Mayesha Alam. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Volume 19. Fall 2018.
A humanitarian catastrophe of epic proportions has been unfolding along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border since late August 2017. To date, some 700,000 Rohingya men, women, and children have fled their homes in Rakhine state of Myanmar to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh after the Myanmar military— also known as the tatmadaw—began “clearance operations” in the aftermath of a small-scale insurgent attack by a separatist group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The indiscriminate, horrific, and rapid state-led violence has provoked widespread condemnation, not least because it is evocative of “textbook” ethnic cleansing campaigns such as those during the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia. Violence against the Rohingya—who are a religious, linguistic, and ethnic minority—is hardly new. The ongoing cross-border crisis, however, is unprecedented in its scale and pace and, thus, has rightfully drawn international scrutiny about the future of democracy and the record of human rights in Myanmar. An underexplored but nevertheless important question relates to how the refugee influx has impacted Bangladesh, which has borne the brunt of Myanmar’s expulsion of the Rohingya. In this article, I seek to address this lacuna by shining a spotlight on Bangladesh’s role and experience in the ongoing crisis.
Bangladesh’s ability to absorb such a vast number of Rohingya people is commendable. Despite the lack of space and resources necessary to cope with a disaster of this magnitude, Bangladesh is, in some ways, well positioned to respond to disasters thanks to recent and historical experience. As one of the leading troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions around the world, the Bangladesh military, which is helping to manage security and infrastructure of camps, is equipped to deal with an evolving humanitarian emergency. Moreover, the people of Bangladesh are no strangers to ethnic cleansing and forced displacement. The legacy of the 1971 Liberation War, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Bengalis and forced some ten million Bengalis to flee to India, looms large in the public imagination. This history has served as a source of much sympathy toward the Rohingya among both state leaders and ordinary citizens.
But Bangladesh is very small, underdeveloped, and overpopulated. The government, and broad swathes of the public, is growing increasingly exasperated with having to serve as the host nation for the displaced Rohingya. In late November 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar reached a hastily negotiated bilateral “arrangement” on repatriation that was supposed to commence in January 2018. Implementation has been delayed not least because the terms are ambiguous and unrealistic, but also do not take into consideration the needs and aspirations of the displaced population. In the meantime, Bangladesh continues to struggle with the enormity of the refugee influx, which at its peak saw some ten-thousand people arriving per day, and consensus emerges that the situation is untenable.
In the following analysis, I document and analyze a range of political, legal, economic, social, and environmental effects of the Rohingya influx, and I call for greater attention to how these short- and long-term consequences are affecting Bangladesh in order to prevent the situation from worsening for both refugees and local communities. The findings of this article are based on a combination of journalistic reporting as well as ethnographic fieldwork in Rohingya settlements in the border region between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Political Impact
The Rohingya crisis is not only a humanitarian catastrophe but also a cross-border political crisis that is extremely complex. Even though it has not spiraled into cross-border violent confrontation between Myanmar and Bangladesh, tensions are at an all-time high. Becoming a host nation to the fastest- growing refugee crisis in the world has also brought with it noteworthy political impacts for Bangladesh, both domestically and on the international stage.
When the Myanmar military began to raze hundreds of villages in northern Rakhine in late August 2017, the government of Bangladesh was at first disinclined to permit Rohingya refugees into the country. Rohingya have been seeking shelter in Bangladesh since 1978 as a result of previous pogroms by the Myanmar government as well as intercommunal clashes with Buddhist Rakhine.3 Whereas they found little protection in the past, this time the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina quickly relented because of domestic and international pressure.
Hasina has faced consistent scrutiny from local rights groups and international NGOs for her increasing intolerance toward dissent in Bangladesh. Under her rule, for example, forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings have spiked. So, the opportunity to recast herself in a positive light (and in doing so divert attention away from her own government’s abuses) was welcomed.
Throughout her tenure, Hasina—the daughter of Bangladesh’s founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was assassinated along with most of his family—has sought to raise the country’s profile on the international stage. In explaining her government’s decision to open the border to the Rohingya, Hasina claimed that if Bangladesh could feed 160 million of its own citizens, it could care for one million more. When she appeared at the UN General Assembly, she pleaded with the international community for help on behalf of the Rohingya. She also put forward a five-point plan to end the crisis, including (1) a call to the Myanmar government to “unconditionally stop” ethnic cleansing in Rakhine once and for all, (2) a call to the UN to establish a “fact-finding mission,” (3) the creation of “safe zones” in Myanmar supervised by the UN to protect civilians, (4) return of Rohingya to Myanmar, and (5) immediate and full implementation of the Kofi Annan Commission Report. Though international donors were obliging with aid and echoed calls for Myanmar to end the violence, Hasina’s proposals were left unimplemented.
Many high-level dignitaries from the United States, European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and elsewhere have visited Cox’s Bazar since the Rohingya crisis began to offer diplomatic support, but a political solution that addresses Dhaka’s concerns and holds Myanmar accountable for its actions has been fleeting. Although India has been a longtime ally of Bangladesh, including during the 1971 Liberation War, the current government in New Delhi led by Narendra Modi has failed to deliver the kind of political backing that Dhaka expected. The sentiment toward Rohingya refugees in the Indian government remains largely unforgiving, with several senior officials calling for tightening border security and deporting Rohingya people who had previously already been living in India.6 Beijing, meanwhile, has firmly stood behind Naypyidaw, not least because of an array of economic investment projects throughout the country, including in Rakhine. The US government introduced targeted sanctions in December 2017 against more than a dozen Myanmar officials including Maung Maung Soe, who led the clearance operations, but the Trump administration has been generally unwilling to prioritize democracy and human rights abroad. In April 2018, a delegation from the UN Security Council visited Myanmar to meet with government officials, call for the protection of Rohingya, and urge an end to the crisis, but the tangible outcomes of that effort remain to be seen.
With mounting evidence of grave human rights abuses, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court asked judges to rule on whether her office has jurisdiction over “the alleged deportation of Rohingya people from Myanmar.” While Myanmar is not a party to the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, Bangladesh ratified the treaty and has been requested to offer inputs to help the Court decide its jurisdiction. The Statute allows for referral of cases to the Court via States Parties, UN Security Council, and through proprio motu initiative of the Office of the Prosecutor with the consent of ICC judges. A possible ICC investigation into crimes against humanity in Myanmar poses both opportunities and challenges for the Bangladesh government. On the one hand, cooperating with the ICC would allow Bangladesh to help the Rohingya find justice, protect human rights, advance accountability, and uphold international criminal law. On the other hand, working with the ICC could antagonize Myanmar, worsen relations between the two nations, and further complicate Rohingya repatriation, which has already been severely delayed. Bangladeshi civil society groups and human rights activists have called on Hasina’s government to respond earnestly to the ICC request and provide the necessary information to enable the Court to proceed.
Meanwhile in Bangladesh, her party and its supporters have hailed Hasina as “the mother of humanity.” Large banners and posters depicting Hasina comforting distraught refugees can be found throughout Cox’s Bazar and in the capital Dhaka. But, while in some respects the refugee crisis helped to embolden the ruling Awami League, it also created splinters within the party and left the government susceptible to attacks from opposition leaders. Khaleda Zia—Hasina’s bitter rival and head of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party—initially lauded the acceptance of refugees, displaying a rare united front, but later criticized the government’s handling of the refugee situation and failure to reach an adequate political solution with Myanmar. Zia is currently imprisoned after facing corruption charges brought forward against her by Hasina’s government. At the same time, Islamist groups like Jamaat and Hefazat, who are eager to capitalize on the plight of the Rohingya to garner public support for their political cause, initially called for the armed liberation of Muslims in Rakhine. A general election is scheduled for late 2018, and Bangladeshi secularists continue to raise alarms about the growing social and political influence of right-wing Islamists.
Economic Consequences
Although foreign aid has been essential to Bangladesh’s ability to absorb and manage the Rohingya influx, the economic costs are eye watering and do have implications for the local and national economy. Despite remarkable progress in recent years, Bangladesh remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Although the national economy grew by 7.1% in 2016, the GDP per capita hovers at approximately $1,400. The cost of taking care of almost a million Rohingya refugees is upward of $ 1 billion per annum. The influx of refugees has been accompanied by an influx of international humanitarian assistance, but there are economic costs—especially in the border region—whose full effect may not be apparent for some time.
The coastal town Cox’s Bazar—which boasts the longest natural uninterrupted sea beach in the world—used to be Bangladesh’s primary tourist destination. The country has generally struggled to develop a tourism industry because of security concerns among foreigners in urban areas as well as low infrastructure, including roads, electricity, and clean water, in more remote parts of the country. In recent years, dozens of hotels and resorts have been established along the shoreline in Cox’s to attract vacationers—mainly domestic—that want a respite from the hustle and bustle of Dhaka and other cities. Now, the resort town is saturated with foreign aid workers from virtually every part of the globe. Their continuous arrival—for both short- and long-term stints—has served as a major economic boost for the local hotels. Many Bangladeshis, including young professionals, have also found jobs with humanitarian organizations, but day laborers and other low-wage workers are struggling with price hikes for basic goods and losing out on work because of competition from refugees who are willing to work for much less pay.
Societal Tensions
Related to the economic effects at the local level is a range of social strains that have been introduced as a result of the Rohingya population’s expansion in Cox’s Bazar. Of the approximately 900,000 Rohingya— which includes both arrivals since August 2017 and those who came before— 73 percent can be found in new spontaneous settlements, 13 percent are living in makeshift settlements, 9 percent have dispersed into host communities, and 5 percent are in the formal refugee camps. In contrast, according to the 2011 census, less than half a million Bangladeshis lived in Ukhia and Teknaf, so refugees now outnumber the local population 2 to 1.
The birthrate among the Rohingya, who have previously lacked access to contraceptives, is also much higher than that of Bangladeshis. In 2018 alone, more than 48,000 children are estimated to be born to Rohingya mothers in Bangladesh. Maternal and neonatal health are thus significant challenges for medical aid professionals. Newborns are at risk of malnutrition, disease, and death, as is all too often the case with forcibly displaced populations. A massive vaccination campaign for diphtheria is currently under way after an outbreak that began in early December 2017, and although Bangladesh has long made immunization available to citizens—including in rural areas— fears remain about the potential for waterborne and other communicable diseases spreading.
The Bangladesh government wants to control the movement of the Rohingya and prevent them from being able to leave designated refugee settlements. This would lead to their assimilation into local villages, which in turn would make repatriation all the more unlikely. To thwart the possibility of assimilation, the government has introduced restrictions on instruction in Bengali, but education is provided to children and adolescents in English and Burmese. The government also wants to prevent refugees from being able to obtain citizenship through marriage. At the beginning of January, a Bangladeshi court upheld a 2014 law refusing to recognize unions between Rohingyas and Bangladeshi nationals.
Various forms of trafficking are also known to be happening in the area, using refugee settlements as organized criminal networks seek to capitalize on the flow of people and goods. There are reports of human trafficking for both sex as well as domestic labor. In addition, the production and trafficking of illegal drugs—especially methamphetamines—from Rakhine to Cox’s Bazar has been a long-standing problem that has spiked in the last year. In short, trafficking represents a major social concern with economic and security implications that could bear ill short- and longterm consequences for both the Rohingya as well as Bangladeshi authorities.
Environmental Effects
An understudied dimension of humanitarian disasters, the environmental impact of the refugee influx in this case is difficult to overstate. The UN Development Program recently submitted a report to the Bangladesh government identifying twentyeight risk factors related to environmental destruction and its economic and social consequences. For instance, groundwater sources are quickly being depleted while previously freshwater streams have become polluted. Sanitation and hygiene are among the most challenging issues facing humanitarian service providers. Air pollution in Ukhia and Teknaf has also increased because of the smoke from firewood burned by refugees for cooking and the exhaust from thousands of trucks, jeeps, and cars bringing people and goods into the camps. The consequences of deforestation and contamination are innumerable and likely to last for generations, affecting not only people who live along the border but also far inland in Bangladesh and northeastern India.
Along the border region, where refugees have settled, thousands of acres of national forests were cleared. Areas previously inhabited by wild elephants are now barren. With elephants pushed out of their natural habitats, the likelihood for conflict with humans is increased. Both local villagers as well as refugees have reported encounters with these giant endangered animals. The geographic character of the area has been transformed as green hills have been replaced with flattened stretches of red earth. Beyond aesthetics, this is highly problematic from an ecological and environmental standpoint.
Bangladesh is highly susceptible to climate change and has, for years, been grappling with soil erosion, rising sea levels, and frequent natural disasters including cyclones and floods. As the monsoon season fast approaches, questions are swirling about the fate of refugees. Their temporary and ramshackle shelters will not be able to withstand heavy rains and gale-force winds, meaning that they must either be moved or their accommodations fortified. This is part of the reason why the Bangladesh government is eager to move forward with the repatriation of refugees, which they insist should be completed within two years, but that expectation is totally unrealistic. As an alternative, the government has put forth plans to relocate refugees to Bhashan Char, an island in the Bay of Bengal that is currently uninhabited. This proposal has been criticized by human rights activists in Bangladesh as well as by humanitarian organizations abroad because it would only further isolate and denigrate the Rohingya. Moving refugees and making the island livable would also be extremely expensive, costing billions of dollars.
Conclusion
Taken together, there are a myriad of complex ways in which Bangladesh has been affected by the influx of the Rohingya. This is not surprising. A growing body of research covering Syria to South Sudan examines the impact of refugees on host communities, but analysis to date has primarily focused on humanitarian and economic factors. More investigation into political and environmental dimensions is imperative since refugee crises induced by conflicts and natural disasters are increasingly common and, by their very nature, cross-border phenomena.
In the case of Bangladesh, where the situation continues to evolve, there are both positive lessons learned as well as cautionary tales that deserve greater attention. As the world continues to confront the many challenges brought on by forced migration, policy makers, practitioners, and scholars have a responsibility to better understand the role and experiences of countries that bear the brunt of refugee movements, and to better support their capacity to adapt and act humanely during changing circumstances.