Youngshik D Bong. Korean Studies. Volume 32, 2008.
Introduction
The transition to democracy and the experience of globalization since the 1980s brought South Korea as a nation to self-appraisals and new interpretations of the ways its national identity is defined. Korea’s self-identification as an advanced country, a democracy, and a globalized society has also provided general conditions instrumental for the general public to become comfortable and sympathetic with the spirit and vocabulary of human rights such as equality, decency and diversity. Rising public attention and acceptance of human rights issues has resulted in discernable political changes in the areas of gender equality, political freedom in North Korea, migrant foreign workers, overseas Koreans, and the handicapped, to name a few. Yet in the shadow of such welcoming developments, there is still a minority group that fails to receive comparable public attention: sexual minorities.
Considering that Korean individuals “coming out” and the issue of homosexuality addressed as part of pop culture and lifestyle are very recent phenomena in Korea, the dearth of public attention and scholarly studies on sexual minorities’ political rights may not be so surprising. The political visibility of the gay and lesbian population in Korea remains minimal, as symbolized by the fact that no official or reliable statistics to measure the actual size of their population exists. The Korean government does not publish any official statistics regarding the size of the gay and lesbian population that are based upon nationwide and rigorous methods. It estimates that there are approximately 110,000 non-heterosexuals in Korean society, but that is a very rough figure, inferred from the proportion of the homosexuals and transgenders to the total population of people infected with HIV.
Sexual minorities in Korea have been an unpopular subject in academic fields, too, and have long been predominately discussed and examined as a peripheral topic. The issue of sexual minorities in Korea was introduced as one of many human rights topics for intellectual and scholarly discussions for the first time in an academic publication with the appearance of Ilsang-ui ogap kwa sosuja inkwon ui ilkwon (Everyday Oppression and Minority Rights), an edited volume on human rights conditions in Korea published by the Korean Foundation of Human Rights in 2000. As of 2008, there had been only one book publication that focused solely on sexual minorities: Songchok sosuja inkwon (Sexual Minority Rights), an edited volume published in 2002, examines the legal status of sexual minorities and cases of discrimination against them. In 2005, the National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea (NHRC) published a report titled Preliminary Study of Human Rights of Sexual Minority that surveys cases of discrimination against sexual minorities. As for academic writing in English on sexual minorities, Young-gwan Kim and Sook-ja Hahn offered historical and cultural narratives of how Koreans think about homosexual life, and Dong-jin Seo explored the multifaceted conceptualization of homosexuality in Korea by exploring the effect of globalization as a cultural phenomenon.
This article builds on the existing scholarly literature on gay rights in Korea by discussing the plight of sexual minorities and their resistance in the military, mass media, the educational system, and the courts. To complement previous scholarly studies on the subject from a different perspective, it examines the key points of contention and obstacles to underpinning the current state of sexual minorities and discusses the likely future trajectory of the gay rights movement in Korean society.
Homosexuality in Korean Society
The gay rights movement owed its beginning to the new political atmosphere created by the beginning of political liberalization after 1987. A quarter century of military authoritarianism created political conditions that were hostile and oppressive to all minorities in society, including sexual minorities. Political conditions kept minority issues as minor issues. The authoritarian regimes stifled liberal political agenda and democratic ideals from spreading while advocating national solidarity and political stability. It was a time when the prodemocracy movement was synonymous with an antigovernment movement. The main, if not the only, goal of the movement was to oust the military dictatorship and restore constitutional order, leaving little room for minority rights to be voiced. But military authoritarianism was particularly inimical to sexual minorities because the military regimes in Korea adopted and enforced the neo-Confucianism of the Choson dynasty, which disparages homosexuality because it disrupts the kinship tradition that emphasizes gender hierarchy, duty, and family over personal priorities and preferences. Seungsook Moon asserts that the Korean military government exploited and reproduced Confucian ideology in order to carry out military and industrial mobilization of the populace. Such mobilization, in turn, solidified the binary and hierarchical conceptualization of gender that regards homosexuality as a foreign and un-Korean value.
The end of military authoritarian regimes in 1987 provided an opening for gays and lesbians to work together to dispel hostile and debasing labels on the gay population and to build a nascent level of solidarity among them. Homosexual associations before the democratic opening in the late 1980s were basically small company-based associations and fellowship-oriented, local gatherings whose foundational goals were detached from political representations. For example, in the 1970s, Younhoe (Female Taxi Drivers’ Association) was organized among lesbian cab drivers. The association, which tried to promote members’ financial self-reliance and the warmth of communal ties, lasted for approximately ten years. It appears that the members regarded their sexual identity and orientation in negative terms, viewing themselves as people with the “third sex” or “wrong birth.” It’aewon Community, created in 1980 and open to both gays and lesbians, was also basically a social circle for fellowship among high-income, white-collar members. Then the surging fear of AIDS rendered It’aewon Community’s expansion to actively promote gay rights virtually impossible, and it was dissolved within a year.
The gay rights movement in Korea as political activism began in the 1990s. At this time, most Koreans were completely unaware of the existence of gays. They remained hidden, and homosexuality went unmentioned. Then Korean Americans who were studying on a few college campuses in Seoul started a very low-key gay rights movement and gradually extended their networks. In November 1991, Sappho, a fraternal society of foreign and Korean lesbians and bisexuals, was organized. Korean members who participated in this society, while realizing the wall of cultural and linguistic differences, agreed to launch an endogenous organization that would go beyond cultivating social fellowship among gays and lesbians. In 1993, they created Ch’odonghoe, the first official pan-sexual minorities association in Korea. Two months after its creation, Ch’odonghoe was dissolved, and gay and lesbian members created their respective associations, the gay community Ch’in’gusai (January 1994) and the lesbian group Kkirikkiri (November 1994). The 1990s witnessed a surge of networking and a proliferation of organizations among lesbians and gays who used personal computer (PC) communication and a telephone mailbox system (153 Mailbox). By 1995-96, gay and lesbian organizations succeeded in forging a spirit of solidarity and action plans among their members. The publication and circulation of Buddy and Ttodarun sesang helped promote self-identity as homosexuals and a critical attitude toward bias and discrimination in society among readers. Han’guk Tongsongaeja Inkwon Undong Hyobuihoe (Organization of Homosexual Human Rights Movement Organization of Korea), an umbrella organization was created to orchestrate the advancement and representation of respective and common agendas for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgenders as unattended yet urgent human rights issues.
Fighting Discrimination in the Military, Mass Media, and the Courts
In conjunction with community-building efforts, sexual minorities in Korean society waged a civic movement on two fronts. The first front was to dispel the bias against the homosexual population as promiscuous, hedonist, and AIDS-spreading aliens hiding in the dark with a campaign to clean-up the so-called Pagoda culture. Distorted and perverse portrayals and references to the gay population in mass media, textbooks, and the government AIDS policy were the main targets of protest. At the same time, an effort was also made to enhance the legal status of homosexuals as citizens with inherent rights to enjoy dignity and protection of the law. In close concert with other human rights activist groups (antiwar, environment, women, labor, and so forth), gay rights activists presented their cause as a legitimate human rights issue like other social issues that had to be ultimately rectified by law. As a result, the gay rights movement began to transform itself both as an internal community-building movement and as an external audience-seeking campaign that purports to rectify and enhance the collective image and legal status of sexual minorities.
Gays in the Military
The activists’ first target of protest was the systematic negligence of the Korean military that bred and reinforced false characterization of gay soldiers, which left them defenseless against rampant maltreatment and violence inside barracks. Nowhere in the official language of Korea’s military law is the word homosexuality. However, the Regulations on Physical Examinations of Recruits (Department of Defense Order No. 556) define homosexual orientation as a form of disease and mental disturbance (“sexual orientation disorder” and “sexual identity disorder”). In response to inquiries by gay rights organizations, the Office of Military Manpower Administration defended this practice primarily in terms of protecting the military’s organizational interests. It acknowledged that, although the military relies on medical experts’ opinions for determining the aptitude of those subject to military service who possess homosexual orientation, it took into account the possibility that gay draftees are likely to cause humiliation and discomfort among servicemen and undermine morale, “because transsexuals and gays posses a very different sexual desire from that of ordinary people.”
Once in the military, most gays find themselves struggling to adjust to the masculine culture. The regulations of the Korean military assure that psychological counseling and medical treatment are available, with authorization from a senior officer in charge, for any serviceman under his command who struggles to adjust to training and military life in general. Yet, seeking assistance and guidance is extremely dangerous for gay military personnel. Protection of privacy is frequently violated. Senior officers, without the consent of the servicemen, would notify their parents of their sexual orientations. Gay servicemen or draftees who actually sought counseling testified that they were “advised” to be taken to military hospitals for intensive mental care that sometimes included HIV tests. Some were granted discharge from military service for medical and family reasons (uigasa chedae). Some were driven into harsher situations. Discharge for medical conditions requires authorization by medical officers. As they have to submit hard evidence that the servicemen are being discharged for legitimate medical reasons, medical officers would require the servicemen to submit photographs or video clips showing their involvement in sexual acts with another male.
Gay rights activist organizations also complained that homosexual members in the military were subjected to unwarranted scrutiny and suspicion as potential sex offenders. Article 92 of Korea’s military criminal law prohibits and punishes a sexual act between members of the same sex, even if it is a consensual act. (The law terms intercourse between homosexuals as kyegan, which literally means intercourse between chickens.)
Mass Media and Youth Education
In addition to working to protect gay military members’ rights to privacy and equal treatment, gay activist groups launched campaigns targeting the mass media, schools, and churches. They issued joint statements to protest articles and reports in magazines and newspapers that pandered to sensationalism and provoked the public’s curiosity about gays and lesbians. These reports, usually dealing with gays and lesbians involved in promiscuous secret parties and anonymous sexual encounters in restrooms at bus terminals, the activists asserted, posed a great danger of reinforcing false and distorted images of the homosexual population. The activist groups also fought a series of actions by conservative Christian organizations such as Kookmin ilbo and Han’gich’ong (Pan-Christian Coalition of Korea) that condemned homosexual orientations and behavior based on conservative biblical interpretations and defined them as a mental illness.
The gay rights activists also reached out to teachers and students. By organizing cultural events and academic forums on campus and disseminating informational materials to teachers’ unions, activists attempted to enhance youth’s awareness and eliminate groundless homophobia. Efforts focused on eliminating references and definitions in laws and government regulations that characterize homosexuals as psychological deviants, disease-carriers, pedophiles, or sodomites. The Queer Cultural Festival -Rainbow Parade-has become an annual event since 2000, held to augment self-pride among sexual minorities and to promote a positive understanding among the general population.
Protecting youth from dangerous media influences has been a major theme favored by those who oppose full political representation of gays and lesbians. Article 7 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the Youth Protection Commission, prior to its revision in April 2004, had listed homosexual behavior as a “socially unacceptable” act along with intercourse with animals, orgy, and incest. Section 1, Article 10, of the Youth Protection Law defines mediums inciting lewd thoughts and pandering to youth’s sexual desire as hazardous materials to be prohibited. These two laws have long been the basis of many decisions by the Committee for Ethics of Information and Communication (CEIC, a government agency equivalent to the Federal Communication Commission in the United States) that censors content favorable to homosexuals or that explicitly mentions them.
Gay and lesbian groups, the proliferation and networking of which had immensely depended upon widening access to the Internet in Korea, vigorously attacked Internet Tunggupche, the Internet content rating system of the CEIC, which restricted youth access to gay and lesbian Internet Web sites. In 2000, they protested the CEIC’s order of closure to “X-Zone,” a Web-based community site, by supporting its legal battles to have the order repealed. In December 2001, they submitted a collective petition to the Constitutional Court, calling for a ruling on whether freedom of expression was violated in this case. The groups pointed out that the International Lesbian and Gay Association, a renowned international umbrella organization for gay rights, was on the list of 120,000 foreign Web sites the CEIC deemed “risky” and prohibited. They also indicated that Korea was a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) advocating freedom of expression (Article 2) and rights to equality (Article 26) including “rights to protection from discriminations based upon sexual orientation” in all signatory states. In 2002, gay and lesbian communities also organized Tongsongaeja Ch’abyo l Pandae Undong Haengdong (Solidarity for Action against Discriminations of Homosexuals) to protest the main search engine providers in Korea (Yahoo Korea, Freechal, Daum, and others) as they unilaterally closed gay and lesbian Web sites, placed automatic pop-ups warning viewers that those sites were hazardous to underage Internet users, and categorized words like “homosexual” and “gay” as adult-only search terms. In October 2002, Kkirikkiri filed a complaint with the NHRC against an Internet technology company that developed a computer program, Suho ch’onsa (Guardian Angel), that automatically identifies and blocks homosexual communities’ Web sites.
In the new millennium, a few groundbreaking developments that enhanced public awareness of gay issues came about. In 2000, Hong Suk Chon (Hong Sok-ch’on), a well-known television actor, declared his homosexuality. The coming-out of a public figure for the first time in history was a cultural shock that gradually enhanced public awareness and changed public perception of homosexuality in Korea from merely characterizing it as foreign disease to seeing it as a reality for Koreans. Ha Ri Soo, a celebrity who had transsexual operations before entering the entertainment business, has become a pop icon among men and women. Having been granted the court’s permission to change her legal status as a female citizen in 2002, Ha continues to manage a very successful career as a singer with four music albums, a movie star, and a model for women’s cosmetics. In 2005, the movie Wang ui namja (The King and the Clown), which dealt with the sorrow and beauty of homosexual love with extraordinary candidness, became a record-breaking box office hit. Mainstream mass media began to tap the rising public interest in homosexuality and ran programs reporting the dilemmas and difficulties experienced by sexual minorities, especially those of school age.
Gays in Court: Sexual Crimes
The law has been a hostile yet familiar venue for homosexuals seeking to make their voices heard. This has been particularly so in Korea. Korea’s legal system is conservative in nature in terms of advancing political rights of sexual minorities. On the one hand, the Constitution of Korea embraces human dignity and equality as universal principles. Article 10 of the Constitution stipulates that “[A]ll citizens shall be assured of human dignity and worth and have the right to pursue happiness. It is the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals.” Article 11 also reads, “All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status.” On the Other hand, the Constitution also endorses the concept of society based upon sexual dichotomy, a society made up of two and only two sexes, male and female. Article 36 of the Constitution reads, “Marriage and family life shall be entered into and sustained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes.” While the Constitution’s pronouncement of universal human dignity and rejection of prejudice and discrimination would help gays and lesbians corroborate their demand for legal justice and fairness, the binary concept of a marriage ingrained in law hampers their effort in realizing them.
The binary conceptualization of sexual identity, embedded in legal concepts and language, has undercut the political rights of Korean homosexuals to the equal protection of the law. In the legal realm, sexual violence is exclusively defined as violence committed against a woman by a man. This definition is too narrow to include both sexual violence committed by a woman against a man and between members of the same sex. In criminal law, the most important criterion used to distinguish between a rape and a sexual assault is whether the offender’s sexual organ was inserted in the victim’s sexual organ. If it was, the act is defined as a rape case. If not, the case will be treated as a sexual assault case. Moreover, in current criminal law (criminal code no. 297), only punyoja (a female, either married or single) is considered a rape victim. Thus, if a homosexual person is raped by another person of the same or the opposite sex, he or she will not be treated as a rape victim. The offender will be only charged as a sexual assault criminal, but not as a rapist, thus avoiding a far heavier punishment. Moreover, homosexual people are not equally protected under domestic violence law as heterosexual people. The Special Law on Domestic Violence in Korea includes a partner in common marriage but a same-sex domestic partner is not considered a member of a family. Therefore, the law’s aggravated assault clause does not apply to an assault case between same-sex partners.
One major change in favor of legal protection of homosexuals against sex crimes was the Supreme Court’s 1996 ruling (96-do-791) that, for the first time in the history of Korean law, adopted a gender-based approach in determining a person’s sexuality. In reviewing an appeal of a lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court inquired whether the victim, a transsexual with clearly identifiable physical attributes of a female, would be a subject of rape as defined by law. The Court upheld the traditional definition of including only punyoja, married or single woman, as a rape victim, but asserted that the concept of punyoja should be determined not solely by genetic determinants but also “in accordance with prevailing social understandings” (sahoe t’ongnyomsang). Although the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision to acquit the offender charged with rape on the ground that the victim was still not legally regarded punyoja by the new criteria, this 1996 decision set an important precedent stipulating that an individual’s sexual status in law be determined not just by biology but also by psychological, social, and personal aspects of self-identification and perceptions of other members of society.
In summary, the gay rights movement in Korea has focused on dispelling prejudice and false stereotyping and fighting to gain equal protection under the law. Activists have fought to redress the pathologies of conventional political, social, and legal environments where sexual minorities were hated, punished, and ignored simply because of their sexual orientations.
This persistent collective effort recently produced some visible achievements. For instance, homosexuality was removed from the Youth Protection Commission’s list of “socially unacceptable” acts and was deleted from Article 7 in 2004. As of 2006, the Office of Statistics no longer directly ties homosexuality to mental disturbances in the category of diseases. In the sexual education manual for junior high school teachers, homosexuality is referred to as another human lifestyle and an expression of affection. In its National Human Rights Action Plan (NAP) published in January 2006, the NHRC recommended that Article 92 of the military law be struck out, asserting that a “sexual minority’s rights to life, protection, labor, and freedom from prejudice and discrimination must be guaranteed.” It also issued a policy recommendation in 2006 that national health insurance cover medical expenses for sex-change operations. Activists themselves acknowledge that the overall movement has successfully progressed from a sporadic and local phenomenon of building personal “shelters” and networks for informationsharing and friendship to a legitimate and organized effort that speaks and stands for the entire gay and lesbian community.
In politics, the NHRC, in November 2001, designated discrimination based on homosexuality as one of nineteen issues for which it recommended the President’s Office and the National Assembly exercise increased oversight for systematic violations of human rights. In June 2006, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiff, a transsexual who appealed to change his legal name and status in the family register system (hojok) from woman to man. The court’s ruling was significant in that it expanded the legal definition of gender from the previous definition that was exclusively based on biological attributes such as X and Y chromosomes to a new one taking into account not only biological attributes but also psychological and social dimensions.
One paradoxical development related to sexual minorities’ rights to equal protection under the law is the Special Law on Prostitution and the Sex-Trade Prevention Act. Prior to the two laws coming into effect in September 2004, sex trade between persons of the same sex was not charged under the Prostitution Prevention Law because the law defined prostitution only as an act between members of different sexes. The new laws made no distinction between sex trade involving members of the same sex or involving members of opposite sexes. Although the original goal of these laws was to better protect underaged females from prostitution, the letter of the laws helps protect sexual minorities.
Prospects and Problems of the Gay Rights Movement
Many participants in the gay rights movement that this author interviewed in 2005 agreed that political representation of the gay population has improved drastically, and yet its future still faces numerous and arduous hurdles.
One interviewee agreed that,
Making the society acknowledge that we are not dangerous, we exist, our sexual orientations are not a pathological symptom, and we are not called by derogatory terms like “homos” or “homosexual lovers” [tongsong yonaeja] but “homosexuals” [tongsongaeja], these small changes are not small achievements, although much needs to be improved.
Another interviewee added that he had met a lot of senior gay people in their sixties and older telling him that
We would not have entered a marriage had the social atmosphere in our time been anything like these days. We had no idea we were homosexual. We did not have a chance to know who we were. Our younger friends [hubae] in their forties were at least more conscious [of their sexual identity] and chose to emigrate.
The interviewees also shared a few common concerns regarding the direction and sustainability of the movement after its initial success. The first concern is whether the gay rights movement should continue to rely on pan-human rights solidarity to maintain the momentum of the movement. Due to the lack of number and organizations, gay rights activists had to forge alliances with other human rights groups. Advocating gay rights as a part of the overall human rights movement (women, environment, prisoners, education, antiwar, labor, and so forth) helped draw attention and support from other activist groups and the society in general.
However, such an action plan constrained the latitude of the gay rights movement and limited its members’ ability to articulate political agendas unique to sexual minorities. Besides, beyond rendering sympathetic support for the gay rights movement as another human rights issue, other organizations would find it difficult, or contrary to their own organizational interests, to advocate the “deep” and “serious” issues for sexual minorities who are a bit “too different.” For instance, in March 2003, Pusan Metropolitan Women’s Center did not admit members of the Pusan Lesbian Human Rights Center to its Workshops for Women. The Pusan Lesbian Human Rights Center petitioned the NHRC regarding possible discrimination. The Pusan Metropolitan Women’s Center responded that the Center was not a platform for women’s rights and its activity had no bearing on gender equality between men and women. Collaboration between feminist organizations and lesbian activists has been minimal because the former remained reluctant to publicly accept lesbian sexual discourse as an integral part of feminist discourse. A leader of a progressive Christian human rights advocacy group that I interviewed expressed a similar view:
It is okay for them [gay rights activists] to take part in our [Christian churches’] activities. However, it is still too early [for Korean Christian groups to openly support their causes]. Every human rights issue is, after all, something that needs to be solved by actions taken by people who are the subject. If the church gets into the issue of homosexuality, it cannot avoid dealing with the biblical interpretations.
Another area of concern for gay rights activists is the persistency of patriarchic culture in the society. As illustrated in Ha Ri Soo’s case, sometimes the “success” of the gay rights movement at both personal and collective levels is nothing more than yielding to the heterosexual-centered system. By acting as a “transsexual who is prettier than any women,” and “a person dying to now have a baby … whose favorite hobby is knitting,” Ha appears to accept, rather than challenge, the image of a woman demanded in the patriarchic society. In contrast, Hong Suk Chon, whose coming-out challenged the conventional dichotomy of masculinity and femininity, was vilified. Transsexuals’ petitions for legal sex changes in court are driven by personal wishes to avoid social discrimination but indirectly confirm the male-female dichotomy as the only accepted principle in determining one’s sexual identity.
The third and final common concern is the clash between individual interests and collective interests in living as a homosexual in Korean society. One interviewee who identified himself as a gay radical explained what makes the oppression of homosexuals in Korea unique:
In Korea, the homosexual movement was very weak. But more importantly, so has oppression of homosexuals, which created an interesting situation: Oppression is real and ubiquitous, yet invisible and weak enough to make calls for advocating homosexuals’ rights look “excessive” or “privileging.”
Such nebulous conditions of oppression support an optimistic forecast about the society’s acceptance of homosexuals, especially when compared to Western society. (“Koreans are not violent. At least no gay is beaten to death in Korea.”) However, others countered that such conditions also weaken the impetus of the gay rights movement. They pointed out that many white-collar homosexuals tend to choose to remain in the closet rather than act upon big causes and principles because the personal cost of coming out is huge and it is easier to stay in the “ghetto.” As long as homosexuals do not cross the boundary of ghettos set by invisible rules in the society, their access to “normal life” is guaranteed. Such expected benefits of maintaining the status quo and the punishment for breaking it put individual sexual minorities in a serious dilemma of collective action. In summary, the participants of the gay rights movement in Korea face a set of old and new challenges. While continuing to deal with invisible oppressive conditions and low public interest, they need to strike a balance between their participation in the general human rights movement and independent representation of gay rights.
Conclusion
Despite the hostile initial conditions and remaining obstacles, the gay rights movement in Korea appears to have made a number of significant achievements in enhancing the legal, social, and political status of the homosexual population in public spheres and moved on to the next battlefront. It remains to be seen what kind of normative arguments, organized action plans, and strategic choices the new phase of the gay rights movement will employ and how effectively they will enhance the representation of sexual minorities as a legitimate and priority human rights issue.
Examining the status of sexual minorities and the gay rights movement is a useful exercise that helps us understand not only the issue itself but also both the undercurrent of the politics of minority rights and democratic consolidation in Korea. In particular, further research on this subject is needed to discover and evaluate evidence that helps clarify the future trajectory of sexual minority rights in democratizing Korea.
There are at least two hypotheses future research can use. The first hypothesis to be tested relates to the overall improvement of human rights and the gay rights movement in Korean society. At first blush, the democratic movement and minority rights for homosexuals appear to go hand in hand. One may imagine the relationship between democratization in general and the gay rights movement in particular as being by and large mutually reinforcing. It seems a plausible hypothesis to believe that a higher degree of public tolerance of diversity and equality under the law as a result of democratic consolidation will lead to a higher degree of tolerance and protection for sexual minorities. On the other hand, the two phenomena may well be discrepant and disconnected. Although the net effect of democratic consolidation generally may help improve the baseline conditions for the gay population to represent its political interests as a minority group, the lag between the pace of advancing gay rights and that of democratization in general may remain significant.
The other hypothesis explores whether different minority rights are associated with each other in consistent and harmonious ways. Advancing one minority right may not necessarily be done in a way that is harmonious and synchronic with other minority rights issues. When unifying goals no longer exist and spirits of solidarity dwindle, the political game is no longer the state versus the civil society but becomes a zero-sum competition among minorities within the civil society. In such a case, the distribution of the benefits of democracy will be biased and uneven among minority groups, thus exacerbating power relationships and political representations among them.
As one gay activist notes, compared to other minorities, sexual minorities in Korea are so deprived of political resources, language, and sheer numbers and so powerless that they lacked effective means to claim themselves as a legitimate minority group that actually exists and deserves rightful representations and benefits in the broad context of the human rights movement in Korea. It remains to be seen whether the sexual minorities will become a minority among minorities in Korea, so powerless that they cannot even prove they are powerless, or successfully ride on the wave of democratization to claim their seat in the process of minority empowerment in Korean politics.