Falk Hartig. Asian Studies Review. Volume 42, Issue 4. December 2018.
Introduction
Confucius Institutes (CIs) are educational organisations that promote Chinese language and culture around the world. The Chinese government is investing heavily in establishing several hundred CIs in existing academic institutions. Unlike their institutional counterparts based in the UK, Germany or Spain, CIs are usually organised as joint ventures between Chinese and international stakeholders, and they receive part of their funding from the Chinese government. It is precisely these organisational and financial connections to the Chinese state that have raised concerns about the aims of CIs and have triggered heated debates about their intentions outside China. On the one hand, proponents tend to describe CIs as benign instruments of cultural exchange (McCord, 2014), whereas critics on the other hand describe these Institutes as the propaganda arm of the Chinese Communist Party (Sahlins, 2015).
This paper provides empirical evidence related to these crucially important but at times emotional and somewhat ideologically charged debates as it critically engages with the actual content CIs present to their audiences. While there is growing academic interest in these Institutes, this paper is not simply another description of CIs and how they work on behalf of China’s external communication. Based on internal work reports from around 50 CIs in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas, it analyses the narratives about China that these Institutes present to global audiences and thus sheds light on the crucial question of what does and what does not happen at CIs. These documents, entitled Confucius Institute Conference Reference Materials (CICRM) (Kongzi Xueyuan Dahui Jiaoliu Cailiao), are the annual work performance records that every CI is expected to provide to the Hanban/CI Headquarters in Beijing. These internal reference materials, which have not been academically evaluated before, provide important insights into China’s promotional politics, as they show what image of China students and visitors of CIs around the world experience and thus give hints as to how China promotes itself globally. The internal work reports, in my understanding, illustrate a clear agenda to present a selective and “correct” version of China by emphasising specific elements of traditional Chinese culture and at the same time mostly avoiding controversial political topics.
Conceptualising International Image Management
The communication and information revolutions in recent decades have fundamentally changed the meaning of power in international relations and the conduct of diplomacy (Gilboa, 1998). Contemporary international relations are not only about political and economic relations, but also about culture and communication (Mowlana, 1997). These fundamental changes go along with “the rising importance of publics in foreign affairs”, which in turn steadily increases the necessity of “image-making” (Hertz, 1981, p. 187) or international image management. Following Gass and Seiter (2009, p. 155), I understand international image management as an undertaking that uses “any and all efforts to capture the hearts and minds of others”. From a communicative point of view there are two broad dimensions through which this can happen. First, there are means which I describe here as indirect communicative practices. If Country A provides infrastructure to Country B and thereby improves the quality of living for people in Country B, then Country A is indirectly communicating with these people as it is perceived as a friendly donor. Second, there are means of direct communication, which brings us to international political communication.
Political communication can be understood as “all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives” (McNair, 2011, p. 4) and can clearly have a domestic and an international dimension. International political communication, according to Hachten and Scotton (2012, p. 103), consists of “public diplomacy, overseas information programs, cultural exchanges, propaganda activities, and political warfare”.
One of the most frequently used terms with regards to national image management is public diplomacy. The problem, however, is that there is no definite and universal definition of this term and there is “considerable confusion about how public diplomacy’s function, purpose, and strategies are distinguished” (Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 91). Public diplomacy can be understood as “a country’s engagement and communication with foreign publics” (Wang, 2011, p. 3) with a variety of aims, one being “building positive images” (Löffelholz, Auer, & Srugies, 2014, p. 440). According to Cull (2009), public diplomacy consists of different elements, including listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, international broadcasting and psychological warfare (see also Leonard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002; Melissen, 2005). Cultural diplomacy, in turn and sticking with Cull, can be understood as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad” (Cull, 2009, p. 33). One of the most important instruments in this regard is cultural institutes such as Germany’s Goethe Institute, the British Council or Confucius Institutes.
Related here are the terms cultural relations and propaganda. While the term (international) cultural relations is often used synonymously with cultural diplomacy (Gienow-Hecht, 2010), I follow the understanding that the two are not the same, as cultural relations involve the exchange of informal cultural activities between two countries on a purely private basis, meaning without governmental influence, guidance or financing (Aguilar, 1996; Mark, 2009). And it is precisely a certain role for the state—be it as funder or coordinator of specific activities—that makes cultural diplomacy a form of diplomacy.
A similarly close relationship can be detected with regards to public diplomacy and propaganda as one of the most salient debates about whether government-sponsored or directed activities are “manipulative ‘propaganda’ or valid ‘public diplomacy'” (Zaharna, 2004, p. 219). The thinking implicit in this is that while both are communicative practices, propaganda as a means of distortion and sinister manipulation is something done by “others”, while “we” do public diplomacy in the sense of “civilised persuasion” (Gilboa, 1998, p. 58).
Looking at China, we can state that the PRC has embraced public diplomacy and related concepts “with an enthusiasm rarely seen in other parts of the world” (Rawnsley, 2012, p. 126). Without digging too deep into the Chinese discourse debating these concepts (see Hartig, 2016; Li, 2009; Ding, 2008 for this), it is clear that they have “become an important component of China’s diplomacy” (Han, 2010, p. 291) as the Chinese government has realised the importance of international image (guojia xingxiang) and favourable international public opinion (lianghao guoji yulun) for the development of the country (Lee, 2014). It is against this background that cultural diplomacy as one part of China’s public diplomacy and the even broader global image management is used to explain China to the world (Lin, 2012; Ye, 2012) and to create a favourable image among foreign publics (Han, Zhao, & Ke, 2012). Closely related here is the aim to counter negative attributions, especially in the Western media, which are exemplified in the so-called China Threat Theory (Zhongguo weixie lun) and are frequently seen in predominantly negative coverage of China-related topics in foreign news media (Golan & Lukito, 2015).
The purpose of international image management in China (and elsewhere), then, is to project the positive aspects of a country while at the same time playing down the negative components. Therefore, such activities should help to “change the ‘marketplace of ideas'” (Zhou, 2012, p. 45) and to increase China’s discourse power (Huang & Tang, 2014), which essentially means that China should “talk back” (Zhao, 2007). The fundamental desire behind all these communicative practices is not to leave the prerogative of interpreting what China is and what it stands for to external stakeholders (Hartig, 2016, p. 8). This concern is also reflected in the idea that public diplomacy should help foreign publics to understand, or better understand, the “real China” (zhenshi de Zhongguo) (Lin, 2012, p. 75; Zhao, 2012, p. 15).
The attempts to present the “real China” can be equated with attempts to present a positive image of the country, as mentioned above. It remains, however, somewhat unclear what that good image actually consists of and it “seemingly goes without saying that the Western attributions form the negative image that public diplomacy should correct and remedy” (Hartig, 2016, p. 60). Alongside correcting negative Western ascriptions, China wants to present itself as a country “that works hard to give its people a better future”, a “stable, reliable, and responsible economic partner”, a “trustworthy and responsible member of the international community”, and finally “an ancient, but vibrant, culture” (d’Hooghe, 2011, p. 24).
Confucius Institutes and China’s Global Image Management
Against this background I understand Confucius Institutes as one of China’s cultural diplomacy instruments which are used to manage China’s global image in the same way as public diplomacy instruments such as Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International (CRI), China Daily and China Central Television (CCTV) under its new label China Global Television Network (CGTN) or more indirect communicative practices such as foreign aid or infrastructure diplomacy (d’Hooghe, 2015).
According to official statistics, by the end of 2017 a total of 525 Confucius Institutes and 1,113 smaller Confucius Classrooms (mainly established at high schools and associated with a Confucius Institute) had been established in 146 countries. What they should do there is outlined in their Constitution and By-Laws: they should 1) satisfy the demands of foreigners who want to learn Chinese, 2) enhance the understanding of the Chinese language and culture, 3) strengthen educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and the world, 4) deepen friendly relationships with other nations, 5) promote the development of multiculturalism, and 6) construct a harmonious world (Hanban, n.d.). In the words of Anja Lahtinen (2015, pp. 211-212), a former CI director from Finland, the Institutes are a “place for foreigners to learn Chinese language and culture as well as understand modern China”, which echoes what Liu Yandong, Vice Premier and Chair of the Council of CI Headquarters, noted in her speech in celebration of the tenth CI anniversary in 2014 when she called on CIs to “help more foreigners to understand China” (Liu, 2014).
Unlike their international counterparts such as the British Council or Germany’s Goethe Institutes—which share similar missions—CIs are normally organised as joint ventures between Chinese and international partners. Usually the Chinese universities supply teaching materials and provide language teachers, while local partners provide accommodation, facilities and local staff. All CIs are under the supervision of Hanban, the Office of Chinese Language Council International, which reports to the Chinese Ministry of Education. Hanban is responsible for the administration of the Institutes, the supply of teachers, and the development and distribution of teaching materials, and provides start-up funding and normally around 50 per cent of operational costs (Hubbert, 2014; Hartig, 2016).
It is precisely this financial support from an authoritarian government that concerns the critics who accuse Confucius Institutes of “improper influence over teaching and research, industrial espionage, surveillance of Chinese abroad and undermining Taiwanese influence” (Starr, 2009, p. 79). Confucius Institutes are thus described as one of “China’s foreign propagandists” (Brady, 2008, p. 159), are connected to “cultural crusades” (Young, 2009, p. 8) or are seen as “academic malware” (Sahlins, 2015; see also Peterson, 2017), essentially as organisations by which China is “infiltrating” classrooms around the world (Epstein, 2018). While different critics make a number of valid observations such as the potentially problematic proximity to the Chinese state (Chey, 2008; Hughes, 2014), the debate gets rather heated and emotionally charged at times and lacks comprehensive empirical grounding. The growing academic interest in Confucius Institutes has so far not produced enough empirical evidence to answer the seemingly simple but fundamental question of what actually happens in Confucius Institutes around the world.
There are summarising accounts linking Confucius Institutes to China’s soft power (for example, Leung & du Cros, 2014; Pan, 2013; Paradise, 2009; Yang, 2010), case studies of CIs in regions or individual countries (Gil, 2015; Hartig, 2016; Hubbert, 2014; Starr, 2009; Wheeler, 2014) and studies that deal with questions of identity formation in CIs (Fallon, 2015; Schmidt, 2013). Most of these studies only generally mention the actual content provided. Yang (2010, p. 240), for example, notes that CIs’ “basic business is Chinese language teaching and promotion with a local flavour”, while another study presents a cursory overview of “common activities of CIs in Thailand”, including, among others, language courses, lectures, academic seminars, exhibitions, competitions, performances and activities to promote Chinese art and culture (Nguyen, 2014, p. 103). The CI at the University of Nairobi offers Chinese courses, and acts as a focal point to support China-related activities and to develop and promote teaching, learning and research on Chinese studies (Wheeler, 2014, p. 55).
Looking at Confucius Institutes in Australia and Germany, Hartig (2016, p. 2) describes the main activities of CIs as “language courses for various levels, the support for local Chinese teaching internationally and a wide range of cultural events such as exhibitions, screenings and various talks”. The analysis of one CI in the United States from an ethnographic perspective illustrates that “the Hanban China of pandas and avant-garde architecture is very different from the idea of China that dominates the public sphere in the United States, where China is frequently represented in terms of environmental degradation, political danger and threat, communism, and repression” (Hubbert, 2014, p. 335). Those differences are also articulated by Hartig when he describes the contrast between China’s public diplomacy aim to introduce the “real” China and the tendency of Confucius Institutes “to present a politically correct version of China” (Hartig, 2016, p. 9).
In a recent analysis of Confucius Institutes mainly in Australia, Gil (2017, p. 97) concludes that at the state-to-state level Confucius Institutes do “not currently appear to be influencing the policies and actions of other countries, nor leading governments to unhesitatingly comply with China’s goals”. At the society-to-society level, however, Confucius Institutes have “made a valuable contribution to Chinese language teaching and learning” (Gil, 2017, pp. 97-98). While these activities have “helped facilitate understandings of China”, they have “not necessarily resulted in more positive dispositions towards China” (Gil, 2017, p. 98). A more recent sceptical account is provided by Peterson (2017), who interviewed CI directors and teachers from Confucius Institutes across the US but focused her examination on 12 Confucius Institutes located in New Jersey and New York. Based on this assessment, Peterson (2017, p. 20) finds that “Confucius Institutes tend to present China in a positive light and to focus on anodyne aspects of Chinese culture”, and while avoiding “Chinese political history and human rights abuses, present Taiwan and Tibet as undisputed territories of China”. While this is a reasonable assessment, the conclusion that CIs “develop a generation of American students with selective knowledge of a major country” (Peterson, 2017, p. 20) seems somewhat overstated and the “recommendation” that “all Confucius Institutes offer at least one public lecture or class each year on topics that are important to Chinese history but are currently neglected, such as the Tiananmen Square protests or the Dalai Lama’s views on Tibet” (Peterson, 2017, p. 149) appears rather problematic, not least for the concept of academic freedom.
These studies present important and helpful insights, but they are either limited to individual countries or even Institutes or present only summarising accounts of what is happening at Confucius Institutes. This paper aims to broaden the knowledge about Confucius Institutes as it looks at 50 CIs from around the world and analyses what they did in 2015 in order to better understand how they represent China. To understand what is happening at CIs is important because in just a decade China established more than 500 CIs (and around 1,000 smaller Classrooms) around the world. And while new CIs are still being established, a number of universities, including Pennsylvania State, the University of Chicago and Stockholm University, have ended their collaborations with Hanban. Furthermore, by answering this question, the paper exemplifies how China wants to present itself to the world through Confucius Institutes.
A Closer Look at Confucius Institute Conference Reference Materials
In order to find out what is happening in Confucius Institutes around the world, this paper evaluates and analyses internal work reports from 50 CIs in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas and Oceania. These documents, entitled Confucius Institute Conference Reference Materials (CICRM) (Kongzi Xueyuan Dahui Jiaoliu Cailiao), are the annual work performance records that every CI is encouraged to provide to the Hanban/CI Headquarters in Beijing, which then collects and internally distributes the documents to CI representatives during the annual Confucius Institute Conference held in China at the end of each year. These work reports are official documents for internal use (neibu in Chinese) only. While there is some disagreement over the confidentiality of these neibu-documents in Chinese Studies (Thogersen, 2006; Carlson, Gallagher, Lieberthal & Manion, 2010), it is clear that neibu is a “term used for publications not meant for public distribution” (Wu, 1993, p. 272).
When analysing documents, it is important to keep in mind that those documents “are produced for some purpose other than research” (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). This is especially true for China where “documents are not produced to make foreign researchers better informed but to achieve certain goals” (Thogersen, 2006, p. 199), and in order to evaluate the reliability of such materials, it is necessary “to understand the political processes by which such materials are generated” (Chen, 2010, p. 16).
CICRMs were published as A4-format paperback books with several hundred pages in the early years, but are now distributed via DVDs, which include pdf versions of the individual work reports. CICRMs are based on a template provided by the CI Headquarters/Hanban to the Institutes. In their released form CICRMs consist of a few A4 pages for each Institute, ranging from three to 12 pages. At the end of each report one normally finds a number of pictures (normally between two and five) showcasing some of the CIs’ activities. The scope of the reports depends on how much the particular CI actually did and therefore reported back, but the scope also depends on how the reports are designed. While most CIs follow the straightforward template (see below) provided by Hanban, some use it only very loosely, providing their information in one continuous text without using the specified sub-headings, or occasionally using their own sub-headings.
All of the reports under review for this paper were written in English. In previous years reports were either provided in both English and Chinese or only in Chinese. One European director I asked about the reports noted that his CI submitted an English and a Chinese version in 2015, but the CICRM only includes the English version.
Following the template, most CICRMs open with “General Information” or an “Overview” of the activities that took place at CIs in the last year. Part I asks the Institutes to provide information regarding teaching activities, cultural activities, and “featured and innovative” programs, as well as major events and media reports. The CI at Addis Ababa University, for example, listed as featured and innovative programs “office skill courses like computer operation and common Chinese software application” (CICRM, 2015, p. 18). The CI at Colorado State University, which according to its mission statement specialises in water and environmental sustainability, lists “some joint research with Chinese relevant scientific research institutions to help solve the actual environmental problems in China” (CICRM, 2015, p. 698) in that section, without giving more concrete information. There is, however, apparently no clear definition of what such “featured and innovative” programs actually are, and different CIs seemingly have their own interpretation. The CI at Paris Diderot, for example, catalogues courses on calligraphy and traditional painting as innovative projects (CICRM, 2015, p. 490) and the CI at Soonchunhyang University, South Korea, announces under the sub-heading “innovative projects” that it plans “to carry out several seminars which are related to Chinese teaching and culture [including] lectures on calligraphy, tai chi, martial arts” (CICRM, 2015, p. 309). It is not my intention here to denigrate any of the events organised by any of the CIs under review, but it is obvious that there is no global consensus about what the individual categories actually mean, and one cannot help but get the impression that some CIs list rather “usual” activities as “innovative” in order to fill in this column somehow.
After the content-related information provided in Part I, CICRMs outline technical details in Part II. This includes an overview of the Board of Directors and its composition and/or operational regulations. The CI at Frankfurt University, Germany, for example, notes that it is “an association under German Association Law” with a board of two members from Frankfurt University and two from Fudan University in Shanghai. It also notes that it conducts “an annual meeting, alternating in Shanghai and Frankfurt. The meeting 2015 has been held in Shanghai” (CICRM, 2015, p. 207). This second part also requests CIs to outline events organised by both “Chinese and Foreign cooperative organisations” and what services the individual CI “provided for the community”.
Part III includes data about “Research outcomes and Implementation of the key programs of the Confucius Institute Headquarters”, including textbook development, the handling of the “Confucius China Studies Program” or donations from enterprises. As a whole, there is no identifiable regional or continental orientation to the extent that European CIs highlight information in Part I whereas CIs from Southern America emphasise information in Part III, or the other way round. The donation item illustrates the loose, probably deliberately so, way of dealing with those internal reports and exemplifies how and why the reports are generated. The CI at North Carolina State University, for example, notes:
When we partner with organizations on events the money is put directly toward the event (they purchase materials, food, donate items, etc.) instead of the money coming directly to the CI (this is easier with our accounting system). We have partnered with companies on conferences, festivals, and events and they support a segment of the event. This makes our costs for the event smaller since more organizations are contributing to the larger fund (CICRM, 2015, p. 472).
Other CIs do not mention donations at all in their internal reports to Hanban, which either means they did not receive any external funding or—and this is purely speculative—they do not want to highlight their sources of external funding in order to avoid a reduction in the funding they receive from Hanban.
As the donation example illustrates, the documents not only provide data but are a tool through which Confucius Institutes communicate with the Headquarters in a broader sense. The reports can either highlight significant achievements in order to make a favourable impression on superiors in Beijing or they can exaggerate a particular problem in order to receive help. One such problem could, for example, concern the lack of language teachers for an Institute. While a number of reports did mention issues in previous years (Hartig, 2016), the major aim clearly is to tell what happened in the past year and to highlight achievements and thereby, ultimately, to justify the funding received from Hanban. Nowadays only rarely do CIs elaborate on the problems they are facing. One exception in the 50 work reports from 2015 analysed for this paper is the CI at La Trobe University in Australia, which in its report included a whole section on “Difficulties and Future Plans” (CICRM, 2015, p. 90). The CI lists a number of recommendations which “identify the policy levers that would likely generate the most support from across Australian society, and therefore produce the most significant educational and societal impact” (Hartig, 2016).
The La Trobe CI recommends developing “school teacher and education mobility & exchange programs to bring more Chinese school teachers to Melbourne to teach in local schools” (CICRM, 2015, p. 91). It also recommends working “with key cultural and voluntary organisations across Melbourne and the regions to deepen cultural linkages and understanding between China and [the Australian state of] Victoria” (CICRM, 2015, p. 92). Although these recommendations clearly illustrate practical issues Confucius Institutes are facing—such as human resources problems or too little engagement with local communities—they also indicate how CICRMs are used by individual CIs to communicate strategically with the Hanban. This becomes clear when looking at La Trobe’s first recommendation, which is to establish a “national coordinating CI for Australia based at La Trobe University to provide a negotiated national plan [for promoting Chinese language and culture] with emphasis on the whole of Australia [and] not just major cities” (CICRM, 2015, p. 91, emphasis added). Through this suggestion La Trobe not only highlights a real problem—the absence of a coherent strategy between individual CIs in individual countries—but at the same time brings itself into play to host such a CI, which would most certainly mean more money and resources in the future.
Finally, and only occasionally, statements in the reports are seemingly designed simply to please Hanban authorities in Beijing, as the following example illustrates:
The difficulties and problems for the present work at [our] Confucius Institute include: studying important speeches and instructions of leaders of the central government […]. In the near future, [our] Confucius Institute will, under the guidance of the scientific development, take advantage of strategic opportunities of the teaching of Chinese as a foreign language […] to […] promote Chinese culture […] (CICRM, 2011, p. 32, emphasis added).
Taking these aspects into consideration, the CICRMs present us with unique insights and are by far the most comprehensive and authoritative sources for understanding what Confucius Institutes are doing on a day-to-day basis and what version of China they actually present to global audiences.
How to Decrypt Confucius Institute Conference Reference Materials
The sample includes 10 reports each from Asia, the Americas, Europe, Africa and Oceania. The selection is based on purposive sampling, which means that randomly selected work reports were only included if they contained at least five items that could help answer the question of what happened in a CI in 2015. For instance, if one CI submitted a work report that only very briefly mentioned that it engaged in language teaching and cultural activities, the report was not used for the analysis.
In order to get a manageable and processable sample (or to bind the case), I focus on non-language activities, which can be found in all three parts of the work reports. Even though I am aware of the potentially political dimension of language teaching and the criticisms concerning teaching materials and the fact that CIs only teach simplified Chinese, I focus on non-language activities to keep a manageable sample and because a meaningful investigation would require a proper analysis of teaching materials used by CIs (for the issue of teaching materials see Fallon, 2015). After excluding language teaching, two general objectives of Confucius Institutes remain—namely, explaining Chinese culture to foreigners and making foreigners understand China, as Liu Yandong (2014), the most senior politician responsible for the Confucius Institutes, puts it.
With regard to the “notoriously slippery term” culture (Flew, 2007, p. 3), the reports do not provide any guidelines, let alone a definition, as to what “culture” actually means, and “we decide by ourselves what to mention in the reports and where to put it”, as the director of one European CI told me. Sometimes, however, the people in charge are not totally sure about this separation. As one CI director phrased it in a rhetorical question in a conversation with Hartig (2016, p. 162): “Take a calligraphy course, for example, is this a language course or is this a cultural course?” As I will outline below, I understand calligraphy to be a cultural course or activity as part of the broader category “traditional culture”, which, as other studies indicate (Hellkötter, Oehler, & Shen, 2011), dominates the cultural offerings at Confucius Institutes.
The second task—helping foreigners understand China—is the least straightforward but the most crucial one in terms of the propaganda accusations brought up against the Institutes. Recalling Hubbert’s analysis of one CI in the US and her insights that this CI imagines China “by its historical cultural glories, avant-garde architecture, and endearing zoo animals rather than by its political system” (Hubbert, 2014, p. 334), the question emerges as to what else, besides traditional Chinese culture, is presented by these Institutes?
In order to find this out, the work reports were read through several times and categories were developed and redefined after several rounds of reading. A coding sheet was developed inductively and the final coding was done by the author. This labour-intensive approach allowed for further refining of the coding sheet to increase the validity of the analysis through the accumulation of (contextual) knowledge about the case.
The starting point was two broad categories—”Traditional China” and “Contemporary China”. “Contemporary China” refers to the People’s Republic of China, while “Traditional China” encompasses activities, practices, items, and/or components that have their origin in China’s dynastic history or the Republican era. “Traditional China” further consists of three categories with various sub-categories. The first sub-category is “Traditional Culture”, broadly conceived, the second concerns “Traditional Celebrations”, and the third includes “Philosophy/Religion and History”. “Contemporary China” includes the sub-categories “Contemporary Culture”, “Chinese State and Politics” and “Chinese Society”.
As not all cultural activities would clearly fit into “Traditional Culture” or “Contemporary Culture”, a third broad category simply labelled “Culture” was necessary. The original idea to include only cultural activities that could unambiguously be grouped into one of the first two categories was abandoned, as it would have distorted the overall analysis. The category “Culture” thus includes everything that the work reports simply mention as “cultural activities” or the like. It furthermore includes everything related to foodstuffs, referring to Chinese food, cuisine and tea culture/tea ceremony.
After the categories were established I closely screened all 50 work reports and identified all non-language items. All items were listed as they appeared in the reports and later assigned numbers related to the codes described above. The overall shape of the reports requires a close reading as the material is self-evidently not proofread by Hanban. While the template appears straightforward at first, consisting of the three parts described above, it remains unclear what the difference is between “cultural activities”, “main activities” and “events organised by both Chinese and foreign cooperative partners”. This results in duplication and multiple mentions of similar events in different parts of the work reports, further complicated by the fact that the same event may be described in different ways. A prime example is the description of the traditional Chinese New Year either as Spring Festival, Lunar New Year or Chinese New Year. Some reports mention the Lantern Festival, which traditionally ends the Spring Festival. A close reading is therefore necessary to exclude multiple mentions or to make sense of them. It is also necessary as not all CIs use the template provided by Hanban, while some use it only very loosely and provide all of the information in one continuous block of text. In addition, it occasionally becomes clear that non-native speakers have filled out the template.
To familiarise readers with the work reports, I illustrate the coding with the following examples. If a report mentions activities on the occasion of a traditional Chinese festival, the festival itself is coded as well as the activities listed. One European CI “took active part in [a local China-event] and offered a ‘Chinese experience course’ for everyone on stage. At its own stand the institute also offered language and calligraphy courses, taiji activities and also answered questions about general topics related to China and its culture” (CICRM, 2015, p. 180). Here, calligraphy and taiji would be coded, while everything else would be disregarded, as the Chinese experience course refers to language and the questions on general topics related to China and its culture are not replicable.
During the celebrations of Confucius Institute Day one African CI presented “diversified cultural programs” including “photo exhibitions of ‘in celebration of 45th anniversary of Sino-[…] Diplomatic Relations’ and ‘One Belt, One Road'” (CICRM, 2015, p. 24). Here, the two photo exhibitions were coded: the exhibition in celebration of the 45th anniversary of Diplomatic Relations as “Bilateral Relations” and the exhibition on “One Belt, One Road” as “Foreign Policy” and “Business/Economy”.
Often a work report would only note that a CI held “different cultural activities to introduce traditional culture”. It remains unclear how many activities actually took place, and if the website of the CI gives no indication (which is quite often the case), I coded such an entry as “traditional culture” twice. It may, of course, be that there were more than two events, but as this remains unclear, I make sure that more than one event is included.
Findings and Discussion
Based on the categories outlined above, the analysis of the work reports of the 50 Confucius Institutes results in 3,764 non-language related items (on average 75.28 items for each Institute) that in one way or another illustrate the outreach activities of CIs. Those items include a Chinese New Year celebration, a paper-cutting event, a discussion of foreign policy, a calligraphy course that takes place 15 times a year in an affiliated high school, and a discussion about water issues in China. The items do not include, for example, a film screening if it is not clear what the film is about. If the report gives an indication of the topic or it was possible to find that information elsewhere, the film screening would be included.
With regards to the two broad categories described above as “Traditional China” and “Contemporary China”, of these 3,764 activities, 27.5 per cent (1,039 items) relate in one way or another to “Contemporary China”, dealing with culture, state and politics or society. 63.6 per cent (2,395 items) of the outreach activities refer in one way or another to “Traditional China”. The remaining 8.9 per cent (333 items) refer to the supporting category labelled as “Culture”, and include activities that were mentioned in the report but could not be linked to one of the other categories.
These numbers quite clearly indicate what picture of China Confucius Institutes portray around the world—namely, the picture of an ancient culture characterised as different and unique. It also becomes clear that a particular set of cultural activities and practices is dominant. According to one European director, “the tastes and demands of a foreign public and Hanban officials can be quite different” (quoted in Hellkötter, Oehler, & Shen, 2011, p. 202). Whereas the Chinese “tend to like song and dance shows that we might find rather kitschy and unrepresentative of real Chinese culture”, Westerners prefer “contemporary Chinese art” which in turn “might be more popular with us than in Chinese official circles” (quoted in Hellkötter, Oehler, & Shen, 2011, p. 202). It is not my intention to judge what constitutes “real” Chinese culture, but calligraphy, traditional painting, paper cutting, martial arts, Taiji Quan and dance and music performances such as various traditional operas can safely be regarded as the main activities in this regard. Of the total of 3,764 activities, around 41 per cent (1,546 items) describe such activities and traditional cultural practices.
Traditional cultural practices are often presented to audiences during the various celebrations held by CIs around the world. On the occasion of the Spring Festival, the CI at Colorado State University, for example, hosted a gala with a “rich and colorful” performance including folk music, poem reading, acrobatics, Chinese operas, Chi Gong, Tai Chi, Erhu, piano and more (CICRM, 2015, p. 695). Similar activities are organised by CIs around the world for the so-called Confucius Institute Days. A typical celebration of that day would read like the following from the CI at the University of Texas at Dallas:
With the theme of “Peace and Understanding”, the activities include: lion dance, exhibition of Chinese calligraphy and paintings, Chinese calligraphy competition, exhibition of traditional Chinese musical instruments, Chinese character games. […] Nanjing University Chinese Music Orchestra […] concluded the celebration with a splendid performance of Chinese traditional music (CICRM, 2015, p. 520).
During such celebrations, CIs would normally organise what the Confucius Institute at Karaganda State Technical University exemplarily describes as a “Fun sports competition” including activities such as “use the chopsticks to hold bean”, “kick shuttlecocks”, “play the Kongzhu”, “jump rope”, “pass the ball”, group games of “tug of war”, “jump big rope” and “ping pong” (CICRM, 2015, p. 128). Some of these activities are also well known in other parts of the world, but there are Chinese versions of them such as Chinese jump rope (tiaopijin) and Chinese tug of war (qian gou) that unambiguously reference China’s long cultural history. Similar references are created when CIs, like the one in Mexico City, celebrate the Mid-Autumn festival by presenting “the rich and various cultural performances and ethnic fashion shows to Mexican audience” and thus demonstrate “China’s long history and splendid culture” (CICRM, 2015, p. 1538).
Another cultural component that no CI can ignore is Chinese food. Many cultural institutes use the “symbolic representation” of food “to communicate ideas, values, identities, and attitudes” (Zhang, 2015, p. 1) and Confucius Institutes are no exception. During its Mid-Autumn festival, the Colorado State University CI organised food tasting of Chinese moon-cakes, dumplings and Gongbao Chicken which “were deeply loved by local residents” (CICRM, 2015, p. 699). The Confucius Institute at the University of the South Pacific, Fiji, held various “Chinese cooking experience courses” entitled “Fijian Ingredients and Chinese Taste” with the aim “to introduce students to cooking with local ingredients using Chinese cooking method and health philosophy” (CICRM, 2015, p. 238). But, as the report also notes, not only is food a symbolic representation of China, but students also “learnt so much in Chinese cooking which would increase their interest of learning Chinese” (CICRM, 2015, p. 238).
With regard to contemporary culture, the picture is quite different, as only around 18.6 per cent (or 702 items) of identifiable components refer to cultural products or activities related to the PRC. One example here is a discussion on China’s most famous dating show “If You Are The One” (feicheng wurao), organised by the CI at the University of Melbourne. The show “has become a cultural phenomenon in Australia and the Institute invited a panel of distinguished guests to explore what insights into modern China the show offers” (CICRM, 2015, p. 110). This event, the report notes, “had a big impact on the community and the Institute was interviewed and featured on various news outlets” (CICRM, 2015, p. 110).
Within the “Contemporary China” category the most interesting insight probably refers to the sub-category “Chinese State and Politics”. From all 3,764 activities that the selected 50 Confucius Institutes around the world initiated in 2015 only 5.1 per cent (193) actually referred to state and politics. As outlined above, this category incorporates lectures on foreign or domestic politics, bilateral relations or similar topics. The CI at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru held a Chinese Study Circle discussing “China’s legal system and its relationship with the Peruvian legal system” (CICRM, 2015, p. 132), while the CI at the University of Malaya held a seminar on the development of Chinese Islam. The seminar discussed the present situation of Muslims in China in order “to present real development of Chinese Muslims”, with the aim of refuting rumours and misunderstandings (CICRM, 2015, p. 472). The CI for Scotland in the University of Edinburgh organised a Distinguished Lecture Series with lectures by David Shambaugh and Sheng Dingli, among others. While these are well-known scholars in their respective fields, presentations by Yang Guoqing, former Chinese aviation minister (in Edinburgh), or by Consul-General Zhao Yongchen (at the CI at the University of Queensland in Brisbane) probably had a more direct political dimension.
I also counted the celebration of China’s National Day as “political”. In my sample of 50 CIs, only six celebrated the National Day, or mentioned it at least, but as there is no more information on what happened on these occasions, my classification admittedly remains speculative. Furthermore, if a CI noted that it offered a course of university studies on Chinese regional studies, this would also be included here as those courses normally outline national conditions including the political situation, state and society, geography and related aspects.
It is of course possible and conceivable that political content could be communicated through other channels than lectures or seminars. Movies, for example, can be highly political, and when the CI at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul cooperated with a Chinese state-owned education television channel to air Chinese documentaries entitled “China: Culture and Modernity” that were “provided by the Chinese Consulate” (CICRM, 2015, p. 99) it seems natural that these documentaries would be political. And in the case of China, one could argue that a seemingly innocuous show about scenic spots could become highly political if, for example, Taroko National Park in Taiwan was listed as a must-see destination in “China”.
While such aspects cannot be covered by an analysis of these work reports, what they do uncover is the fact that Confucius Institutes try to stay away from politics in their content as much as possible. In this regard, the findings confirm what scholars of China’s public diplomacy note, sometimes based on research findings, but mainly based on anecdotal evidence—namely, “that Chinese culture and tradition tend to be liked and admired by foreign publics, whereas its politics and governance are at a much lower standing” (Wang, 2011, p. 6). One could, of course, somewhat heretically, argue that people like culture and tradition because that is what they get when they go to a Confucius Institute, but the potentially apolitical nature of the outreach activities is indisputable and derives its underlying rationale from the nature of the authoritarian Chinese state.
The attempt to avoid engaging in politics becomes even clearer when looking at the Institutes in different global regions. In Africa, 11.8 per cent of all activities (29 of 245) dealt with state and politics in one way or another, described and grouped as outlined above. In Asia, a mere 7.5 per cent (130 of 1,724 items) and in the Americas just 3.1 per cent (16 of 522) referred to this category. In Europe, a tiny 1.8 per cent (8 of 437) and in Oceania only a low of 1.2 per cent (10 of 836) of activities related to this category. Again, this is not to say that there are no political statements made at all by these Confucius Institutes, but this is just not measurable using this data set. It should, however, also be noted that these reports are internal documents sent back to CI Headquarters, which are the funding body, and it is very likely that, if a CI had held a lecture on the latest foreign policy slogan or a prominent policy initiative, it would also report this back to Beijing.
The recurrent propaganda accusation (due to the pejorative understanding of the very term propaganda) therefore appears weak to some extent. Confucius Institutes, at least the 50 Institutes I investigated here, would most likely not go on the record as promoting Chinese leaders’ policy initiatives and thereby engage in apparent propaganda. They simply try to avoid politics, an observation that echoes what Hubbert (2014, p. 334) investigated in her ethnographic analysis of one US-based Confucius Institute, where she observed apolitical classroom discussions in the sense that whenever “politically laden topics emerged from classroom discussions, I observed that the teachers quickly refocused students on language acquisition and cultural activities”.
Although it is possible to disprove the propaganda accusation, it also becomes apparent that Confucius Institutes do not engage with topics that are regarded as sensitive for official China, such as Tiananmen (referring to the crackdown on the protest movement), Taiwan (referring to the legal status of the island), Tibet (referring to China’s role there) and the Dalai Lama or Falun Gong (Hartig, 2016).
Conclusion
The overall aims of Confucius Institutes are to introduce Chinese language and culture to foreigners and to help foreigners to understand China. This clearly reflects one major task of China’s overall image management, which should also be used to help foreign publics better understand the “real China” (zhenshi de Zhongguo) and to “present a truer picture of China” (Zhao, 2007). The problem here, of course, is that there are multiple “real” Chinas—positive and negative—and the crucial question is who decides what this “real” China is all about, and why. It is therefore highly questionable what the “real” China is, or should be, all about. From the official Chinese point of view, however, it goes without saying that the Western attributions form the negative picture that China’s image management, and therefore also the Confucius Institutes, seek to correct and remedy (Hartig, 2016).
Based on the analysis of these internal work reports from 50 CIs in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas, it is clear that Confucius Institutes present a specific narrative of China to global audiences. This is not so much a counter-narrative, as this would make it necessary to engage with the global, mainly Western, criticism of China. The narrative presented by Confucius Institutes focuses on the cultural dimension of the Chinese state and especially on China’s traditional cultural achievements and practices. The narrative furthermore only rarely includes any political topics. Therefore, Confucius Institutes do not present the “real” China (which is an illusion anyway), but a much more selective version of China. This selective version of China is, as the analysed data indicates, most of the time an apolitical version. Referring back to McNair’s (2011, p. 4) definition of political communication as “all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives”, one can argue that representing such an apolitical version of China by avoiding state-political issues is in itself political.
Confucius Institutes as one instrument of China’s cultural diplomacy and actors in China’s broader global image management efforts are clearly political actors—whether CI representatives like this fact or not (and most of them would deny it)—who purposefully communicate specific narratives about China by often leaving out topics that are regarded as negative or sensitive for official China. The fundamental point here is that although any country needs to find a delicate balance between its multiple “realities” (governments tend to highlight positive aspects while critics tend to highlight negative ones), this balance is especially hard to find for Confucius Institutes. This, however, is not so much a flaw in the Institutes themselves, but in the authoritarian political system behind them and the broader credibility problems that China’s overall image management faces in relation to its domestic affairs and its international behaviour (Rawnsley, 2013; Hartig, 2016).
Whereas CIs’ international counterparts from Germany, the UK or Spain have much more leeway and would normally not shy away from addressing issues and problems their home countries are facing and therefore presenting a more realistic picture, CIs, being constrained by the political realities at home, are less likely to present a realistic picture that would include regular engagement with sensitive questions and problems. The presentation of such a selective version of China, essentially, is the biggest challenge for China’s image management and promotional politics. While these specific global promotional politics, characterised by the omission of politics, serve domestic governance purposes by not questioning the Chinese party state, they do, at the same time, hamper China’s standing in the competitive marketplace of nations.