Fabian Virchow. Patterns of Prejudice. Volume 38, Issue 1, 2004.
Above all, there is no cause for resignation. What we have achieved over the last twenty years alone shows us that we are on the right path … If ten years ago it was only a hundred comrades who came together for a demonstration, today we are able to reach more than fifty times that number of like-minded people without any problems. And the future political success of a movement depends on its growth. Ten years ago, it was very embarrassing when our comrades were attacked by the red mob. Nowadays, we fervently look forward to such an attack to show them who has captured the streets in the meantime. Furthermore, it was not long ago that every nationalist was being beaten with the Auschwitz-club. Now the average citizen doesn’t even get excited about a selfproclaimed National Socialist because they have got used to us. These first small successes show us that we must carry on going to the public as often and in as great a number as possible.
This assessment by a leading German neo-Nazi shows that the neo-Nazi movement in Germany feels it has made significant progress over the last ten years in recruiting new supporters, in strengthening its positions and in organizing actions that are effective in winning publicity. This has given the movement a growing feeling of self-confidence, which it had been lacking for some time.
Post-war neo-Nazism
It was not until the 1970s that (small) groups emerged openly declaring their intention to rehabilitate the National Socialism of the pre-1945 period. The emergence of such groups followed the failure in the national elections of 1969 of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National Democratic Party of Germany), which, since its establishment in 1964 as a coalition of several far-right organizations and parties, had been the extreme right’s best hope. As a result of that electoral failure the political forces of the far right that had coalesced as the NPD split up into several different components. While the NPD faded into political insignificance, paramilitary Wehrsportgruppen appeared, the most notorious being the WSG Hoffmann, and new neo-Nazi circles were formed. During the late 1970s these neo-Nazi groups made their first attempt to build a nationwide organization, called the Aktionsfront Nationale Sozialisten/Nationale Aktivisten (ANS/NA, National Socialist Action Front/ National Activists), which became known to the broader public by carrying out some spectacular actions.
While the NPD continued to be insignificant, despite some electoral successes at regional level, two new party-political formations came into being. The Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union) and Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans) were founded, and enjoyed some electoral success at state level. The REP in particular tried hard to promote an image far removed from revolutionary nationalism ‘by playing down or shedding altogether its revolutionary programme and translating it as far as possible into the language of liberal democracy, producing a curious hybrid of democratic form with anti-liberal contents’. Accordingly, the REP has always hoped that the possibility of forming a coalition with the Christian Democrats might become a reality.
In 1989–90 the entire far right had expected to profit from the unification of Germany. Not only did they see themselves as champions of the (re-)united Germany, but they believed there was a unique opportunity to foment social unrest and political opposition to the ‘system’ among the people of the former East Germany, who were considered to be much less ‘contaminated’ by the ‘American way of life’ than their counterparts in the West. But as far as elections were concerned, only the DVU was able to enjoy temporary success by playing the ‘race card’. It was, in fact, the repeated, violent attacks on foreigners or, more precisely, on those who were visibly non-European, and pogroms like the ones in Hoyerswerda and Rostock that hit the headlines. Throughout the following decade, a rightist youth culture began to flourish, with its own cultural codes and its own music scene. Social scientists have estimated that—especially in the eastern regions of Germany—at least one-third of youth have deeply rooted racist attitudes and, even worse, feel supported in their prejudices in their immediate neighbourhoods. In some smaller towns, such neo-fascist groupings have acquired a kind of cultural hegemony locally; these local groups adopt such names as ‘Aryan Youth Alliance’, ‘Teutonic Comradeship’ or ‘National Youth Alliance’ in order to provide themselves with a clearly defined identity.
Therefore, by and large, it is not the far-right electoral parties like the DVU or the REP that draw young rightists. It is, rather, to this more violent part of the extreme right that young people feel attracted. The development of this neo-Nazi subculture with its own music and cultural codes has been complemented by new organizational structures and methods that are able to integrate locally active racist skinhead groups into the broader scene by providing meeting places and technical support. As early as the beginning of the 1990s, there were signs that (sections of) the far right could be understood as a cohesive social movement. Although this notion has yet to be explored sufficiently, there is no doubt that the organizational structures of the neoNazis, their public profile, the embedding of their groupuscules in a growing rightist youth subculture, and their methods of mobilization and integration have changed significantly since the late 1980s. Therefore, it is useful to examine groups with relatively few members but which nevertheless exert pivotal influence on the contemporary development and activities of the neoNazi movement in Germany.
New organizational structures
Since the beginning of the 1990s—and after brutal attacks on foreigners and asylum-seekers created a political climate in which some serious action by the state authorities was expected—seventeen neo-Nazi organizations have been banned in Germany. In addition, public rallies like the annual marches in honour of Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess have, since 1993, been regularly prohibited by the police. These developments have forced the leaders of neoNazi groups to look for other forms of political action.
Part of the neo-Nazi subculture turned to the NPD—which opened its doors to skinheads under its new leader Udo Voigt—thereby making use of the advantages provided by its status as a legally recognized political party and contributing to its significant radicalization. The NPD’s profile has changed significantly since 1995, especially when compared with its marginalized position during the 1970s and 1980s: its membership has climbed to 7,000, the average age of its membership has fallen, its newspaper Deutsche Stimme has been developed to cover a wider range of themes, its financial situation has been consolidated, and there has been a massive increase of public activity. The (great majority of the) NPD has, accordingly, opted for a clear ‘revolutionary’ profile and does not attach particular importance to respectability. Furthermore, in organizing its activities, the party has adopted the so-called ‘3 pillar concept’, namely, ‘the fight for the streets’, ‘the fight for hearts and minds’ and the ‘fight for election’. The ‘fight for the streets’ has been of particular importance during the past eight years because it has noticeably enlarged the scope of the NPD’s activity. Success in this ‘fight for the streets’— including the unrestricted distribution of hate material—is seen as the prerequisite for the implementation of the other two ‘pillars’.
Another part of the neo-Nazi subculture, meanwhile, developed ‘new’ organizational structures that were neither rigid nor highly centralized. The rhizomic character of this cellular and centreless network with ill-defined boundaries was utilized to make it invulnerable to state repression. Locally based groups, the so-called freie Kameradschaften (free fellowships), active mainly at the local or regional level, emerged, their co-operation guaranteed by regular meetings and by longstanding contacts between their leaders. The origins of this concept of freie Kameradschaften can be traced back to the early 1980s when a then leading neo-Nazi, Thomas Brehl, tried to keep the work of the ANS going following the imprisonment of its leaders, Michael Kühnen and Christian Worch.
Between the NPD and the freie Kameradschaften there exists a complex relationship that includes both co-operation and rivalry. While the party-political approach of the NPD has the advantage of providing a more reliable financial footing, better opportunities for the political training of cadres and a broader range of party publications, the other approach can afford to be more aggressive in public and is more attractive to young sympathizers who do not want to attend regular party meetings or fulfil other party duties.
From 1997 onwards, the concept of freie Kameradschaften, or freie Nationalisten (free nationalists)—with a black flag as shared symbol—has gained ground inside the German neo-Nazi movement. It has been realized most systematically by leaders and long-term supporters of the former Nationale Liste in Hamburg (banned 24 February 1995). Despite the fact that there is a growing number of (mostly young) people getting involved in far-right activities overall, there is still only a small group of neo-Nazi cadres who have been active for two or more decades. Under the banner of ‘Nationaler Widerstand’ (National Resistance), these neo-Nazis have created a number of points of reference for the broader neo-Nazi subculture and movement, including the so-called ‘info-telephones’, magazines (such as Zentralorgan) and the groupuscule Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland (ABND, Northern Germany Action Bureau). Through these closely linked activities the freie Kameradschaften are able to co-ordinate activities throughout the whole of Germany.
The groupuscule Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland as a relay station
The ABND is part of a loosely organized alliance, the Nationales und Soziales Aktionsbündnis Norddeutschland (National and Social Action Alliance of Northern Germany), that acts as an umbrella for neo-Nazi Kameradschaften and far-right skinhead gangs active in northern Germany. By definition there is no formal alliance or list of component groups. Instead meetings are held to coordinate activities as the occasion demands. The ABND, which is composed of a small but influential group of neo-Nazis, operates on a day-to-day basis, and sends out internal bulletins about forthcoming activities and rallies. It is not a ‘bureau’ in a physical sense but mainly an independent Internet website that is updated almost every day. As one of the organizers of the ABND, Tobias Thiessen, emphasized in a neo-Nazi magazine, neither the ABND nor the Nationaler Widerstand should be viewed as an organization, but primarily as a cluster of projects on the Internet; these projects, Thiessen claimed, would represent such a loose alliance ‘of so many groups, persons and projects that the system would not be able to construct “one organization with a particular goal” as the basis for a ban’.
Ideologically, the ABND is rooted in historical National Socialism. It reveres iconic Nazi heroes such as Rudolf Hess and Horst Wessel, and idealizes the SA (for its role in internal politics, especially in fighting the ‘Reds’), as well as the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS (as ‘the first European army’) in its commemorations. Activities are regularly organized around symbolic historical events, such as wreath-layings at war memorials or anniversary events marking Hitler’s march to the Feldherrenhalle in Munich. However, the ABND recently (in February 2003) produced leaflets for distribution in case of a war against Iraq; in them, the German federal armed forces were portrayed as servants of ‘US imperialism’ if they were to take part in the war, and the anti-war position included demands for the withdrawal of the US army from Germany, a rejection of the ‘Americanization’ of German culture and calls for government policies to serve so-called ‘national interests’. The shift from antisocialism to anti-Americanism is clearly related to the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and demonstrates the adaptability of the far right. As is the case with the ABND’s invocation of historical National Socialism, its fierce anti-Americanism—often laced with antisemitism—is not troubled by considerations of political correctness or ‘image’.
Like many other groupuscules, the ABND’s handful of dedicated ‘staff’ (or cadres) rely heavily on the Internet. Its Internet website provides links to other sites that give information and news about various neo-Nazi projects and activities. The most important of these are, apart from the ABND itself, the Freie Info-Telefon, the magazine Zentralorgan, the Braune Kreuz (Brown Cross) and Club 88. In particular, the ABND’s Internet page provides information about forthcoming marches and meetings of the neo-Nazi movement, as well as reports on those that have already taken place. The site also makes available electronic stickers that are easily downloadable, as well as leaflets and posters related to political campaigns initiated both by the ABND or the Nationales und Soziales Aktionsbündnis Norddeutschland. Recently, such campaigns have been directed against the use of German armed forces in Macedonia and against Germany’s involvement in the war against the Taliban and in Afghanistan. (Included in the material on offer are leaflets addressed to German soldiers.) In January 2003, in view of the increasing deployment of US and UK troops in the run-up to a war against Iraq, the ABND asked its supporters via the Internet to prepare actions against ‘US imperialism’.
The first national info-telephone (NIT) came into service in 1992. Announcements are updated at least once a week and, at present, there are about a dozen NITs in operation in Germany. The ABND started its own NIT in June 1999, calling it the Freie Info-Telefon (FIT) in order to distinguish it from other NITs in operation. The FIT disseminates its messages via both the Internet and a telephone line. The FIT Internet site is divided into the following sectors: ‘Greetings to friends’ (e.g. comrades in the United States), ‘Archive’, ‘About us’, ‘Regional’ activities, ‘Documentation’, ‘Reports & dates’—the most important sector, featuring press releases and articles about rallies and activities that have taken place—and ‘Current announcements’, which gives the dates of neo-Nazi demonstrations and provides short political commentaries.
In addition to FIT, the magazine Zentralorgan disseminates an openly neoNazi ideology. It preaches aggressive racial nationalism, antisemitism, antiAmericanism and anti-communism as well as glorifying National Socialism. Most pages of the magazine are filled with reports of rallies and actions. Some of them, however, provide information about Nordic or Teutonic mythology. In November 1999 the eighth edition of the Zentralorgan carried the headline ‘Jews out!—of Austria’ on its front page, and was banned by the authorities. Despite this ban, its average circulation may well have increased to around 4,000 copies per edition. It has become the most important neo-Nazi magazine in Germany.
The Braune Kreuz (Brown Cross) is another part of the neo-Nazi effort to build up a comprehensive infrastructure for activities. Modelled on the Red Cross, its members wear an armband with a brown cross on a white background. The male and female members are often given first-aid training and sometimes are even equipped with a vehicle that functions as an ambulance at large neo-Nazi rallies.
In northern Germany the freie Nationalisten operate Club 88 (88 signifying ‘Heil Hitler’) in Neumünster, a town north of Hamburg. Club 88 is a pub with regular opening hours three times a week that is attended not only by neoNazis but also by young people with racist attitudes from the surrounding villages and small towns. Concerts and meetings at the club are used to recruit new followers. When, in 2000, a campaign by anti-fascist groups together with measures taken by the state authorities threatened the continued existence of the club, the neo-Nazi movement in northern Germany, under the leadership of the ABND, launched its own campaign, which turned out to be a longrunning one, to secure the club’s survival. This campaign included two rallies in Neumünster, the distribution of leaflets, public debates on the subject of the proposed closure of Club 88 and some violent actions, all of which resulted in a situation in which the local administration was unable to close down the club lawfully and the anti-fascist campaign was unable to muster sufficient strength to close it down through popular protest. Never before had there been a comparable campaign by neo-Nazis to defend one of their public venues. Indeed, the establishment and ‘defence’ of non-clandestine meeting places like Club 88 is a major part of the neo-Nazi movement’s current strategy of promoting the notion that National Socialism is a political ideology like any other.
The importance of the ABND as a strategic protagonist derives from a combination of factors. First, it is well known in the neo-Nazi network that the ABND is organized by long-standing cadres who are respected because of their knowledge and political experience as well as their criminal convictions and prison sentences. Consequently, these ‘comrades’ have a huge amount of ‘street credibility’. Second, the ABND’s announcements of neo-Nazi rallies are always up-to-date and reliable, especially with regard to possible bans on marches. Third, the ABND offers downloadable leaflets, posters and stickers with a professional layout, thus making it easier for locally based groups—which often do not have the time, money or ability to do it themselves—to distribute hate material in their areas. And, finally, by formulating statements on such current issues as nuclear power, war and peace, or unemployment, the ABND provides this loosely organized subculture with a definite political orientation. It is an essential aspect of its groupuscular nature that the ABND forms part of a broader network of magazines, groups and publishing houses in the neo-Nazi milieu, and that there are numerous links between them all. In addition, the ABND has inspired the emergence of imitators in others parts of Germany, although, to date, none is of comparable relevance.
Out on the streets
The organization of marches and demonstrations throughout the country has been one of the neo-Nazi movement’s main activities in recent years. Despite the importance of these gatherings for the growth and public profile of the movement there has been very little research on them. This is all the more surprising since the greater frequency of demonstrations, the growth in the number of participants and the catchment area from which they come, and the broader range of themes adopted as pretexts for the demonstrations, all point to the fact that radical changes have taken place in the German neo-Nazi movement over the last decade.
In the 1980s few neo-Nazi marches attracted more than 300 people. Participants at that time came from all over Germany. The marches staged in commemoration of the war criminal Rudolf Hess—following his death in August 1987—were the first to attract larger numbers; starting with not more than 100 participants, the ranks grew to more than 1,000 in 1990 and 2,000 in 1991 and 1992. After serious mistakes by the police in 1993, when more than 500 neo-Nazis were able to demonstrate in front of Fulda cathedral despite a general ban on neo-Nazi demonstrations, every August throughout the 1990s saw heavy deployments of police on the streets to prevent the public Hess celebrations. Because of this determined police action and the resulting prosecutions, leading neo-Nazis began to question the value of organizing further national marches. It was not until the spring of 1997 that the NPD was able to bring more than 5,000 far-rightists, most of them neo-Nazis, out on to the streets of Munich to protest the controversial exhibition ‘War of Extermination: Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944’. Just as the neo-Nazis had been successful in mobilizing people outside their own milieu for the Rudolf Hess marches—Hess’s appeal was felt in much wider circles—so they were able to win much broader support for the protest against the Wehrmacht exhibition, which was thought even by elements of the conservative parties to disgrace Germany and its soldiers. The far-right protesters in Munich were triumphant over the success of the demonstration: it had been the biggest and most successful public demonstration by the extreme right since the early 1970s. Two leading neo-Nazis drew some optimistic conclusions after Munich:
Seen from a psychological point of view, Munich has been a major breakthrough. After four years of bans and growing repression the movement has found its feet again … The state can now consign years of attempts at intimidation to the archives and has to develop new tactics. Munich has brought a new self-confidence that will have an effect on every participant and will have wider repercussions.
This rosy view has been confirmed by subsequent developments. Not only have the far right, the NPD, and the freie Nationalisten especially, seen the numbers participating in their organized marches and demonstrations grow significantly, they have also been able to repeat the ‘Munich victory’ on several occasions, bringing several thousand demonstrators on to the streets of Rostock, Leipzig and Berlin. The self-confidence expressed in the above quotation was enhanced further when Christian Worch won the right to hold demonstrations, in a case decided at the Federal Constitutional Court in 2000. In the spring of 2001, the same court ruled that the fact that a rally was inspired by an open belief in National Socialism was not sufficient reason to ban it. A few months later, in August 2001, after ten years of bans, the neo-Nazi movement commemorated Rudolf Hess with a demonstration in the small Bavarian town of Wunsiedel where Hess is buried. While 900 neo-Nazis participated in that demonstration, the number rose to over 2,000 in 2002, and to more than 3,300 in 2003. It seems likely that Wunsiedel will again become the site of large neo-Nazi demonstrations in the coming years.
However, it is not only ‘traditional’ or historical themes that are used by the neo-Nazi movement as pretexts for public marches and rallies. The growing variety of issues used marks another significant change in the activities of the NPD and the freie Nationalisten since the mid-1990s. If one examines the themes of marches during the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, the following emerge as the main issues:
| Demonstration theme | Number of rallies | Number of participants |
| Celebration of National Socialism | 24 | 13,700 |
| Drugs and crime | 16 | 1,890 |
| Repression | 76 | 16,690 |
| Anti-communism | 36 | 6,030 |
| Anti-capitalism | 41 | 16,870 |
| Peace | 33 | 6,355 |
| Racism/nationalism | 32 | 5,340 |
| Environmental causes | 3 | 300 |
| Others | 17 | 3,825 |
| Total | 278 | 71,000 |
Once again, the progress of the neo-Nazi movement in Germany is reflected in these statistics. In general, an average of 255 neo-Nazis participate in rallies that take place almost every weekend, often in two or three cities simultaneously, and that bring together far-rightists from the surrounding regions.
The importance of these marches should not be gauged by their numerical aspect alone. They are of wider significance to the neo-Nazi movement, both in relation to the movement internally and to the society at large. As far as the latter is concerned, it is clear that rallies are seen by their neo-Nazi organizers as a good way to show the public that their movement still exists as a political force and that it is well organized and powerful enough to be able to organize such public meetings. They are also effective ways of publicizing an openly racist and antisemitic programme, and of trying to ensure that the general public become accustomed, and even habituated, to hearing the slogans of National Socialism. Writing about the former German Democratic Republic, a leading theoretician of the younger generation within the NPD pointed to the fact that ‘many towns and cities in Mitteldeutschland cannot be imagined without shaven-headed nationalists, so that the effect of deterrence, for the average citizen, is fading away’. Finally, rallies organized by neo-Nazis are seen as a stepping-stone to their winning the ‘fight for streets’ by intimidating political opponents. An aura of violence is generated by neo-Nazi speakers, and by the threatening slogans shouted during the marches, including ‘Don’t forget—we have names and addresses of the Reds’. To win the ‘fight for the streets’, the location and timing of marches are selected very carefully. When nearly 900 neo-Nazis attended a rally in Frankfurt on 1 May 2001, one of the organizers wrote retrospectively:
In 2001 I wanted to organize a big demonstration possibly in connection with a conference of the EU, the IMF or NATO in Germany because over the last years there had been big rallies in others countries against these capitalist–imperialist organizations (Seattle, Prague, France) and we should exploit this worldwide protest politically by joining in … and as a place for our rally we looked for a city that presently is a symbol for all that we want to overcome. In Frankfurt/Main capitalism is at home, the European Central Bank has its HQ there and the foreign mafia reigns. Since the end of the war, an anti-fascist quagmire has grown up in Frankfurt that virtually engulfs most of the relevant forces in the city: ‘the left’, the city council, the political parties, the police, the church, foreign gangs, Jews etc. A big march in Frankfurt, therefore, could not fail to be a provocation; we could count on the resistance of these forces of reaction. And we had the prospect of a big prize for our efforts: the destruction of the myth of ‘Frankfurt am Main’ as an ‘impregnable stronghold’ of the enemy of our people and, through that, their demoralization.
Furthermore, marches organized by the groupuscular neo-Nazi network serve the purpose of increasing recruitment, mobilizing support and adding cohesion to the movement. This ‘internal’ function has several aspects. First, organizing marches is seen as a way to motivate ‘young nationalists’. The feeling of success that is generated, especially by rallies with more than 1,000 participants, gives them ‘an incentive for months after to become active in a nationalist way in their region: to address and inform sympathizers, to recruit comrades-in-arms, and to do public relations work’. Second, neo-Nazi leaders believe that it is equally important for the movement to demonstrate its ability to act, and rallies are seen as part of such a demonstration: ‘Especially in the context of persecution by the state and terror by anti-fascists, it has become necessary to prove our unbroken will and capacity for action.’ Third, the planning and accomplishment of rallies (and other activities) are part of a strategy aimed at bringing the loosely organized cliques and gangs of young rightists that exist throughout the country closer together within the already existing networks and structures of the movement. Fourth, the organizing of marches is also useful for the selection of cadres. Young neo-Nazis who make a good impression as assistants to the leaders of the movement may become ‘cadres’—and therefore allowed to give speeches themselves—within a short period of time. To ‘achieve’ this status does not require a deep knowledge of National Socialist ideology and history. More important is ‘strength of character with an emphasis on loyalty and self-sacrifice, followed by strength of mind and a sturdy sense of responsibility’. Finally, most of the rallies also serve as paramilitary exercises: ‘It is therefore very important that all comrades remain in marching formation. And when a group or a bus arrives, they have to line up for roll call immediately. After all we are political soldiers.’ The neo-Nazis reluctantly refrain from wearing standardized uniforms in order not to violate the law:
Uniformed clothing raises the esprit de corps and the consciousness of being part of a large movement. At the same time, it emphasizes the requirement of subordinating oneself to the movement and its aims … it is not allowed for us to be uniformed at public meetings but it is surely only a matter of numbers. If we are out in the streets one day with several thousands of us in uniform, that will put an end to the ban.
The advantages of groupuscularity
The organizational approach of the freie Kameradschaften—including a certain number of ‘relay stations’ like the ABND—allows them to connect the large, and still growing, number of neo-Nazis who are almost continually politically active, mainly on a regional level, with the activists nationwide who have been operating for more than twenty years. Despite some limited attempts by the state authorities to counteract and outlaw the most violent groupuscules that form the backbone of the movement, the options available to the neo-Nazi movement are by no means exhausted. Rallies held in Leipzig and Frankfurt in 2001 demonstrated its capacity to act as direct and visible rivals to the NPD.
It is likely that at least three or four dates or issues will continue to be used in the coming years as occasions for bringing as many far-rightists as possible on to the streets in nationwide actions: the commemoration of the war criminal Rudolf Hess (August), May Day (1 May), World Peace Day (1 September) and the anniversaries of the war-time bombing raids against German cities. Again, a celebration of National Socialism will be combined with the dissemination of propaganda about the need for peace and social harmony. Marches, as well as other public events, will continue to unite the NPD and the freie Kameradschaften in an ongoing relationship marked both by co-operation and by a rivalry as to which of the two will be able to attract more followers.
The future of the extreme right in Germany, therefore, is likely to involve far-right parties such as the DVU and REP that show strong populist tendencies, as well as an active network of neo-Nazis. Apart from some organizations with traditional and formal hierarchical structures, the neo-Nazi scene will also comprise many different groupuscules that are more or less part of a broader network. Some, like the ABND, will be mainly of importance for disseminating information about forthcoming public activities and demonstrations, while others, like the Deutsche Akademie, will see their contribution to a revival of revolutionary nationalism in the organizing of seminars and workshops with a view to educating those neo-Nazis selected to join some kind of intellectual elite or vanguard. Further research into the activities of other groupuscules and their particular function within the extreme-right political culture will contribute to the development of a typology of groupuscules. Furthermore, while it is important to pay attention to particular groupuscules despite their small memberships and marginality, it should also be necessary to observe the de facto division of labour between them as part of a polycratic movement. This broader perspective should pay attention to the factors conditioning the ups and downs, the emergence and the disappearance, of the different groupuscules, and thereby provide not only information on single groupuscules in isolation, but also an insight into the various stages of groupuscular development and possible future trends.
By focusing on the ABND within the current neo-Nazi movement in Germany, it becomes clear that the ‘rhizomic nature’ of groupuscularization affords a number of advantages when compared with the traditional political party. First, the small autonomous cells, both ideological and active, are so diverse that every far-right ‘taste’ is catered for, from the ‘philosophy’ of Julius Evola to the heavy metal of the White Noise music business. All these groups and circles co-exist amicably and there is neither the need nor the desire to unite them in one single organization. Nevertheless, there are many possibilities for interaction between them because of such common denominators as a hatred of multiculturalism or a belief in white supremacy. Second, the great variety of extremist ideologies on offer gives supporters of different social backgrounds and levels of education the opportunity to join. Third, the movement (or some of its members) may easily create new groupuscules to satisfy newly emerging interests without needing to follow the lengthy procedures required to create a working group or sub-committee in a party-like (‘arborial’) organization. Fourth, the fact that the movement consists of a great number of mostly small or even virtual groups with little or no formal hierarchy or rigid organizational matrix makes it practically unbannable. Even if there is a prosecution or a ban against a groupuscule, only a very small sector of the movement would be affected. This, finally, is the main factor allowing the groupuscularized neo-Nazi movement to maintain its ideological radicalness.
After the recent failure of an attempt by the authorities to ban the NPD, both the party itself and the freie Kameradschaften see new opportunities for the dissemination of their hate material and for the organization of further actions. Some of the neo-Nazis who joined the NPD as an act of solidarity when the government took its decision to ban the party have already left it, and are swelling the ranks of the freie Kameradschaften.