Tomer Mazarib. The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies. Volume 8, Issue 1, Spring 2022.

This article examines the concept of Bedouin culture in the Middle East as it is perceived both by the Bedouin themselves and by various scholars. Like other cultures, Bedouin culture has undergone extensive and continuous change. This process can be understood as a dynamic construction process related to agents of change, flexibility, liquid borders, and identity politics, and has enabled Bedouin culture to enter the modern age under conditions that will ensure its continued existence. Yet “cultural translation”—i.e., Orientalist scholars and the Western travelers and historians who followed in their footsteps, alongside imperialist and colonialist powers—has viewed Bedouin culture as weak and detrimental to the sedentary population. Hence, this study presents an approach that differs from that espoused by Orientalist scholars, whose narratives tend to paint a negative picture, claiming that structural violence has defined the Bedouin and the relationships between Bedouin and Fellahin (Arabic for “peasants” or settled Arabs) populations throughout history. Thus, this article seeks to correct assumptions embedded in earlier, Orientalist studies. Accordingly, the main argument is that the Bedouin culture has a material and spiritual historical reputation. Historically, there have been integrative relations between Bedouin and Fellahin. To that end, I make use of historical literature, Arab chronicles, anthropological studies, and four in-depth interviews conducted between the years 2014-2016 with Bedouin from Yafa, a Bedouin-Fellahin village.

Introduction

This article examines the concept of Bedouin culture in the Middle East as it is perceived by the Bedouin themselves and by various scholars. I use the term “Orientalism” to indicate the historical platforms used both by historians and historiographers to describe and analyze Bedouin nomadic society in all its aspects: historical, cultural, social, economic, and political. The accounts of these scholars have all relied upon the memoirs of Western travelers. I use the term “Culturism” (which I explain below) to describe the attitude of ruling elites, such as colonial empires and postcolonial states, to the Bedouin culture within their borders.

In light of these two concepts, I will analyze Bedouin culture and its relations to other cultures, such as the Fellahin Arabs, within the concept of culture as understood in anthropology. Unlike Orientalism or culturism, which are based on an ahistorical, apolitical, and monolithic conception of culture, anthropology proceeds from the premise that culture coexists within social power structures and contains differing and opposing interests and voices. From this perspective, I propose the concept of cultural relativity as a perspective that enables analysis and understanding of Bedouin culture.

The main argument of this article is that the Bedouin culture is an ancient one, which, like other cultures, has undergone a dynamic and ongoing process of change throughout history. This process can be framed and understood as a process of construction, agents of change, flexibility, liquid borders, identity politics, and ever-shifting boundaries; it has enabled Bedouin culture to enter the modern age under conditions that will ensure its continued existence. Therefore, Bedouin culture is neither a “negative culture” nor is it “harmful to civilization,” as claimed by Orientalist scholars or as defined in hegemonic governmental policy (during the Ottoman and British Empires, and under the modern national colonial states that emerged after the disintegration of these empires). The current article makes a theoretical anthropological contribution to understanding Bedouin cultural identity, as well as the dynamics of relationships between the nomadic population and sedentary populations such as the Fellahin.

Accordingly, my research questions are: What is Bedouin culture? How has it been described by Western travelers and historiographical researchers? How did the colonial empires view Bedouin culture? And finally, how have anthropologists reacted to the writings of the Western travelers? To answer these research questions, I employ a review of historical literature, Arab chronicles, and anthropological studies.

Historical Background: Bedouin Culture

The term “Bedouin” (sing. badawi in Arabic) derives from the word badia, which means “desert.” Thus, the term emerged etymologically as a designation for “desert dwellers.” The Bedouin in general—this article uses the term as both a singular and plural proper noun—traditionally lived in a tribal framework in the Middle East and North Africa. Over time, ecological factors played a significant role in shaping the Bedouin lifestyle. A tribe consists of a grouping of people constituting a social, cultural, economic, and political organization, whose members generally reside in a single geographical unit that they have chosen for themselves or wherein they have come to dwell as a result of tribal rivalries or other external pressures.

Historically, the Bedouin engaged in nomadic herding, agriculture, and sometimes fishing on the Syrian steppe starting in approximately 6,000 BCE. By about 850 BCE, a network of oasis settlements and pastoral camps was established by a people known as “A’raab,” whose major source of income was the transportation of goods and people in caravans pulled by domesticated camels across the desert. The scarcity of water and permanent graving land required them to move constantly, wandering from place to place in search of land resources, water, and pasture for their flocks.

Even before the rise of Islam in the seventh century, the Bedouin excelled in epics and oral tradition; prominent figures included the poets Al-Zeir Abu Layla Al-Muhalhal (443-531 CE), Antarah Ibn Shaddad (525-608 CE), Imru’ Al-Qais (501-544 CE), Tarafa Ibn Al-Abd (543-569 CE), Al-A’sha (570-625 CE), and Al-Khansa (575-646 CE). During the period of Muslim rule, from the seventh century onwards, Bedouin culture continued to exist and prosper. A significant example is the poetry of Al-Mutanabbi (915-965 CE), a famous Abbasid Arab poet at the court of Sayf Al-Dawla in Aleppo. Al-Mutanabbi, one of the greatest and most influential poets in the Arabic language, composed 300 folios of poetry. In one of these, he speaks to the power of identity and the freedom that comes with knowing oneself: “(1) I am the one whose literature can be seen (even) by the blind—And whose words are heard (even) by the deaf. (2) The steed, the night, and the desert all know me—As do the sword, the spear, the scripture, and the pen.” Bedouin poetry was used as a means of conveying information and social control. Through these works, we can learn much about diverse aspects of the lives of the Bedouin, including love, raiding/marauding (ghazw in Arabic), wandering, courage, economy, and other social and cultural elements.

In the Late Middle Ages, the Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta reported that in July 1326, en route from Egypt to Gaza, the Egyptian authorities maintained a customs post at Qatya, on the north coast of Sinai, where Bedouin guarded the road and tracked down those trying to cross the border into Palestine without permission. The 14th-century historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun was the first to provide a full description of the development of Bedouin society and its transition to sedentarization in Arab towns and villages. He classified the Arab population into two categories: the Bedouin (Al-Badu), and the sedentary people (hadhar, or rural Fellahin and urban dwellers). Ibn Khaldun claimed that the differing lifestyles of the two groups, derived from their distinct ecological conditions, was the key factor that distinguished between them.

Under the Ottoman regime (1516-1918) in the Middle East and North Africa, steady expansion of cultivated land appeared to shrink the number of pastoral nomads. At the same time, the latter were perceived by Orientalist scholars, as well as by the Ottoman Empire during and after its disintegration, as hostile and a nuisance to the authorities, as will be described below.

Orientalism: Historians’ and Historiographers’ Approaches

In the 19th century, Western travelers began to arrive in the Middle East, not only for pilgrimage to the Holy Land, but also for research purposes. Many historiographers developed a pattern of accounts that relies consistently on these travelers’ testimony; I discuss this pattern below.

The first such genre, mainly dating from the 19th century, is comprised of the studies of Western travelers such as John Louis Burckhardt (1822), Henry Baker Tristram (1865), James L. Buckingham (1825), Edward Robinson (1856) and others, such as James Finn, British Consul for Jerusalem and Palestine (1878). Despite the relative brevity of these travelers’ visits, these works collectively serve as a rich source of information about the population in the Middle East, including Palestine, at the time. The works, however, contain descriptions of the Bedouin population and the relationships between them and the sedentary population in somewhat essentialized terms, relying on stereotypical and largely uncomplimentary descriptions of the Bedouin. These works often present the Bedouin as thieves and bandits, lying in wait for the Fellahin and their commercial convoys and pilgrims en route to Mecca.

In his account of his 1812 expedition, Burckhardt described Bedouin attacks on Fellahin towns (Tiberias, Safad, Nazareth, and Beisan), and even demand of protection money (khawa, or “brotherhood” payments) from villagers and townspeople. According to Burckhardt:

The third and most heavy contribution paid by the peasants [Fellahin] is the tribute to the Arabs [Bedouin]. The Fahely, Serdie, Beni Szakher, Serhan, who are constant residents in the Haouran [Hauran], as well as most of the numerous tribes of Aeneze, who visit the country only in the summer, are, from remote times, entitled to certain tributes called Khone [khawa, or “brotherhood”], from every village in the Haouran.

Note that like other travelers and Orientalist writers, Burckhardt interprets khawa as “being a brother/sister of the tribe.” In other words, according to his account, Bedouin would demand khawa in the form of money, legumes, or clothing from all those who lived in their vicinity, i.e., from Fellahin, from weaker Bedouin sub-groups, or from strangers accosted as they passed through Bedouin territory. In return, these persons would become the responsibility of the Bedouin and be under their protection from robberies, theft, looting, or vandalism by others.

Another mid-19th-century observer was the British Consul James Finn, who visited Palestine between 1845 and 1863, and described the “wars” between Bedouin and Fellahin that began in Jerusalem and Nablus and spread throughout Palestine. Traveler Henry Tristram, who visited Palestine in 1863, wrote of the “great tension” between Bedouin and Fellahin, citing as an example the Bedouin Aqil Agha’s imposition of a heavy annual tax on the village of Isfiya in return for his protection. At the same time, the tribes Banu Hassan, Banu Adwan, and Banu Saqer levied khawa from Fellahin villages in Marj Ibn Amer (the Jezreel Valley) and the Beisan Valley.

These narratives by Westerners reflect a Eurocentric and almost eclectic association of incidents that they observed or about which they were told, lacking a central axis. Note that until the 1980s, scholars widely considered these travelers’ accounts to be reliable and accurate, without a trace of criticism. Edward Said was the first to draw attention to their biases in his seminal work Orientalism (1978), in which he took the observers’ skewed perspective to task. In Said’s view, this perspective painted peoples of the East as primitive and weak, serving as justification for their conquest by the “civilized” (enlightened) West. According to Said, the new Orientalist cast the Orient as an “imitation” of the West. Said’s charges are also echoed in Bernard Lewis’s 1964 tome The Middle East and the West, wherein Lewis wrote the Levant can only “improve itself when “its nationalism is prepared to come to terms with the West.”

The second genre of descriptions of the Bedouin consists of works by historiographers of the mid- to late 20th century, who followed in the footsteps of earlier Western travelers. Five examples of historiographers—Uriel Heyd, Moshe Sharon, Moshe Ma’oz, Adil Manna’, and Muhammad Suwaed—and their studies of the Bedouin population in Palestine during the Ottoman period illustrate this problematic framing: Heyd based his research on a collection of Sultanic decrees from the famous Muhimme Defterleri collection in the Ottoman archives. These decrees often mention Bedouin insurrection and insubordination, including frequent references to wars that erupted between Ottoman forces stationed in the region and the Bedouin. Heyd wrote under his book’s subtitle, “Keeping the Bedouins in Check”:

The domination of parts of Palestine and the neighbouring districts by rebellious Bedouins compelled the Ottoman Government to take strong measures […]. Where important roads crossed uninhabited parts of the country, new villages were established with a view to protecting the travelers against attacks by Bedouin and other brigands.

In his study on the Bedouin in Palestine in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, Moshe Sharon corroborated Heyd’s conclusions. In his 1964master’s thesis, basing his argument on descriptions provided by Western travelers, Sharon argued that the relationship between the Bedouin and Fellahin is anchored in the struggle between the desert and the sown, between the sons of the desert and the sons of the settled country (Fellahin). Sharon claimed that starting in the 18th century, the last big nomadic tribes, including the tribes of Banu Saqer, Al-Shamlna, Al-Qdirat, and Turkmens, migrated from the East and various locations such as Hauran (southwestern Syria) to Palestine. There, they settled in the Hula Valley and Marj Ibn Amer (Jezreel Plain), and began to attack the settlements and villages unrelentingly from these vantage points.

Sharon seasoned his descriptions with terror: “[…] raids on trade caravans and pilgrims, and highwaymen demanding ransom.’ This reflected Sharon’s overarching perception of the inhabitants of the desert and the sown as enemies locked in mortal combat, which he summarized thus: ‘The Ottomans failed in this task [to keep their promise to secure the holy sites in Palestine], and, as in the previous Mamluk period, most of the roads were at the mercy of the Bedouins. Rarely did the hajj caravan succeed in returning from Mecca unmolested.”

In his 1968 work, Moshe Ma’oz claimed that a key preoccupation of the Ottoman regime was fighting the Bedouin tribes, which he defined in historical terms as “an ancient theme in Middle Eastern life.” For example, in the subsection of his book that discusses Bedouin turbulence and aggression, he wrote:

After a short period of peace and order under the Egyptians [1831-1840], the Syrian provinces became again a vulnerable target of [for] Bedouin aggression and turbulence; as in the pre-reform era, the main victim was the peasant [Fellahin]. […] One major target of Bedouin assault were the roads.

These same weaknesses are evident in Adil Manna’s essay on the Farrukh Bedouin tribe and the relations between the governors of Jerusalem and the Bedouin. Manna’ noted the weakness of the central government and its inability to restrain “rebellious” Bedouin, while casting the Ottoman government’s curtailment of Bedouin activity in the first half of the 16th century as an improvement, albeit one that subsequently petered out toward the end of the century. Manna’ even devoted a second study to the Jerusalem district—this time to the volatile relations between the Farrukh, the Bedouin, and the Fellahin. Ties between Bedouin and governors were always at the expense of the settled population; here, Manna’ described at length how the local provincial elite (such as the governor, Muhammad Ibn Farrukh) betrayed their duty to protect the populace and allied themselves instead with “ruthless nomads.”

The final example of the second genre is Muhammad Suwaed, who, basing his claims on Western travelers’ accounts, wrote:

In addition to the domination of the Bedouin on the sedentary societies [Fellahin], they also proceeded to control the main roads in the north of the country [Palestine], especially those that connect Tiberias to the areas of the Jordan Valley, and Nazareth with Nablus, which fell within the area of movement of (Banu) Saqer tribes.

Collectively, all of these studies paint a negative image, placing an inaccurate focus on structural violence as a defining factor in relations between Bedouin and Fellahin populations. The Bedouin are portrayed as wild and barbaric, terrorizing urban and village populations, commercial convoys, and pilgrims throughout the Ottoman Empire. These descriptions corroborate Orientalist, ethnocentric, and eclectic accounts; unsurprisingly, they have since generated vehement criticism.

Culturism: Ottoman and Postcolonial States’ Discourse

The stereotypical, negative perception that the Bedouin culture makes no contribution to human society and even threatens it—an example of Orientalist discourse—has continued throughout the age of colonial empires and postcolonial states, and has even accelerated to a more condescending discourse of Culturism, as is evident in three different periods of rule in the Middle East: Ottoman, British, and Israeli.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, the definition of Culturism is “Belief in the relative superiority or inferiority of certain cultures; discrimination or prejudice based on assumptions about culture.” In other words, Culturism—a discourse of the majority groups/hegemony or those in power and authority—focuses mainly on minority groups’ cultural, social, and political life, and presents these as negative. Incidentally, this discourse denies that it is an orientalist, superior, arrogant, and racist discourse. The use of the term “Culturism” became common in the neoliberal era (the late 19th century) for cases wherein “tribalism” serves the writer or the hegemon as a powerful element of personal or collective identity or ascription, based on the answer to “Who are you?” and “Who are we?” As such, the subtext of Culturism forges a racist discourse that goes farther than merely accusing the natives of cultural backwardness according to a Western yardstick. Therefore, this genre has very little to contribute to an understanding of the Bedouin culture and its practical aspects.

During both the colonial and postcolonial periods, outlying areas and nomadic communities were subjected to various civilizational discourses and viewed as living in an extra-state space.

The Ottoman Period (1516-1918)

The attitudes of the Ottomans and their administration toward tribal communities, as part of the geographical periphery, were strongly negative. As Serif Mardin noted, “The clash between nomads and urban dwellers generated the Ottoman cultivated man’s stereotype that civilization was a contest between urbanization and nomadism, and that all things nomadic were only deserving of contempt.” Moreover, the modern state’s civilizational discourse of “backward,” “savage,” “barbarian,” “constant fighting,” and “robbery” began, as argued by James Scott, exactly where states’ sovereignty and tax collections ended.

Accordingly, the Ottoman government treated the Bedouin as “civilizational exceptions” and made them the target of the Tanzimat reforms. These reforms were a series of edicts issued between 1839 and 1876, intended to bring about order and organize the Ottoman Empire through various levels of legislation and implementation. These reforms were borrowed from the West; as noted by Selim Deringil, “borrowed colonialism” came to be viewed as a modern way of being. Accordingly, increased involvement in tribal regions and attempts to extend the new administration to these regions took place under Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909). In doing so, the Ottoman officials dealt with the Bedouin “in the only language they could understand.” They operated on two parallel planes. On the first, government officials in any given locality—the vali or the kaymakam—may very well not have needed to enforce the center’s will, so that both he and the local power holder (sheikh, bek, agha notable, etc.) would go through the motions of a polite fiction: niceties would be uttered, gifts exchanged, bribes given and taken, and in return, the local power holder would acknowledge the sultan’s suzerainty. On the second plane, the government officials used the “divide and conquer” policy in order to rule. They tried to move beyond “merely” disciplining or educating (te’adib, [phase omited]) the Bedouin, and deployed a “divide and conquer” policy of tribal warfare in order to rule. This involved pitting tribes against other tribes, such as the fighting in the Negev in the 19th century between the Tayaha-Tarabin, Azazmi-Tayaha, and others.

The British Mandate Period (1918-1948)

After World War I, Britain perceived itself as more experienced than any other country not only in war, but also in its ability to control and manage nomadic peoples. Accordingly, it employed a self-interested bureaucracy driven by a progressive imperialist ideology that treated nomadic peoples as primitive, culturally exceptional, inherently violent, and basically a nuisance to the administration. Therefore, it is no wonder that British policy toward the Bedouin population was aggressive, rigid, and expressed in the enactment of strict and coercive laws aimed at ad hoc oversight of this nomadic category. This policy was exemplified by the Collective Punishments Ordinances of 1926-1936, directed against Bedouin suspected of invading state lands or crossing international borders without a border pass. The tribe of any individual to violate this order would be punished collectively for his infringement, as per Bedouin Control Ordinance, no. 18 of 1942. This ordinance’s purpose was to confer upon District Commissioners the power to control nomadic tribal communities, including the power to investigate and punish alleged offenses committed by the communities’ members.

The Israeli Period (from 1948)

Following its establishment in 1948, Israel conferred citizenship upon the Palestinian minority that remained within its borders. Officially, they were and are supposed to have equal rights alongside the Jewish majority. In fact, however, they do not enjoy equal rights; this applies even to groups that are considered loyal to the state and serve in the IDF, such as the Bedouin and the Druze. This situation can largely be ascribed to ideological, religious, economic, and political motives. Moreover, the state has abandoned the security of its Palestinian citizens. Gun violence and drug trafficking are increasing in Israel’s Palestinian community, and both phenomena have reached the Bedouin villages in the periphery of the country. Not only does the state fail to address the most painful issues faced by Palestinian citizens, but it also actively institutes administrative obstacles, based on a belief in Arab cultural pathology or a view of Arab culture as oppressive and inherently violent.

Within the Palestinian minority in Israel is the Bedouin minority, which suffers from near-total neglect by the state. Faced with customs and social norms such as polygamy, murder for family honor, female genital mutilation, and blood revenge, the state is hobbled in addressing these issues by a perception that this minority is in need of reeducation, as its culture does not sufficiently prepare its members for life in a modern society.

This perception is apparent in everyday examples, such as the use of visual symbols on signs in parks, on power poles, or at construction sites proximate to Bedouin concentrations or neighborhoods in the Negev. Although these signs feature both Hebrew and Arabic text, the Arabic is larger and more prominent, not only to warn Bedouin residents but to remind the members of the majority that they are in a “danger zone.” This practice—only one of many—clearly demonstrates the concept of Culturism, according to which the state (representing the majority) views the Other (such as the Bedouin) as embodying cultural inferiority, as manifested in their way of life.

An Anthropological Interpretation

As noted above, Orientalist studies and Culturism discourse portray the Bedouin as thieves and bandits, harmful to sedentary cultures. These descriptions held steady not only throughout the tenure of the Ottoman Empire, but even after its disintegration and during the rule of the modern postcolonial states that arose in its wake, especially in the first half of the 20th century.

By contrast, anthropologists challenged Western travelers’ narratives, even rejecting them outright. As such, anthropological research may present a more complex structure: an epistemological approach, reflexive experience, and coherent interpretation of Bedouin culture and the relationships within and between tribes, as well as the interactions and practical relations between Bedouin and Fellahin.

For instance, would it be accurate to characterize all the members of a tribe—including women and children—as robbers? Is it really correct to portray the tribal structure as a segmentary lineage, which assumes that there are no differences in status and class between individual members of the tribe? Despite the utility of their accounts, the Western travelers generally were not in the region long enough to familiarize themselves with the actual economic, social, and cultural situation, or to culturally translate the particular phenomenology presented by the locals in a contextually reliable fashion.

Accordingly, American anthropologist Talal Asad challenged and opposed the concept of “cultural translation” that manifests in British social anthropology, arguing that the objective of cultural translation is to define by overt or covert signs. According to Asad, ethnographers should not approach the research field as group leaders or tourists whose aim is to interpret what the “native” says or to “embellish illogical things.” Asad wrote: “Cultural translation is inevitably enmeshed in conditions of power—professional, national, international. And among these conditions is the authority of ethnographers to uncover the implicit meanings of subordinate societies.”

Another avenue of criticism of Orientalist studies was developed by anthropologists Khaled Furani and Dan Rabinowitz. In their article on ethnography in Palestine, they described the Western travelers’ accounts as “biblical anthropology,” i.e., in thrall to a biblical symbolism aimed at proving that the Holy Land did not belong to the Muslims, thereby justifying its reconquest. In this sense, their argument goes, these travelers and their narratives paved the way for the early Zionists:

Proto-ethnographic work in Palestine involved European writers animating their own patrimony by following the footsteps of emblematic biblical figures. This conveniently supported a European claim to shape Palestine’s administrative reality and to morally incorporate it in a European universe […] which is mentally and politically external to the lands of Islam. One consequence of this “biblical anthropology” was validation of the nascent Zionist claim of a “historic” return to a “promised” land.

Nearly all anthropologists are familiar with Tylor’s famous definition of culture, according to which “Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” Accordingly, some anthropologists also described the interaction between the Bedouin and the settled/Fellahin as based on flexibility, structuring, and formulation, and not on essentialist differences or dichotomous relations. The anthropological study of Daniel Bates, which describes the relations between nomadic and Fellahin populations in Syria, exemplifies this view. Bates proposed that ecological conditions contributed to the symbiosis between Bedouin and Fellahin. For instance, he noted the integration of the land uses of the Bedouin and Fellahin: the Fellahin work the land; after the harvest, the Bedouin bring their herds into the fields, contributing to land fertilization before the subsequent planting season. When the agricultural season is over, Bedouin sell livestock products, such as milk, cheese, butter, meat, and skins, to the Fellahin, and in turn buy agricultural products from the Fellahin.

Anthropologist Donald Cole addressed these phenomena in his article “Where Have the Bedouin Gone?” There, he described Bedouin working as truck drivers transporting gasoline in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria; transporting water for crop irrigation; or working as sheep and cattle merchants in Syria. While loyalty to the tribe has shifted to loyalty to the state, this has not necessarily changed Bedouin self-ascription. Cole’s insight lies in the fact that changes to a lifestyle do not necessarily entail the loss or assimilation of social or cultural identities. Francoise Metral summarized this concept in one sentence:

Lifestyles change, but identities remain. For a Sukhnite [referring to Al-Sukhnah, a town in eastern Syria], a Bedouin, even if his family spends three-quarters of the year in town, is still a Bedouin, member of such-and-such a tribe. The same is true for [other] tribesmen.

In other words, the means and tools may have changed, but the cultural identity remains the same, as illustrated in the next section.

Recent Changes in Bedouin Culture: Israeli Bedouin as a Case Study

Change occurs on a constant basis throughout the world; as a result, its inhabitants are encouraged to change as well. The population learns to adapt in various ways in order to survive, often causing traditional practices to be forced aside to make way for more modern methods. The Bedouin have recently experienced a great many changes throughout the Middle East. Products of 20th- and 21st-century technology have been imported into their lifestyles. The majority of tribes have settled in Bedouin or Fellahin villages and towns and taken up agriculture, attracted by educational and health facilities and in response to government pressure.

The Bedouin in Israel are located in four main geographical areas, namely Negev, Galilee, Ramla, and Lod. Like other Bedouin in the Middle East, they have been in the throes of dynamic and rapid change for several decades in almost all areas of their lives. Since its inception in 1948, the Israeli government has sought to resettle the nomadic Bedouin in both Galilee and Negev, partly in an effort to induce socioeconomic development among this indigenous minority community. The effect of Israeli military rule (1948-1966) on Bedouin settlements in Negev and Galilee was considerable. According to Falah, in his article on the development of planned Bedouin settlement in Israel from 1964 to 1982, the prohibition of the free movement and mobility of the Palestinian population (siyeg, in the Negev plan) and the policy of expropriation of lands from the Bedouin contributed significantly to their transition to sedentarization. During and after military rule, mainly during the 1960s, Israel implemented three government programs with the ultimate aim of evacuating the Bedouin from areas defined as “essential lands for the state” and settling them in populated Bedouin villages or Fellahin towns and villages. This government policy “as agency” contributed significantly to the continued integration of the Bedouin into towns and villages. After the Bedouin settled in permanent communities, they began to develop lifestyles drawn from their cultural history. I will mention and emphasize here two primary aspects of this change in Bedouin economic and material culture.

Economy

Some Bedouin residing in Bedouin or Fellahin settlements continue to raise livestock near their homes, including both sheep and goats, for economic capital and for their own sustenance. Sammy Ghazalin, approximately 65 years old, is married to a Bedouin woman and lives in the Marah Al-Ghuzlan neighborhood in Yafa (a Bedouin-Fellahin village near Nazareth). In an interview, he told me, “I am raising a small herd of about 15 animals [so that my family can] have fresh mutton whenever [we] need, especially for the holidays. Also, my wife and I make labaneh [fresh yogurt cheese], and sometimes cheese.” This indicates that the practice of raising livestock is not only for commercial purposes.

In another interview, Muhammad Hamdoun, a resident of Yafa who raises cattle and calves, said that he currently has 75 animals grazing south of the Marah Al-Ghuzlan neighborhood between Yafa and Migdal Ha’emek. He and his sons raise the livestock for trading purposes. He sells the calves to butchers after slaughtering them in his own cowshed.

Fatma Ghazalin is about 60 years old. She is married to a Bedouin man and lives in the Marah Al-Ghuzlan neighborhood. In my interview with her, her comments illuminated the cultural differences between Bedouin and Fellahin communities: “The Bedouin today live separately from the Fellahin in the village. It is true that we grow livestock near our homes, and sell them livestock products, but we live in our [Bedouin] neighborhood.” This is another indicator of the bifurcated path of social relations: the Bedouin have economic interactions with the Fellahin but live in a separate neighborhood within the Fellahin village.

Marx claimed that the Bedouin immigrate in large groups of “lineages” and choose to live in tribal enclosures in town neighborhoods, tending to maintain family and social relations with their mother tribes (such as through marriage) even though they may be geographically remote from one another. Marx attributes this to the pessimism of the Bedouin about their economic and political positions in towns and villages. Apprehensive due to a lack of employment security, the Bedouin view the tribe as a source of political and economic stability. Nevertheless, commercial activity, primarily the sale of meat and livestock, creates an economic bridge between the Bedouin living in villages and towns and the townspeople.

In addition to livestock, some of the Bedouin have been integrated into the employment market, trade, and the economy of the Bedouin village. Many work in the service industry, maintenance, construction, and small trade, both in and beyond the village.

Over the course of my observations, I identified desirable work patterns for Bedouin in Yafa, specifically in the field of security. At the time of my research, there were about 18 security guards working in educational and banking institutions both inside and outside the village. A total of six Bedouin youth were serving in the IDF, four in professional army service and two in the prison service. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, 24 Bedouin have served in the IDF, including those still in service at the time of my fieldwork. The Fellahin, who are not conscripted for army service, do not look favorably on the Bedouin serving in the IDF. For historical reasons, conscription into the IDF is considered a betrayal of the Palestinian national cause by the Palestinian Arabs who remained within the state borders of Israel after its establishment in 1948. In their view, Israel is an occupying entity plundering the homeland of the Palestinian people.

These two employment patterns demonstrate the connection between the Bedouin and their cultural past, typified by acts of bravery and demonstrated by combat, carrying arms, and riding horses. Therefore, interviews with Bedouin living in a permanent locality such as Yafa—a Bedouin-Fellahin village—may yield insights into the economic shift taking place in Bedouin society in Israel. The Bedouin adapt to an economic pattern drawn from their cultural past of daring, courage, and heroism and suited to their locality. This adaptation also has an impact on other areas of life.

Aspects of Material Culture

The official home of the Bedouin was the tent, called bayt al-sha’ar (“house of hair”), which used to be a residence for the nomadic Bedouin. Recently, most Bedouin settlers have replaced the tent with stone houses. This change shows that the Bedouin are not immune to the modernization process, but rather are active players, engaging and adapting the modern means to their needs. Contemporary shifts in Bedouin residence culture are evident from the houses themselves. The backyards of the new Bedouin houses are wide and contain sheds for raising livestock and horses. The courtyards of these houses resemble the wide courtyards outside the tents of the Bedouin tribe in the past, including a shed or grape shed; inside the courtyards, there are piles of firewood. Vases adorned with paintings of palm trees are positioned at the entrance to the house, and sometimes horse saddles are hung on the trees in the courtyard. Inside the house are material tools that were once used or are still used by Bedouin. These include a wooden mortar (mihbash) and pestle (yad) with white metal decorations, used for crushing coffee beans; a decorated ladle (mihmaseh) and stirrer (yad) of iron, used for roasting coffee beans over the fire; three brass coffee pots (dalleh, balleh, and masab), or, alternatively, an “artificial pot” made of plastic and similar in shape to a brass coffee pot; cooking pots (sing. qidr); and copper serving dishes (sing. sahan). A fiddle (rababah) is often played to entertain guests.

These material objects were passed from the older generation to the younger to preserve and strengthen the Bedouin heritage and to remind the Bedouin youth of the “noble Bedouin culture.” Their social power can be drawn from their ancient culture. Alternatively, the surrounding cultures understand the Bedouin culture as unique through these material means, with symbols distinct from those of other cultures. Either way, the material Bedouin culture continues to survive.

Women’s and Men’s Costumes

The traditional costumes of both men and women are well adapted to temperature extremes in the desert. They are loose-fitting, with several layers providing good insulation. Clothing can denote economic, social, or marital status, and a woman’s clothing often indicates the tribe or locality from which she comes, as well as the period in which she lives, such as Ottoman, British, or Israeli. Garments of different types, colors, and ornamentation were worn by unmarried girls, wives, widows, and elderly women.

The costumes worn by Israeli Bedouin women are very different from those worn by other women of the Middle East. Until recently, a Bedouin woman wore a black dress (shersh) with colored stripes at its bottom, a black crepe head veil (milfa’), a silk and metal brocade head covering (‘usbeh), and gold coins around her forehead.

Recently, the costume of Bedouin women has changed according to prevailing fashions. This change in fashion required that women wear a new dress to each festive gathering. At the beginning of the 21st century, young Bedouin women wore jeans and T-shirts and no longer wore embroidered dresses (shersh) or coin-encrusted ornaments. Their status was displayed by wearing as much jewelry around the neck as possible. Sometimes, women can be seen wearing traditional clothes, especially at wedding ceremonies.

Bedouin men no longer wear the traditional costume, comprising a long white robe (thob), a wide sleeveless cloak (‘abayeh), a head veil (keffiyeh), and head ropes (‘aqal). Today, they wear modern clothes. Young people wear jeans and T-shirts, and adults wear elegant pants and button-down shirts. However, like women, adult men tend to wear traditional clothing in rite-of-passage ceremonies such as weddings or funerals, thus demonstrating seriousness and identification with the other people in attendance.

In addition, women and men pursue higher education and use mobile phones to connect to social media. These changes would not have taken place had it not been for both external and internal factors. In terms of external factors, most areas of modern life (such as laws, bureaucracy, education, technology, etc.) penetrate the Bedouin lifestyle through agents of change (individuals, companies, and government institutions). In terms of internal factors, Bedouin themselves tend to compromise, be flexible, and allow for liquid borders, and get practical engagement to engage with broader society in practical ways. They absorb and accept the external changes activated on their lifestyle. Bedouin take active steps to integrate into the modern economy, education, and society without losing their unique characteristics. Social scientists such as Giddens have recognized that “modernity risk culture” can create radical individuals. Therefore, if culture strives to survive, as Giddens argues, individuals must understand the susceptibility of most aspects of social activity as material relations of modern conditions and know how to build their identities according to the changes taking place around them. This is the approach espoused by the Bedouin, who adapt and accommodate modern means to their particular needs. At the same time, they engage in the preservation of non-material means, such as the Bedouin dialect, which is different from other Arab dialects, such as Fellahin and urban.

Summary and Conclusion

The article challenges us to rethink classical Bedouin culture as it is recognized in Bedouin society. It demonstrates that throughout various historical periods during the Ottoman and British Empires, as well as after their disintegration and the establishment of modern nation-states such as Israel, Bedouin culture was marginalized, purportedly did not contribute to society, and was considered a nuisance by the authorities; every criminal act in a Bedouin locale was immediately attributed to the “structural violence” of the Bedouin. Such acts were attributed to a backward culture that had failed to integrate into modernity. However, anthropologists proposed a far more comprehensive and coherent alternative when they began to culturally translate Bedouin culture and its relationship with other cultures. As we have seen through the cultural translation of the Bedouin population in Israel, Bedouin culture is undergoing dynamic and continuous change today. The Bedouin are adapting modern means to their needs in order to retain their cultural uniqueness, without which Bedouin society would lose its valuable cultural collective. Thus, they preserve and strengthen material symbols to survive in a changing world.

The conclusion reached herein is that a cultural researcher must not only spend extended periods in the field of their studied culture—getting to know that culture’s habitus, undergoing reflexive experiences, and identifying phenomena embodied in the public symbols used by the members of the hegemony to communicate their worldview, value orientations, and ethos—but also read cultural history in the studied culture’s language in order to arrive at cited objectifications and embodiments within their cultural capital and incorporate them into their interpretation in writing culture.