Michael Wessells. The International Handbook of Psychology. Editor: Kurt Pawlik & Mark R Rosenzweig. Sage Publications, 2000.
Today millions of people live in what are best described as systems of violence in which violence pervades multiple levels, including the family, community, and societal levels. One of the great challenges facing humanity is to convert systems of violence into cultures of peace, not only ending physical, psychological, and structural violence but also creating conditions and processes that enable human well-being, protection of human rights, and sustainable development.
Psychological science has much to contribute to the construction of peace and the resolution and prevention of destructive conflict. In recent decades, psychological research has advanced analyses of causes of war and inter-group conflict, dynamics of oppression and injustice, impacts of violence, processes of conflict escalation and de-escalation, and methods for building cooperation and resolving conflicts without resort to violence, among many other areas.
Issues of peace and conflict, however, are multidisciplinary and require analyses that emphasize the interpenetration between micro-level processes and macro-level institutions and processes in a dynamic social system. This chapter develops a systems analytic framework that situates the contributions of psychological research in multidisciplinary perspective, analyzes causes of violence at levels such as the family, community, and society, and identifies processes that contribute to peace at multiple levels.
War
War has multiple causes, including political, historical, economic, social, and psychological processes. Most analyses of war, particularly wars fought between states, have emphasized power struggles, political conflicts over realistic divergences of interest, and competition over scarce resources such as land and water (Levy, 1989; Lynn-Jones & Miller, 1995). Resource scarcity is increasing and is likely to amplify poverty and the North—South gap in wealth (Homer-Dixon, 1994), and growing environmental degradation creates problems such as environmental refugees that increase social pressures and conflict (El-Hinnawi, 1985). Further, anthropological evidence indicates that although as many as 20% of preindustrial societies have no history of organized war (Ross, 1993), increasing pressures for land competition have led previously non-warring groups such as the Fore people of New Guinea to take up arms (Sorenson, 1978).
As important as realistic conflicts are, protracted conflict damages the relationship between adversaries, and the damaged relationships bring a host of negative psychological dynamics into play that become integral, self-perpetuating parts of the conflict process (Kelman, 1997a; Staub, 1989). In this respect, war and destructive conflict reflect a mixture of objective and subjective elements. Analysis of subjective elements is a natural focus for psychological research, which has adapted its methodologies to fit real-world problems that do not permit careful isolation of variables and that have a rich historical, political, and cultural context.
The interplay between objective and subjective elements has become particularly conspicuous in the brutal ethnopolitical wars that surfaced in the latter three decades of the twentieth century. Objective oppression of ethnic groups and denial of access of minority groups to resources is a major determinant of ethnopolitical wars (Gurr, 1993; Horowitz, 1985). Land shortages, overcrowding, difficult economic circumstances, and privileging along lines of social class and ethnicity have helped to fuel conflicts such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Prunier, 1995; Smith, 1998). Ethnic struggles, however, are intensely psychological and often center around issues of identity, social memory, and group victimization. Each ethnic group, really an ‘imagined community’ (B. Anderson, 1991), honors its own culture, origin myths, and traditions, which provide a culturally constructed space in which people find their social identity, meaning, and security. Social psychological research indicates that even in the absence of material bases of conflict, people naturally divide themselves into in-groups and out-groups (Tajfel, 1982). Although ethnic identity and divisions do not themselves cause fighting, human needs theory has emphasized that armed conflict occurs when basic needs for security or positive social identity go unmet (Burton, 1990). This occurs in contexts of actual or perceived victimization, where remembered wrongs at the hands of the Other become a psychological warrant for revenge, fighting to protect one’ group, or human rights abuses such as ethnic cleansing and mass rapes. As people participate in violence, they become increasingly capable of committing heinous acts (Staub, 1989).
In the wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, for example, both Serbs and Croats celebrated memories or ‘chosen traumas’ (Volkan, 1997) of their historic victimization by the Other. Each group integrated a sense of victimization into its social identity, increasing its fears about its collective survival. Political leaders on both sides exploited these fears to their own advantage. The survival fears, coupled with the increasing polarization of communities by ethnicity, unleashed powerful nationalist sentiments that had been held in check largely by superpower domination during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, ethnonationalism erupted in many regions out of desire for ‘patria’ that would be sovereign, protected from adversaries, and enabling of the fullest expression of the cultural values of one’ ethnic group (Kelman, 1997b). Thus psychological processes have contributed to the splintering of states that has characterized the post-Cold War era.
These processes of mass victimization, collective memory, and socialization for war are particularly powerful at present due to changes in the nature of armed conflict (Wessells, 1998a). In current intra-state conflicts, now the dominant form of war (Wallensteen & Sollenburg, 1998), nearly 90% of war casualties are civilians (Gar-field and Neugut, 1997; Sivard, 1991), and mass victimization of civilians by attack, displacement, loss, and landmines plants the seeds of future conflicts. Further, the fighting occurs mostly with light weapons such as AK-47 assault rifles, and the combatants are increasingly children reared in environments that normalize violence, banditry, and war (Cairns, 1996; Klare, 1999; Wessells, 1998b).
With regard to international relations, subjective influences are visible at multiple levels. Both national leaders and political elites within the government bureaucracies that make decisions about war in industrialized societies are subject to a variety of biases that contribute to departures from strictly rational decision-making. Consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), leaders frequently take excessive risk to avoid losses (Levy, 1992). Research conducted by political scientists and psychologists has indicated that amidst realistic conflicts of interest, leaders of competing nations experience powerful fears, which motivate mis-perceptions regarding their adversaries’ motives, strength, and willingness to fight (Jervis, 1976; Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, 1985). These misperceptions can be particularly dangerous in crises, leading some analysts to criticize policies such as nuclear deterrence (White, 1984). In addition, increased international tensions can lead to cognitive constriction as exhibited, for example, in the reduction of complexity of views toward the adversary in political speeches (Tetlock, 1985). Attributional biases are also pervasive. During the Cold War, both U.S. and Soviet leaders imputed the worst motives to their adversaries’ behavior even in cases in which there may have been peaceful intent (White, 1984). Small group processes may also bias decision-making by leaders. Some evidence indicates that leadership groups having a strong espirit de corps and a charismatic leader may, in a crisis situation, engage in groupthink, a biased decisional process characterized by premature consensus, a sense of invulnerability, failure to weigh moral concerns, internal suppression of dissent, inadequate attention to problems, and poor contingency planning (Janis, 1982).
In many societies, particularly those having democratic governments, leaders alone do not make war. Publics also have to be mobilized for war, and numerous psychological processes are influential in this regard. Both political elites and political cultures encourage patriotism, which entails positive sentiments towards one’ nation and a sense of obligation to protect it (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997). In times of crisis, public symbols and political rhetoric stir patriotic sentiments and prepare the people to make sacrifices in war. Both individuals and groups construct social meaning and find social identity and cohesion through patriotism (Reykowski, 1997). But extreme forms of patriotism can lead to silencing of dissent, anti-intellectualism, and discrimination against out-groups defined as a threat to national security (Gozman, 1997).
A particularly powerful tool for public mobilization for war is enemy imaging, the construction of dehumanized images or beliefs that portray the Other as thoroughly diabolical, untrustworthy, evil and as manageable only through violence (Silverstein, 1989; White, 1984). Enemy images have sociocultural roots, become part of the reigning ideology, and find expression in mass media (Szalay & Mir-Djalali, 1991). By dehumanizing the Other, enemy images reduce moral restraints against killing and ill treatment. Both superpowers cultivated enemy images throughout the Cold War (White, 1984), and more recently, U.S. leaders used negative images of Saddam Hussein to win public support for the Gulf War (Manheim, 1993). Enemy imaging also played a prominent role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, as the Hutu-dominated regime spread demonic images of Tutsis by radio and other means, preparing the way psychologically for the attempted extermination of the Tutsis (Prunier, 1995).
Violence
Aside from war, psychological processes influence violence at many levels. In criminology, psychological research has complemented multi-disciplinary investigations by analyzing the interaction of personal and situational determinants of violence. Physical violence occurs at much higher frequency in men than women (Archer, 1994), and longitudinal studies indicate remarkable stability in aggressiveness and violence in males from two to eighteen years (Loeber & Hay, 1997; Olweus, 1979). Childhood violence correlates with various forms of violence in adulthood, including partner assault and conviction for violent crimes by age 32 years (Farrington, 1994). This remarkable consistency of aggression and violence has encouraged the search for criminal personalities and attempts at criminal profiling, which have had modest success in regard to crimes such as serial rape and serial sexual homicide (Pinizzotto & Finkel, 1990). Still, most psychological research has emphasized the importance of situational influences and of family, community, and peer determinants of violent behavior. Many violent crimes are impulsive and incited by situations that produce intense anger, frustration, or fear (Berkowitz, 1993). Similarly, heightened levels of aggression and violence often occur in disadvantaged neighborhoods where people experience multiple psychosocial and economic stressors, where relative deprivation is pervasive, and where violence becomes an instrument for attaining not only material goods but also personal power and recognition (Campbell, 1986; Gilligan, 1996).
Psychological research has also advanced analysis of problems such as gang violence, which is rooted in historic patterns of discrimination and economic injustice (Huff, 1990). Psychological analyses have contributed by illuminating the manner in which young people are socialized into gangs, the interplay between personality and gang participation, dynamics of conformity, compliance, and obedience that lead individuals to participate in gang violence, and the needs for belonging, power, and social identity that may be met partially through gang membership (Goldstein, 1991). They have also helped to illuminate the psychological functions and meanings associated with the issues of territory and honor over which gangs frequently fight (Goldstein & Soriano, 1994).
More broadly, societal violence has been examined through the lens of systems theory (Miller, 1978; Rapoport, 1989), which interconnects psychological research with research on institutions. This research has yielded more comprehensive understanding of structural violence (Galtung, 1969)—psychological violence, social oppression, and physical damage owing to institutionalized inequalities and denial of access to basic service such as health care. Structural violence is particularly conspicuous in the ‘-isms’ of racism, classism, sexism, and militarism. In each of these, psychological processes contribute to structural violence, and structural violence enables direct, physical violence.
Sociological studies of the institutional, legal, and economic bases of sexism, for example, have emphasized patriarchy and macro-social power differentials between men and women (M. Anderson, 1993). These studies have been complemented by psychological investigations of gendered identities, socialization practices, and dynamics around gender issues (Unger & Crawford, 1992). In addition, sexist institutions set the stage for direct violence at various levels, as evidenced in domestic violence against women, a global phenomenon (Walker, 1999). Men often use spouse battering as a strategy (objectionably) for maintaining power and control in the family. This strategy is grounded in patriarchy, socially constructed beliefs about men’ rightful position of dominance, socialization into gendered identities and roles, and institutionalized patterns of injustice towards women (Koss et al., 1994).
In regard to militarism, research has documented processes of violence glorification, the heroization of military deeds, the integration of violence into men’ roles, and the socialization of soldiers for obedience and watching out for fellow troops (Archer, 1994; Kellett, 1990; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Lorentzen & Turpin, 1998; Reardon, 1985). Further, psychological processes are evident in militaristic regimes’ use of state-sponsored violence to control populations through policies of terror and political repression (Ardila, 1996; Lira, 1988). The state may define social reality through state lies (Martın-Baró, 1994), and dissenters are treated as criminals or terrorists. At the individual level, torture is often used to destroy the identity and meaning patterns of dissenters (Sveaass, 1994) and to insure that others learn to adhere to the state line.
States have no monopoly on militarism, which is cultivated by many non-state groups and paramilitary organizations. Also, in democratic countries, psychological processes contribute to an insidious form of militarism in the streets. For example, many U.S. cities are saturated with guns, gangs, and violent crime, which serve both to normalize violence and to set the context for socialization in the streets into lives of violence (Berkowitz, 1993; Campbell, 1986).
Conflict Mitigation and Resolution
Law is one of the primary means for handling conflicts without resort to violence. Extensive research on psychology and law has grown up around issues such as mental competency to stand trial, psychological assessment, jury selection, family law, and psychology of corrections (Kapardis, 1997). In some cases, psychological research has cast new light on ancient practices. For example, cognitive research on eyewitness testimony has revealed a variety of biases in memory, including possible distorting effects of information introduced by post-event questions and discussions (Loftus, 1979). Psychological research has also encouraged alternate means of dispute resolution through the use of professional mediators (third parties) rather than adversarial legal proceedings, which may strain already troubled relationships. Some evidence indicates that divorcing couples are happier with mediated settlements, which they regard as more fair, less damaging of relationship, and more likely to be complied with (Emery & Wyer, 1987; Kelly & Gigy, 1989).
At the societal and international levels, law is a useful but limited means of handling conflicts in a constructive manner. Societal law is a principal venue for achieving justice, which is closely connected with conflict resolution (Bunker & Rubin, 1995; Deutsch, 1985). Citizens’ willingness to obey law and use the legal system to handle conflicts depends on perceptions of fairness and procedural justice (Tyler, 1990). As illustrated by racist societies, however, law can itself become a tool of injustice that sparks armed rebellion or encourages nonviolent social movements such as the U.S. civil rights movement, which was animated partly by psychological processes and enabled changes in law (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). In intra-societal wars, the opposition groups challenge the legitimacy of governmental laws, and legal means are poorly suited to addressing the psychological issues of identity and fear that fuel conflicts in communities following the signing of treaties (Kelman, 1997a). In many international conflicts, willingness to adjudicate conflict via international law is often limited by lack of political will, perceptions that the adversary will not obey law, or attachment of higher value to national law.
Beyond legal means, a variety of sophisticated tools exist for nonviolent conflict mitigation, resolution, and prevention. Among these are diplomacy (Barston, 1988), negotiation (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), mediation (Zartman & Rasmussen, 1997), interactive problem-solving (Fisher, 1997), contact across lines of conflict (Pettigrew, 1998), cooperation on superordinate goals (Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Sherif, 1966), and unilateral initiatives (Osgood, 1962). Which tools are most appropriate depends on the situation, the kind of issues involved in the conflict, and whether the parties have an orientation that is cooperative, individualistic, or competitive (Deutsch, 1994). Analysis of how conflicts may be contained and resolved requires consideration of the social context, including its political, historical, cultural, economic, and religious elements.
Culture also plays a key role in determining which approaches to conflict resolution are most appropriate and effective in a particular context (Cohen, 1997). For example, collectivistic, high-context cultures favor the use of collaborative strategies and maintenance of harmony. In high-context cultures, communication often occurs implicitly through context rather than through what is said directly, and emphasis is on nonverbal reactions, how the perceiver is responding, and avoidance of confrontation and competition. In contrast, individualist, low-context cultures favor more direct, clear communications and emphasis is on what is said rather than on how it is said or other aspects of context (Ting-Toomey, 1988). In high-context cultures, confrontational, argumentative styles of handling conflict are avoided, whereas these styles may be preferred in low-context cultures. Just as culture shapes modes of conflict, it also shapes approaches to conflict mitigation and resolution (Fry & Björkqvist, 1997; Jandt & Pederson, 1996; Sponsel & Gregor, 1994), which are passed on through processes such as social learning.
Psychological research has helped to elucidate why various methods succeed, the conditions under which particular methods work, and the psychological processes that mediate changes in conflictual relationships. For example, negotiation is often not possible or limited in scope in very intense conflicts since the parties mistrust each other and avoid making concessions to prevent image loss. In this context, mediation is often the more appropriate method since an effective mediator may be perceived by the parties as willing to oppose intransigence and cheating and as being in a position to broker an outcome that is more acceptable than the hurting stalemate that the parties would otherwise confront (Rubin et al., 1994). Face-saving plays an important role in mediation, as the mediator may suggest concessions, thereby avoiding any appearance of weakness among the parties. Effective mediators use social influence processes such as ‘carrots and sticks’, a mixture of promised rewards for conflict-reducing actions and promised punishments for intransigence, to move toward an agreement.
Formal agreements by themselves, however, do not make for peace, which is frequently undermined by polarized communities, powerful fears, and damaged inter-group relationships. Settlement of a particular dispute, particularly if achieved through power bargaining, may manage the conflict but do little to achieve conflict resolution, which requires changing a hostile relationship (Fisher, 1994). Official diplomacy has limited ability to resolve conflicts since external political pressures constrain negotiation. Moreover, what is said in public dialogues can evoke backlashes that undermine a peace process, and treaties signed between leaders may make little change in the polarization, fear, and hostile patterns of interaction that characterize divided societies and communities (Kelman, 1997a). For these reasons, psychologists have helped to develop methods of unofficial diplomacy that contribute to conflict resolution and enable official diplomacy before, during, and following formal negotiations and mediations.
A particularly useful tool of unofficial diplomacy is the interactive problem-solving workshop (Fisher, 1997) pioneered by psychologists such as Herbert Kelman (1996). In regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a typical workshop brings together three to six Israelis with an equal number of Palestinians for two-and-a-half days of private dialogue facilitated by social scientists. The participants are well-respected political influentials who hold no official positions, are free to explore various options, and are likely to assume official political leadership positions. Through careful analytic, problem-solving discussion, the participants examine the main issues at stake in the conflict, explore their concerns and fears, and identify possible solutions and steps that might help to overcome the psychological and political barriers on both sides. Empathy, problem-solving, and collaborative exploration of ‘what-if’ questions are encouraged. Following the workshops, participants have taken their new learning about the other side back into their communities, beginning the arduous process of community transformation that is essential for handling and preventing intercommunal conflict. The workshops have been instrumental in establishing positive communication and empathy, altering dehumanizing stereotypes of the other, and stimulating constructive dialogue across conflict lines in highly segregated societies. They have also helped set the stage for official negotiations and for official back-channel, secret meetings such as those which led to the Oslo Accords.
Psychology also has much to contribute to tasks of conflict prevention such as preventive diplomacy (Lund, 1996), early warning and intervention of bystanders, and development of prosocial behaviors and caring societies (Staub, 1996), education for peace (Wagner & Christie, 1994), and systemic integration of processes of nonviolent conflict resolution (Deutsch, 1994). In the next millennium, one of the main challenges of social science research is to improve strategies for prevention of violence and destructive conflict.