Nguyen Khac Giang & Nguyen Quang Thai. Contemporary Southeast Asia. Volume 44, Issue 1, April 2022.
Party’s Central Committee
There is a consensus among observers of Vietnamese politics that the Central Committee (CC) of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is the most important political institution of the party-state. However, despite this recognition, the CC has only been sparsely mentioned in the literature, rather than being a stand-alone topic of investigation. The most in-depth research on the CC so far was done by Carl Thayer in 1993. In the late 2000s, a series of studies on Vietnamese politics by Edmund Malesky and colleagues shed light on the rise of the CC in Vietnam’s power structure as well as the characteristics of the factional infighting that took place within it. Other than that, the CC has been mostly described as an arena of power struggle in annual reports on Vietnam or reviews of the VCP’s quinquennial congresses. While insightful, these studies consider the CC as the explanatory variable rather than a topic of research in and of itself, and thus do not offer a detailed examination of its fundamental characteristics. This is in contrast with the study of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has been rigorously examined over the past few decades. As a result, many analyses on Vietnamese elite politics are case-specific and time-sensitive, which inevitably lead to contradictory perceptions of how the CC works, particularly with regard to the question of factionalism. Naturally, the failure to see how the CC has evolved over the years and adapted itself to new environments has left scholars unable to account for the reasons behind the regime’s relative stability. Furthermore, the lack of studies on the Vietnamese CC makes it difficult to directly compare its political development with China, which has recently emerged as one of the most interesting topics in comparative authoritarian studies.
Based on a new biographical dataset of 626 CC members from the 6th to the 12th congress of the VCP, as well as the Party’s internal documents, we examine the institutional origins and development of the CC in three key aspects: (1) its changing structure and composition; (2) its decision-making principles; and [3) its norms of elite promotion. In so doing, we argue that the CC has moved from the periphery to the centre of Vietnamese elite politics, resembling the role of a shadow parliament where major policies are deliberated and passed, as well as where top leaders are chosen. The CC has achieved this position by developing and maintaining a considerably high level of intra-party democracy, expanding the selectorate by accommodating the increasing power of the provinces and the National Assembly (NA) while greatly standardizing the norms of elite promotion. Our study is one of the first attempts to collate and summarize the biographies of Vietnamese CC members over an extended period of time.
The article proceeds as follows. We first offer an explanation of the CC’s changing power since 1986, followed by an analysis of its institutional development throughout the Doi moi (Renovation) era, with a particular focus on its composition and voting structures. After examining the normative sources of the CC’s power, which come from the institutionalization of working procedures as well as respect for the democratic centralism principle, we delve into the patterns of elite promotion to show how central leaders find it increasingly difficult to intervene in the CC promotion process. Based on the dataset, we also evaluate the factional dynamics of the CC based on three popular classification strategies. The article concludes with our reflections on the power limits of the CC given recent re-centralization efforts by General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong.
The VCP Central Committee’s Changing Composition and Structure since Doi moi
In communist regimes like Vietnam and China, the central committees of the communist parties, with the formal mandate to elect the top leadership, can be considered the selectorates. Before the country officially embraced market reforms under the Doi moi policy in 1986, central leaders in Hanoi dominated the CC by tightly controlling the party’s personnel policy as well as keeping the decision-making process within a small group of elites. However, since the 6th Congress in 1986, the CC has gradually attained its position as the centre of Vietnam’s collective leadership mechanism. Today, it is widely considered as the most important institution in Vietnam’s one-party state. The expansion of the selectorate and the changing voting structure play a significant part in this transformation.
The rise of provincial representation is a particularly noteworthy factor that led to the CC’s expansion. Before 1986, provinces were greatly underrepresented. The country’s provinces were not guaranteed to have representatives in the CC, while the party chiefs of central municipalities Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) were not guaranteed Politburo seats. However, the situation changed dramatically in the late 1980s. From the 1990s onward, barring special circumstances, provincial Party secretaries were guaranteed full CC membership. Nevertheless, the norm remained informal and had to be agreed upon by the CC before each congress, until 2017 when Regulation 90 (and its amended version Regulation 214 in 2020) was issued by the Politburo, which requires a provincial Party secretary to meet the criteria of the “Politburo or CC membership”. Provincial representation in the CC increased from 23.4 per cent at the 6th Congress (1986) to 35.6 per cent at the 12th Congress (2016).
Why did the central elites accept more provincial representation in the CC, a transformation that would subsequently weaken their own position? The commonly accepted narrative is that the death of General Secretary Le Duan, who dominated Vietnam’s post-war politics, in 1986 facilitated the transformation from a personalized to a collective leadership system, with reformists within the CC being able to exert more influence ever since. However, if we look at the composition of the CC, it had undergone major changes four years earlier. Before the 5th Congress in 1982, Le Due Tho emphasized the need to increase representation for the provinces, particularly Hanoi and HCMC, in the Politburo and the CC. Subsequently, the number of the CC full membership increased from 103 at the 4th Congress to 121 at the end of the 5th Congress. The changes in 1982 have rarely been discussed but deserve more attention as an analysis of these changes helps us understand the rationale behind Vietnam’s collective leadership system. We suggest there are both economic and ideological considerations behind the move.
First, as the economic crisis which started in the late 1970s deepened, the centre had been unable to sustain the centralized distribution system. On several occasions, Hanoi and HCMC—where the centres of power were located—had to ask for food support from surrounding agrarian provinces. The sharp decrease in foreign aid in the 1980s, a result of Vietnam’s military intervention in Cambodia and the deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, put parts of the country in a self-subsistent mode. These events increased the financial independence and thus the relative power of the provinces vis-a-vis the central authority. The high level of decentralization in Vietnam can also be seen as a legacy of this period.
Second, along with the worsening economic crisis, dissatisfaction towards the centrally planned economy started to emerge. In several provinces, local leaders defied the centre’s orders to practise “fence-breaking” policies that rationalized and normalized economic activities. Some of the fence-breaking provincial leaders, most notably Vo Van Kiet, would later move to Hanoi and be considered as part of the “reformist” faction. Several key central leadership members, such as Chairman of the State Council Truong Chinh, gradually changed their conservative views and leaned towards the reformists.
Third, the existential crisis in communist Europe also had profound psychological and ideological impacts. As the VCP scrambled to learn lessons to ensure its own survival, it identified the lack of intra-party democracy as one of the key reasons for the collapse of communism in Europe, suggesting it needed to improve and expand “the practice of democracy”. Having a more diverse and enlarged CC would help meet this goal. Between the 6th and the 8th Congress [1986-98), CC membership increased by 33 per cent. Along with the provinces, the National Assembly (NA) also benefitted from this ideological shift as its role in the system increased in importance. Since the 7th Congress in 1991, the NA has gradually consolidated its position and the NA chairmanship eventually became one of the “four pillars” of Vietnam’s political power structure. As seen in Table 1, the number of NA representatives in the CC tripled from the 6th to the 12th Congress, with a net increase of 5.2 per cent in vote share.
The Central Committee’s Inner Workings: The Primacy of Democratic Centralism
The changing composition would not matter much if the CC only functioned as a “window-dressing institution” as seen elsewhere in other authoritarian regimes. However, a closer look at the inner workings of the CC shows its rather surprising democratic characteristics.
The VCP’s Constitution explicitly requires the CC to meet every six months, which provides CC members with more opportunities—at least formally—to deliberate on issues and policies. In reality, the Vietnamese CC meets more often than that. More importantly, after the 7th Congress, the amended Party’s Constitution guaranteed CC members the right to preserve their opinions if they were different from those of the Party’s organizations. This had a profound impact on intra-party democracy in the VCP and perhaps explains why CC members had the courage to criticize and veto decisions made by top leaders and the Politburo on several occasions. In the mid-term National Party Congress in 1994, for example, 644 delegates were surveyed on 10 major policies which could only be passed if they received more than 50 per cent of the votes. The practice of frequent voting on policy issues continued to be applied in later congresses. The working guidelines of the CC, issued after each congress, upholds the democratic centralism principle that requires votes and opinions in all important matters.
The relative level of intra-party democracy allows the CC to operate as a de facto parliament, where major policies are deliberated and decided. The CC plenums, for example, typically take place ahead of NA sessions where most CC members are delegates or have a strong influence over delegations from their constituencies. Consequently, CC members must “embrace” [quart triet) the CC’s decisions and carry out “ideological work” [cong tac tu tuong) to explain these decisions to the NA delegates. In 2008, when the NA did not approve the administrative expansion of Hanoi, central leaders were able to change their position by reminding delegates about the need to “embrace” the Party’s decisions.
Another significant aspect of the CC’s democratic centralism principle is the role of its central commissions, which administer the Party’s daily affairs under the umbrella of the Secretariat. If the CC is a shadow parliament, central commissions work as shadow super-ministries, imposing the Party’s will in almost all aspects of social, economic and political life. Party commissions were relatively weak during Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s tenure (2006-16), but grew in importance after the 12th Congress (2016). These powerful institutions, particularly the Central Inspection Commission and the Central Organization Commission, have played an instrumental role in General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s consolidation of power.
The Standardization of Elite Promotion
There has been a remarkable standardization process for electing CC members since Doi mai. In earlier congresses during the 1990s, when membership of the CC was more limited, there were a few surprising appointments. Vu Dinh Cu, a well-known physicist, was promoted to the CC in 1991 just six years after he became a party member. Professor Cu then served as Chairman of the NA Committee on Science, Technology and Environment, and later as the NA’s vice chairman, which might imply that his promotion fulfilled the technocratic needs of the party. The case of Dao Dinh Binh, who was selected by the CC to be the minister of transport for the term 1996-2001, was more intriguing. He was promoted to the CC at the 8th Congress after only serving as the director-general of an inter-regional subsidiary of the state-owned Vietnam Railways. This role was at least two ranks below a CC position. The NA refused to accept the CC’s endorsement of his nomination for the ministerial position, which might indicate the NA’s disapproval of Binh’s rapid rise as a CC member. Ultimately, Binh was only allowed to serve as the vice minister of transport from 1996 to 2001.
In later congresses, such so-called “helicopter promotions” were much rarer, as certain qualifications, such as educational background and leadership experience, have been explicitly required. Under the leadership of Nguyen Phu Trong, the standardization of elite promotion intensified, first with Decision 244 in 2014, then with Regulation 90 in 2017 and Regulation 214 in 2020. One clear marker of standardization is the sharp increase in CC members with post-graduate degrees. While 25 per cent of the CC membership in 1986 never graduated from high school, and only 9 per cent had a postgraduate degree, all of them had at least a university degree and the majority had a postgraduate degree (128 out of 180) in 2016.
Another important area of standardization is the age requirement. There has been much discussion about age limits (55 as the threshold for first-term members, 60 as the general rule); however, a standardized age distribution among CC members is also worth noting. Currently, the VCP applies a three-layer age formation system which requires a Party executive committee (cap uy) to consist of three age groups: “senior” members (who can stay one full term before reaching the retirement age); “middle” members (who can stay at least two terms); and “junior/young” members. This age formation system plays a pivotal role in stabilizing the CC structure and helps prevent leaders from overstaying their positions.
The formation was discussed in plenums leading to the 4th Congress in 1982 as the old age and health issues of CC members had become a major concern in the early 1980s. Many CC members, some of whom were key leaders such as Prime Minister Pham Hung, died in office. However, it was not until after the 6th Congress in 1986 that the CC was able to experiment with this policy at lower administrative levels. By issuing Resolution 05-NQ/TW in 1988, the CC formally required all party organizations’ executive committees [including the CC itself) to guarantee the three-layer age formation; elections had to ensure that one-third of the committees were made up of new members. In addition, at the 6th Plenum in 1989, the CC for the first time mentioned the need to impose age limits on senior positions in the party, state and mass organizations. From the 7th Congress in 1991, the three-layer age formation was formally established. As a result, there has been a substantial decrease in the ages of CC members. Candidates for CC promotion also tend to be newer party members. The average age of full CC members [see Figure 4) decreased from 58.4 at the 6th Congress (1986) to 54.8 at the 12th Congress (2016), while the average years of party membership for newly elected CC members declined from 33.7 to 26.2 during the same period.
The standardization of elite promotion came together with the compartmentalization of membership, which was aimed at reducing the over-representation of several groups in the early days of Doi moi. Sectors are allocated a specific number of seats in the CC, depending on their relative importance in the Party. For example, a ministerial-level agency is allocated one seat, while the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Defence are normally allocated around six or seven positions each. This informal norm prevents powerful factions from dominating the CC. As a result, the proportion of CC members with security and defence backgrounds has sharply decreased from more than 50 per cent in 1986 to approximately 25 per cent in 2016. In addition, the CC structure is also stabilized by a relatively constant re-election rate at around 50 per cent.
In addition to standardizing the criteria for candidacy, the selection process has also become highly institutionalized. In theory, according to the Party’s Constitution, the Party’s national congress is the only institution that has the authority to select CC members. However, before 1986, central leaders were able to intervene and there were instances where an influx of cadres were promoted to the CC during plenums between congresses. Since 1986, however, this rule has been strictly adhered to. When facing the need to increase CC membership in the early 1990s, the VCP had to convene a mid-term congress in 1994 instead of a plenum. Central leaders can no longer decide personnel issues arbitrarily and must go through a complex process that involves engagement with lower-level party organizations. One notable example was the failure of Minister of Health Nguyen Thi Kim Tien to get re-elected at the 12th Congress [2016), despite being officially nominated by the CC. Furthermore, the fact that the CC must organize plenary sessions towards the end of its tenure to deliberate on personnel issues indicates that central leaders cannot always force their will on CC members.
The increasingly institutionalized elite promotion process in the CC has made alternate membership irrelevant. While there were 49 alternate members elected at the 6th Congress in 1986, the VCP decided to eliminate these positions altogether for the next three congresses. After 2001, the VCP brought back this practice but allocated only around 20 seats. The chance for alternate members to be promoted to full membership is quite high, indicating that these positions are considered as the apprenticeship for future leaders rather than a competition ground for promotion as in the case of China. As the CC has the authority to decide on full membership promotions, decreasing the number of alternate members significantly reduces the power of central elites over personnel matters.
The above analysis does not imply that the CC is an impartial political institution. There are cases where family backgrounds (the “princelings”) can significantly affect the prospects for promotion to the CC. These princelings often have fewer years of party membership than other newly elected members. Given that the new generation of princelings have much better opportunities for education and careers, we expect that more princelings will be appointed to the CC in the coming congresses.
In addition, although the overall political system strives to maintain balance among geographical regions, birthplace might influence promotion prospects. Our data shows that members with Northern origins always occupied a majority in the CC—albeit at a small margin—since 1986.
CC members tend to be concentrated in the Red River Delta and Northern Central region, which are known as the cradle of the Vietnamese revolution. Northern leaders also dominate key positions. A well-known activist, resenting this situation, commented—in reference to the popular television series Game of Thrones—that “the North rules, but the South remembers”.
Factions and Power Balance in the CC
This section uses a new biographical dataset to examine characteristics of factionalism in Vietnamese politics. Despite the frequent use of the term, scholars have rarely agreed on what constitutes a “faction” in Vietnam. During the Cold War, scholars debated the divisions between pro-China and pro-Soviet Union camps, or between moderates and hardliners. In the early 1990s, Doi mai also saw the emergence of interest group politics which created the factional line along what Thayer called “sectoral representation”. The oscillation of reform policies since the late 1990s brought back the ideological distinction of “reformist/liberal” versus “conservative/hard-line” factions, while the emerging regional geopolitics created the new labels of pro-China versus pro-West/pro-America. Some scholars put more emphasis on patronage-based factionalism, illustrated by the power struggle at the 12th Congress between the then Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong.
Most of the above classifications of factions, unfortunately, do not provide clear membership criteria as well as any lists of potential factional members. Considering the new biographical dataset, we examine the validity of three main classifications of factionalism in contemporary Vietnam, namely the occupation-based, the patronage-based and the ideology-based (or policy-based). The first two follow the clientelistic approach offered by Andrew Nathan, which emphasizes factional links based on occupations and birthplaces. While occupation-based factions often do not have a factional leader, it is imperative for patronage-based factions to have one. Using the biographical dataset and additional qualitative evidence, we now explore the plausibility of these various factional classifications.
Occupation-based Factionalism
Occupation-based factionalism mostly refers to the group of CC members that have the same occupational background. The idea of the CC being dominated by different “sectoral” groups was raised in a seminal work by Thayer, in which he argued that CC members represented sectoral or regional constituencies rather than being mere followers of top leaders. Although factional ties can emerge from a wide variety of occupations, we test the link in two professional areas most frequently used in analyses: the Communist Youth Union (CYU) and the security apparatus. Given the lack of more precise information, the criteria for alleged factional ties tested here is less strict: CC members can be considered as belonging to the same faction if they have ever worked in the same sector.
It is no coincidence that many Vietnamese leaders, when preparing career paths for their children, place them in the CYU. A notable case is Nguyen Minh Triet, the youngest son of former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who rose quickly to become a member of the CYU’s central executive committee after just ten years. Indeed, our dataset reveals that CC members with youth union experience occupy a large portion of the CC membership.
However, there is not enough qualitative evidence to confirm there is a CYU alliance at any of the Party’s congresses. Even at the 8th and the 12th congresses, where there were 27 and 34 CC members with CYU experience respectively, they did not seem to have a close connection. If we use a stricter criterion for an occupation-based faction that requires the presence of a factional leader who holds a post in the “four pillars”, there are only four occasions where such leaders can be found (Prime Minister Phan Van Khai at the 8th and 9th, President Nguyen Minh Triet at the 10th and President Truong Tan Sang at the 11th Congress). Prime Minister Khai, however, only served one year in a local CYU early in his career (1950-51), which is hardly indicative of a strong link with other CYU members. The same can be said of President Truong Tan Sang, who never worked at the central CYU. Nguyen Minh Triet is theoretically an ideal factional leader, who had a five-year stint at the central CYU. Yet there were no clear links between him and the other nine CC members who also had central CYU experience at the 10th Congress, when he was elected president. More importantly, all the three “factional leaders” are Southerners, suggesting that their presence in the top four more likely reflects a geographical allocation than an occupational one.
Another possible occupation-based faction centres around CC members who had experience within the security establishment, whether in the military or police forces. This suggestion appears to be more credible, as many former security officials have taken up top posts since 1986: two general secretaries, three presidents, and four prime ministers. However, the idea of a security-based faction has its weaknesses. This grouping ignores the fact that the military and security establishments at times hold different interests. Even within the same security factions, there is evidence of fierce intra-group competition. A recent case involves two police generals, Hanoi’s former Chairman Nguyen Due Chung (12th CC member) and Nguyen Duy Ngoc (13th CC member), who used to work under Chung in Hanoi’s Municipal Police Department for at least six years from 2010 to 2015. General Ngoc was later promoted to Vice Minister of Public Security and took charge of an investigation that eventually brought down his former boss. This goes against the notion that factional members must protect each other.
Patronage-based Factionalism
Patronage-based factionalism has overlapping characteristics with occupation-based factionalism, but include other determinants such as geographical origin, family connections or any other forms of reciprocal relationships. The biggest challenge for this conceptualization is to identify the patrons and their clients. In the case of China, general secretaries of the CCP are generally considered patrons. However, Vietnam’s more collective system means the general secretary is not always the most powerful man in charge, as shown in the case of Nong Due Manh (2001-11). Manh was seen as a weak leader and his tenure saw the rise of the powerful Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Consequently, although the grouping of Vietnamese politicians around specific personalities has been widely discussed since the 2000s, few can name the exact factional leaders and their policy priorities or vested interests in each congress.
Using our dataset, we examine in detail the most famous patron, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, and examine his alleged faction based on Shih et al.’s criteria. (Accordingly, CC members during Dung’s leadership are considered part of his faction if they share the same birthplace, educational institutions or work history.
Although some individuals can be seen as close to Dung, such as generals Le Hong Anh and Nguyen Van Huong, other cases are not as convincing. There have been sustained reports by Vietnam observers that former president Tran Dai Quang and Prime Minister Dung belonged to different camps in the events leading up to the 12th Congress. The same can be said of former Vice Premier Truong Hoa Binh. Nguyen Phuong Nam, who shared the same birthplace with Dung, was disciplined by the CC in 2015. Yet at the 12th Congress when Dung lost the race against General Secretary Trong, Nam managed to retain his CC seat. This would not have happened if Nam had indeed been a member of Dung’s faction.
Policy-based Factionalism
The lack of clarity in “background sorting” makes a policy-based classification a tempting option. However, while it is easy to create new factional labels based on policy preferences, providing acceptable justifications remains a huge challenge. Some of the most well regarded reformists among the CC members, including former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and Politburo member Tran Xuan Bach, had extensive experience in the security establishment. Furthermore, as Gainsborough points out, policy positions can easily be jettisoned to suit circumstances. For example, one of the most accepted assumptions about the CC’s characteristics is the autonomy of provincial CC members vis-a-vis the centre. They are also believed to be more supportive of economic growth, and the high percentage of provincial representation in the CC thus represents an advantage for the reformists. However, not many studies provide justifications for this assumption, except Malesky’s excellent work in classifying “reformist” and “conservative” provinces based on the level of the state sector’s economic contribution. Additionally, a CC member might make a policy decision out of personal interests rather than considerations for his constituencies. Approaching the issue of factionalism from this angle, it might be possible to examine policy debates and case studies to identify different factions. Unfortunately, the secretive nature of the policymaking process in Vietnam makes this approach extremely difficult, if not unfeasible. One method to identify the policy-based faction is to group CC members with similar characteristics, for example, educational background. Members who do both undergraduate and postgraduate degrees domestically or in other communist countries might have a “conservative” view, while members who study in Western countries might have a “reformist” view. Based on our dataset, at the 12th Congress, there were 60 members from the “conservative” faction—with some notable names such as General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Minister of Public Security To Lam—while 12 members have a “Western” educational background with just two Politburo members (then Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and HCMC Party Secretary Nguyen Thien Nhan).
This approach faces the same problem with the occupation-based and patronage-based classifications. First, a member of a policy-based faction can change their views, and share characteristics with another group, such as Prime Minister Dung and Tran Xuan Bach mentioned above. Another example is Nguyen Van Linh, who was seen as a strong supporter of Doi moi, but gradually became conservative when the crisis of communism unfolded in the late 1980s. Second, CC members can switch allegiances if they see better prospects elsewhere. With his lifelong career in the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Pham Minh Chinh was seen as a close ally of PM Dung. However, before the 12th Congress in 2016, Chinh switched his loyalty to General Secretary Trong, a decision that brought him a Politburo seat at that congress and the prime ministerial position five years later. Third, there is the phenomenon of “inter-factionalism” where CC members of supposedly different camps have intertwined interests. For example, the MPS and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are seen as having different policy priorities. Nevertheless, our dataset shows senior officials from these two ministries forging close informal ties. The son of the late President Tran Dai Quang—who used to be the Minister of Public Security—joined the MoF and has served as its Chief of Staff since 2021. Meanwhile, Dinh Tien Hai, son of former Minister of Finance Dinh Tien Dung, currently serves in the secretariat of Minister of Public Security To Lam.
What can we learn from the complexity of factionalism in the Vietnamese CC? First, “fixed” characteristics, such as the sectoral lines pointed out by Thayer in the early 1990s, appear to be less significant in determining factionalism within the CC at present. Second, while patronage-based and policy-based factionalisms seem to be more dominant in recent years, it is not clear how policy preferences and patrons can be identified. Third, the lack of factional clarity in Vietnam, as a result, might imply that the CC functions as a parliamentary institution with coalitions built around temporary policy positions rather than as a battleground for patronage-based promotion. As previously analysed, this came about due to significant changes in the CC’s composition, inner-working dynamics and the standardization of elite promotion. In the absence of clear and strong factions, the CC can gain a higher level of independence.
Conclusion: The Gravity of the Centre
In nearly four decades since Doi moi was adopted, the CC has moved from the periphery to the central stage of Vietnam’s elite politics. Structurally, the selectorate has been expanded to accommodate the increasing power of the provinces and the NA, while elite promotion has been greatly standardized and institutionalized. The CC has also developed and maintained a considerably high level of intra-party democracy. This shows not only in high-profile vetoes against the Politburo’s and the general secretaries’ decisions, but also in the way policies are discussed and decided. Although plenums are generally not televised (except for the opening and concluding sessions) like the NA sessions, recorded minutes of several key plenums reveal a high level of deliberation.
However, the power of the CC has its limits. Central leaders—particularly General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in the last two congresses—maintain a strong influence through the ability to set agendas, control personnel policies, and increasingly, investigate and punish CC members under anti-corruption campaigns. In addition, amendments to election regulations under Trong’s watch tipped the power balance towards a smaller circle of central leaders. Under the new regulations, CC members are no longer allowed to self-nominate or nominate a person not on the list dictated by the outgoing CC. If a person is nominated by delegates at the Party’s national congress, they are obliged to submit a letter of withdrawal, following which the congress will vote to decide whether they are allowed to do so. This happened at the 12th Congress in 2016 when Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung was narrowly “allowed” to withdraw his nomination for CC membership, effectively ending his political career.
The CC, as powerful as it may seem, also failed to uphold the Party’s Constitution at the 13th Congress as General Secretary Trong was re-elected for a third term, a clear violation of Article 17 of the Party’s Constitution. Although there are suggestions that this continuity is more about power balancing rather than consolidation, it is certain that breaking a long-established rule will have a negative impact on the institutionalization process that the CC has been carrying out over the past three decades. Whether this marks a point of institutional decay for the CC remains to be seen. Structurally, the CC must address imbalances in the distribution of CC membership to guarantee better representation of women [the CC has always been dominated by men, although the male membership declines slightly from 94 per cent in 1986 to 91 per cent in 2016), ethnic minorities (more than 90 per cent of membership are Kinh ethnic), and other regions than the North. With Southern provinces, particularly the Mekong Delta and HCMC, suffering most heavily from the COVID-19 pandemic, on top of being underfunded in infrastructure projects for years, there is a real risk of widespread dissatisfaction, which could be a destabilizing factor in the long run. How the CC responds to these structural imbalances and challenges will define Vietnamese politics in the years to come.