Gowoon Jung. Journal of Homosexuality. August 2020.
Introduction
The social atmosphere around homosexuality and the LGBT groups’ civil, political, and legal rights in the US have been liberalized since 1990, but the implicit prejudice to same-sex couples has remained (Doan, Loehr, & Miller, 2014). To understand the various aspects of the public views on homosexuality, sociologists have long been developing scales and measures of public opinion on homosexuality and LGBT rights, measuring the object—homosexual persons, their rights, and homosexual behaviors (Kite & Whitley, 1996; Loftus, 2001); types of rights—formal rights (e.g., civil rights, including employment rights, gay marriage, and adoption rights) versus informal privileges (Doan et al., 2014; Lewis, 2003; Yang, 1997); visibility—abstract feelings toward homosexuality versus feelings toward the visibility of homosexual behavior in public (Adolfsen, Iedema, & Keuzenkamp, 2010; Doan et al., 2014); and cognitive ability—emotional-psychological, cognitive, and behavioral reactions (Adolfsen et al., 2010; LaMar & Kite, 1998). Various social factors, such as class, race, gender, age, and religion, may influence how people understand and interpret homosexuality and LGBT rights. Numerous studies agree that people who are older, less educated, African American, male, and conservative Protestant are more negative than those who are younger, more educated, white, female, Jewish, Catholic, and nonreligious (Ellison & Musick, 1993; Herek & Capitanio, 1999; Lewis, 2003).
However, such literature on public attitudes toward homosexuality has failed to account for why and how resistance to granting full rights to LGBT groups remains. Moreover, previous works that have been examining individual-level factors tend to decontextualize country-specific cultures that may play a significant role in crafting the individuals’ perspectives on homosexuality. What are the cultural foundations of public attitudes toward homosexuality and LGBT rights? What are the rationales that heterosexual people, especially religiously affiliated groups, frequently use to justify their concerns and discomfort about LGBT groups? Drawing on the evangelical Protestant women’s narratives originating from South Korea (hereafter Korea), this study explores the complex interplay of religious and indigenous cultures that buttress heteronormativity and how this ideological framework shapes ordinary women’s perceptions and interpretations of homosexuality and LGBT rights.
As a former developmental state with lingering Confucian traditions and a puritan Protestant belief system, Korea makes up an interesting and adequate site. It represents the complex operation of heteronormative culture. The surviving Confucian heritage, which emphasizes blood lineage, family honor, and social harmony, has dominated the society. Moreover, Christianity has grown rapidly in Korea over the past century. Owing to missionaries and churches emphasizing a fundamental evangelical belief system, the proportion of Christians has risen to 27.6% of the total population, and Korea boasts having the world’s largest Pentecostal church, the Yoido Full Gospel Church in Seoul (Kim & Son, 2016; Ryu, 2008). With regard to LGBT politics, religion is one of the most important factors leading the diverging views on LGBT issues, as Protestants are the strongest opponents of LGBT issues (Kim, Bong, Lee, & Kang, 2015). Debates on homosexuality in Korea, between opponents and supporters, are structured aggressively and antagonistically (Yuh, 2019). The Protestant Right has launched an anti-LGBT movement, specifically the anti-gay movement, through the reproduction of gender binaries within the mass media, educational institutions, and the military (Kim, 2016). The media also plays a role given that conservative media has portrayed LGBT politics as the cause of social conflicts, while the progressive media has approached the issue with an institutional and political agenda with regard to human rights (Jeong, 2019).
Another factor was the generational split within the public opinion on LGBT politics. The public attitude toward homosexuality has drastically shifted across generations. According to annual surveys of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies conducted from 2010 to 2014, the public has become tolerant of homosexuality, as the number of respondents who were open-minded about homosexuality has increased from 15.8% in 2010 to 23.7% in 2014. Generational divide was apparent, given that 26.7% and 20.0% of respondents in their 20s and their 30s, respectively, in 2010 were more tolerant of homosexuality. The numbers have almost doubled in four years, peaking at 47.4% and 34.7% in 2014. By contrast, adults who were 50 years old and above did not change their views over the past four years (Kim et al., 2015). Under this circumstance, the severe controversy over homosexuality and the variation across age and religion made it difficult to reveal a complete picture of the public opinion on homosexuality and to explain why such a shift, which intersects with multiple indigenous cultural forces, has occurred.
When it comes to the cultural backbone of traditional morality concerning LGBT politics, the intersection of heteronormative ideology with religious culture has been frequently discussed. Scholars have recognized that heteronormative culture varies across nations because the degree to which it is regulated may differ, depending on the geopolitical, economic, and cultural context. While much research has been conducted by examining Protestant and Catholic nations (Adolfsen et al., 2010; Jewell & Morrison, 2012; Loftus, 2001), little attention has been paid to Asian countries. Much of the research on East Asians’ attitudes toward homosexuality argued that they are likely to be less supportive than numerous residents in Western developed nations, but they are more tolerant than African and Middle Easterners (Adamczyk & Cheng, 2015; Cheng, Wu, & Adamczyk, 2016). Taiwan became the first Asian country to approve the legalization of same-sex marriage (Hollingsworth, 2019). However, other researchers have long observed the culturally rooted operation of indigenous Confucianism in the public view of homosexuality (Adamczyk, 2017; Adamczyk & Cheng, 2015). Adamczyk (2017) found that the low approval of homosexuality among the Taiwanese was related to the Confucian culture that emphasizes the bloodline, obedience to parents, and social hierarchy. Nonetheless, her analysis only touches on the idea that the Confucian-oriented heteronormative culture is intertwined with nationalism, resulting in an idea that heteronormative marriage and reproduction are a means to accomplish social harmony, national stability, and strength.
Following the observation of Adamczyk (2017), this study aims to unpack the complex cultural root of public attitudes toward homosexuality through the narratives of evangelical Protestant mothers, taking local native culture into consideration. It focuses on why and how evangelical Protestant women, especially mothers, show uneasiness, discomfort, and ambivalence about the legal and political rights of LGBT groups, and it explains their rationales through the intersectional lenses of Christianity, Confucian tradition, and nationalism. Through an examination of evangelical women’s stories, I found that their perception of LGBT rights and their justifications revealed the evangelical commitment to procreation, motherly moral concerns about the rapid change of heteronormative ideals, and ambivalence about an individualistic, expressive culture. I argued that heteronormative notions may constitute a key construct that determines the evangelical women’s responses, in which such notions are not only guided by evangelical teaching but also reinforced by a complex amalgamation of local Confucian tradition and ethno-centric nationalism. This study contributes to complicating a simple, one-dimensional understanding of public attitudes on homosexuality by offering a nuanced look into the multiplex arrangement of heterosexual ideologies unique in the Korean context.
Women’s Talk on Heterosexuality
Heteronormativity is a normative discourse, culture, and institutional structure that provides privileges to, organizes, and promotes heterosexuality and heterosexual marriage (Bryant & Vidal-Ortiz, 2008; Green, 2002; Kitzinger, 2005). Kitzinger (2005) argues that heteronormativity is cultural, legal, and institutional practices that maintain normative assumptions, in which there are only two genders, that gender reflects biological sex, and that only sexual attraction between these opposite genders is acceptable. Heteronormativity has been viewed as a central notion shaping and buttressing hostility toward LGBT. Although the focus of sexuality has shifted “from reproduction to personal happiness and from family to individuals” (Herek, 1990, p. 320), the social stigma and hostility toward homosexual identity and gender expression remains (see Averett, 2016). While these studies show the pertinent impact of heteronormativity in sociocultural and institutional dynamics in Western societies, Asian countries like South Korea offer an adequate site, given their firmly grounded heteronormative marriage and family system, which only allows heteronormative versions of life and gender scripts and regulates a search for alternative lifestyles and intimacy outside the institutionalized forms of heteronormative love and family (Kim, 2013).
Scholars that examined the micro dynamics of heteronormativity have claimed that heterosexuality is normalized, privileged, and taken for granted in “mundane, everyday ways” (Martin, 2009). Heterosexual couples’ parenting and guidance regarding children’s gender expression using clothing, toys, and activities represented the reproduction of heterosexual norms in everyday circumstances (Averett, 2016; Martin, 2009). For example, heterosexual mothers tend to assume their children are heterosexual and interpret their romantic attractions and gender behaviors, such as dressing up, as signs of heterosexuality (Martin, 2009). The media also praise and disseminate heteronormative-parenting discourses by portraying two gender families as desirable (McFarland, 2011).
In the production and reproduction of heterosexual discourses, women, as wives and mothers, have played an integral role in families and the society. The socially constructed image of the “good mother” constantly made women pursue roles as heterosexual mothers who implement heterosexual parenting as a way to signify their self-worth (McQueeney, 2009). This image was related to the fact that women who can enact an ideal motherhood can achieve moral self-worth and meaning, but women who are unable to achieve motherhood are blamed, accused, criticized, and excluded (McMahon & Pence, 1995; McQueeney, 2009). The meanings behind being a woman, a mother, or a wife are distinct and different in each society and culture, producing various modes of feminine subjectivity (Kandiyoti, 2004).
Idealizing motherhood is also found in literature on women and nation (Nagel, 1998; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989). Nationalist discourses allocate separate positions to women and men in the process of nation-building, assigning women the symbolic role of mothers of the nation (Nagel, 1998; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989). By likening the nation to a family (McClintock, 1991), women’s role in nationalism is to occupy a symbolic place and embody family and national honor. Women have been portrayed as the biological producers of ethnic members, symbolic reproducers of ethnic and national boundaries, and ideological transmitters of collective culture (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989, p. 7). The common ways in which women can patriciate is to fulfill traditional roles by supporting their husbands; raising, nurturing, and educating their children; and serving as symbols of national honor. One example of idealized motherhood in contemporary Korea is the commitment of Filipino marriage migrants to motherly roles to claim their citizenship in Korea, which reflects the notion that women immigrants as social minorities can only gain social status and moral dignity when they carry reproductive roles of producing ethnic descendants of the nation (Kim, 2013).
The valorization of motherhood has uniquely appeared in South Korea, where the great value and importance placed on motherhood continuously operated as a source of reward, meaning, and identity for women (Cho, 1998; Chong, 2006). Korean women recognized the continuous attraction of motherhood, as tremendous value and power are placed on women’s domestic roles, especially as “mothers of sons, which has served as a compensatory mechanism for women in a patriarchal family system” (Chong, 2006, p. 716). The modern construct of “wise mother and good wife (현양처, hyeon-mo-yang-cheo)” has been the most influential gender ideology in modern Korea. This discourse epitomizes the complex operation of patriarchy, along with the women’s compliance with and resistance to the patriarchal gender arrangement (Choi, 2009, p. 3). The discourse of the wise mother and good wife reflects the salience of the Korean nationalist mandate and Korean women’s desire for empowerment in the modern nuclear family system (Choi, 2009).
This tendency to sanctify motherhood discourses in Korea and fulfill women’s desire for liberation and domesticity has gained meaning through “patriotic mothers” of the nation, even after the Asian bailout crisis in the 1990s. In the globalization paradigm and the shrinking labor market, patriotic capitalism encourages the persistence of a masculine labor market, which has resulted in increasing unemployment and marginalization for women. This circumstance has made women see marriage and motherhood as an “alternative way of pursuing a career” (Kim, 2001, p. 64). For Korean women, being mothers or wives is a way of achieving family/gender roles as a moral obligation, and a way of transforming themselves into respectable, independent adults and members of society. Hence, Korean women, as reproducers, nurturers, and educators of Korean society members, are likely to talk more about heterosexuality, thus reproducing and reinforcing it.
Heterosexuality in Nationalism and Confucianism
In numerous countries, heterosexuality is a building block of society, and nonheterosexual relationships, such as same-sex marriage, are regarded as a threat to the structure of society (McFarland, 2011). The national threat discourse or nationalism is one of the frequently cited themes working in opposition to homosexuality and LGBT politics. Scholars have argued that nationalism is relevant to or remote from sexuality, showing that “most forms of nationalism are intrinsically homophobic” (Peterson, 1999; Pryke, 1998; Rankin, 2000). While the nation is an imagined political community comprising members who have never met yet shares similar interests and belonging (Anderson, 1991[1983]), the ways in which membership is imagined are gendered. Nationalism is rooted in “masculine memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope” (Enloe, 2014, p. 93). In addition to this hegemonic masculine nature of the nations, the nation and citizenship have relied on the naturalized notion of heterosexuality (Rankin, 2000). Heterosexuality is a central component of nationalist ideologies, where deviance from heterosexual norms can provoke gender and sexual policing in the nation (Nagel, 2000, p. 117). Nationalism is typically represented as a “family trope,” where the nuclear heterosexual family is used as a metaphor for nationalism. Nationalists tend to equate “patriarchal, heterosexualised, and familial relationships with the survival of the nation” (Rankin, 2000, p. 179). Under a nationalistic discourse, the heterosexual ideology may criminalize nonreproductive sex by enacting laws and public policies to celebrate the sanctity of the heterosexual family (Peterson, 1999; Rankin, 2000).
Korea is not an exception when it comes to the proliferation of the regulatory discourse of heterosexual reproduction in the name of nationalism. The Korean government’s population control program strongly emphasized heterosexual love and sexual pleasure within the boundary of monogamous marriage (Cho, 2016). Korean citizens, regardless of sexual orientations, are expected to fulfill the familial and social obligations of forming heterosexual nuclear families (Cho, 2009). The concept of Korean family lineage, which links marriage to childbirth, provides an additional meaning of contributing to the maintenance of the larger family and Korean nation, rather than treating it as an event for an individual couple. This heteronormative system anchored in the patriarchal familism and nationalism makes coming out to friends and families onerous for non-heterosexuals, gays, and lesbians, resulting in their strategic use of contact marriage to fulfill their familial roles while maintaining their homosexual lifestyle (Cho, 2009).
Religion also comes into play in the interaction between nationalism and heterosexuality (Friedland, 2001; Van Klinken, 2014). Religious teachings have valorized family and gender as a foundational order and practice for communities (Peterson, 1999). Religion puts heterosexuality, especially the creation of families, at the center of its practices and discourses (Friedland, 2001). Familial discourses in religion, including love and loyalty through marriage, carry the logic of creation and production, which may buttress the nation (Friedland, 2001). In evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity, sin discourse and good Christian discourse operate as a regulatory force, where individuals are strongly encouraged to be heterosexual, married, and have children to gain a membership in religious organizations and society (McQueeney, 2009; Moon, 2004; Wolkomir, 2006). In Zambia, where the constitution declares itself as a Christian nation, nonheterosexuality and gay rights are regarded as a threat to the purity of the nation (Van Klinken, 2014). Korean Protestantism based on theological conservatism, which is built on a bible-centered, puritan fundamentalist belief system, also emphasizes a middle-class, heteronormative, family-centered lifestyle (Ryu, 2008).
In addition to Christianity, Confucian tradition deserves a careful attention in explaining the cultural basis of public attitudes on homosexuality. While debates on whether or not Confucianism is a religion are still underway, some scholars have taken Clifford Geertz’s approach of conceiving “religion as a cultural system” to understand the religious character of Confucianism (Hyun, 2015). In spite of the demise of Confucianism as an institutional form of religion, Confucianism still dominates the minds of Koreans as an internal orientation, habit, and ethos in contemporary Korea (Lew, Choi, & Wang, 2005). People who abide by Confucian values would not necessarily identify as “Confucian,” but Confucianism may influence people’s behaviors as a set of interconnected values and morals about how to interact and behave (Adamczyk & Cheng, 2015). On the question of sexual orientation embedded in Confucianism, Adamczyk and Cheng (2015, p. 278) drew on four sets of values, namely, obedience, traditional gender roles, sexual morality, and family connectedness (i.e., making parents proud and keeping family intact). People who value obedience may have a strong attachment to conventional thoughts and systems as well as preference to protect traditional family. Thus, those who value Confucian ethos are likely to react punitively to individuals whose behavior is unconventional, thus disapproving attitudes about homosexuality (Adamczyk & Cheng, 2015).
Another point that was relevant to the operation of heteronormativity is Confucian emphasis on self-cultivation. The religious worldview of Confucianism places a tremendous importance on self-cultivation, which cultivates one’s ability to relate to others (Hyun, 2015). The paramount idea of Confucianism was to achieve self-cultivation as a wise person and maintain social order and stability through harmonious relationships between social members. 1 Prioritizing the status quo of communities, sexual expressions, and behaviors is expected and allowed only within the boundaries of families. Sexual expression and actions, other than for the purpose of procreation, are strictly banned, and a lifestyle pursuing active sexual pleasure was perceived as restricting individuals from fulfilling filial responsibilities toward parents, family, communities, and the nation (Lee, 2016). This notion was also linked to the principle of regarding marriage as a means of procreation and a passionate personal sex drive was viewed as a dangerous force in balancing self-cultivation and filial responsibilities. The Confucian emphasis on individual responsibility has resulted in people being discouraged from expressing individual emotions. Confucian teachings believed that emotions are volatile, a fact which needs to be managed and regulated for the sake of satisfying one’s desire for virtue, with the result being that expression of emotion is not well received (Wawrytko, 2000). Confucian tradition, which has emphasized Stoic teachings on the virtue of controlling the sexual drive and emotion, still dominates the Korean people’s sexuality and emotional expression (Lee, 2016; Wawrytko, 2000).
Scholars have argued that Koreans are deeply Confucian in their minds (Lew et al., 2005). Heterosexuality may have complex, intersecting meanings for Koreans and added meanings for Korean Christians. In the socio-cultural milieu, the family has an important meaning and place, and it is a site that serves as a basic unit of society. A study of Korean evangelical Protestant women has proven that their submission to religious and family patriarchy reflects their conservative yearnings for family formation, recognizing their powerful and continuing attraction to motherly and wifely roles (Chong, 2006). Therefore, heterosexuality likely has a dominant cultural position in Korea, thus making resistance to heterosexual ideas and practices extra difficult for ordinary people.
In this study, I explored how heterosexual females, specifically devout evangelical Protestant Korean mothers, presented their views on homosexuality and LGBT rights. I also analyzed how their discomfort about LGBT rights was tied to the notion of heterosexuality as intersecting with Christianity, Confucianism, and nationalism. My findings revealed that the evangelical women’s discursive tactics, on the surface, illustrated the significance of evangelical teaching, but evangelical women often used the language of the heteronormative family ideals permeating Korean society. I discussed how evangelical women, who attended the World Vision Church in Seoul, Korea, frequently voiced the centrality of heteronormativity as a backbone of Korean society, narrating the protection of traditional Korean heteronormativity, and the long-term consequences of legalizing same-sex marriage, such as the rapidly-changing meaning of the family in the Korean context.
Data and Methods
My data is based on the individual in-depth interviews conducted for seven months, from June 2015 to December 2015. I interviewed 30 women from the World Vision Church. The church (est. 1986) is one of the mainstream evangelical Protestant megachurches in Korea. It has chapters located in Japan, US, and other countries. Although lay members have various socio-economic backgrounds, the majority of the members belong to the middle-class background. In addition to in-depth interviews, I also used fieldnotes, which contained my observation on the Korean Queer Festival in June 2015. I attended the opening ceremony and parade of the Korea Queer Festival in June 2015, in front of Seoul City Hall. Numerous signs and writings carried by conservative older Christian protestors and Korean older adults symbolically represented a deeply rooted Korean culture upholding the evangelical women’s heteronormative perceptions. As the opening ceremony and parade occurred in the public space, I played the role of complete observers, conducting an observation without deep interactions or contact with participants.
The interviewees were mostly those who are college educated and between the ages of 20 and 39. To recruit interviewees, I combined purposive and snowball sampling strategies. I recruited members from two specific Korean ministries, namely, the “university student ministry,” which comprises young university students and the “bridge ministry,” which comprises young university students and professionals who travel back and forth between Korea and other countries. I selected the two ministries based on the theoretical interest and opened access. I have several formal and informal networks within the university student ministry, as I could contact former companions and acquaintances handily and recruit interview volunteers by their recommendation.
Depending on the preference of interview participants, I used online communication tools, such as Skype or KakaoTalk (a Korean chat application). An online video chat was useful for recruiting people who are unavailable for face-to-face interviews in Seoul. Several women were traveling back and forth between Korea and other countries, so recruiting them in Seoul was difficult. Although face-to-face interviews are advantageous in developing rapport with interview participants, I tried to create a similar dynamic in online interviews. Using the same set of questions in the interview guide and facilitating a uniform flow, I spoke with people online, who were unavailable for face-to-face interviews in Seoul, as I could maximize the time with my interview participants. In terms of face-to-face interviews, most of the interviews would take place in the church, café, or homes, depending on the availability of the time and space for interviewees. Upon the agreement of interviewees, interviews were audio-taped using an audio recorder. The interview guide comprised the following parts: 1) personal life history, mostly about international education, career paths, and foreign life experiences; 2) religious journey, personal practices and group activities; 3) personal attitudes and views toward LGBT; and 4) thoughts on social and legal rights of LGBT. The interview was conducted for one to three hours, and the background information sheet was used to collect basic demographic information (e.g., age, nationality, occupation, education, and so on).
All participants hold a bachelor’s degree or higher degree, with 18 people with Bachelor’s degrees, 11 people with Master’s degrees, and 1 person with a Doctoral degree, respectively. The average length of church attendance is 25 years, and that of World Vision Church attendance is 7 years. In terms of class background, all participants, except two people who identified “don’t know” and “working class,” reported that they belong to the middle-class. Out of 30 women, interviews quoted largely draw on 12 married women, taking the information narrated by 18 single women into consideration. Despite the limited number of mothers used in this paper, I could reach to the empirical generalization because of the repetitive languages that evangelical women have used in justifying their views. Most of the single women plan to marry on time, so they shared similar views with these mothers, owing to their evangelical responsibility to form a family and plan childbearing. However, evangelical mothers have explicitly expressed more firm thoughts on potential concerns on the rapidly changing notions of families.
Evangelical Women’s Discourses on Homosexuality
The evangelical women’s discursive tactics illustrated the impact of evangelical teachings and the Biblical emphasis on procreation, but these women use the language of heteronormative family ideals permeating Korean society to a great extent. Wide concerns about the future of Korean society appear frequently when they justify their ambivalence on LGBT rights. At first, the evangelical women’s reasoning entails their evangelical beliefs on procreation, especially in the discussion of homosexuality, but their discourse advances to bring up their concerns as mothers who are afraid of the rapid change in heteronormative ideals and their hesitation and aversion about an expressive culture.
Accepting the Idea of Procreation and Sinfulness
By reproducing heteronormative ideas, Christians and church leaders classify homosexuality as “a plague; an abomination, a disorder, a sin, and a violation of God’s design” (Coley, 2018; Cragun & Sumerau, 2015; Wolkomir, 2001). This belief appears in Korea, but in a different way. To my questions about what they think of homosexuality and LGBT individuals, the first discursive rationale originated from Biblical teachings, sin discourses, and the principle of procreation. Evangelical women, who have little international experience and see religiosity as their core identity, stated that homosexuality is clearly a sin, according to the Bible. Evangelical women with more transnational backgrounds tend to embrace “hate the sin, love the sinner” discourses (Jung, 2016; Tay, Hoon, & Hui, 2018). However, interviewees who lack frequent travel experiences have shown a submissive behavior to the traditional moral conservatism on homosexuality, which defines homosexuality as a sinful desire, feeling, and action. While certain evangelical groups attempted to redefine the evangelical identity to include a positive valuation of homosexuality in the US (Thumma, 1991), most church pastors in Korea continue to preserve the moral conservativism on homosexuality. Thus, homosexual feelings and acts are a sin. This teaching leads to the evangelical women’s submissive acceptance of their teachings as their upbringing based on the church and religious family. For example, Yeonjin stated,
In the Bible, there are verses about the sexual relationship between a man and a man … like in Sodom. In (pastor’s) preaching with regard to these verses they said that it is sin that God does not like … but they have not talked about how we should respond and react if those people come to church. I have not heard how we should respond. They just said that it is sin (Yeojin, Fashion Designer, Korea).
As expressed above, “sin” appears in other women’s conversations alongside statements, such as “I oppose homosexuality.” People like Yeonjin, who has her own fashion business and a bachelor’s degree, believe that the church is a place to educate oneself and learn social values. She often converses with her husband and friends about various social issues, such as abortion, gender inequality, and morality. Biblical teachings, small-group meeting discussions in church, and her own reflections matter when judging what is right and wrong, but the church is an integral place to learn crucial social values, virtues, and moralities. When I talked to Soojeong, a pre-school teacher with a bachelor’s degree, she told me that without critically reflecting on the matter, she signed the signature-seeking campaign opposing a queer parade and the legalization of the same-sex marriage, a campaign organized and promoted by the alliance of evangelical Christian churches in Korea.
I noted a broad Christian discourse on homosexuality that is largely shaped by conservative older Christian protestors at the opening ceremony of the Korea Queer Festival. While a queer parade seems to be a site for claiming LGBT rights among various actors, affectionate politics operate as a significant vehicle for actors to feel attached to heteronormativity (Heo, 2019). In June 9, 2015, I observed many emotions and value-laden symbols and signs carried in front of Seoul City Hall by different groups of people including police officers, Christian protestors, conservative nationalism protestors, Queer Festival staff, and Korean citizens. A woman was holding a sign saying “People’s body is a holy temple of God, not for homosexuality. We are the image of God.” Other signs included phrases such as “God created men—(Genesis 1:26-27)” and “homosexuality is a sin in the eyes of GOD—Christian Party of Democracy.” Two middle-aged evangelical women held microphones and loudly sang a hymn. Aggressive hymns were repeated incessantly, and many people sang together. These scenes encapsulate the typical media and public portrayal of Christian protestors who demonize LGBT groups with threatening language.
This situation is an extreme case of opposition, and not all individual adherents express such militant opposition in their everyday lives. Yet, in answer to my questions about their opinions, some evangelical women raised the principle of procreation, including the themes of family formation, childbearing, and childrearing as God’s will. Some of these women directly cited the importance of the Bible verse “God said to them, Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1: 28), when discussing the infertility of homosexual couples. This issue of fertility is not unique to Korean Christians, as their counterparts in North America also claim that homosexuality serves no “natural” purpose because sexual intercourse between gay men does not lead to reproduction and given that the “reproduction of offspring” is “a natural law” (Jewell & Morrison, 2012, p. 362). In trying to avoid the negative stigma attached to the word ”sin,” some evangelical women came up with in-depth stories explaining why procreation should be a basic rule. For example, Yoonjoo said,
God created men and women and asked them to form a family, be fruitful, and thrive. There will be deviances and wrongdoings due to people’s sins, but we need to form families in God’s plan of creation. People should unite and make an effort. But these [homosexual] people have rejected [God’s plan] since Genesis, so I consider this as disobedience to God (Yoonjoo, Research Scientist, Korea).
As Yoonjoo’s remark shows, God’s directions about procreation and the union between men and women have become an important rationale for many evangelical women. Although Yoonjoo has a master’s degree and is a professional scientist, she strongly believes that family formation and sexual reproduction are necessary duties of the citizens of God’s Kingdom. The principle of procreation also arose frequently in the interview with Nahyun:
The most important thing is the principle of procreation of God. We approach it through the virginity of premarital sex or the prohibition of homosexuality … We condemn and prohibit them-pre-marital sex experiences are not allowed, and it is a sin to love the same sex … I think we should not approach this in a [negative, condemning] way. We should understand the principle of procreation. The reason why pre-marital sex is prohibited is related to life. Sex is related to life. We need to be careful. Also, it is possible to flourish when man and woman love and bear children. God created us in that way (Nahyun, High school teacher, Korea).
Nahyun, who has a competitive teaching job at a high school in Seoul, also called for a transition from emphasizing sin to remembering the rule of procreation. For many Korean Christians, overt discussion of premarital or nonmarital sex is avoided in a highly sensitive manner, as it is related to production and reproduction. Christians believe that “men and women are made for each other,” given the fertility within the heterosexual family and the positing of man as protector/leader and woman as nurturer/helper (Ammerman, 1987; Bartkowski, 2001). When this evangelical Christian principle is adopted by Korean Christians, their narratives illustrate the unique ways in which evangelical women submit themselves to the teachings of Korean evangelical leaders.
Such women commonly spend many hours of voluntary service as small group leaders and choir members at the World Vision Church. Clearly, their understanding of procreation is rooted in a deep knowledge of the Bible as developed through theological study meetings and other training programs offered by the church. Having been advised to strengthen their belief and commitment through various practices, such as morning prayers, regular Bible reading, and worship services, Korean evangelicals tend to develop the habit of putting themselves before the gaze of God. Growing up in a hierarchical culture where respect for adults and the position of power is deemed as a moral virtue, Korean Christians are also accustomed and willing to accept the authority of knowledge and religious power. For instance, an interviewee stated that she liked to hear a clear viewpoint and guidelines on homosexuality from a pastor. By assuaging a militantly strong faith and promoting a Bible-centered, spirit-filled, devotionalistic Protestantism, Korean evangelicals share a core belief system with their Western counterparts and are thus loyal supporters of religious hierarchy in their obeisance to the teachings of pastors and other leaders.
Fear of Rapid Change of the Definition of Family
Another frequently appearing rationale when discussing homosexuality and LGBT rights is the evangelical women’s recognition of social transformation, and the ripple effects that provision of various rights such as same-sex marriage would bring to Korean society. Biblical passages on God’s commands about procreation clearly influenced evangelical women’s viewpoints, as discussed above. However, the emphasis on sin discourse and procreation seemed to weaken as our conversation progressed, though heteronormative ideas for the sake of protecting the basic structure and purity of the nation as a whole became pronounced when these evangelical women were justifying their views. Of course, this heteronormative idea is crucial to Christianity, as shown in the sanctification of heterosexual marriage and the patriarchal family (Moon, 2004; Sumerau & Schrock, 2011). Nevertheless, the Korean women’s conversations indicated the unique ways in which such idea intersects with Confucian-oriented tradition and nationalism.
These evangelical women formulated their thoughts on the basis of religious language. Hayoon explained that God created boundaries within the family and the roles of the father and mother are important for the children. Hence, she opposed same-sex marriage despite her liberal views on many social issues arising from her experience living in Abu Dhabi. From there on, Hayoon continued to express her worries and unease about shifting family ideals with regard to the father and mother in relation to the standard family model in Korean society. As a former media team journalist in an NGO and a current journalist, Hayoon provided comprehensive reflections in the interview. She emphasized that her views arose not only from her religious perspectives but also from a sociocultural understanding of Korean history, genealogy, and kinship relationships.
When we think about family, we imagine dad, mom, and kids, but in a same-sex couple, a man replaces the woman’s role. Aren’t they able to adopt a child? If they adopt, the family system can be unstable for children. Although society is rapidly changing, culture has not yet developed to incorporate and accept this in our society. (Hayoon, Journalist, Korea).
Like Hayoon, other religious mothers, such as Jeongsoo and Eunjeong, started with procreation as a vantage point. However, their discussion advanced to convey that legal and political change may cause rapid and drastic shifts in the definition of the family. Yoonjoo said, “I stand on the oppositional side (on same sex-marriage). As I said before, the social consequences, the change in social awareness, is immense.” Aside from Yoonjoo, almost all interviewees uniformly displayed concerns about the domino effect when the ideal norm of the family shifts from heterosexuality to homosexuality. Regarding LGBT politics in Korea, a comparison of Korea and the U.S. repeatedly appeared in the conversations. Some evangelical women raised the American case as an exemplar of the breakdown of heteronormative family ideals. Jeongsoo, a devout Christian who trained in Youth with a Mission in her 20s and who is currently raising a pre-school daughter, stated,
I have seen on Facebook that one American family was living in a state which legalized same-sex marriage before the Supreme Court’s decision this year [2015]. A child brought a book from a school and was reading a story that portrayed a family where two fathers and two children were a normal family. After seeing that, the mom was frightened. So she complained to the school, but then the mom was sued. The school announced that they had acted legally, so the family, mom and dad, were sued. I accidently saw a movie clip covering the story. It seems that there were many similar cases (Jeongsoo, Consultant Professional, Korea).
Her words reflect her unease about same-sex marriage and recognize a possibly drastic change in the definition of the family. News of the trouble that heterosexual parents encountered when teaching their children in the US frightened her. For Jeongsoo, sex education overtly discussing condoms and other tools for safe sex not only sounds awkward and embarrassing but also implicitly legitimizes premarital sex between teenagers, which she does not agree with. Homosexuality is still a nascent issue for many Koreans and my interviewees, so that it is merely imagined in the minds of religious women. When I posed an open question about homosexuals, many evangelical women raised gay couples rather than lesbian counterparts, and such occurrence suggests that their use of reference originates from stories and cases which they heard from American drama, news media, and other resources.
Another woman, Hyejin remarked, “I absolutely oppose [same-sex marriage] … Legalization can make the idea disseminate to other people … At school, people will talk about condoms more naturally…” Hyejin continued to stress that changing policies and laws will bring increasing attention to the LGBT subculture and legitimize it. Once the frame of the dominant heterosexual family is shifted, educating children and other people in the traditional manner will be challenged, and the sexual identity of children, teenagers, and young adults may encounter confusion and challenges. By worrying about domino effects, such as a change of school textbooks and sex education in public schools, they uniformly question how to raise children wisely in a rapidly-changing society.
In addition to the question of same-sex marriage legalization, another issue is related to whether or not evangelical women support LGBT politicians. Regarding homosexual politicians, many evangelical women who showed support for personal friendship-building and equal employment rights turned out to be ambivalent. Even those women who showed the most liberal perceptions of marriage because of their overseas experiences largely disapproved of LGBT politicians. For instance, Yoonjoo remarked, “No, I won’t (support a homosexual candidate) … that person will do what he or she can do to legalize gay marriage … and that’s why I won’t support homosexual candidates.” Hyejin, who earned a Master’s Degree in the UK, stated,
I won’t (vote for a homosexual candidate). I want to vote for a candidate who can think neutrally and has the passion to work for our citizens. I think homosexuals will favor laws that can help them to express their culture. Those people might think that an attempt to pass such laws is positive for the citizens of this country, but my political viewpoints are different from theirs. I always try to be neutral (Hyejin, Documentary Producer, Korea).
Hyejin’s remarks indicate her concerns about the representativeness of LGBT politicians, and these thoughts are similarly echoed by other women’s anxious reactions. Another woman, Hayoon, said, “No, I wouldn’t (support). It would be uncomfortable, if that person keeps raising topics related to gay people. Politics is a large field. Sexual topics are a bit uncomfortable.” Interestingly, evangelical women did not use religious language to describe why they oppose LGBT politicians regardless of their politically conservative or progressive stances, but they rather expressed worries about the changing cultural frame and the possible consequences. The narratives of World Vision women partially overlap with the modern prejudicial belief that gay men and lesbians magnify the importance of their sexual preference and make illegitimate or unnecessary demands for changes in the status quo (Morrison & Morrison, 2002).
Overall, evangelical mothers’ wide concerns center on the potential change in the cultural and moral frame of heterosexuality and its ripple effect in the social, political, and legal arenas. They believe that recognition of LGBT rights not only affects gay couples but also shifts the social and cultural meaning of heterosexual family morals, such as household structure, membership, and division of household labor, including maternal and paternal roles. When Hayoon, Jeongsoo, and Hyejin discussed their opposition to the legal and political rights of LGBT persons, they barely mentioned Bible verses and referenced God’s perspective. Instead, they discussed how the family ideals of the father, mother, and children support the society and the country, and they raise the subsequent domino effects. These women’s discourses on the legal and political rights of LGBT persons are a manifestation of the enduring heteronormative ideals deeply rooted in Korean society. In Korea, heterosexuality is linked to the Confucian traditions of producing offspring and educating future descendants who will honor the family linage, society, and nation. Moreover, heterosexuality is celebrated in relation to nationalistic discourses which make members prioritize a sense of patriotic collectivism and social stability and its maintenance.
Eschewing the Culture of Individual Expression in the Public Space
Finally, one recurring rationale among World Vision mothers is aversion to LGBT groups’ public expression of sexual identity. American literature argues that LGBT groups have been framed as “hypersexualized, predatory, and deviant” (Loftus, 2001) and are often characterized in terms of their socio-erotic identities, thereby fueling sexual stereotypes for the heterosexual majority (Herek, 1990). Accordingly, even heterosexuals who support civil, legal, and political rights for LGBT groups can exhibit implicit prejudice toward LGBT groups in terms of their public display of sexual identity and affection (Doan, Miller, & Loehr, 2015; Morrison & Morrison, 2002). This tendency emerges notably in the case of evangelical women in Korea who discussed their aversion to the sexualized subculture of LGBT persons.
Evangelical women’s ambivalence and aversion appear quite consistently regardless of their political stance. That is, even evangelical women who vocally identify themselves as political progressives were conservative in relation to the right to public display of sexuality and the degree to which they feel comfortable about this. For instance, Daeun, who lived in the US for five years during her husband’s doctoral and her own master’s degree education, mostly expressed progressive opinions about LGBT rights and social recognition. Nonetheless, she hesitated and ultimately disagreed with public presentation of sexual identity and affection in the case of the queer parade or in other public places.
Well, I do not think a lot about the queer parade (and am not against it), but the parade held in Korea seems to have become a serious problem. For example, (I) saw pictures of activists who had dressed up and searched about the parade … It looked somewhat disordered. No matter who sees it, (it would) look like (the corruption) of the public morals. I think that they would not necessarily present themselves in that manner just because they are gay, and in a way, I thought that they went too far … (Daeun, Graduate Student, US).
Daeun’s remarks reflect the ways in which people connect public morality and sexuality. In Korea, sexuality talk is not fondly received in the public space, and discussion of sex in a formal setting is viewed as threatening to social norms and boundaries. The 2015 Korea queer pride parade generated public controversy because of the media portrayal of LGBT activists in overtly sexualized ways. The coverage of the Korean media, including Christian media of the sexualized performance of LGBT activists, spurred debates among Korean netizens and citizens about public morals, ethics, and boundaries of rights. Eunjeong said,
The problem with the protest by LGBT activists is that, when they express themselves, they express as sexual deviants, so it spurs hatred more and creates even more serious opposition. I do not think that it was the only way [to protest]. They could [protest] without taking off their clothes, but if expressing it in that way is homosexuality, it would be even bad (Eunjeong, Office Worker, Seoul).
Like Eunjeong, other evangelical women brought up the matter of undressed activists and revealed their feelings of discomfort. The 2014 Korea Queer Festival left a strong impression on Christians and heterosexuals, perhaps influenced by the media which stereotyped LGBT groups as having oversexualized identities. Reflecting the prevailing narrative of Korean Christians, Eunjeong stated that sex is an inherently private thing, and that expressing it repeatedly in public makes ordinary people uncomfortable and antagonized. She continuously stated that “People do not want to see what is happening in the bedroom in public places.” In differentiating between public and private issues, sex-related issues are considered as private matters that should not be tackled in the public domain. Overall, many of my interviewees agreed that the expressionism of LGBT activists goes beyond what society allows, given that public discussion about sex is taboo in Korean culture. Confucian tradition strongly discourages sexual and emotional drives for the sake of self-cultivation, as it could damage social harmony and stability.
These women sometimes discussed sexual cultures in foreign countries but mostly as a contrast to Korean society. Eunjeong studied abroad in the Netherlands, which is famous for its legalized sex workers and prostitutes, and she shared her wide knowledge of this industry in Europe. She could tolerate holding hands and kissing in public but not hyper-sexualized attire. Eunjoeng stated, “But the problem here is that … last year it happened here in Shinchon too. People did not wear underwear in public. I think that it is public lewdness…” Major media outlets, including Christian-affiliated newspapers (e.g., Kukmin Ilbo), have reported the promiscuousness of gay activists who wear lingerie in public spaces (Baek & Kim, 2015). Although such individuals might not be the majority, they still garnered the attention of many people.
Children came up as another reason behind their discomfort and aversion to the expressive culture of sexuality. Another woman living in New York City, Minjeong, experienced discomfort about the public display of homosexuality and performance of homosexuals in the Korean queer pride parade. Despite her open-minded attitude toward the social and legal rights of LGBT people, she claimed that she does not want to raise her children in a promiscuous culture in Korea. To her, homosexual people should exercise their freedom and rights within set boundaries. Minjeong remarked,
I have talked about this topic with someone before, but the situation here in the US is very different from that of Korea. It is because nobody actually talks about sex directly and specifically, even if they march in the gay parade. Their message is … ‘I am gay and ask for respect toward my freedom of sexuality.’ But in Korea, they cross the line. I really lean against it. They should exercise their freedom morally (Minjeong, Office Worker, US).
As Minjeong noted, most evangelical women remain conservative. To their eyes, overt expression of sexual identity may be a demand transcending the commonly allowed boundaries in Korea. Some evangelical women stated that heterosexuals are also not allowed to overtly express their sexuality. Certain types of dress code and language are allowed in the public space. This notion has appeared in similar ways in other research, thereby confirming that informal privileges, including public displays of affection (e.g., kissing and holding hands in a public place), are not well received by heterosexuals (Doan et al., 2014; Morrison & Morrison, 2002). Lesbians and gays are denied through rejection of public visibility and recognition (Steinbugler, 2005).
Korean evangelical women’s aversion to public expression of sexual identity by LGBT activists and individuals may be linked to a sexually conservative culture entrenched in Confucianism as well as nationalism. In my field trip to the Korean Queer Festival in June 2015, I observed that Confucian-oriented nationalism intertwined with family narratives has been a recurring theme in anti-homosexuality discourses and LGBT politics. When I wandered around Seoul City Hall during the Korean Queer Festival, several groups and signs caught my eye, with messages like “Homosexuality has cut the family lineage and dishonors our ancestors. That is the most undutiful (unfilial) of undutiful things;” “What is homosexuality? Father is crying;” “Mayor Park, Please protect our young children. We parents oppose the Queer Festival in Seoul Plaza;” and “Our national future is miserable. Our country that we made with blood and tears has collapsed because of homosexuality. OUT for Mayor Park who supports homosexuality.” In a corner, a man wore a traditional Korean costume and hat, and looked exactly like a Confucian scholar from the Chosun dynasty while holding the national flag. In another corner of the square, I saw Korean national flags flying.
Confucian tradition views marriage as a means of procreation and regards a passionate personal sex drive as a dangerous force when balancing self-cultivation and filial responsibilities (Lee, 2016). One Confucian teaching is to “restrain emotions as the rules of propriety and righteousness for the sake of social harmony,” and people are expected to channel emotions into moral principles (Wawrytko, 2000, p. 167). Like sexual activities, emotions are considered to follow the same process. A mutuality of responsibilities and benefits between the individual and the group emphasizes a complex interdependency that requires the sacrifice of personal preferences, including sexual preferences, for the good of the whole (Wawrytko, 2000, p. 168). As a consequence, Confucian tradition plays an important role in leading a regimented culture that restricts the expression of emotional and sexual orientation (Lee, 2016; Wawrytko, 2000). Korean evangelical women’s discomfort and aversion to the individual expression of LGBT groups show the operation of heteronormativity complexly entrenched within Confucian tradition and nationalistic discourses that downplay sexual drives for the sake of nation-building, strength, and harmony.
Conclusion and Discussion
Quantitative approaches that treat religiosity as a static variable in research on homonegativity (Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009; Burdette, Ellison, & Hill, 2005; Ellison & Musick, 1993) tend to neglect how people exert agency to reinterpret religious texts and overlook the hybrids of various local religious cultures in which individuals are elastically embedded. Therefore, an examination of public opinion on homosexuality and LGBT rights must be accompanied by close observation of local contexts, where notions of religious texts, heteronormativity, and the family system are amalgamated. This study confirms that evangelical Protestant Korean women, especially mothers, conceive heteronormativity as a central value of Korean society, and produce narratives about the protection of traditional Korean heteronormativity and the long-term consequences of legalizing same-sex marriage and supporting LGBT politicians.
Three major findings elucidate why evangelical women tend to have ambivalent and unfavorable views about homosexuality and LGBT rights. On the surface, they draw on the Biblical view of procreation when differentiating between homosexuals and heterosexuals. However, evangelical women’s continuing stories show a complex operation of the heterosexuality system permeating Korea. One important reason is their recognition of social change and the ripple effects of the provision of political and legal rights that may threaten the dominant heteronormative family ideal and eventually harm national stability. Another narrative is the evangelical women’s aversion to the expressive subculture and public display of sexual identity.
To explain the evangelical women’s ambivalence and aversion to homosexuality and LGBT rights, I have elaborated on the significance of heteronormative ideas and how they operate uniquely in relation to the indigenous Korean culture. Normally, heterosexual ideas are reinforced by and intersect with religiosity and Biblical literalism, which accepts the word of God as an absolute truth (Burdette et al., 2005). In submitting to church teachings, lay members promote and embrace a “good Christian” discourse, which espouses “being heterosexual, getting married, and having children” (Wolkomir, 2001, p. 311). While recognizing that evangelical women’s inherently complex views of homosexuality and LGBT rights arise from heterosexuality co-determined by religion, Confucianism, and nationalism, I assert that their discourses on LGBT rights demonstrate the peculiar form of collective heteronormative family norms continuing to thrive in Korea. Their disposition encapsulates middle-class evangelical women’s implicit desire for an intact traditional heteronormative family structure and discourses that conform to Confucian ideas that eschew emotional and sexual expression in Asian societies for the sake of national well-being. Overall, their stories reveal the intertwined nature of evangelical Christianity, Confucianism, and nationalism collectively reinforcing heteronormativity.
Some may argue that the intersection of evangelical belief and mothering experiences does not necessarily lead to condemning, negative interpretations of homosexuality and LGBT individuals’ legal and political rights. A research on transnational evangelical women demonstrates that they tend to display tolerant perspectives on LGBT groups. These women reconcile their conflicting beliefs in terms of conservative religion and human rights by valorizing the values of equity and meritocracy and referring to the discourses of sameness developed through personal contacts with LGBT in foreign countries (Jung, 2016). However, the evangelical women involved in this work with a sparse foreign living experiences did not challenge the traditional religious conservatism of condemning homosexuality, which is defined as a sinful desire, feeling, and action. What stands out more for these women is their position as heterosexual Korean mothers whose paramount concern involves the rapidly changing definition of families and the expansion of individualistic expressive culture. Further research on heterosexual mothers will shed light on the pertinent power of heteronormativity embedded in the local Confucian and nationalistic culture.