H W Brands. Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume 34, Issue 1, March 2004.
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. Within 24 hours they controlled that small country. On January 16, 1991, President George Bush ordered U.S. military forces into battle to undo the Iraqi conquest and liberate Kuwait. The president’s decision for war came in several stages. In the first stage, which lasted hardly longer than it took for Saddam Hussein’s troops to subdue Kuwait, Bush determined that Iraqi soldiers must be expelled from Kuwait and that country’s sovereignty restored. In announcing this decision on the third day after the invasion, he did not say explicitly that force might be used to accomplish this goal, but the implication was obvious and deliberate. In the second stage of the decision process, which lasted from early August until late October, Bush deployed American forces to Saudi Arabia and orchestrated sanctions against Iraq. The deployment of forces, initially designed to defend Saudi Arabia against further Iraqi adventurism, increasingly afforded the Bush administration the capacity to wage war against Iraq; this capacity, together with the sanctions, was intended to signal the seriousness of the United States and its allies. The role of allies became more explicit during the third stage of the decision process, in which the administration pressed for, and in late November received, explicit authorization from the United Nations Security Council for the use of force to evict Iraq from Kuwait. In the final stage of the decision process, Bush focused on the home front, seeking-and, again, finally receiving-congressional endorsement of war against Iraq. Days after the vote, the president ordered American forces, in conjunction with those of several allies, to war.
“This Will Not Stand”
The Gulf War of 1991 grew out of a pair of miscalculations. American officials underestimated the depth of Iraqi grievance against Kuwait at the end of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, including the willingness of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to use force to address that grievance and extend Iraq’s power. And Hussein underestimated the affront he would give the United States and the international community by annexing Iraq’s neighbor. From these twin miscalculations arose the crisis that led to the Gulf War.
For years, Hussein had expressed displeasure against Kuwait and the status quo in the Gulf. He-and many other Iraqis-had long contested legitimacy of Kuwait, claiming that it had been stolen from Iraq to suit the needs of Britain and the other imperial powers. Kuwait constrained Iraq’s access to the Gulf, and it controlled a great deal of oil that Saddam and the other irredentists thought should be theirs. The Iran-Iraq war gave Iraq another complaint against Kuwait, for that war burdened Iraq with debt, which it hoped to lighten by raising oil prices. When prices did not rise sufficiently, Saddam accused Kuwait of conspiring with other producers to keep them down. In addition, he charged Kuwait with stealing oil from the Rumaila field, which underlay the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
Saddam’s displeasure was no secret. “He (and his people) are extremely bitter toward Kuwait, primarily because economically he is on the ropes,” explained Sandra Charles of the Bush administration’s National security Council, summarizing opinions expressed at an interagency meeting held July 27. Saddam had mobilized his army and sent 100,000 troops to the Kuwait border. But because the dictator had blustered in the past, to no real effect, American officials found it easy to assume that he was blustering again. Besides, the United States had taken Iraq’s side in the war with Iran, apparently leading some in Washington to believe that Saddam would not want to alienate a friendly superpower. The previous autumn Bush had greeted a new ambassador from Iraq and declared his hope of getting along with Saddam. “We have never met,” Bush said of Saddam, “but I have heard many interesting things about him. Our relationship has made steady progress.” In the weeks and clays before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, American officials continued to hope for progress. The American ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Hussein in Baghdad on July 25. Precisely what transpired at this meeting became a source of controversy. Although the State Department denied that Glaspie gave Saddam anything like a green light, an Iraqi transcript of the meeting had Glaspie telling Saddam, “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” The State Department refused to confirm the transcript, but neither did it challenge its essential accuracy. In any event, whatever Glaspie did or did not tell Saddam in Baghdad, it was beyond dispute that the Bush administration as a whole took no strong position on the subject. Asked whether the United States was prepared to defend Kuwait against a possible Iraqi assault, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler answered, “We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”
Even if there had been a commitment to Kuwait, the Bush administration would have had difficulty focusing on the troubles of the Gulf. “I must confess that my mind that evening was on things other than Iraq,” the president recalled of the night before the invasion. “We were in the midst of a recession and an ugly, partisan budget battle. Strained meetings with the congressional leadership were underway to find a compromise.” Nor was the rest of the world quiet. “There were other pressing foreign troubles catching my attention as well, such as a hostage-taking in Trinidad and a tragic civil war in Liberia, in which Americans were in danger.'” A senior administration official who declined identification summarized the mindset in Washington regarding the Gulf: “We were essentially operating without a policy. The crisis came in a bit of a vacuum, at a time when everyone was focusing on German unification.”
Even after the invasion, the administration was not sure at first how serious the crisis with Saddam was. “For a moment I thought, or hoped,” Bush said, “that his move was intended to bring greater pressure on Kuwait and to force settlement of their dispute, and that he might withdraw, having made his point.” This feeling informed a comment by Bush at a photo-op before an emergency meeting of the National security Council (NSC) on the morning the news of the invasion reached Washington. “The United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait,” the president said. “We call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all the Iraqi forces.” But when Helen Thomas of United Press International asked whether he contemplated military intervention, Bush answered, “We’re not discussing intervention. I would not discuss any military options even if we’d agreed upon them… But I’m not contemplating such action.” Thomas followed up: “You’re not contemplating any intervention or sending troops?” Bush repeated: “I’m not contemplating such action.”
Brent Scowcroft, the president’s national security adviser, afterward characterized Bush’s word choice as “not felicitous.” But the president’s statement was not inaccurate. “The truth is,” Bush admitted later, “at that moment I had no idea what our options were.”
Things became a little clearer in the NSC meeting. Director of Central Intelligence William Webster outlined the initial reactions of various other countries. The Arab League had condemned the invasion but stopped short of calling for forcibly reversing it. NATO was insisting on an Iraqi withdrawal. The British had warned that the invasion represented a grave threat to regional peace. Robert Kimmitt of the State Department explained that the several countries currently selling weapons to Iraq had been asked to stop shipments; the department was awaiting answers.
Treasury secretary Nicholas Brady, taking the view that the invasion of Kuwait was essentially about oil, proposed blocking exports of oil from Iraq and Kuwait. Other oil producers could be asked to expand output to make up the difference and prevent a price spike. Defense secretary Dick Cheney agreed that oil was the crux of the issue for the world, if not necessarily for the United States. “The rest of the world badly needs oil,” Cheney said. “They have little interest in poor Kuwait.”
Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf of the U.S. Central Command outlined the military options. Schwarzkopf explained that the United States had a few ships in the Gulf that could launch planes against Iraq or Kuwait, but these would have little effect. Any serious action would require a significant buildup.
Bush was not ready for military action. he suggested asking Congress to impose economic sanctions against Iraq and to support a United Nations resolution condemning the invasion. But he did not want to go further until he had a clear view of things on the ground and in the thinking of other governments.
That same day Bush was scheduled to meet British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Aspen, Colorado. En route, the president placed telephone calls to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan. Both leaders urged Bush not to overreact, but rather to allow the Arabs time to resolve the dispute among themselves. The president also called secretary of State James Baker, then visiting the Soviet Union, and the two discussed how to align the Kremlin with American efforts against Iraq. In Aspen he spoke to Thatcher, who advocated a hard line against Iraqi aggression. “If Iraq wins,” the prime minister said, “no small state is safe. They won’t stop here. They see a chance to take a major share of oil. It’s got to be stopped. We must do everything possible.”
Thatcher said much the same thing in a joint news conference with Bush. “Iraq has violated and taken over the territory of a country which is a full member of the United Nations,” the prime minister declared. “That is totally unacceptable, and if it were allowed to endure, then there would be many other small countries that could never feel safe.”
Bush was asked again whether he contemplated military action. “No,” he said. Yet this time he added: “We’re not ruling any options in, but we’re not ruling any options out.”
A short while later Bush called King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The monarch was angry and alarmed at the recent events. he felt betrayed by Saddam, who had indicated a willingness to talk the Kuwait problem out. “He is conceited,” Fahd said of Saddam. “He doesn’t realize that the implications of his actions are upsetting the world order. He seems to think only of himself. he is following Hitler in creating world problems… I believe nothing will work with Saddam but the use of force.” Yet when Bush offered to send a squadron of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, the king demurred. Bush thought this quite significant-and potentially worrisome. “King Fahd’s hesitation rang alarm bells in my head,” he recalled later. “I began to worry that the Saudis might be considering compromise, that they might accept the new status quo on their northern border if there were guarantees from Iraq. There is a historical Arab propensity to try to work out ‘deals.’ Even though we knew the Saudis well, and trusted them, we could not be completely certain what course they would take.”
The next morning the president reconvened the NSC. “It’s been a remarkable 24 hours,” he said. Reporting the reactions of the world leaders he had spoken with, Bush started with Britain’s Thatcher. “We are seeing eye-to-eye,” he said. The Arabs were distraught. “King Fahd, King Hussein, Mubarak, and [President AIi Abdullah] Saleh [of Yemen] and I talked at length. They expressed great concern and some other disquieting factors. Their reaction was hand wringing.”
By this time Bush, with the backing of Thatcher, had reached a critical conclusion. “The status quo is intolerable,” he told the NSC. But how to correct the status quo was the question. The Arab leaders were reluctant to see the United States intervene. Bush hoped indirect methods would work, but he feared they would not. “Diplomatic efforts are underway to get Saddam to back off. he is ruthless and powerful. Others’ efforts might not succeed to get his troops out and Kuwait’s ruler back in.” If those efforts did fail, the United States would probably have to take primary responsibility. Yet Bush wanted to move slowly. “We need to weigh the implications of taking this on directly.”
William Webster laid out the view of the intelligence community on Iraq’s capabilities and intentions. Apparently Webster’s brief intimated that none of the options available to the United States was especially appealing. (Because Webster’s comments were excised upon declassification of the minutes of this meeting, it is impossible to know just what he said.) Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s national security adviser, felt obliged to buck up the meeting. “I detected a note in the end that we may have to acquiesce to an accommodation of the situation,” Scowcroft said. “My personal judgment is that the stakes in this for the United States are such that to accommodate Iraq should not be a policy option. There is too much at stake.” To let the Iraqis keep Kuwait would place the structure of Middle Eastern politics at risk. “They would dominate OPEC politics, Palestinian politics and the PLO, and lead the Arab world to the detriment of the United States. … It seems while the alternatives are not attractive, we have to seriously look at the possibility that we can’t tolerate him succeeding.”
“I couldn’t agree more,” declared Deputy secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (Baker being still absent). “This is the first test of the post [Cold] war system. As the bipolar contest is relaxed, it permits this, giving people more flexibility because they are not worried about the involvement of the superpowers.” The Soviets had been Saddam’s sponsor and hence his potential watchdog. But the recent turmoil in the Soviet Union had prevented their keeping the leash tight. “Saddam Hussein now has greater flexibility because the Soviets are tangled up in the domestic issues.” To let Saddam get away with his theft of Kuwait would set an ominous precedent. “If he succeeds, others may try the same thing. It would be a bad lesson.” Eagleburger thought Saddam’s intentions were clear. “Saudi Arabia looks like the next target. Over time he would control OPEC and oil prices. If he succeeds, then he would target Israel. This is what we could face unless he leaves the scene. We need to think of this as a very, very critical time.”
Defense secretary Dick Cheney reiterated that oil was at the heart of Saddam’s actions. “He has clearly done what he has to do to dominate OPEC, the Gulf and the Arab world. He is 40 kilometers from Saudi Arabia, and its oil production is only a couple of hundred kilometers away. If he doesn’t take it physically, with his new wealth he will still have an impact and will be able to acquire new weapons, including nuclear weapons. The problem will get worse, not better.” Cheney anticipated the need for American military action, but he cautioned against taking such action lightly. “Looking at the military possibilities and options, we should not underestimate the U.S. military forces we would need to be prepared for a major conflict.”
White House Chief of Staff John Sununu concurred with Eagleburger and Cheney about the oil. “If he moves into Saudi Arabia, he would control 70 percent of Gulf oil; if he moves into U.A.E. [United Arab Emirates], then he would have 90-95 percent of the oil in the Gulf or 70 percent of all of OPEC. It would be very easy for him to control the world’s oil.”
Richard Darman of the Office of Management and Budget thought Saddam had already achieved effective control. “Even without that, he would be in control of world oil prices with Kuwait plus Iraq. Without a physical takeover [of Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.], he will gradually do this if he is not undone.”
Scowcroft turned the discussion to what the United States could do. “The reason we are here is to review our options now, and then go into what we can and what we can’t do.”
Eagleburger described the activities of Thomas Pickering, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. The security Council had passed a resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion, and now Pickering was circulating a resolution that would mandate economic sanctions against Iraq. “At this stage, it’s hard to imagine we will not succeed,” Eagleburger said. He added that Iran had denounced the invasion, and Iraq’s Arab neighbors were convening a “mini-summit” to consider the issue.
“The Arab summit might buy off Saddam?” Scowcroft inquired.
“Kuwait is not very popular in the Arab world,” Eagleburger answered. “So it might be difficult.”
Bush interjected, “They want an Arab solution to the question. Mubarak wanted 48 hours until after the summit with King Fahd. There was hand-wringing wanting us not to do anything. There was even more distance from Yemen… King Fahd was the exception. he was very firm. he equated Sadclam to the most evil person; he was very unflattering.”
No one at this meeting held much hope for an Arab solution. As Sununu pointed out, even the Saudis were reluctant to take a stand against Saddam, for fear of provoking him. “There’s one psychological problem in the government,” the chief of staff said. “They are unwilling to take such a step because they claim they don’t know what we are willing to do. We have to define at a minimum a package of steps we would commit to Saudi Arabia… Until they hear, they won’t take any action that is provocative.”
All present agreed that the United States and the United Nations would have to do something against Saddam. Treasury secretary Brady explained that the administration could freeze Kuwait’s assets to prevent Saddam from looting that country’s bank accounts. Energy secretary James Watkins described how an oil embargo against Iraq might be managed.
Dick Cheney and Colin Powell updated the military options. In the very short term, there was little the United States could hope to accomplish. American aircraft carriers were too far from Kuwait at present to threaten Iraqi forces. And even when they got closer their influence would be limited. “There is not a lot you can do with naval aircraft. They can reach some targets, but they won’t alter the military situation.” What the administration needed for real military influence was bases on the ground. “The options require access to ground facilities. We need Saudi Arabia to agree.” General Powell described two “force packages,” depending on what the administration wanted to accomplish.
The first, to deter further Iraqi action with Saudi Arabia, would require U.S. forces on the ground. This is the most prudent option… Saddam Hussein looks south and sees a U.S. presence. This would include an air package or U.S. troops to exercise to deter Iraq. The second would be to deploy U.S. forces against Iraqi forces in Kuwait to defend Saudi Arabia, or possibly go against Iraq. Looking at this option, this is harder than Panama or Libya. This would be the NFL, not a scrimmage. It would mean a major confrontation. Most U.S. forces would have to be committed to sustain, not for just one or two days. he is a professional and a megalomaniac. But the ratio is weighted in his favor. They also are experienced from eight years of war.
Bush questioned whether Saddam was as strong as Powell suggested. “Why weren’t they able to kick Iran?” the president asked.
“They tried and over time, they adapted and came out okay in the end,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman replied. “Another problem they had was a smaller population base.”
“I am not certain he is invincible,” Bush continued. “They tried for five years and could not get across a small part of land.”
“But Iran paid in manpower.”
The discussion then turned to where action against Saddam might ultimately lead. “The real solution must be long term,” Powell asserted. “It is an international and regional problem, so the whole world must realize this has got to be dealt with internationally. One question is, how individualized is this aggression? If he is gone, would he have a more reasonable replacement?”
“Iraq could fall apart,” Scrowcroft noted.
“It’s unlikely anyone else would have the same cult of personality,” suggested Richard Haass, the Middle East expert of the NSC.
Eagleburger remarked that one thing Saddam had going for him was his ferocious reputation. “Saddam is a tough son of a bitch,” the deputy secretary said. “He recognizes this asset.” Eagleburger went on to warn that Saddam might respond to any American pressure by seizing U.S. nationals in Kuwait and Iraq. There were approximately 3,800 Americans in Kuwait and about 500 in Iraq.
Bush declared that seizure of Americans would mark an intolerable escalation. “This would change the ball game,” the president said. “When Saleh mentioned Grenada, I said there were U.S. lives at stake. We should tell Saddam this would be a new ball game, and give him our bottom line. Whatever resolve it takes, with or without friends, we will do it. … This clearly changes everything. The change is that U.S. deaths and hostages will not be tolerated.”
That afternoon the president contacted other world leaders. Francois Mitterand agreed that Iraq’s absorption of Kuwait was intolerable. The French president supported an oil blockade, but he cautioned that if imposed, it had to be successful. Moreover, the Western powers must take care not to let Saddam position himself as the defender of the Arabs against the imperialists. Helmut Kohl of Germany counseled collective action. Toshiki Kaifu of Japan concurred. Turgut Ozal of Turkey was the most bellicose. Ozal demanded that Saddam “get his lesson.” he thought NATO should be brought in. “We should not repeat the mistakes made at the beginning of World War II.”
While Bush was phoning heads of various friendly governments, James Baker was persuading Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, to bring the Kremlin along. Collaboration did not come easily, cutting, as it did, against the grain of 40 years of Cold War rivalry. Moscow was reluctant to alienate its primary Middle Eastern client, and-like Washington-it feared for the safety of its nationals. But in the end Shevardnadze joined Baker in a statement condemning “this blatant transgression of basic norms of civilized conduct.” (Baker assumed Shevardnadze had cleared the statement with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Only later did he learn that Shevardnadze had acted on his own authority.)
The Soviet statement was crucial. “It dramatically put the two superpowers on the same side of a major crisis for the first time since the Cold War began,” Scowcroft remarked later. In every previous Middle Eastern crisis, Washington had to worry about Moscow backing the other side, with the potential for escalation such opposition entailed. The removal of that worry freed the Bush administration to focus on Iraq.
The next day-Sunday, August 5, the president delivered what became the defining statement of American aims for the duration of the crisis. At the end of another question-and-answer session, in which reporters were pressing him about the administration’s tactics in dealing with Iraq, Bush raised the discussion to the level of strategy. “I’m not going to discuss what we’re doing in terms of moving forces, anything of that nature,” he said. “But I view it very seriously, not just that but any threat to any other countries, as well as I view very seriously our determination to reverse out this aggression.” Without mentioning names, he assured the reporters that “there are an awful lot of countries that are in total accord with what I just said… We will be working with them all for collective action.” he closed: “This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.”
Bush’s August 5 announcement set the stage for everything that followed. In deciding, and then publicly announcing, that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would not stand, Bush put the United States on the path to war. Assuming he did not change his mind, the president’s words indicated that if other measures-diplomacy, economic sanctions-failed, the United States would fight to evict Saddam from Kuwait. “Afterward, Colin Powell remarked that he felt I really had declared war on Iraq that Sunday,” Bush recalled. “It was a widespread reaction.” Bush agreed that his words contained the possibility of war. “I don’t know if I had yet determined that use of force would be required. After all, the UN was still taking action and I hoped the matter could be ended peacefully with political and economic measures. It was still too early to make that call. On the other hand, I certainly felt that force could be necessary.” This attitude informed administration actions during the next several months. “I never wavered from the position that I would do whatever it took to remove Iraq from Kuwait.”
Shield and Sanctions
From the start of the crisis, Bush recognized that removing Saddam from Kuwait would be easier if the United States had help. This would be true if force were required; it would be true even regarding the diplomacy and sanctions Bush hoped would render force unnecessary. he was heartened by the swift condemnation by the UN security Council of the Iraqi invasion, and by the imposition of sanctions by America’s allies. But Bush and his advisers recognized that security Council resolutions and economic sanctions would have added bite if combined with the credible threat of force; and by the time of the president’s August 5 declaration, they were hard at work lining up partners for possible military action against Iraq.
The essential first partner was Saudi Arabia. Needless to say, the defense of Saudi oil fields would be facilitated by permission to base American troops and planes in that country. And an invasion of Kuwait, should matters come to that, would be nearly impossible without a Saudi launching pad. Moreover, an American presence in Saudi Arabia would prevent Saddam Hussein from striking out against that kingdom as economic sanctions began to take hold. In Bush administration thinking, American forces in Saudi Arabia would be the anvil against which the hammer of sanctions would beat.
But the Saudis were hesitant. On the day Bush vowed to oust Saddam from Kuwait, the president called King Fahd from Camp David. Bush pressed Fahd to accept American troops. The king was coy. he appreciated the American offer but wanted to discuss the matter further. Fahd was too polite to say so, but it became apparent that he doubted American resolve. he had watched the Americans land in Lebanon in the 1980s only to be withdrawn after a suicide attack on their base killed 200 American marines. If he allowed the Americans to enter Saudi Arabia and the Americans showed no more courage than that, he might be left facing a vengeful Saddam alone.
Bush addressed this issue in his conversation with Fahd. After discussing various diplomatic details, the president said, “Another point I want to make here involves a word of honor. The security of Saudi Arabia is vital-basically fundamental-to U.S. interests and really to the interests of the Western world. And I am determined that Saddam will not get away with all this infamy. When we work out a plan, once we are there we will stay until we are asked to leave. You have my solemn word on this.”
Bush’s promise broke through Fahd’s reservations, and a short while later the Saudi ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar, relayed the king’s agreement to accept American troops.
Bush took this agreement into a late-afternoon session of the NSC. Much of the meeting involved discussion of covert operations against Iraq; this part of the record was withheld upon declassification. But the president and his advisers also discussed the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf. Scowcroft related what he called the “major breakthrough” of Fahd’s decision to allow the basing of American troops and planes in Saudi Arabia. After JCS Chairman Powell described the logistics of landing American forces in Saudi Arabia, Scowcroft asserted, “Now is the time to get the Saudis everything we have.” James Baker, back from the Soviet Union, agreed. “Absolutely,” the secretary of state said.
There was some difference of opinion at this meeting as to whether Saddam intended the conquest of Saudi Arabia. Baker thought he did. “The only thing that will influence Saddam is our deterrent,” Baker said. Bush was not sure anyone could predict what the Iraqi leader would do. “Saddam is irrational…” the president said. “We are dealing with a madman.” Powell seemed less concerned about an invasion of Saudi Arabia. “Even after he is in Saudi Arabia, we could kick him out,” the general said. It was Scowcroft who summarized the dual purpose of an American military presence in Saudi Arabia. “We want to deter him from invading and protect Saudi Arabia so when we begin to clamp down economically, Saddam has no military option,” the national security adviser explained.
The second half of the dual purpose seemed the more important as the days passed. On August 6, William Webster told the NSC, “In the last 24 hours, the situation has stabilized. There is no real increase in [Iraqi] preparations at the Saudi border.” The director of central intelligence acknowledged that Saddam did not appear about to abandon Kuwait. “Iraq still has not withdrawn any significant forces from Kuwait and may be augmenting them with units taken from its border with Iran.” Moreover, there were indications that Saddam was preparing for a large war: Iraqi reserves were being called up, and bases near Saudi Arabia were being improved. “But we have not yet seen their Republican Guard units reforming for attack… There are no significant troop movements.”
Discussion turned to economic sanctions. Nicholas Brady summarized what had been done thus far. The European Community and Japan had joined with the United States to embargo oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait. The United States and Japan had embargoed non-oil trade as well, but other countries had yet to follow. Several governments had frozen Kuwaiti assets, now in Iraqi hands. The United States, Britain, France, and the EC had frozen Iraq’s own, smaller assets. The United States, Germany, and Japan had cut off trade credits to Iraq.
The critical issue was oil. And it was a delicate issue. The Bush administration wanted to prevent Saddam from reaping the benefits of his seizure of Kuwait, which was to say the revenues from the sale of Kuwait’s oil. And as punishment for invading Kuwait, the administration intended to block the sale of Iraqi oil. But in blocking oil shipments from Iraq and Kuwait, it risked driving America-and much of the industrial world-deeper into recession. The mere threat of oil disruptions was already unsettling economic affairs. “The financial markets are down badly,” Brady said. “The price of oil is rising. The effect of petroleum and home heating oil price increases is already 0.5% in the C.P.I. [Consumer Price Index}, or 0.6-0.7% of G.N,P. This would bring our growth down toward zero.” Richard Darman of the Office of Management and Budget added, “Unless the Saudis increase production, the effect on us will be a recession.” Darman added that the United States and its allies were at a disadvantage in an economic war against Iraq. “Democracies and market-oriented economies are less prepared to wage this kind of battle than non-market economies, especially given that modern communications will affect us more than it will them. We need to assess not simply the change in Iraq’s welfare, but what it takes to starve them. We will be more responsive to ordinary pain than they will.” Darman continued, “The key will be giving them extraordinary pain. We will therefore need to target their key vulnerabilities.”
James Baker interjected, “But food will be exempt.”
“No,” rejoined Richard Haass. “Under the security Council resolution, we can block food shipments except those that can be shown to be for humanitarian purposes.”
Although Chief of Staff Sununu remarked, “The key is food,” no one else pursued this issue, perhaps because most of them recognized the political cost to the United States of embargoing food to hungry Iraqis. Darman thought the answer lay in pressuring the Saudis to step up their oil output. “It is essential that Saudi Arabia increase production up to capacity. If we succeed, we will punish Iraq more than we will suffer.” Yet he added that such a solution would be only temporary, until Saddam was ejected from Kuwait. “You have to get this guy out of there.”
Bush concurred. “Yes, that is the bottom line …” he said. “Darman is making a point I agree with, that all will not be tranquil until Saddam Hussein is history.” Yet the president mused, as the meeting ended, “It is one thing to defend and quite another to liberate.”
Two days later, Bush publicly announced his decision to defend Saudi Arabia. “At my direction,” he told the nation, “elements of the 82nd Airborne Division as well as key units of the United States Air Force are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia.” Stressing the defensive aspect of the deployment, the president essentially repeated: “I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland.” Later in the speech he was still more specific: “The mission of our troops is wholly defensive.”
Yet even while emphasizing the defensive nature of the deployment, the president implicitly opened the door to offensive action. Four principles guided American policy, he said. “First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. second, Kuwait’s legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime [established by the Iraqis}. And third, my administration, as has been the case with every President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad.”
Bush cautioned that rooting Iraq out of Kuwait would not be easy. “Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world’s second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It’s the fourth largest military in the world.” Yet the stakes in the Gulf were very high. “Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi threats.” The world had learned the hard way that aggression must be resisted. “Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.”
For now the United States would rely on sanctions. “These sanctions …” Bush said, “have the potential to deny Iraq the fruits of aggression, while sharply limiting its ability to either import or export anything of value, especially oil. I pledge here today that the United States will do its part to see that these sanctions are effective and to induce Iraq to withdraw without delay from Kuwait.”
A Coalition for Force
To make the sanctions effective, the administration sought to combine them with the credible threat offeree. The initial deployments to Saudi Arabia were plainly defensive, designed to prevent an Iraqi thrust into that country. But as the American presence grew, from the airborne units landed in August to the heavy armor brought by ship during September and early October, the United States began to acquire an offensive capability in the Gulf. Although this shift was inadvertent at first, it became deliberate following a late October meeting between Bush and his top civilian and military advisers. “The time has come,” the president said, “to determine whether we continue to place most of our eggs in the sanctions basket, which would take a good deal more time as things now stand but would possibly avoid the risks and cost of war, or whether we raise the pressure on Saddam by pressing ahead on both the military and diplomatic tracks.” Each course had risks; each held certain promises. “I realize that if we do give Saddam some kind of a deadline, we are in effect committing ourselves to war. I also realize that by making such a threat and preparing for it, we may also increase the odds that Saddam agrees to a peaceful solution. Indeed it may be necessary to push matters to the brink of war if we are to convince Saddam to compromise. ”
Bush asked whether sanctions were working and whether they would get Iraq out of Kuwait. James Baker thought not. “I believe sanctions will not get him out in a time frame we can accept,” the secretary of state said. Baker posed a second, more political question: “How long will it take to be able to say that we have given sanctions a chance?” To this, Dick Cheney responded, “February to March.”
The defense secretary went on to outline the developing military options. “We have a defensive force in place now,” he said. “We can do an air campaign now; we can do a feint to the west now. But for a real offensive, we will need significant additional forces three more divisions.” Cheney pointed out that the buildup he described would be difficult to sustain. “We could have an additional hundred and forty thousand people in place by January 15,” he said. But he couldn’t keep the whole force there for long without its capability degrading. Already some units required rotation.
Colin Powell agreed. “We are at a fork in the road,” the JCS chairman said. “We either have to rotate or build up.”
Baker thought a buildup, combined with a deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, would underline the administration’s determination. “An ultimatum, plus major force buildup, would make it clear we’re serious,” he said. The diplomat in him then added, “But I guess we shouldn’t call it an ultimatum.”
Bush accepted the buildup. “Defense should go ahead and move its forces,” he said. But he wanted to do so with a minimum of fuss. “We will tell the press that our forces are continuing to move, but there have been no decisions… The press line will be that troops continue to go in, and we’re reviewing the situation.”
The decision to develop an offensive capability in the Gulf was a unilateral one, but the administration at once began seeking multilateral endorsement. From this meeting Baker set off on a 12-nation tour designed to drum up support for a security Council resolution imposing a deadline for Saddam to evacuate Kuwait. His most important stop was Moscow. Though the Bush administration was happy for the continuing support of Britain, France, and the other NATO allies, American officials saw the Soviet Union as the key to international solidarity-regarding Iraq, but also regarding the “new world order” the president was trying to forge. A de facto U.S.-Soviet alliance would make all sorts of things possible that had not been possible during the Cold War.
Baker’s Moscow visit was strange yet enlightening. “I had long and rather extraordinary conversations with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev today,” he wrote to Bush on November 8. The Soviet foreign minister and president initially expressed skepticism regarding an ultimatum on Iraq. “It’s not that they reject the idea of setting a deadline or even posing an ultimatum,” Baker wrote. “It’s that they still feel it’s too early to do that.” Baker explained to the Soviet leaders the problems inherent in delay. If military action did not begin before the end of February, he said, it probably could not start for several months after that. The rainy season, then Ramadan, and then the hajj to the Saudi holy sites would make fighting physically or politically difficult. The American secretary added that if the U.S. had to withdraw some forces as a result of the long delay, Saddam would take this as a moral and political victory. This argument brought a response. “Shevardnadze began to change his position,” Baker reported.
But Gorbachev remained skeptical. he liked the idea of a new world order, yet he hoped that it would not have to be inaugurated by a war.
“I answered him in two ways,” Baker told Bush. “First, it’s hard to establish recognized norms of civilized and peaceful behavior if a brutal aggressor who quite simply rejects these norms is allowed to succeed because the will to use force is absent. second, that the only way to produce a peaceful outcome-our clear preference-was to convince Saddam that if he didn’t withdraw peacefully, he would be forced out militarily. Only when Saddam becomes convinced that a massive military response was imminent would a peaceful outcome become possible.” Baker suggested framing a resolution that the security Council could pass within a few weeks authorizing force, but giving Saddam perhaps two months to comply. “Saddam would realize that the international community would support the use of force and he would have only a limited amount of time to avert a certain defeat. Nothing else would signal him so starkly and credibly. And yet a resolution passed now, but operative only after the beginning of the year, would also show that we had given him every chance to withdraw peacefully, and indeed that we had given sanctions a fair amount of time [five and one-half to six months} to work.”
Shevardnadze accepted the logic of Baker’s arguments. “I felt Gorbachev, too, was being persuaded by them,” Baker added. “But he didn’t want to be pushed into making a decision today.”
The Soviet president would make the decision soon enough. Baker visited China, France, Britain, and eight other countries besides the Soviet Union on this trip, securing votes for the security Council resolution. The Chinese were reluctant; Baker said a veto would severely damage U.S.-Chinese relations. “We don’t hold it against our friends that they are not joining us,” he told the Chinese foreign minister. “But we do ask that they not stand in the way.” The French were supportive. “Their position on the next steps in the Gulf is remarkably similar, indeed almost identical, to our own,” Baker wrote Bush.44 Margaret Thatcher thought another security Council resolution unnecessary. But she let Baker know that Britain was with the United States all the way.”
When the resolution came before the security Council, the necessary votes were in place. At the last minute, Gorbachev-still hoping to avert a war-tried to push the deadline back from January 1, as American officials proposed, to January 31. Mitterand recommended a middle course: January 15. Because the U.S. buildup would not be complete until then, the Bush administration had no difficulty accepting the compromise. Gorbachev agreed, as well. With Baker in the chair (which fortuitously rotated to the United States at this time), the security Council on November 29 adopted Resolution 678, declaring Iraq “in flagrant contempt of the security Council” and authorizing member states of the United Nations “to use all necessary means” to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. The vote was twelve in favor, two (Cuba and Yemen) against, and one (China) abstaining.
The Home Front
One reason the administration pushed so hard for a resolution explicitly authorizing force was that critics at home were questioning the need for war and the basis for waging it. From the moment in early August when he decided that force might ultimately be necessary to deal with Saddam, Bush devoted almost as much attention to the domestic politics of the crisis as to the international diplomacy. he had been in Congress during the Vietnam War and had observed that public and congressional opinion could be invaluable to a president’s war policies if supportive, and fatal if obstructive. he remembered how Lyndon Johnson had brought Congress on board with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964, and he directed his aides to consider how Johnson’s precedent might apply to the current crisis. “I realized the Vietnam War was different,” he said later, “but his effort made a big impression on me, and I began to think about seeking a similar congressional vote of support.” Initial soundings revealed broad indignation at Saddam but little willingness to commit to the use offeree. Bush determined to press on. “We do not want to unleash a War Powers debate, nor do most of the senators, so we’re going to keep working the problem,” he wrote in his diary. “My gut wonder is, how long will they be with us? How long will the Senate stay supportive, or the House? As long as the people are with us, I’ve got a good chance. But once there starts to be erosion, they’re going to do what Lyndon Johnson said: they painted their asses white and ran with the antelopes.”
The politics of the Gulf crisis were complicated by a bitter fight over the budget. Campaigning for president in 1988, Bush had pleased the Republican faithful by pledging, “Read my lips: no new taxes.” But then the country went into recession and the budget dived deeper into deficit, and the president felt obliged to reconsider his pledge. Neither his fellow Republicans nor the Democrats made it easy. “I am looking like a sucker, criticized by my own people and criticized by the Democrats,” he lamented in his diary.
While fighting the battle of the budget, Bush sought to educate Congress and the public regarding Iraq. He met frequently with members of Congress, and he spoke repeatedly to the American people. On September 11 he addressed both audiences simultaneously in a televised speech before a joint session of Congress. The president reiterated his four objectives in the Gulf-Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait’s government, the security of the Gulf, and the safety of Americans-before adding:
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective-a new world order-can emerge: a new era-freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.
By linking the crisis in the Gulf to his vision of a new world order, Bush hoped to heighten its significance and thereby mobilize political support behind his anti-Saddam policy. Initial reactions were not promising. While no one could contest the appeal of the future Bush described, many did question whether it was feasible and whether the road to this future ran through the Gulf. Democrats in Congress who remembered the Vietnam era as well as Bush did were not about to cede control of foreign policy to the president. And much of the public remained puzzled over where Kuwait was and why it mattered.
Bush and his advisers tried to answer the doubts, but did not always help their own case. After Baker, worn out from explaining the potential economic implications of Saddam’s aggression, exasperatedly summarized the issue in the Gulf as “jobs,” critics leaped on the administration for mercenary motives. And when Bush repeatedly referred to Saddam as another Hitler, some wondered whether he was not over-personalizing the problem, overreacting, or misunderstanding history.
Congressional Democrats resisted the administration’s push toward war. Georgia’s Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, ordered televised hearings on the Gulf crisis and the preparations for war. Nunn and the committee summoned several distinguished witnesses who challenged the rationale for war. Admiral William Crowe, Powell’s predecessor as JCS chairman, and others projected high casualties in a war against Iraq and contended that sanctions should be given more time.
Bush doubted the good faith of some of the critics. “Sam Nunn, I think running for president, is trying to decide how hard to push,” Bush wrote in his diary. Yet other critics had bona fides he could not dispute: “Bob Kerrey, a true war hero in Vietnam and John Glenn, also a hero, ‘no force, no force.'” Bush was of two minds regarding the role of Congress in a decision for war against Iraq. “If we fail [to remove Saddam from Kuwait], we would be reduced to total impotence, and that is not going to happen,” he wrote. “I don’t care if I have one vote in the Congress. That will not happen.” But in almost the next sentence he said, “I want the Congress involved. The big debate goes on about the declaration of war, but the big thing is, we need them; we want them; and I’ll continue to consult.”
Because Congress had adjourned by the time the security Council voted to authorize force against Iraq, the president had to decide whether to call the lawmakers back for a special session. Bush consulted senior legislators of both parties, who offered different opinions. Speaker of the House Thomas Foley wanted to give sanctions more time, and anyway worried that a lame duck session would cause mischief. Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole thought the president should bring the legislature back. Bush opted against a special session, and he even toyed with the idea of bypassing Congress entirely. “I was confident I did not need a resolution,” he wrote. “The United States had used military force about two hundred times in its history and there had been only five declarations of war.” But politics and diplomacy persisted in pushing him toward the legislature. “For the country’s sake, and to show Saddam we were speaking as one voice, I wanted Congress on record, and before the deadline passed.”
To facilitate a favorable vote, Bush agreed to send Baker to Geneva to meet Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi foreign minister. The president thought he had already exhausted all reasonable avenues of diplomacy. “But we should go the extra mile before asking our service men and women to stand in harm’s way,” he declared in a radio address to the nation on January 5, 1991. “We should, and we have.” all the same, Bush made clear there would be no last-minute compromise, at least not on the American part. “This will not be secret diplomacy at work. secretary Baker will restate, in person, a message for Saddam Hussein: withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally and immediately, or face the terrible consequences.”
The Geneva meeting produced nothing by way of resolution to the crisis. “Aziz gave no indication during our more than six hours of discussions of any flexibility or readiness to comply with relevant UNSC [UN security Council] resolutions,” Baker cabled Bush. Though the foreign minister complained of American actions and threats, he appeared under no illusion as to American resolve. “Aziz allowed that war may be ‘destiny’ or ‘fate.'”
The meeting, however, gave the Bush administration credit for patience in the service of peace. Hard upon the news of the failed meeting in Geneva, administration allies in the Senate and House introduced measures authorizing the use of force. The administration worked assiduously to secure approval. “We expended enormous effort to ensure a favorable vote,” Brent Scowcroft remembered. “Almost no members of Congress, except those about whom we were certain, went without multiple efforts to persuade him or her that the national interest lay in a positive vote. The President was on the phone constantly, and met with many members.”58 The president’s arguments were much as before, with special emphasis now on national unity. “The national interest is to be found in signaling Saddam that we are united and resolute,” Bush told a group of congressional leaders in the Oval Office. “I am truly concerned that otherwise we risk encouraging the notion that we lack the will to confront him.”
Although Democratic leaders in Congress held out against war, they could not keep the rank and file in line. By joint resolution, Congress on January 12 authorized the president “to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations security Council Resolution 678.” The vote in the House was not especially close: 250 in favor, 183 against. But the margin in the Senate was nerve-wrackingly slender: 52 in favor, 47 against.
Launching Desert Storm
Three days later, with Saddam’s army still in Kuwait, Bush wrote in his diary:
There’s no way to describe the pressure. It’s 9:45 the night of the 15th. Deadline runs out in two hours, 15 minutes… The reports from Baghdad are defiant. People marching in the streets-turning out. Yet their faces smile and they chant. And I think, oh God, save their lives. There’s a kid that comes on television. I think it is an Asian child. It haunts me because it looks like an Iraqi child. And I say, pray to God, pray to God that we will be accurate and not hit that child.
The next day the president unleashed an air assault on Iraq and Kuwait. In announcing the start of the war, Bush asked rhetorically, “Why act now? Why not wait?” he answered his own question. “The world could wait no longer… While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. he subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities… While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own economy… While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.”
As he had said before, so he repeated: that much more was at stake in the Gulf than the sovereignty of Kuwait. “We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order… Even as the planes of the multinational forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we will prevail but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor.”
Political speeches typically hide as much as they reveal, but in this case Bush’s remarks fairly summarized the basis of his decision for war. The president was offended by Saddam’s brutalization of Kuwait; he feared the consequences for the global economy of Iraq’s control of a large part of the world oil supply; he hoped the end of the Cold War would inaugurate a new order marked by reason rather than force. These considerations had been present in Bush’s thinking from the outset of the crisis; the long delay in going to war reflected the president’s desire to marshal international and diplomatic support for action against Iraq, and to determine whether means short of war would induce Saddam to withdraw. The administration’s efforts in this regard were quite successful. The security Council blessed the American-led action (more than 30 countries took part in the war against Iraq), and Congress likewise gave its explicit approval. Though Bush afterward contended that he would have gone to war without Congress and without the UN, having those bodies on his side certainly made his decision for war easier. The president had declared very early in the crisis that the final decision would be Saddam’s. In a sense he was right, for when Saddam refused to withdraw, Bush merely-if going to war ever deserves that adverb-implemented a decision he had made in principle months before.