Shannon E Reid & Matthew Valasik. Journal of Youth Studies. Volume 21, Issue 10, 2018.
For the last 30 years, gang scholars have explicitly disregarded white youth who are active in groups with overt or implicit ties to neo-Nazi/skinhead or white power ideologies from street gang research. This article argues that this decision to keep these two groups separate stems from a misinterpretation of the realities of these groups and this decision has had a long-standing impact on how researchers, law enforcement and policymakers understand and interact with youth active in these groups. The coining of the term ‘Alt-Right,’ and the re-emergence of white power youth in the international dialogue, underscores how the lack of systematic research severely limits our knowledge about youth involved in gangs with white power leanings. Based on these concerns, this article challenges the current understanding of both skinheads and their troublesome youth groups/gangs. By orienting the limited research on skinhead gangs within key street gang domains, this article draws attention to disconnects in the literature that have influenced how researchers approach the study of skinhead youth. This study’s conclusions support the purposeful inclusion of skinhead youth in future street gang research.
Introduction
Scholars and policymakers have shown a re-emerging concern about the radicalization of youth, domestically and internationally (Dandurand 2014; Decker and Pyrooz 2011; Pyrooz et al. 2018; Valasik and Phillips 2017). The press has been inundated with incidents and dialogue around the mainstreaming of nationalism and xenophobia across Europe and throughout the United States. The current political climate in the United States, and the coining of the term ‘Alt-Right’ by white nationalist Richard Spencer in 2008, has increased attention back to groups that had previously been labelled as the racist right (Hawley 2017; Nagle 2017; Niewert 2017). The increased visibility of these Alt-Right groups should serve as a reminder that despite a desire to believe these individuals and groups are nothing more than periphery, there is a subset who are members of street-oriented delinquent youth groups (Wood 2017). In order to address the latter subset of youth, this article has two main goals. First, demonstrating that skinheads fail to substantially differ from street gangs and therefore, should be included in the broader study of street gangs. Second, highlight the fact that the dismissal of skinheads from street gang research has negatively impacted the understanding of skinhead youth and impaired policymakers when trying to prevent/intervene with skinhead membership/behaviour. It is also important to note that ‘skinhead’ is used throughout the text as catch-all term referring to all deviant youth groups with white power ideology and not SHARP (Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice) or other non-racist skinhead groups.
Gang researchers, perhaps the best equipped to offer guidance to law enforcement and policymakers on dealing with these youth groups, continue to conceptually exclude racist skinheads from conventional street gang studies (e.g. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014). Even with the lack of a uniform definition for a street gang, scholars generally considered these groups to be composed of at least three members for a substantial period of time and engage in criminal activities which reinforces the identity of the group (see Curry 2015). Such a definition would clearly include skinhead youth (see Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). While skinhead youth may be captured inadvertently in street gang surveys (e.g. the G.R.E.A.T. survey1), the instruments are not designed to distinguish between skinheads and other white youth claiming gang membership.
Klein (1995, 22) states in The American Street Gang that his book is a discussion ‘of street gangs, not skinheads … ’ due in part to what he perceived as a lack of street orientation on the part of skinhead groups. Skinheads are ‘inside; they’re working on their written materials; or if outside, they’re looking for a target, not lounging around’ (Klein 1995, 22). Other gang scholars contend, ‘while these groups share some features in common with gangs, they fall outside the definition of what a gang is’ (Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014, 58). The common features referenced by these authors include engaging in criminal activity and the presence of group membership. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz (2014, 58) contend that skinheads ‘have a strong ideological set of beliefs, tend to be organized internationally, and seek to radicalize their members to take political action’. The lack of systematic research on these groups, due to both the explicit exclusion of these groups by gang scholars (e.g. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014; Klein 1995) and the implicit expectation that these groups are too ‘fringe’ to be concerned about, highlights the difficulties in targeting youth at risk for joining these groups. Simi, Smith, and Reeser (2008, 755-756) argue that the exclusion of skinheads from street gang scholarship ‘is based upon inadequate assessments of the empirical evidence’ with excessive focus being placed upon skinheads’ ‘ideological perceptions, overt racism, political violence and international connections.’ It is within this divergent literature that the lack of systematic, generalizable studies of skinheads is apparent and reflective of the shortcomings of early street gang research (Pyrooz and Mitchell 2015).
Excluding skinheads from gang studies has aggravated the lack of knowledge about these groups, with scholars being just as uninformed about the risk factors and behavioural outcomes impacting skinhead youth as they were thirty years ago. The current article utilizes a narrative literature review methodology in order to orient skinhead literature within key features of the gang literature to expose the overlap between skinhead groups, and street gangs. Furthermore, we highlight how well-situated gang researchers are to undertake the study of skinheads and other alt-right youth groups. Additionally, we hope to reinvigorate scholarship into these groups since membership into an alt-right group, just like street gangs, can induce negative consequences, short- and long-term, for both youth and their local communities. We also work to consolidate the research on Alt-Right gangs and street gangs to build a useable definition for systematically capturing these groups in future research.
Background
In the United States, the skinhead movement gained traction in the 1980s with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reporting a membership of 1000-1500 in twelve states in early 1988 growing to 3300-3500 members across 40 states by 1993 (ADL 1995). More recent numbers are difficult to ascertain due to variation in how law enforcement categorizes and tracks these groups’ membership. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 78 racist skinhead groups, 99 neo-Nazi groups and 100 white nationalist groups active in 2016 (SPLC 2017). While these figures provide a helpful overview of a range of groups active within the United States, the focus on the group offers a misleading underestimation of the skinhead/Alt-Right youth population. Pyrooz and Sweeten (2015, 417) document that youth participating in street gangs has also been ‘grossly underrecognized’ by both national surveys and law enforcement agencies attempting to estimate America’s street gang population. Any sensible estimate for the number of American skinhead youth is unlikely to exist. For some youth, their membership in a skinhead/Alt-Right gang will not be captured until entry in a correctional facility, where a motivation exists to systematically track and segregate individuals (Goodman 2008).
Researching skinheads
A majority of research on the formation of skinheads fall into two categories: subcultural studies focusing most often on the fashion and music of skinhead youth (Forbes and Stampton 2015; Love 2016; Moore 1993; Pollard 2016) or studies describing group-level characteristics and formation; the latter of which often relies on small samples (see Baron 1997; Hamm 1993; Wooden and Blazak 2001). Across both research categories, there is a range of critiques. These include an inability to reconcile inconsistencies between style and action (Kinsella 1996; Moore 1994; Suall and Lowe 1988); failure to offer ground level specificity about skinheads’ social action (Asal et al. 2016; Hamm 1993; Kinsella 1996) and methodologically, having a weak ethnographic foundation or being produced by advocacy organizations (Moore 1994).
Hamm (1993), a terrorism scholar, is one of the first to stress that skinheads should be categorized separately from street gangs by emphasizing a skinhead’s ideological perspective, their adherence to racism, participation in political violence and connections to international networks. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz (2014), and initially Klein (1995), echo this distinction and place ideology as the driver of skinheads’ activities. Adherence to these early findings, and the failure of gang scholars to reconcile inconsistencies between these older studies and more recent work (see Gilbert 2013; Klein 2009; Shashkin 2008; Simi 2010; Simi and Futrell 2015), has hindered this research programme for the past three decades.
More recent studies, while prudent in their assertions, are limited in their ability to have policy implications due to sampling limitations or by focusing solely on a particular skinhead gang (Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008, 2016). In order for the study of skinheads to move forward and inform policy and practice, Alt-Right youth need to be initially studied in comparison with street gangs to test whether or not joining a group with a particular ideology impacts a youth’s participation in delinquency, and other long-term outcomes. If there are no differences in these characteristics other than their willingness to subscribe to a range of racist beliefs, then both law enforcement and scholars need to systematically include them in street gang studies. While a small subset of researchers (see Blazak 2009; Blee 2017; Klein 1996; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008) has pushed for the inclusion of skinheads in the broader gang literature, this call has largely been ignored.
The definitional dilemma
The disconnect in including skinheads in the canon of street gang scholarship revolves round a definitional quandary. As with the street gang literature (see Curry 2015; Klein and Maxson 2006; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008), there is not a consistent definition for a skinhead group. For instance, the subculture literature highlights basic ideological beliefs, a particular clothing style, the role of hate-based music, and the use of particular signs/symbols (i.e. tattoos, swastikas, SS bolts, 88) as key identifiers of these youth groups (ADL 1995; Fangen 1998; Forbes and Stampton 2015; Love 2016; Miller-Idriss 2018; Moore 1993; Pollard 2016; Sarabia and Shriver 2004; Simi and Futrell 2015). However, the blatant use of these visible symbols has begun to wane as some members have begun to normalize and conform with mainstream society (Cooter 2006; Simi and Futrell 2015). Through a review of the skinhead literature, the ‘otherness’ of skinhead youth, as compared to street gang youth is often focused on the mythology around skinheads as ‘the foot soldiers’ of the racist right (Baysinger 2006; Moore 1993) and bastions of the working-class ideal (Pollard 2016) mixed with a dangerous and highly racist political identity (Baudouin 1997; Hamm 1993; Kinsella 1996) with the potential to develop into political terrorists able to overthrow governments (Hamm 1993; Kinsella 1996; Pyrooz et al. 2018). Simi and Futrell (2015) provide one of the most generalized descriptions typologising skinheads gangs as a youth subculture that has synthesized the symbolism and ideals of neo-Nazis, form loosely organized groups and regularly congregate in ‘free spaces,’ where members reify group solidarity, cultural norms and express themselves.
Within the street gang literature, the Eurogang definition ‘has become widely adopted and appears regularly in publications’ and could be considered the most appropriated, modern definition for determining what is a street gang (Maxson and Esbensen 2016, 7). The Eurogang definition identifies a street gang as ‘any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity’ (Maxson and Esbensen 2016, 2). Under this definition, racist skinhead groups would clearly be considered a street gang, as indicated by Pyrooz et al. (2018) recent study. It seems that the belief of skinheads as remaining outside of the street gang spectrum remains a post-hoc decision, and their inclusion or exclusion is more fluid than would be expected given the emphasis placed upon skinhead’s ideological differences. For example, Klein (2001, 17) stated in The Eurogang Paradox:
Skinheads-more prominent in Europe than in the U.S.-stretch the meaning of street gangs; they are less street-oriented, and more focused on a particular crime pattern, for example. Yet I find I am comfortable placing them in the Specialty gang category of the paradigm. It seems that Klein’s (1996, 2009; Klein and Maxson 2006) reversal of now including skinheads as ‘specialty’ street gangs has been greatly ignored by gang scholars (e.g. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014) that attest to skinheads being diametrically different from street gangs. While not explicitly discussed in this article, it is important to note that in several more current studies, skinhead youth refer to themselves as gang members (Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008) and their group as a gang (Wooden and Blazak 2001). This self-identification is considered a reasonable standard for inclusion in gang studies and should not be dismissed due to a desire to exclude them for unsupported reasons (Esbensen et al. 2012).
Gang scholars’ definitional disconnect between skinheads and street gangs hinges on ideology being the key characteristic partitioning these two archetypes. This distinction leads to two main questions. First, is skinhead ideology more mythological, or does it actually drive the routine behaviours of skinheads? Second, if ideology is critical to skinhead identity, is having an ideology unique to skinhead groups making them distinctively different from street gangs?
Ideology
The ideologies referenced by skinheads are varied, and sometimes contradictory, being centred on rudimentary notions of white power and anti-minority/immigrant sentiments to more complicated mythologies/religious beliefs such as Odinism or National Socialism (see Gardell 2003; Pollard 2016; Simi and Futrell 2015). Many of these beliefs are not limited to skinhead gangs, but are disseminated throughout the larger white power movement (Simi and Futrell 2015). There is a spectrum of how integral white power ideology is to either a skinhead group’s or an individual’s identity. As Van Gemert, Peterson, and Lien (2008, 8) point out when discussing skinheads/neo-Nazis in Europe, ‘[t]hese groups may or may not be linked to political organizations. In some countries, juvenile gangs exist that merely use extremist symbols to add to their identity … ’ In America, the image of skinhead gangs being the white power foot soldiers is countered with evidence highlighting their lack of defined goals and shared beliefs limits their ability to be well-organized right-wing revolutionary alarmists (Hamm 1993; Suall and Lowe 1988; Wooden and Blazak 2001). As seen internationally, and echoed within street gangs, more recent generations of skinheads are eschewing some of the traditional garb toward more subversive clothing and symbols (i.e. Pepe the Frog, and clothing companies such as Hoelzer Reich, Thor Steinar, or Fred Perry) (Miller-Idriss 2018; Nagle 2017). Pollard (2016) attests that the strict racial hierarchies of Nazism has been abandoned by skinhead gangs due to the large influx of Slavs joining groups throughout America and Eastern Europe. The influence of American white supremacy on skinheads has also shifted the focus away from ethnicity and onto skin colour to achieve white racial purity, allowing for non-Aryan members to participate and for relationships to exist between members and non-Aryans (see Dyck 2017; Miller-Idriss 2018; Mudde 2005; Simi and Futrell 2015; Wooden and Blazak 2001).
As for ideology being a unique feature in the formation and membership of skinhead youth, gang scholars have demonstrated that race/ethnic based pride and/or political ideology is not limited to skinhead youth. The marginalization of black and Latino youth motivated street gangs to incorporate a political ideology as an attempt to grow grassroots movements fighting for political power and producing positive social change within their neglected communities (Brotherton 2008; Brotherton and Barrios 2004; Cureton 2011; Francisco and Martinez 2003; Helmreich 1973; Short 1974; Short and Moland 1976). Street gangs have also focused on religious/spiritual principles. The Almighty Latin Kings and Queens Nation in New York City established a spirituality of liberation to resist the dominant culture dehumanizing, objectifying, and criminalizing the gang (Brotherton and Barrios 2004). Liberation spirituality directly contributed to the gang’s social identity and established a process of acculturation for new members (Brotherton and Barrios 2004). Other gangs may not have a true ideology but are formed with the intention of offering youth pride in their heritage. The formation of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in the city of Los Angeles has been associated with Salvadorian pride and identity (Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner 2011; Cruz 2010). Vigil (1996, 151) further notes how initiation for Chicano gangs in Los Angeles ‘affirms one’s ethnic identification … showing they are “Chicano”’ (see also Moore 1978; 1991; Vigil 1996).
Overall, we argue that ideology should not be a limiting factor excluding skinheads from larger research programme on youth gangs. Subscribing to an ideology itself is neither adhered to in such a strict way, nor so unique to youth in skinhead groups that it places Alt-Right youth outside of the street gang spectrum. Focusing on the ideology of skinheads ignores/minimizes the role of ideology/ethnic pride in the formation, maintenance and membership of non-white street gangs. Limiting the inclusion of skinhead youth in gang studies because of their ideology is the principle reason why scholars today lack a comprehensive grasp about skinheads. This decision has directly impacted how skinheads are studied, how law enforcement is trained about street gangs, and how policies are implemented to deal with marginalized youth (Moore 1978).
Intersection of skinheads and street gangs
Formation
The formation of skinhead groups in the United States is connected to the growth of the hardcore punk scene in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The subcultural literature describes skinhead groups as a reaction to the growing economic inequality, the uneven disbursement of social resources, and the political climate (Cotter 1999; Hamm 1993; Hicks 2004; Moore 1993; Pollard 2016). As noted by Brake (1974), early skinhead youth were aware that they lived in the worst areas of London, attended the worst schools and held the lowest paying jobs. Studying skinheads as a subcultural movement, an amalgam of interchangeable youth, rather than members of distinct gangs has led to a continued focus on macro-level economic, social, and political changes that impacts the formation and growth of every skinhead group throughout America. This focus is a serious limitation, as it ignores the variation in skinhead formation across smaller aggregations (e.g. neighbourhoods). Gang research has demonstrated that smaller levels of aggregation, particularly local communities, are integral for understanding not only the conditions under which gangs are established but also how they are maintained. Gang scholars routinely indicate that an area’s local socioeconomic conditions shape where in neighbourhood street gangs manifest (Densley 2013; Klein and Maxson 2006; Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005). Research has consistently revealed that street gangs form and emerge in interstitial spaces within a community (Thrasher 1927; Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005). Therefore, while large national shifts in social, economic or political indicators may explain growth in the overall number of active skinheads, this approach fails to account for any particular influence of variations at the neighbourhood- or city-level. In fact, early research on skinheads found that they were directly tied to specific localities/neighbourhoods that where socially disorganized and rapidly deteriorating (Brake 1974; Moore 1994). Simi (2006) points out that early skinhead gangs formed directly through strong ties between peers and conflict with local gangs. An overreliance on subcultural studies of skinheads (i.e. Hamm 1993) has diverted research on skinheads away from neighbourhood-level investigations limiting scholars, practitioners, and policymakers understanding of how these groups form at the local level (Blee 2002; 2017). This is a particular avenue of research where gang scholars would be adeptly capable of examining and unpacking more thoroughly.
Use of space
The relationship between street gangs and space has been a topic of interest since Thrasher’s (1927) seminal work. For skinhead youth, there is a lack of consensus about how territorially oriented they are. The literature generally considers skinheads as less territorially confined than street gangs. For skinheads, there is an assumption of having ‘natural dominion’ over spaces they are occupying, taking their whiteness wherever they venture (Simi and Futrell 2015, 55). This does not mean, however, that skinheads refrain from being territorial. Simi, Smith, and Reeser (2008, 766) repeatedly circumscribe the Public Enemy Number One gang’s behaviour as being street orientated, keeping their racist activities ‘territorial and localized’ in their neighbourhood. Space plays as an important role in maintaining skinheads’ collective identity and group solidarity as it does for street gangs (Futrell and Simi 2004; Moore 1994; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Conversely, it is also important to note that not being fixed to any particular turf is not unique to skinheads. Valasik and Tita (2018) indicate that both within the United States and globally, scholars have documented gang members with residential and territorial patterns that diverge from the traditional literature. Even earlier gang research discusses the movement away from strict territoriality (Klein 1995), with Short (1996, 238) stating that ‘[g]angs are more mobile now and their territories may include a shopping mall rather than (or in addition to) a street or neighbourhood or area drug market.’
Skinheads regularly gather in what Simi and Futrell (2015, 4) term ‘Aryan free spaces’ where white power members gather, openly express extremist beliefs, and coordinate activities. Gang scholars have developed a similar concept known as gang set space, defined broadly as a localized, geographically distinct area (e.g. street corner, park, alley, etc.) within a gang’s territory where members gather (Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005). Just as the set space of a street gang becomes the ‘group’s life space’ within their turf (Klein 1995, 79), Aryan free spaces provide members with an indisputable place with a distinct zone of influence. It is within this sanctuary that gang members/skinheads ‘hang around, brag a lot, eat again, drink, hang around some more’ and feel protected from the outside world (Klein 1995, 11; Simi and Futrell 2015). Furthermore, a street gang ‘becomes fairly attached to a definite locality and wanders only occasionally beyond its frontiers’ as a result of habitually congregating in the same spaces (Thrasher 1927, 166). Simi and Futrell (2015) observe analogous patterns with skinheads regularly frequenting known locations. It is within these intimate Aryan free spaces that skinheads are able to reify their beliefs, participate in rituals (e.g. being tattooed), espouse group norms, culture, and values, cultivate social ties, and develop their social identity (Futrell and Simi 2004). It is within these spaces that strong social ties and group identity are developed and bind group members together. As with gang set space (Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005), Aryan free spaces used by boisterous skinheads eventually become recognized by local residents (Simi and Futrell 2015). One disparity between Aryan free spaces and gang set spaces is that skinheads are thought to conceal their loitering in private spaces away from the public’s gaze, yet, these findings have potential bias within the literature given the focus on skinheads’ racist and hidden activities. Regardless of where gang members or skinheads establish their territorial hangout a consistent feature is finding a location that lacks social control, either informal or formal. The absence of social control agents in these set spaces/free spaces permits gang members/skinheads to engage in inappropriate and/or predatory behaviours that can be detrimental and harmful to local residents.
A number of researchers have highlighted the public nature of skinhead activities (Ezekiel 1995, 2002; Moore 1994). In fact, Baron (1997), Hamm (1993), and Ezekiel (1995) recruited skinhead youth from public spaces (e.g. street corners) for their studies. It seems counter-intuitive to believe that skinheads adopt a particular style of dress, aimed at providing a clear identification of their group identity, but hide from the public sphere. The territorial use of space is a necessary area of inquiry for policies to be developed in dealing with these youths. Certain place-based interventions may still be a viable tactic (e.g. nuisance abatement) to inhibit skinheads from loitering, however, the greater reliance of congregating on private-property requires more flexible and unique approaches to succeed.
Group structure
The organization and structure of skinhead gangs is difficult to address. An overarching issue is that research has focused on skinheads as a subculture. Focusing on skinheads at this scale is not conducive to investigating the structure of a localized group. Another complication in understanding skinhead group structure is the ethnographic dominance of the literature. While these case studies have provided insights into the structure (and the variation) of particular skinhead gangs, a broader generalized understanding of these groups structure is lacking. An additional complication is the inclusion of the larger white power movement in skinhead studies. Including skinhead youth groups in studies examining white power movements (e.g. Klu Klux Klan) gives an illusion of organization amongst skinheads that has not supported in the literature. It is only in this vein that the group structure of skinheads is discussed, highlighting their lack of organization, management, and discipline necessary to achieve political change (e.g. Tarasov 2008). What limited research exists on the structure of skinhead gangs discusses the unorganized nature and highlights a lack of leadership/hierarchy (Baron 1997; Wooden and Blazak 2001). Simi (2006) finds that skinhead organization exists on a spectrum, ranging from being a poorly organized, independent gang to a more traditional and organized structure. A report by the ADL (1995) is one of the unique studies that discusses the size of a skinhead gang’s membership, ranging from 10 to a few dozen members. Yet, without a systematic study of skinhead gangs, perhaps similar to Maxson and Klein’s (1995) survey of law enforcement, it is challenging to discuss skinhead group structure with any certainty.
Much of gang research argues that street gangs are socially disorganized, confederations of loosely-structured individuals or small groups of friends that ‘coalesce irregularly over issues that emerge and vanish from the street’ (Decker and Curry 2002, 351). This lack of organization allows street gangs to have greater flexibility and resilience to group interventions. Street gangs are regularly comprised of age-graded cliques, derived from residence, academic years, friendship, and shared interests facilitated by similarities in gender, ethnicity, and age (Klein and Maxson 2006; Moore 1991). Thus, the overall cohesiveness of a street gang is weak to moderate, while social ties within a clique are more tightly-knit (Klein and Maxson 2006). Street gangs, however, are described as being hierarchically-organized, centring their criminal pursuits on economic activities (e.g. drug sales, extortion) (Densley 2013; Padilla 1992; Stephenson 2015). Densley (2013, 43) argues that street gangs exist on a spectrum growing naturally from their emergence as a ‘neighborhood group to delinquent collectives to full-scale criminal enterprises to providers of extra-legal governance.’ This explication makes sense. Street gangs are observed in the literature as both disorganized and structured as criminal enterprises. Yet, street gangs remain a localized phenomenon that develop, adapt, and evolve in relation to a specific environment. Observed differences in the literature exist because of a group’s position on this evolutionary spectrum at the time of investigation.
Violence and criminality
Skinhead youth, like their street gang counterparts, participate in both symbolic and instrumental crime and violence (Moore 1994). Research on skinhead criminality, however, has been greatly impacted by scholars’ focus on hate-based crimes, although being rarer events, that identify with skinhead ideology. Etter (1999, 19) states ‘[s]kinhead crimes are usually violent and chosen for their political or racial impact rather than for profit motive … ’ Skinheads have high levels of entitativity, perceiving members of rival groups as being unified and cohesive (Vasquez et al. 2015). ‘Entitativity makes all members of the offending group blameworthy,’ a belief facilitating violence to overflow into the civilian population (Vasquez et al. 2015, 249). Much of skinheads’ hate-based violence highlights a lack of discretion in their attacks against non-whites (Mills, Freilich, and Chermak 2017). More recently, group-based participation in protests to protect Confederate monuments (e.g. Charlottesville, Virginia), and the dialogue that surrounds these protests, continues to perpetuate the threat of race-based violence and a desire of these groups to maintain structural racism. This perspective of collective responsibility is also pervasive among street gangs catalyzing retaliatory violence (Densley 2013; Stephenson 2015). Leovy (2015, 206) depicts a perfect example of how high levels of entitativity among street gangs propagates violence, ‘a black assailant looking to kill a gang rival is looking before anything else, for another black male … a presumed combatant, conscripted into a dismal existence “outside the law” whether he wanted to be or not.’.
Focusing on status-based violence (e.g. race, ethnicity, etc.) has overshadowed skinhead youth’s participation in localized criminality (Baron 1997; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Not minimizing hate-based crime, but emphasizing status-based violence ignores routine criminality that impacts youth’s lives and the safety of the community more regularly. In fact, skinhead youth participate in similar patterns of ‘cafeteria-style offending’ observed in street gangs (Klein 1995, 68).
Studies of skinhead youth discuss the cultural values encouraging violence (Baron 1997; Moore 1994; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Analogous to street gangs, violence is routinely broadcast by skinheads as a public statement bolstering their group’s status/reputation, reifying boundaries, intimidating local residents, and displaying group dominance over rivals (Brantingham et al. 2012; Papachristos, Hureau, and Braga 2013). Retributive violence, for real or perceived slights, is supported by a youth’s peers and the larger skinhead gang (Baron 1997). Chronic feuding between street gangs to redress prior grievances is also well documented in the street gang literature (Brantingham et al. 2012; Papachristos, Hureau, and Braga 2013). Disputes among skinheads are usually interpersonal (Baron 1997; Simi 2006; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008), often white-on-white conflicts or focus on other street youth (ADL 1995; Baron 1997; Hamm 1993; Klein 2009; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Scholars (Baron 1997; Bjørgo 2016; Fangen 1998; Klein 2009; Moore 1994; Shashkin 2008) discuss how skinhead violence mirrors traditional gang rivalries of the street by affirming group identity and strengthening the group’s symbolic solidarity. Wooden and Blazak (2001) finds that skinhead gangs utilize the ritual act of ‘jumping in’ new members. The street gang literature repeatedly discusses how the use of violence during initiation helps normalize violence and solidify group identity (Moore 1991; Vigil 1996).
As with street gangs (Densley 2013; Stephenson 2015), skinheads use instrumental violence in their criminal undertakings (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi 2009; Simi 2006; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Skinhead youth have been shown to participate in a range of criminal activities, including drug selling (Simi 2006), identity theft (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi 2009; Simi 2006; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008), and assorted property crimes (ADL 1995; Baron 1997; Ezekiel 2002; Simi 2006). Furthermore, the range and quantity of participation in non-violent offending is expected to be even higher than is portrayed by the limited literature on skinhead criminality. Concentrating on violence, especially hate-based, by skinheads skews how drug market participation or non-violent offending is documented. It is important to note that no evidence has been revealed to indicate that profits from crimes are funding larger political endeavours (Simi 2006).
Risk factors for membership
The literature on discerning the risk factors for membership in a skinhead gang is also plagued with issues discussed above. Blee (2002, 4) observes the focus on ‘the organized facade of racism- the structure, leadership, and propaganda issued by racist groups- creates a strong impression of uniformity, which may be undermined by an examination of individual racists.’ Focusing on the homogeneity of skinhead youth limits the inquiry into risk factors for membership. For example, skinheads are repeatedly described as being high school educated, abstaining from drugs, holding blue-collar employment, and having a stable home life (Baron 1997; Fangen 1998; Hamm 1993; Hicks 2004). Yet, more recent and rigorous research conflicts with these background characteristics (Klein 2009; Pilkington, Omelchenko, and Garifzianova 2010; Pollard 2016; Simi and Futrell 2015; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008; 2016). Repeatedly citing these early findings supports and perpetuates a working-class mythology and limits inquiry into the existing variation of risk factors for skinhead membership (Pollard 2016). Lacking generalizable findings on the ‘pushes’ and ‘pulls’ for skinhead membership further inhibits programmes/policies to effectively target the risk factors for these vulnerable youth.
While much of the skinhead literature is methodologically qualitative, some themes about risk factors have emerged. Examining the ‘pushes’ into membership, the literature has found that skinhead youth’s age encompasses emerging adulthood (i.e. 12-25 across samples), a pattern analogous among street gang membership (ADL 1995; Klein 2009; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Males are more at risk for joining than females (ADL 1995; Ezekiel 2002; Pollard 2016). A caveat, however, as with the gang literature, female skinhead membership is understudied (an exception is Blee 2002; 2017). Skinhead youth report residing in a single parent household (ADL 1995; Ezekiel 2002; Siedler 2011), enduring domestic discord (ADL 1995; Baron 1997; Ezekiel 2002), being unemployed (Baron 1997; Fangen 1998), abusing drugs and alcohol (Baron 1997; Wooden and Blazak 2001), dropping out of school (Baron 1997; Shashkin 2008), lacking supervision from a guardian (Shashkin 2008), and experiencing parental unemployment (Siedler 2011). Analogous risk factors are documented throughout the life-course of street gang members (Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014; Fox 2017; Klein and Maxson 2006; Moore 1991; Pyrooz and Sweeten 2015). This suggests that ‘substantial overlap’ in the life-courses for members of skinheads and street gang exists (Simi, Sporer, and Bubolz 2016, 540).
Again, analogous patterns between skinheads and gang members exist when examining the ‘pulls,’ or motivations for joining a group. For these youth, membership in a skinhead gang offers a ‘sense of strength, group belonging, and superiority’ (ADL 1995, 5; Miller-Idriss 2018). Researchers highlight the presence of fear and violence in many of these youth’s lives and their hope that skinhead membership offers them safety (Baron 1997; Ezekiel 2002; Miller-Idriss 2018). Simi, Smith, and Reeser (2008, 759) also find support that skinhead youth are joining for purposes of protection with the gang providing ‘white kids with defence from other gangs.’ Skinheads also partake in a variety of profit-oriented crimes (e.g. drug sales, identity theft, counterfeiting, burglary, armed robbery) that provide financial incentives to join the group (Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). These are common themes found in the gang literature, with street gangs occupying multiple voids, such as a providing a collective social identity (Hennigan and Spanovic 2012), protection (Short and Strodtbeck 1965), and economic opportunities (Densley 2013; Padilla 1992; Stephenson 2015).
Nearly a century of research has produced a broader understanding of the risk factors for street gang membership. Motivations for joining a street gang differ between males and females, but craving a similar social identity, protection, status, and filling a void are common (Moore 1991). That void for males is a yearning for adventure, while females are looking to find an emotionally satisfying familial group (Klein and Maxson 2006; Moore 1991). Risk factors for street gang membership include a range of neighbourhood variables, including neighbourhood poverty and disorganization (Hill et al. 1999; Thornberry et al. 2003) and feeling unsafe in the neighbourhood (Hill et al. 1999). There are also family and individual risk factors, including familial poverty (Hill et al. 1999; Thornberry et al. 2003), single-parent households (Hill et al. 1999; Thornberry et al. 2003), low academic achievement (Craig et al. 2002), low school attachment (Hill et al. 1999), drug use (Bjerregaard and Smith 1993; Hill et al. 1999; Thornberry et al. 2003), delinquent peers (Bjerregaard and Smith 1993; Hill et al. 1999), and externalizing behaviours (Craig et al. 2002; Hill et al. 1999). While not a comprehensive list of all the factors confronting youth at risk of joining a street gang, this overview highlights the substantial similarities between street gang members and skinheads. With members of skinheads and street gangs both being marginalized youth it is expected that similar risk factors are present in both populations, however, the comprehensive list of risk factors for gang members emphasizes the need for systematic, quantitative research that includes skinhead youth. Without such studies scholars and policymakers are unable to develop a generalizable set of risk factors allowing for a broader understanding of the cumulative risk for joining a skinhead gang.
Understanding the risk factors facilitating membership into a skinhead gang is crucial for developing effective prevention and intervention programmes/policies. As we have seen from prevention programmes, such as the Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.), targeting a range of risk factors for youth during crucial age ranges can help reduce future gang membership (Esbensen et al. 2012). Unfortunately, the repetition of stereotypical and anecdotal risk factors for membership in skinhead gangs has hindered quantitative, generalizable research into the factors impacting the risk of joining a skinhead gang.
Discussion
The goal of this article is two-fold. First, demonstrate why skinhead gangs should be included in the broader street gang literature. Second, to point out how the removal of skinheads from street gang research has disadvantaged policymakers when trying to prevent/intervene with skinhead membership/behaviour. As argued throughout this article, the longstanding disconnection between the literature on street gang and skinheads/alt-right needs to bridged. This article follows more recent attempts (see Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008) to remedy this gap by specifically outlining the overlap between skinheads and street gangs on several central domains within the gang literature. While some gang scholars (e.g. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014) still rely on cursory and dated studies (Hamm 1993; Klein 1995), to contend that skinheads are diametrically different from street gangs, others (Klein 1996; 2009; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008) have investigated these groups extensively ascertaining that they closely adhere to the specialty gang category as typologised by Klein and Maxson (2006).
This article puts forth an initial effort addressing the knowledge gap that has existed for three decades. It is an explicit investigation into how skinheads function as a street gang. This article argues for the inclusion of skinheads in subsequent street gang studies, suggesting that a meaningful reconciliation of the street gang and white supremacy (e.g. skinheads, neo-Nazis, Alt-Right, white identitarians, etc.) literatures (see Blee 2017; Gil and Lopez 2017; Holt, Freilich, and Chermak 2017; Huizinga and Schumann 2001; Klein 1996; Pyrooz et al. 2018; Sánchez-Jankowski 2003; Simi 2006; Simi et al. 2017; Simi and Futrell 2015; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008) would greatly expand our understanding of how skinheads adopt and/or mimic the behaviours of street gangs. Due to concerns revolving around ideology (Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014; Klein 1995) gang scholars have ignored investigating skinhead gangs stagnating our understanding of the group dynamics, structure, risk factors, and overall life-course of these groups and their membership. The gaps in the literature on female skinhead gang membership also needs to be addressed since, as has been seen in the gang literature, female membership is often under represented as a bias of researchers and police rather than a true reflection of the reality of their membership. This article implies that the inclusion of skinheads into mainstream street gang studies is straightforward and minimal. To aid in this process, we propose a more inclusive characterization than skinhead as an acknowledgement to the considerable degree of similarity with conventional street gangs, Alt-Right gangs. We adapt the Eurogang definition, arguably the most widely adopted and used definition for a street gang, and define an Alt-Right gang as a durable group, public-oriented group whose adoption of signs/symbols of white separatists/nationalists/supremacists and involvement in illegal activity is part of its group identity. Our definition integrates political scientists’ description of the Alt-Right as being a youth oriented, loosely structured, right-wing political movement centred on white identity, with the group’s core being ‘a racist movement’ revolving around beliefs of white nationalism (Hawley 2017, 3) (see also Futrell and Simi 2017; Nagle 2017; Niewert 2017). Incorporating a diverse set of literatures into a singular definition for an Alt-Right gang allows for a broad description that can also have a practical application. As this article highlights, the risk factors that contribute to marginalized youth, actual or perceived, to join a street gang or an Alt-Right gang are comparable. Furthermore, the Alt-Right just like street gangs is not universal monolith but is in fact composed of a variety of factions that have conflicts with one another and regularly feud (Hawley 2017; Lyons 2017; Nagle 2017; Niewert 2017). Utilizing a broader definition, such as Alt-Right gang, allows for the explicit inclusion of skinhead youth in gang studies that will allow researchers to provide law enforcement, youth outreach workers, and policymakers with the generalizable information necessary to create/adapt programmes and policies to limit or reduce the impact of membership into an Alt-Right gang on youth and their local communities.
While not explicitly discussed in this article, it is also important for us to consider the role of race in the exclusion of skinheads in existing gang databases or the within the broader gang literature. The repeated reminder that gang membership is not a minority only problem underscores the bias towards considering minorities to be gang members as compared to their white counterparts (Esbensen and Carson 2012). If agencies or individual officers categorize crimes involving skinheads as being part of a racist subculture rather than a gang-related incident, then we would not expect to find them in gang databases. For instance, Klein (2009) notes that the Old Town Skins, a local skinhead gang in Euroburg, routinely use graffiti to cross out a rival gang’s tags, yet, local law enforcement does not consider the Old Town Skins to be a street gang despite this behaviour being considered a common indicator of street gang activity. Such a categorization leads to an underreporting of the skinhead gang problem. Without an accurate count of the number of skinheads and skinhead gangs, the ability to effectively deal with these youth is greatly diminished.
While these next steps and suggestions are limited due to the distinct lack of systematic skinhead research, they are aimed at helping researchers and policymakers think about how to move forward in how we study and intervene with skinhead youth. This is becoming increasingly necessary given the current dialogue around these alt-right groups. Within the alt-right literature, the role of youth in this movement is extolled as seen in a Breibart article written by Bokhari and Yiannopoulis (2016, 1) where they refer to the members of the alternative right as ‘[y]oung, creative, and eager to commit secular heresies … ’ and state that ‘the alt-right has a youthful energy and jarring, taboo-defying rhetoric that have boosted its membership and made it impossible to ignore.’ Despite the desire to rely on studies that focus on the ‘otherness’ of skinheads, this study is aimed at reminding researchers and policymakers that skinhead youth are similar to street gang youth across several traditional domains. This reminder includes that skinhead youth have traditionally remained autonomous and distinct from adult hate groups (e.g. the Klu Klux Klan), and engage in a variety of crimes unassociated with their political ideology (Baron 1997; Blee 2002; Pollard 2016; Sarabia and Shriver 2004; Simi and Futrell 2015; Teitelbaum 2017). As Simi et al. (2008, 756) underscore, these street oriented skinheads ‘possess a white supremacist orientation and are also simultaneously organized around profit-oriented criminal activity.’ It is with this understanding of skinheads, that the field of Alt-Right gang scholarship needs to be integrated into the larger research agenda of gang scholarship. Following the street gang literature, future research should include both quantitative research that can provide generalizable information that can be integrated into prevention, intervention and suppression efforts, and qualitative research that can better contextualize Alt-Right gangs (see Valasik and Reid 2018).