 2016). Russian agents conducting undermining activities prior to the parliamentarian ratification of the Host Nation Support treaty with NATO is merely one example (Swedish security police, 2015; Holmström 2016c).
3.2. The official security policy of 2009
Sweden’s official security policy, unanimously adopted by Parliament in 2009, sets the foundation and the space for manoeuvre of the Hultqvist doctrine in terms of relationship with NATO and interdependencies with other countries for military support. It reads:
Sweden is not a member of any military alliance. Threats to peace and our security can best be averted collectively and in cooperation with other countries. It is impossible to imagine military conflicts in our region that would affect only one country. Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to take similar action if Sweden is affected. Sweden should therefore be in a position to both give and receive military support (The Defence Committee 2009).
Noteworthy, the word “neutrality” is not mentioned at all. The policy claims that threat to peace and security are best met in concert with other countries, which is the essence of an alliance strategy, while stating that Sweden is military non-aligned. Furthermore, it extends unilateral security guarantees to all other EU member states, and Nordic countries, and sends a signal to others that Sweden expects the same solidarity in return; once again, core elements of how an alliance functions. Although the Swedish declaration of solidarity was inspired by a corresponding formulation in the EU Treaty of Lisbon (paragraph 42.7), no other EU member state has made something equivalent (The Government Offices of Sweden 2014b). It reflects a recognition of Sweden´s dependency on the outside world for its security, as well as a belief that if Sweden declares its support in advance, others will be more inclined to assist Sweden in case of an attack. The explicit statement “not remain passive” can be interpreted as a signal to other countries that the days of neutrality clearly are over. Regardless of the novel solidarity components of the policy, it was adapted in an era when antagonistic threats appeared remote, and its consequences for such threats were therefore not fully explored for quite some years. For instance, not until the deteriorated regional security situation in 2014 did the Armed Forces get the mandate to look deeper into the operational planning aspects of the extensive solidarity ambitions (Wieslander 2017, 95). The same year, Sweden signed the Host Nation Support Treaty with NATO o facilitate military support to and from others. Thus, the Hultqvist doctrine is related to the official security policy from 2009 in that it develops and implements practically what the security policy in broad term prescribes.
3.3. Continuity and change
In this section, I examine the main components of the Hultqvist doctrine in light of the assumption that, given Sweden’s history, a non-alignment policy would include central elements of continuity, rather than change. On the other hand, a substantial amount of new elements would indicate a clear shift of policy.
3.3.1. Strengthening national defence
The first component of the Hultqvist doctrine is a focus on building deterrence and national defence capabilities. A sufficient deterrence and a strong defence were fundamental aspects of making the military non-aligned status credible during the Cold War. At the beginning of that era, Sweden had the fourth-largest air force in the world, and a sizeable navy (Aunesluoma 2003; Logue 1989, 86). Throughout the Cold War it maintained a proportionally heavier budget than that of its Nordic neighbours, dedicating on average 3.5% of GDP on defence well into the 1980’s. A strong Swedish defence was crucial to keep the Nordic balance and avoid a power vacuum in the region (Dörfer 1987, 188). For a long time, Swedes reasoned that self-protection required at least rough parity with any force likely to be fielded against them (Logue 1989, 71). This was a main rationale behind the Swedish nuclear arms development program which it conducted until 1968. Another crucial aspect was to keep an advanced technological base and a national defence industry that could produce strategic assets such as jet fighters, war ships and submarines (Logue 1989, 71-72).
The present levels are not comparable, despite a designated increase of defence spending of 40% from 2020 to 2025. The reactivation of conscription is a central part of the Hultqvist doctrine, as is the emphasis on military exercises, which have increased in number and size, and the re-establishment of a permanent military presence on the island of Gotland. Large investments in defence equipment include new next-generation submarines, Gripen fighter aircrafts and the Patriot missile defence system (The Government Offices of Sweden 2020). Nevertheless, the process of strengthening defence and deterrence has been progressing slowly since 2014 and with relatively low levels of funding. The report of the Swedish Defence Commission in May 2019 outspokenly concluded that the Armed Forces are not able to meet an armed attack against Sweden. Defence spending is estimated to increase to 1.5% of GDP by 2025, which is far from the ambition of most NATO allies to meet 2.0% by 2024 (Benigh 2018). That means that Sweden, who used to be the leading military power of the Nordic states, has fallen behind the others. There is a broad recognition in the political parties, from right to left, that the diminishing of the Armed Forces has been very far-reaching and that restoring it to historical levels would be too difficult and costly (Interview 3). That realization has facilitated the push toward deepened defence cooperation and made it tolerable also for more isolationist leaning, anti-American groupings within the Social Democrats (Interview 4).
In addition to difference in military might, major shift from the Cold War is the drastically increased level of interoperability developed with NATO, and the integration with its advanced exercise and training, all transparently made through Partnership for Peace and participation in NATO-led international missions. Sweden is nowadays as interoperable as most NATO allies (The Government Offices of Sweden 2014b, 42; Bringéus 2016, 119).
Consequently, what first appears to put the doctrine quite firmly in the non-aligned policy category, that is, the posture of a strong, national defence, carries a substantial element of change, since the level of actual defence spending and defence capability is drastically lower than the previous period when the external threat level was high. A strong national defence is nowadays a long-term ambition rather than a real element of the doctrine. Furthermore, the dependency on others to defend Sweden is far more substantial, and in addition, explicit. Interoperability – which was officially non-existent earlier – is at the core of the defence dimension of the Hultqvist doctrine.
3.3.2. Close ties to NATO and a patchwork of bilateral cooperation
The second component of the Hultqvist doctrine consists of a patchwork of deepened bilateral arrangements, as well as an enhanced partnership with NATO, but no security guarantees. After World War II, Sweden was to appear as a neutral block and a bridge-builder between the East and the West. That did not prevent Sweden from combining its neutrality policy with top secret military cooperation with the Alliance, and bilaterally with a group of allies. The purpose was to make preparations in peacetime to facilitate Western assistance in case of a war. Although neutrality did not preclude assistance in war if a country were attacked, it was in general assumed to exclude discussions in peacetime of assistance (Logue 1989, 92). As documented by Dalsjö (2006, XI), Holmström (2011), Agrell (1991) as well as examined by The Commission on Neutral Policy (1994), Sweden conducted covert peacetime preparations both bilaterally with NATO allies such as Norway, Denmark, UK and the United States, as well as with NATO as an organisation. It ended with the Cold War and was inactive for many years, during which Sweden developed its cooperation with NATO through Partnership for Peace and participation in international missions, i.e. areas that did not include collective defence. In past years this has changed and Sweden has, together with Finland, moved closer to NATO in collective defence than any other partner. In 2014, NATO launched the Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP) programme, which allowed for tailor-made cooperation between NATO, Sweden and Finland on Baltic Sea security, in light of the challenge posed by assertive Russia. All parties adopted a pragmatic approach to elaborate processes, structures and capabilities in order to successfully address the threats that might arise. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO pointed in particular at the importance of developing regular political consultations, shared situational awareness, and joint exercises with Sweden and Finland (NATO 2016).
In addition to a very close partnership with NATO, the Hultqvist doctrine builds on an extensive patchwork of bilateral defence cooperation, also new of its kind. Since 2014, ties and peacetime cooperation have been revised and deepened with Finland, the US, Poland, Denmark, UK, Germany, Norway and France. The collaboration is most far reaching with Finland, with whom the agreement officially encompasses joint planning in crisis or war, although security guarantees are not included from either side (The Government Offices of Sweden 2014a, 2018b, 2018c, 2019a, 2019b, 293-308). Despite the fact that defence cooperation with Finland has been deep from time to time, such as in the 1920’s, the openness of the intentions in case of war is a new element in the relationship.
The bilateral relationship with the United States is of special dignity, due to the dependency of American support for the survival of Sweden in case of war. Nevertheless, there are no formal treaties that bind the US to such support, should it be needed. In 2016 Sweden signed a defence agreement with the US. The agreement is a non-binding letter of intent that stipulates areas for peacetime cooperation only. Regardless, both the Obama and Trump administrations have emphasized the significance of Sweden to the US, which is noteworthy given Sweden’s size and non-alignment posture, with Vice President Joe Biden declaring Sweden to be “inviolable territory” and Secretary of Defence James Mattis calling Sweden “not a NATO ally, but it is still (…) a friend and an ally” (Holmström 2016a; The U.S. Department of Defence 2017; Wieslander 2017, 99).
In May 2018, an additional layer of cooperation was manifested through the trilateral Statement of Intent between the United States, Sweden and Finland, emphasising the need for regional situational awareness, coordination of strategic communication and political and military interoperability development (The Government Offices of Sweden 2018c). In September 2020, a second trilateral formation emerged, as Sweden, Finland and Norway signed a Statement of Intent to deepen the military operational cooperation with a focus on joint action in crisis and conflict. The ambition is to establish coordinated operational planning for some parts of the three Nordic territories. Given that Norway is a NATO member and the others are not, this new constellation signals a shift in approach to defence integration both among allies and non-allies (Hultqvist et al. 2020).
3.3.3. Strong international commitment
The third component of the Hultqvist doctrine focuses on strong support for a rule-based security order and a tough stance against Russia, who has broken that order. A solid commitment to a rule-based international order became part of Swedish neutrality policy already at the formation of the League of Nations. “What real defence, Swedish leaders argued, did small nations have other than strengthening international law?” By promoting the relaxation of tensions and international cooperation, Sweden sought to modify the international environment (Logue 1989, 81-82). The Swedish support for the League of Nations was later transferred to the United Nations. The commitment to the UN has remained a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy, as it has provided a platform for an active role both in mediation and especially during the Cold War, as a bridge between North and South, spurred by its outspoken critique of the US policy in Vietnam in the early 1970’s (Logue 1989, 94-96). Sweden shared with her fellow Nordic nations an “inclination for marked visibility in global issues and arenas” (Sundelius 1987, 6). The Swedish Social democratic government at the time labelled itself as a “moral superpower,” used by its proponents with pride, and by its critics as an insult (Dahl 2006, 896-897). The “internationalistic” and activistic approach to foreign policy, as reflected in the Hultqvist doctrine, still resembles in Swedish public opinion. For instance, in The Transatlantic Trends Survey in 2012, 62% said intervening in Afghanistan was the right thing to do, while 42% of Europeans agreed. In 2014, on Ukraine, 73% of the Swedes were willing to support Ukraine, even at the risk of conflict with Russia (Stelzenmueller and Raisher 2014).
To sum up, a substantial amount of new elements is found in the Hultqvist doctrine, which indicates a clear shift of policy. These include: a strong national defence as a future ambition rather than a reality; an open and close relationship with NATO, including high levels of interoperability and participation in its collective defence exercises; an extensive patchwork of peacetime bilateral agreements; and joint wartime planning with Finland. Elements of continuity are also present, but to a lesser extent, and most apparent in the defence of a rule-based international security order. As described above, this position is from Sweden’s point of view connected to its history of neutrality and non-alignment. However, defending a rule-based order is a position that small states in general would prefer, since it guards their right to make their own security choices. Put differently, it is a position that a non-aligned state can choose to gain some space of manoeuvre, but it is by no means an exclusive posture for such states.
3.4 Integration and screening
In examining the integration versus screening dimensions of the Hultqvist doctrine, I recall the assumptions outlined in chapter 2 that (a) a small state that chooses to integrate, would conduct a policy with a high degree of integration and few elements of screening, and that its deterrence would rely on the knowledge by the potential adversary of such integration, and (b) a small state that chooses non-alignment, would conduct a policy with a low degree of integration, and a high degree of screening. Deterrence toward the potential adversary would focus on the ability of the small state to defend itself without having to request political or military assistance from others. The results of the analysis should also indicate if the Hultqvist doctrine can be explained by unique domestic circumstances that has led Sweden to select a particular balancing strategy “from a range of acceptable alternatives.”
3.4.1. Levels of integration
In order to assess the level of integration, I assume inductively that integration is stronger when it is (1) marked by openness and transparency, (2) involves a broad range of states and institutions, and (3) embraces not only peacetime cooperation but conflict and war.
In view of the first dimension, openness and transparency in Sweden´s efforts to integrate with states and international institutions to maximize security is a core feature of the Hultqvist doctrine. It is also a novel feature in Swedish security policy. The major shift was the declaration in 2009 that “Sweden should (…) be in a position to both give and receive military support.” The ratification by Parliament of the Host Nation Support Treaty with NATO in 2016, which was a crucial step to facilitate external support, is illustrative in this regard. It was a transparent process, preceded by an open official inquiry on the legal aspects and a, partly heated, public debate on what this meant for Swedish non-alignment, before the treaty was approved by the Parliament (The Government Offices of Sweden 2015; The Swedish Parliament 2016; Henriksson et al. 2016; Wallström et al. 2016; Wallmark and Karin 2016; Holmberg and Henriksson 2016).
Another aspect of openness in the Hultqvist doctrine concerns Russia as a threat. The Hultqvist doctrine states clearly that Russia’s assertive behaviour and military build-up have caused the deteriorated security situation in Sweden’s vicinity, resulting in the need for Sweden to strengthen its defence efforts and its deterrence posture. Confidence building in the Hultqvist doctrine is mainly focused on deepened relationships and trust building with friendly nations and institutions, such as the EU and NATO, rather than towards the threatening state. In other words, there is no attempt to assume a neutral, balancing position in between the East and West. The open and transparent approach is directed partly towards NATO and its allies, who should be in no doubt that Sweden stands in solidarity and will not hesitate to take sides. Since Sweden for so long has been part of Europe´s neutral states, and is still seen as such by many, this signalling in the Hultqvist doctrine fills a purpose. It strengthens the argument that Sweden not only expects to get support in case of war, but is committed to give support to others, and will not declare itself neutral in case of war (Interview 1; Interview 3; Interview 4). Openness and transparency are also instruments of deterrence towards the adversary. There shall be no doubt for the adversary in which camp Sweden belongs and who its powerful friends are, regardless of lack of treaty-bound commitments (Interview 1; Interview 4; Interview 5). Transparency with whom, and in defence of what the country would fight, can be viewed as a means to limit the negative effects of the embedded ambiguity in Swedish security policy, as pointed out by Salonius-Pasternak (2018). On the other hand, Axelsson et al. (2016) argue that the costly signals that Sweden sends in peacetime regarding its will to give and take military support, decreases deterrence credibility, since they are matched only with poor military capabilities (Westberg 2016, 464-465). Other risks include tempting Russia to test the assertiveness of the West by a limited attack, such a land grab, on Sweden, who would not be protected by a formal security guarantee (Interview 1; Interview 3).
Regarding the second dimension of integration, which is the broadness of relationships with states and institutions, the Hultqvist doctrine encompasses an unpreceded patchwork in the Nordic, European and Transatlantic contexts. The signing of bilateral agreements on security and defence cooperation have served to increase joint efforts and spur integral initiatives, although the level and scope of activities vary. To put in the time and resources needed to uphold and develop the bilateral track is demanding for a small power. Limited national resources risk being spread too broadly and used inefficiently (Interview 1; Interview 3). Since Sweden puts more of its deterrence efforts into the bilateral arrangements than NATO members do, Sweden cannot afford to lose energy, or the arrangements risk to fall flat (Wieslander 2017, 100).
The bilateral relation with the US is crucial for Sweden´s security. Without security guarantees, the US has no stand-alone commitment to help defend Sweden, but could well do so if it facilitates for the United States to carry through its treaty commitment to protect the Baltic states (Wieslander 2016b). However, the relative American decline of global power and its increasing great power competition with China risk drawing attention and resources away from Northern Europe (Interview 2; Interview 4).
With regard to the institutions, remaining a very close partner to NATO is the primary focus, while the EU is slowly growing in concrete importance in defence as it develops and deepens its cooperation in this area. Otherwise, EU’s main role in the Hultqvist doctrine is to provide a political alliance upon which integral efforts can be built. NORDEFCO, the defence cooperative body between the Nordic states formed in 2009, is also worth mentioning, as its ambitious vision for 2025 includes far-reaching integral defensive measures for crisis and conflict.
The third dimension concerns whether integration embraces not only peacetime cooperation but also conflict and war. Also in this aspect, the Hultqvist doctrine reaches novel integral levels in Swedish security policy, as defence cooperation with Finland since 2015 includes joint operational planning for conflict and war, which despite historical closeness between the two, never has occurred before. This has raised calls for a formal military alliance with Finland, but so far Sweden has resisted (Hugemark 2017, 2018a, 2018b). The cooperation aims at “creating the preconditions for combined joint military action and operations in all situations,” which includes initiatives such as a joint naval task group, weekly cross-border training using each other’s airspace and airfields, and a combined army brigade. Of Finnish heritage himself, Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist´s personal engagement in the Swedish-Finnish relationship has helped spurred collaboration further, although the deepened cooperation was initiated before the Social Democratic – Green government came into power in 2014 (Interview 2; Interview 4).
With NATO, there is no such operational planning, but it is noteworthy in which direction the partnership has developed since 2014. For many years, Sweden´s cooperation with the alliance built on its ambition to prepare for and participate in international peace missions far from home. NATO called this “cooperative security,” a different task from collective defence. Sweden, and Finland, managed to earn a status in this regard as “non-allied allies,” which seemed uncontroversial since it had nothing to do with territorial defence. The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia turned all of this upside down. NATO returned to its core task of collective defence, and as it gradually turned its strategic glance towards the Baltic Sea region, Sweden and Finland became close partners also in collective defence, participating in various advanced exercises with wartime scenarios (Wieslander 2016a, 2019).
3.4.2. Levels of screening
As described in chapter 2, screening refers to measures taken by a state to ensure national freedom of action, and to reduce dependency on a great power and its institutional structures.
For more than 200 years, screening has been a central part of Swedish security policy. Neutrality, non-alignment, military non-alignment – the political epithets have varied, but fundamentally, it has been about a small state navigating the power field of surrounding great powers by staying outside of formal military alliances in order to preserve state survival (Elgström 2000; Rothstein 1968; Westberg 2015; Kronvall and Petersson 2012; Engelbrekt et al. 2015). A key factor in understanding Swedish neutrality in a historic perspective, is that it has had no basis in international treaties or bilateral agreements, in contrast to other European neutrals such as Switzerland, Austria or Finland. The Swedish policy has always been self-proclaimed and self-maintained in order to serve national interests. This has allowed for a larger extent of flexibility than for those countries obliged by permanent neutrality by international law or bilateral agreements (Logue 1989, 72).
During the Cold War, the level of screening in Swedish security policy was high, and directed both towards the East and the West to maintain self-determination and freedom of action. Sweden´s neutrality policy did not exclude joining the United Nations already in 1946, in contrast to Switzerland, who did not join until 2002. However, with regard to NATO and the European Community, membership was viewed as non-compatible. Furthermore, any form of official cooperation with the EC, and especially NATO, was carefully assessed and calibrated. With regard to NATO, as well as with NATO allies such as the U.S., Norway, Denmark and the UK, cooperation was covert and so secret, that an official Swedish inquiry in 1994, after the end of the Cold War, had to confirm by means of investigation that this cooperation had indeed occurred. In addition, despite its strong defence capabilities, Sweden was reluctant to clearly state who it was directed against, as Sweden attempted to balance between the West and the East without taking sides. Sweden pursued as far as possible a confidence-building policy towards the Soviet Union (Kronvall and Petersson 2012, 37).
Nowadays, the bottom line of screening is that Sweden does not give treaty-based military security guarantees to other nations. With regard to NATO, screening applies to two areas: operational planning and political decision-making (Wieslander 2019, 214-215). Although NATO and Sweden mutually can decide to share information on operational planning, defence planners on neither side can assume that cooperation will occur in case of war, and the planning has to be adopted accordingly. For Sweden, this presents a serious dilemma. Sweden´s security policy doctrine poses that Sweden counts on others for military assistance to uphold its sovereignty, and its limited defence capability offers no option of self-defence in this regard (Bringéus 2016, 53). Thus, Sweden puts limits on its ability to make operational plans that would realistically uphold sovereignty. NATO decision-making provides a red-line between being a member or not. This is a setback, given the likelihood that a conflict in the Baltic Sea region would develop rapidly, and that Sweden at the very beginning of such crisis would have to consider requests from NATO to make Swedish military infrastructure, territory, airspace and territorial waters available. What Sweden could aim for, using the Partnership for Peace framework, would be consultations, albeit unclear at which level or stage they would take place (Wieslander 2016a, 143).
To sum up, following the assumptions regarding transparency, relationships and scope of integration, it is apparent that the level of integration elements of the Hultqvist doctrine are high not only in one, but in all dimensions, and that they in a historical perspective – examining continuity and change – have reached novel levels in terms of depth, strength and outreach. The level of screening, which is at the core of, and traditionally high, in non-alignment strategies, is low in the Hultqvist doctrine. In terms of deterrence, Sweden’s integration with the West is openly advocated and well known by Russia, who should have no hopes of an isolationistic stance from Sweden in case of a major crisis or war. In practice, Sweden has accepted a large dependency on external powers and institutional settings for its security, without formally joining NATO.
3.4.3. Domestic circumstances
There is clearly a push factor from the international system for Sweden to align and integrate in a balance-of-power logic, easily explained from a realist point of view due to external threats to state survival. The expected response to an emerging threat is to balance against it. But then, there is a Swedish resistance to formally align, which cannot be derived from the systemic level. Can it be explained by domestic circumstances? Yes, so it seems.
In Sweden’s case, the strategy choice seems clear from the outside, but from a domestic perspective, there are unique factors that are working against this option. First, it would imply a strategy deviation from more than 200 years of state survival and staying outside of wars. The lesson learned from history is that it has proven successful in previous times of high tension to remain military non-aligned. The main argument for keeping Sweden formally military non-aligned according to the Hultqvist doctrine, is that it contributes to predictability and stability in the Baltic Sea region (Hultqvist and Wallström 2016; Linde 2020; Löfven 2020). Hultqvist has several times pointed out, that “swift changes” in the security policy, in his view, would lead to disturbances and tensions, both with regard to domestic politics, as well as considerations for Finland and the relationship with Russia (Hultqvist 2015; The Government Offices of Sweden 2020). The major novelties that the doctrine contains are not “swift changes” from this perspective. Only joining NATO would be. The avoidance of change when it comes to military non-alignment in the doctrine has been criticized. Political opponents argue that it does not take into account that Sweden nowadays inevitably will be drawn into a regional crisis, should it emerge. Hence joining NATO would decrease insecurity and unpredictability (Wallmark et al. 2016). Ambassador Tomas Bertelman, in a Government Inquiry Report presented in October 2014, highlighted the growing contradiction and tensions “between the requirement of effectiveness, sovereignty and solidarity that could not be eliminated within the framework of the current restrictions” (The Government Offices of Sweden 2014b, 73). The official inquiry on international cooperation including Swedish NATO membership, led by Ambassador Krister Bringéus, concluded that the “most tangible military consequence of Swedish NATO membership would be to dispel the current uncertainty regarding common action in the event of a Baltic Sea crisis, and that the West’s deterrence therefore most probably would increase.” According to the inquiry, Russian reactions could cause a political crisis as well as Russian military adjustments, but in the end, judging from history, Russia would probably accept it (Bringéus 2016, 10-11; Wieslander 2019, 215).
Another unique domestic circumstance is the dominance of the Social Democratic Party in Swedish governance, despite a relative decline in recent years, and its internal party dynamic and tensions between right and left leaning fractions. Policy shaping on major issues always take place under risk of splitting the party, which in turn could cause the party to lose its dominant power position. For most of the 20th century, the Social Democrats were in power, thus shaping the neutrality policy of the modern era, in which “freedom of action” was a core concept, as was a preference for “a little of both.” “A Little of Both” happened to be the title of an article on a future defence posture in 1930 by the social democrat Georg Branting, son of the ideologically influential Social Democratic party leader and prime minister Hjalmar Branting. With “a little of both,” Georg Branting wanted to combine disarmament with a strong moral commitment to national defence (Interview 4; Branting 1930, 11-17). This heritage is still relatively strong in the left leaning fraction of the party. On security and defence policy, realists within the Social Democrats would have to convince pacifist, anti-American and anti-nuclear fractions of the merits of joining NATO, which would cause a lot of internal tensions. It would disturb “the inner peace (Interview 2). Hence, active proponents of NATO membership are hard to find in the party and the Hultqvist doctrine manoeuvers within the acceptable range, which includes close cooperation with NATO and the US, as such not uncontroversial in the leftist party fraction (Interview 3). The acceptance for close international cooperation and deepened integration, despite anti-American sentiments within the party, comes with the realization that in light of the deteriorated security environment, it would be far too costly to rearm Sweden from an isolationistic stance. Thus, there is also tolerance for the position that international integration increases deterrence (Interview 4). International cooperation is needed in order to be cost efficient, and at the same time be able to signal a forward-leaning posture on national defence (Interview 3).
The third factor is the public opinion, which tends to follow party lines. Voters for Social Democrats, the Green party and the Left Party are still mostly against membership. A plurality of the public (ranging between 35% and 49% depending on the poll) would however like to see Sweden joining NATO. In fall 2014, the liberal-conservative government lost power, and at the same time, conducted a a major shift of policy to abandon military non-alignment and apply for NATO membership. The Social Democratic-Green government that took office instead, did not share that vision (Wieslander 2017, 95, 2019, 208). When it was re-elected in January 2019, it clearly declared that “Sweden will not apply for membership in NATO” (Löfven 2019). Even if the conservative-led alliance had regained power in the national elections in 2018, it would have needed a broad anchorage in Parliament and among the public to apply for NATO membership, which would not have been that easy to achieve (Interview 2). In addition, a referendum would most likely have been called for, as was conducted ahead of EU-membership, and with the Eurozone. In each previous case, the margins for yes (to the EU) and no (to the euro) were small, indicating that a NATO referendum would be a risky endeavour (Interview 4). In all, even with a conservative led government from 2018 onwards, the security policy would probably not have undergone any major changes towards formal alignment, at least not in the short term (Interview 2; Interview 3; Interview 5).
In sum, structural realism would predict that Sweden, facing an external threat, would choose to align. However, out of domestic political circumstances that involve historical policy choices, internal party politics of the Social Democrats, as well as public opinion considerations, Sweden has not pursued membership in the Alliance. Still, Sweden is conducting a form of balancing strategy, siding with an alliance, balancing against the threat together with other friendly states. The purpose is to diminish the negative effects of lacking security guarantees, while not having the capability to defend itself without help from the outside. My findings suggest that the rules of state behaviour are applicable when it comes to Sweden, and that the anomaly that can be witnessed, i.e. the decision not to join NATO, is not strong enough to challenge the forces of systemic imperatives, if all other integrative measures that Sweden has conducted are taken into account. It is a deviation from systemic imperatives not to align, but it is to a large extent an integration strategy anyway, despite its emphasis on military non-alignment.
4. Conclusions
There is little doubt that, following structural realism, the systemic forces would work to encourage Sweden to align in face of the threat that emerged in 2014, with Russia´s illegal annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine. It is also clear from the analysis of the components of the Hultqvist doctrine, that Sweden has responded to a great extent to the systemic imperatives by shifting its policy towards deeper integration with a broad range of other states, and by drawing on their strength for its own protection, according to a balance of power logic. Sweden is preparing in peacetime to meet external threats in concert with others and accepts dependency on them for its state survival. Furthermore, Sweden is deliberately open about it in order to send a clear signal to the adversary who its powerful friends are. The remnants of a non-alignment policy are so few that they can be considered as dismissive, regardless of the official emphasis on this dimension. The Hultqvist doctrine can therefore best be understood as an integration policy.
On the other hand, there has been resistance to fully align by joining NATO, which poses a puzzle viewed solely from a systemic perspective. The resistance can only be explained if domestic circumstances are reviewed. Here, neoclassical realism provides a useful framework by allowing for policy deviation from the requirements of systemic imperatives. Such deviations can be expected under domestic conditions that hinders policy flexibility, such as shifting from a long tradition of neutrality and military non-alignment, to formally joining an alliance. In this article, I have highlighted how Sweden lacks such flexibility – due to internal party politics, historical lessons from the past and public opinion considerations – but still, is able to make major adjustments to comply by the imperatives of the international system, to the extent that it is viewed as an “informal ally” in the Baltic Sea context (Wieslander 2019, 218-220). I argue that not to align is a deviation from systemic imperatives, but the Swedish policy is mainly an integration strategy anyway. Accordingly, Sweden does not fail to balance against hostile powers, but it does so with a particular balancing strategy, from a range of acceptable alternatives, of which alliance would be the most obvious and commonly applied.
Despite the maintained epithet of “non-alignment” in the doctrine, its construction supports the assumption put forward by Bailes (2014), that in a world of large international interdependence, small states tend to seek solutions through external engagement and partnerships in order to make up for their limited capacity, even if that brings a permanent external dependency (Bailes 2014, 32). The Hultqvist doctrine clearly illustrates how small powers can use integration both for deterrence and confidence-building to increase their security, without necessarily taking the step of formally joining alliances. As great power competition is increasing, more small powers will find their space of action limited, including access to formal alliances, while the need for deterrence and confidence building remains high. This tendency is likely to challenge the prevailing notion that alliances must be treaty-bound in order to be efficient and “real” in terms of security guarantees. A small state, who has to navigate for survival in the marginal space that is created in the great power configuration and its institutional setting, will need to assess if it is in a strategically exposed geopolitical position, if it will require assistance in a future war and if it needs to prepare for that in peacetime, and then conduct integration strategies in order to make it happen. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that integration strategies of various and novel kinds, shaped by unique internal characteristics, like the Hultqvist doctrine, will be even more common ahead, since the systemic imperatives do not favour the option of neutrality and isolation. In an international system which is shifting from unipolarity to multipolarity, the calibrated balance-of-power system that is needed for neutrality to work well, is not in place. The analytical framework that I have presented in this article, allowing for an evaluation of integration in three dimensions – openness, inclusiveness and comprehensiveness – in combination with a screening component, provides a useful contribution to understanding and explaining small state strategies.
Furthermore, by providing yet another case study, this article also contributes to the inductive development of neoclassical realism with regard to its predictability, since the mediating variables are assumed to routinely disrupt systemic-incentivized behaviour and encourages deviation. The results of this analysis indicate that the particular balancing strategy of Sweden can be explained by the mediating variable “entrenched national strategies from past periods“ suggested by Brawley (2009), and to lesser extent the one suggested by Dueck (2009), i.e. “ideological constructions within which national foreign policy is justified.” Thus, the findings contribute to solidify the anticipating and predictability framework of neoclassic realism. Additional case studies of small states pursuing integration strategies in face of external threats, without formally joining alliances, would serve to verify these results further. The question remains, whether neoclassical realism solely seek to account for anomalies derived from structural analysis, indicating that in the end, the force of structure always wins, or if neoclassical realism actually proposes wider new behavioural rules of greater lasting consequences. Can divergent behaviour be sustained indefinitely? In addition, the integrational framework that I developed in the analysis should be applied to other case studies, with similar geopolitical settings as Sweden, such as Finland, in order to solidify its value.