Robert Alan Brookey. Argumentation and Advocacy. Volume 37, Issue 4. 2001.
In the past few years the media have given great attention to scientific research which indicates that homosexuality may have some biological cause. Contrary to the current hype, the scientific study of homosexuality is hardly a new phenomenon. In fact, theories about a biological basis for sexuality can be traced back to the nineteenth century. What distinguishes this old research from the new is the untested belief that contemporary findings will somehow ease the social pressures put upon gays and lesbians. For example, Hamer’s (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993) research on the “gay gene” has been hailed as a valuable tool in the on going battle for gay rights. Hamer reported that he had isolated a genetic market on the Xq28 chromosome that correlates with male homosexuality. Shortly after Hamer’s study was published, the Human Rights Campaign Fund released a special press packet suggesting that the biological research on homosexuality will provide a powerful argument for gay rights (Watney, 1995). Specifically, advocates of gay rights maintain that this research proves that sexual orientation is not chosen, and therefore gays should not suffer from discrimination because of their sexuality.
Gay rights advocates believe the biological research on homosexuality will establish homosexuality as an immutable characteristic, and thus extend to homosexuals the constitutional protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argument may seem compelling, it is based on a simplistic, and not wholly accurate reading of the Fourteenth Amendment (Stein, 1994). Furthermore, if this argument is taken at face value, some troubling problems emerge. For example, most of the biological research (Hamer’s study in particular) does not include lesbians as subjects. In fact, Hamer has gone on record as saying that lesbianism is not genetic, but socially and culturally produced (Gallagher, 1998). In addition, most of this research (again, Hamer’s study in particular) argues that bisexuality is not biologically based. Given that the biological argument assumes that rights should be extended to sexual minorities whose sexuality is biologically based, and given that the biological research excludes specific sexual minorities, it would seem that the biological research would only benefit a specific group: male homosexuals (Zita, 1994).
Of equal concern, however, is how the dependence on biological research places the gay rights movement in a precarious position. After all, if the argument for rights is based on specific research, what happens to the argument when the research is rendered obsolete? For example, a recent study published in Science casts doubt on Hamer’s genetic research. The authors (Rice, Anderson, Risch & Ebers, 1999) concluded their report by observing:
It is unclear why our results are so discrepant from Hamer’s original study. Because our study was larger than that of Hamer et al., we certainly had adequate power to detect a genetic effect as large as was reported in that study. Nonetheless, our data do not support the presence of a gene of large effect influencing sexual orientation. (p. 667)
Although the authors of this study admit that their findings do not preclude the existence of a gene for sexual orientation, their conclusion erodes any argument for gay rights based on biological research (Brelis, 1999).
The argument that biological research will help secure gay rights provides a unique opportunity to observe the interface between scientific investigation and political practice. Specifically, I am interested in determining the political potential of the biological argument as a strategy for gay rights advocacy. I begin with a survey of theory that will develop my critical approach. I then proceed with an analysis of various biological studies on male homosexuality that make up the discursive formation I call the “gay gene discourse.” I conclude that the “gay gene discourse” reinforces cultural assumptions about gender that may not serve the interests of gay rights advocates.
Bio-Rhetoric and Background Beliefs
In his study of scientific discourse, Lyne has determined that the arguments generated within certain scientific projects can subsequently be introduced into the political sphere, but the success of these arguments may depend on how well they reflect the political climate. For example, in his analysis of Soviet scientist T. D. Lysenko’s theory of “vernalization,” Lyne (1987) argues that Lysenko’s theories enjoyed wide acceptance in the Soviet Union, not because they were scientifically sound (in fact, they were later proven to be unsound), but because they offered a view of heritability that supported Soviet ideology. In this analysis Lyne first introduces the concept of “bio-rhetoric.” He writes: “The discursive structure in question here is what I would call a bio-rhetoric, a systematic strategy for mediating between the life sciences and social life, and also for mediating between Lysenko the phenomenon and Lysenko the bearer of lessons” (1987, p. 512). In a later essay, Lyne expands his theory of bio-rhetoric and offers this explanation:
A special instance of this is what might be called a bio-rhetoric, a strategy for inventing and organizing discourses about biology in such a way that they mesh with the discourses of social, political, or moral life … A bio-rhetoric is thus talk “on its way” from an “is” to an “ought,” making that connection only in the play of language. (1990, p. 38)
The introduction of the biological research into the gay rights debate is an exact illustration of how science can “mesh” with political debates. Indeed, the biological argument that is offered to advocate gay rights follows the grammar of a bio-rhetoric as it is defined by Lyne: homosexuality “is” biological, therefore homosexuals “ought” to have their rights protected.
In her book Science as Social Knowledge, Longino (1990) identifies the argumentative elements that facilitate the discursive move from an “is” of science to an “ought” of public policy. She argues that although all scientific practices are subject to social influence, the degree of this influence can be gauged by the presence of “background beliefs.” Longino explains: “Background beliefs or assumptions, then, are expressed in statements that are required in order to demonstrate the evidential import of a set of data to a hypothesis. As such, they both facilitate and constrain reasoning from one category of phenomena to another” (1990, p. 59). She argues that by identifying these background beliefs, we can determine in what ways a scientific project has been subject to social influence.
Longino illustrates her point in an analysis of biological research on sex differences. She points out how evidentiary gaps in the research record often escape critical scrutiny because patriarchal values and attendant beliefs about sexual dimorphism and essentialism are so strong. In other words, our society is already invested in the beliefs that there are only two sexes, and that all of the differences between these two sexes can be biologically explained. Therefore, when biological evidence contradicts these beliefs, it is either dismissed or reinterpreted in order to bring it into line with accepted thought. Longino suggests that by tracing background beliefs in the manner of a Foucauldian genealogy, the critic can identify ideologies that are cloaked by scientific objectivity. As Longino maintains, however, the validity of a scientific claim is not based on the presence of ideology, but the degree to which ideology overrides alternative and logical interpretations of data.
Longino’s theory is particularly useful for a rhetorical analysis, because it allows the critic to approach science as an argumentative construction. Although she does not draw these theoretical connections, Longino’s background beliefs serve the same functions as warrants in Toulmin’s (1958) model of argument. Warrants, according to Toulmin’s model, serve to link evidence to claims, or in the context of scientific research, data to a hypothesis. However, this link is inferential and based on what is reasonable within a particular argumentative field. Therefore, warrants are often assumed or accepted as common knowledge. For example, when it is assumed that there are only two sexes, and that all of the differences between the two sexes are biological, then the interpretation of evidence from biological investigations of gender and sexuality is likely to accommodate these cultural assumptions. Longino’s own analysis of sex differences proves this point.
While Lyne’s theory of bio-rhetoric provides us an understanding of how scientific arguments enter into political discourse, Longino’s theory of “background beliefs” provides a tool that allows the critic to identify the types of scientific arguments that might become “bio-rhetorics” and predict their possible political implications. The ability of a scientific discourse to “mesh” with the political and social discourses is, in some cases, contingent on the presence of background beliefs. In other words, the way scientific evidence may be used to dictate policy may be constrained by the cultural beliefs reproduced by the scientific studies in question. The “gay gene discourse” is a case in point; I will consider if this discourse, given the presence of ideological assumptions about gay men, can effectively operate as a “bio-rhetoric” for the advocacy of gay rights.
In my analysis I will examine how the background belief about male homosexuality effeminacy operates in the biological research on male homosexuality. By effeminacy, I mean the cultural belief that male homosexuals express feminine qualities and display a delicacy and weakness that is thought to be unmasculine. When I analyze this biological research, I show how different scientific experiments draw on the belief about effeminacy in a variety of ways. I will examine research in the fields of behavioral genetics, neuroendocrinology and sociobiology. Specifically, through a Foucauldian genealogy, I will trace how homosexuality is argumentatively produced as an object of study in each field (Foucault, 1978). Admittedly, there are some scholars that might suggest that a genealogy cannot accommodate the logical argumentative analysis that I propose. I disagree, and so does Longino (1990). She argues that Foucault’s critique of discursive formations illustrates how dominant ideology passes for reason. Although Longino takes exception with Foucault’s “monolithic” views about science and power, she suggests that background beliefs can help explain how ideology facilitates the production of objects of knowledge. Given her own critical projects, Longino would aver that an examination of scientific research on gender and sexuality should engage questions of power.
The Gay Gene Discourse
As I have mentioned before, biological research on male homosexuality has been conducted in a variety of fields. Consequently, there is a vast body of literature on the biological determination of male homosexuality, and not all of it can be contained or considered in the parameters of this essay. However, I will offer a brief explanation of how the theories from the various fields combined to form a discourse on biological homosexuality, or a “gay gene” discourse.
Some of the initial genetic studies on the heritability of homosexuality involved the study of twins. This research determined that concordant sexual identity is greater among identical twins than it is among fraternal twins. Considering that identifical twins share more genetic material, these findings support the claim that sexuality may be genetically determined. Hamer (1994) took these findings a step further when he analyzed the sexual concordance of all male relatives. After surveying his subjects for sexual orientation, and sampling their blood for DNA, Hamer concluded that maternally related males had a higher rate of sexual concordance than the population at large. This led Hamer to conclude that a gay gene must be located on the “X” chromosome because this is the one chromosome males surely inherit from their mothers. Subsequently, Hamer isolated a gene “marker” on the Xq28 chromosome that he correlated to homosexuality.
Although Hamer’s work suggests a genetic etiology for homosexuality, he does not explain how the Xq28 chromosome is manifest on the physical level. After all, the DNA produce proteins that program the development of the body. If the male homosexual has a distinct genetic code, then that code must be manifest in the physical tissues that influence sexual behavior. For example, LeVay’s (1993) neuroendocrinology study suggests that differences in male homosexuals’ brains may account for their sexuality. LeVay refers to work that suggests the hypothalamus is central to the determination of sexual behavior. He draws from the “organizational/activation” theory of neuroendocrinology that suggests men’s and women’s brains are physically different, a difference related to hormone production. In his own study, LeVay isolated a nucleus in the preoptic area of the hypothalamus that is smaller in women than it is in men. He also found that this same region is smaller in homosexual men than it is in heterosexual men. He concludes that this similarity between the hypothalamus of women and gay men offers an explanation for homosexuality: the brains of women and gay men are similar, therefore, their sexual behavior is similar.
The combination of Ham er and Le V ay’s work may provide an explanation of how male homosexuality unfolds from gene to tissue and then into actual sexual behavior, but it does not provide a biological rationale for male homosexuality. Possible biological rationales can be found in the field of sociobiology (sometimes called evolutionary psychology). This particular branch of biological studies assumes that human social behaviors follow an evolutionary function, and can be explained as methods of genetic survival and propagation. Dawkins, a noted scholar in this field, argues that competition for survival does not take place on the level of the species or the individual; rather, the struggle exists between the genes. Consequently, Dawkins (1976, 1982) developed the concepts of the “selfish gene,” which fights for its own survival, and the “extended phenotype,” or the expression of a genetic structure that is manifest in “survival” behaviors.
Both Ham er and Le V ay make passing references to certain sociobiological “kin selection” theories that have been offered to explain homosexual behavior. Kin selection theory suggests that evolutionary pressures are such that relatives have a shared interest in their family’s procreative success. Weinrich (1976) has argued that through kin selection theory, homosexuality can be understood as an altruistic behavior. Homosexual altruism, in sociobiological terms, means that by forgoing procreation, homosexuals better the chances that their siblings’ offspring will survive. According to Weinrich, homosexuals insure that a significant amount of their own genetic material will survive by facilitating the reproduction of relatives who carry similar genes. Of course this theory assumes limited resources that, in turn, would necessitate limiting offspring; however, Weinrich also suggests that the altruistic benefits of homosexual behavior extend beyond actual procreation. He points to primitive cultures in which homosexual men assumed women’s roles and infers that these homosexuals improved their siblings’ procreative success by assisting in the care of children. Therefore, by foregoing reproduction, and caring for the offspring of their siblings, homosexuals are actually contributing to the survival of their own genes as they better the chances that those genes will live on in the offspring of their siblings.
The argument for the biological determination of male homosexuality can be set out in the following manner. The studies on the sexual concordance of twins establish the role of genetics. Hamer’s isolation of the gay gene not only extends the argument of heredity, it also suggests that this sexual trait is inscribed in DNA structures that determine protein replication and organ development. LeVay’s findings provide the physical structure that is assumed to be the actual phenotypic product of the gay gene. Finally, theories of kin-selection provide the evolutionary explanation for the gay gene. In other words, the work of these researchers aligns argumentatively to form the gay gene discourse.
This discourse not only attempts to explain male homosexuality, but it also makes theoretical assumptions about biology and behavior. The gay gene discourse relies upon the cultural categories of masculinity and femininity, and classifies the male homosexual as feminine. This form of classification is not new; early psychological theories suggested that male homosexuality is a form of gender imbalance, and our culture is littered with stereotypes of the effeminate male homosexual (Russo, 1987). However, the gay gene research takes this stereotype a step further, and invests it with a sense of scientific legitimacy. In the section that follows, I demonstrate how the gay gene discourse operationalizes the male homosexual body as a feminized body, how it invests this body with feminine behaviors, and how it considers this body to be a product of feminine intervention and pollution.
The Feminized Body
In the gay gene discourse, homosexuality begins with the genes. In Hamer’s (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993) study, the gay gene is located on the “X” chromosome, the one chromosome that men inherit from their mothers. This location has significant gender implications because it marks the gay gene as a female gene. Both men and women have a “X” chromosome; yet, this chromosome is still considered to be of the female sex because it is contributed by the mother. In fact, the accepted model for determining genetic sex argues that only individuals with the “Y” chromosome are males. Le V ay makes this distinction, “thus it seemed likely that there was a gene (or genes) causing maleness on the Y chromosomes, and that individuals lacking this gene developed by default as females” (1993, p. 20). Accordingly, the gay gene is on a female chromosome that is passed on to the homosexual male via the mother.
While Hamer’s research suggests that the gay gene comes from women, neuroendocrinology research indicates that this “female” gene may produce a feminized body. Although both men and women have hormonal cycles, the process of ovulation is considered uniquely feminine, and some scientists suggest that the difference in the sexes’ hormonal cycles can be attributed to sexual dimorphism of the brain. Operating under such an assumption, Domer, Rhode, Stahl, Krell, and Masius (1975) conducted an experiment to test the endocrine systems of male homosexuals for “positive estrogen feedback.” Positive estrogen feedback (PEF) is a hormonal response that occurs in the menstrual cycle. When women are at a certain point in their cycle, an exposure to estrogen stimulates the release of a pituitary hormone called luteinizing hormone (LH). Domer et al. tested 21 homosexual, 20 heterosexual, and five bisexual men for positive estrogen feedback. The mean score of the homosexual subjects indicated a surge in LH after an estrogen treatment (20 mg of Presomen), while the mean score for the heterosexual and bisexual subjects did not. Domer et al. concluded that the PEF response in homosexual subjects may indicate that they have a feminized brain. In other words, they suggest that male homosexuals may be neurologically feminine, and this biological effeminacy is contrasted to normal heterosexual male neurology.
There is a significant problem with the way this study reconciles sexual orientation with the LH data. The findings suggest that homosexual men are neurally distinct from heterosexual and bisexual men, and that this neural difference is manifest in a homosexual orientation. However, if homosexual orientation is imagined to be an active desire for a member of the same sex, then the study’s conclusions are problematic. Although the bisexual subjects in the study were married, they all actively sought out homosexual encounters, yet they did not experience the LH surge indicating a “female differentiated brain.” Although the study attempts to locate homosexual desire in the neural systems of the homosexual subjects, it cannot explain this desire when it is reported by bisexuals, and contemporary findings suggest that Dorner et al. probably measured the wrong hormones (Gooren, 1995). In spite of these problems, this LH study is an important part of the neuroendocrinology literature. Its endurance can be attributed to the belief in the biological differences between the sexes, and the suggestion that homosexual men react to estrogen in a manner similar to ovulating women.
There are also neuroendocrinology animal experiments on male homosexuality that operate on the assumption that the brain is sexually dimorphic. These experiments hypothesize that the brain of a genetic male animal can be reorganized into a female brain, if female hormones are introduced in early stages of development. For example, as Young, Goy, and Phoenix (1964) have observed, “males deprived of the principal source of endogenous androgen during the comparable period show accentuated feminine behavior and the absence of, or a greatly diminished capacity for, masculine behavior” (p. 215). A variety of animal studies have attempted to analyze neural organization and sexuality (Luttge & Hall, 1973; Matuszczyk, Femandez-Guasti, & Larsson, 1988; Stockman, Callaghan, & Baum, 1985). Although these studies pursue different research questions and have different designs, they all use invasive procedures. For example, in Matuszczyk, Femandez-Guasti, and Larsson’s (1988) study, male homosexuality was experimentally produced by castrating male rats and injecting them with female hormones. After these rats reached maturity, their behavior was observed. Female behavior was coded when these animals allowed themselves to be sexually mounted by untreated males. The untreated males were coded as displaying masculine sexual behavior even though they were mounting other males.
The laboratory methods that were used in these studies indicate how male homosexuality is thought to be caused by a female physiology. The testes of these animals were removed, thereby significantly reducing the production of male hormones. In addition, these animals were treated with female hormones (specifically, progesterone, an ovarian steroid) during the course of there sexual maturation. In order to produce the female sexual posture that has come to represent male homosexual behavior, male subjects had been physically emasculated and artificially feminized. In other words, the experiment created a male homosexual animal that possessed a hormonally feminized body. As Groski (in Burr, 1996) has noted, these experimental procedures actually create a transsexual rather than a homosexual subject; after all, castration and hormone therapy are necessary elements in sex reassignment surgery. The background belief in male homosexual effeminacy seems to allow a transsexual subject to stand in for a homosexual.
Feminine Behavior
These animal experiments not only illustrate how the gay gene discourse conceives male homosexuality as a feminized physical condition, but they also show how male homosexual behavior is conceptualized. The link between body and behavior is very important in the gay gene discourse. The majority of the research supposes that manifest homosexual behaviors can be attributed to certain body tissues in a causal fashion. For example, the animal experiments were primarily designed to demonstrate how sex hormones change the physical development of the brain. Homosexuality concerned these scientists only to the extent that it signaled differences in neurological development. The animals that were subjected to castration and hormone injections were thought to have developed female brains because they displayed homosexual behavior (feminine receptive sexual posture). Therefore, these experiments imagine that the body tissues motivate sexual behaviors.
The belief that the body imparts behavior is neither new nor controversial, but it becomes problematic when behavior is conceptualized in a manner that is culturally invested. For example, the mounting animals were not coded as homosexual because they were thought to have displayed masculine sexual posture. When subsequent research refers to this experiment as evidence of a biological basis for male homosexuality, then homosexuality is not being conceptualized as sexual intercourse with a same sexed partner. Instead, male homosexuality is conceptualized as feminine sexual behavior, a conceptual error Adkins-Regan (1988) has identified in the majority of the experiments on neurohormonal sexuality. While this conception of male homosexuality is incongruent with the way human homosexuality is generally defined, both psychologically and legally, it is consistent with the cultural assumption that male homosexuals behave as women. In this case, the cultural assumption about male homosexual behavior becomes biologically essentialized in the tissues of the brain.
The same background belief that deems male homosexuality to be feminine behavior seems to inform some of the genetic research on twins and sexual concordant identity. In order to validate their population sample, Whitman, Diamond, and Martin (1993) offer the following anecdotal description of a pair of homosexual twin’s effeminate behavior: “They lived together, aspired to be entertainers and had put together a twin night club act consisting of skits, singing, dancing and identical costumes” (p. 195). The fact that this pair of twins likes to sing, dance, and wear matching costumes, does not convey any information about their sexual preferences or practices. Instead, the authors substitute effeminate non-sexual behaviors as evidence of male homosexuality.
The belief in male homosexual effeminacy is even more pronounced in related studies on heritability. For example, Bailey and Pillard (1991) found a correlation between male homosexuality and genetic inheritance, but they could not reconcile this correlation with the effeminate behavior that male homosexuals are thought to express in childhood. Their data suggested that in order to demonstrate a genetic basis for male homosexuality, the concept of gendered behavior might need to be rethought, or possibly abandoned. Bailey and Pillard, however, dismiss this line of inquiry by suggesting that future experiments should attempt to reconcile homosexual heritability with effeminate behavior. When Bailey collaborated in another study with Buhrich and Martin (1991), a similar problem arose in correlating male homosexuality with effeminate behavior. Once again Bailey (1991) and his colleagues do not allow their findings to dissuade them from conceptualizing male homosexuality as effeminate behavior. Instead, the authors argue that this “Sissy Boy Syndrome” needs to be theoretically elaborated to account for genetic influences. In other words, the belief in male homosexual effeminacy is so strong that it structures the interpretation of data. In both of these studies the data would suggest that while male homosexuality may have a biological etiology, the effeminate behaviors that are associated with male homosexuality do not Surprisingly, this reasonable interpretation of the data is ignored.
Hamer (1994) displays a similar myopia in his study on the Xq28. He asked subjects to report childhood gender atypical behavior, and found that homosexual brothers concordant for Xq28 are more likely to display masculine behavior than discordant brothers. As in the previous studies, Hamer’s data calls into question the background belief that male homosexuality is marked by effeminate behavior. Like the other research scientists, Hamer fails to interpret his data in a way that would question the belief, and instead calls for more research to correlate Xq28 with gender atypical behavior. Not only does the belief in male homosexual effeminacy seem to direct Hamer’s interpretation of data, but it also seems to influence his collection process. Hamer conducted several interviews in which his subjects speculated on the sexual orientation of their relatives. In cases where subjects indicated that a relative was “possibly homosexual,” Hamer would follow up by interviewing the relative in question. For example, two homosexual brothers both indicated that they thought one of their cousins was also homosexual. Hamer decided to interview this cousin; but as he indicates, his assessment of this individual’s sexuality was influenced by other factors: “Although in his 30s, Martin still lived with his mother, which immediately made me suspect he was indeed gay. At least until I saw him: He was big and beefy, crewcut and florid faced, with a potbelly that stretched a T-shirt out over a big leather belt holding up a pair of dusty jeans” (1994, p. 87).
This passage reveals that Hamer may not have treated all of his subjects in an objective manner. In this case, at least, he drew conclusions about a subject’s sexuality before he even interviewed the subject. Hamer’s candor reveals that he did not imagine that his preconceptions were subjective. It seems that his belief in the association between gender and sexuality is so strong that to him, his preconceptions about “Martin” are based on objective facts. In other words, if it is a fact that gay men display effeminate behaviors and straight men do not, then it is reasonable to presume the sexuality of a subject based on the observation of gendered behaviors. In the case of “Martin,” the background belief in effeminacy allows for some unreasonable conclusions; judging a subject’s sexuality based on his living arrangements or personal hygiene can hardly be called a scientific practice.
Later, when Hamer learns that “Martin” has lied about his history of alcoholism, he questions the subject’s self-reported heterosexual identity. Hamer wisely drops this subject from his data. However, Hamer seems to fixate on the mother-son relationship when imagining this subject’s sexuality. As I mentioned earlier, he has operationalized the gay gene in such a manner that men inherit their homosexuality from their mothers. It would seem that he also believes that male homosexuality, as a behavior, is manifest when a son bonds too closely with his mother. The Freudian paradigm of the overprotective mother and the emasculated son raises its ugly head once again.
Mother’s Fault
Hamer’s conception of male homosexuality replicates the cultural suspicion that women cause their sons to be homosexual, an assumption that has also informed the psychoanalytic theories of homosexuality. Hamer still believes male homosexuality to . be the product of feminine influence, although the influence is imagined to be biological rather than psychological. Even one of his female colleagues makes this observation. After he has shown her data that indicates the “maternal loading” of male homosexuality, she remarks “That’s right. Blame it on the mothers again” (1994, p. 94). Hamer dismisses the comment as a “snide remark;” but according to his research homosexual men do inherit their sexuality from their mothers. Furthermore, Hamer’s work as well as other research I have discussed, presents a concept of male homosexuality as the product of feminine pollution. First the woman introduces the gay gene into the male body by passing it along on the “X” chromosome. Then the chromosome creates a hormonal imbalance that feminizes the male body and creates homosexual behavior. Consequently, male homosexuality occurs when masculinity is corrupted by the feminine.
This sense of pollution is best articulated in a speculative assessment of the gay gene that appeared in The Economist (“A Gay Gene,” 1993):
A more intriguing idea is that the relevant gene is only incidentally “gay”. It may be a gene which, when expressed in women, provides them with some advantage. Natural selection would act against its effects when expressed in men but favor it in women. So it persists in an exquisite tension: unable to spread, unwilling to be extinguished. (p. 80)
Intriguing or not, this “idea” portrays the gay gene as something that is inflicted on men in order to benefit women. The “exquisite tension” exists between the sexes, with women looking to corrupt the masculinity of men for their own personal gain.
Earlier I discussed how sociobiology has theorized the relationship between homosexuality and natural selection. The sociobiological concept of “parental manipulation” would suggest how women might benefit from their sons’ homosexuality. According to this concept, parents are thought to direct some of their children into nonprocreative behaviors to better the chances that their other children’s offspring will survive. Sociobiology also maintains that child rearing is the evolutionary biological function of the mother (Wilson, 1975). Therefore, mothers are most influential in directing children’s behavior, and would be responsible for manipulating behavior and directing their sons into homosexuality. Given that sociobiology also maintains that homosexuality is genetic, it is unclear how much homosexual behavior is due to the DNA, and how much can be attributed to the meddling of mothers.
These sociobiological theories on homosexuality are highly speculative. For example, Weinrich (1976) offers examples of homosexuals contributing to the childcare in communal family structures, but all of his examples are culturally specific. It is difficult to generalize from these examples, because their specificity may indicate that these “altruistic” homosexual behaviors are cultural, and not biological. In other words, these sociobiology theories are empirically underdetermined. They offer anecdotal proof of specific social behaviors, but they do not conduct the type of longitudinal analysis that would trace the evolutionary development of the behaviors. Actually, from a methodological standpoint, such empirical proof would be impossible to cultivate, because it would require monitoring human sexual behaviors for thousands of years. In fact Lyne, in collaboration with Howe (Howe & Lyne, 1992), has determined that although sociobiologists appropriate terms from other genetic disciplines (specifically from population, biometrical, and molecular genetics) they do not utilize the same rigorous quantitative methods common to these other disciplines. Without this scientific rigor, sociobiology theories enjoy little evidentiary support. The fact that they are considered at all reveals how well the background belief in male homosexuality effeminacy can compensate for a lack of scientific data. Someone must be responsible for male homosexuality, and some of the sociobiological theories suggest that it must be women.
The “Gay Gene” as a Bio-rhetoric
The gay gene not only re articulates stereotypes of male homosexuality, but it also replicates some of the tenets of Freudian theory, right down to the manipulative mother. Considering that the gay gene discourse has ambitions of changing the study of human sexuality, it is difficult to imagine why these stereotypes have resurfaced. The typical critical response to these stereotypes is to argue that science is implicated by culture, but as Longino has pointed out this argument is neither new nor particularly insightful. Instead, the gay gene discourse should be considered as a public argument, and the presence of the background belief in male homosexual effeminacy should be considered for its rhetorical force.
As a gay rights strategy, the gay gene discourse has had little success as a bio-rhetoric. The greatest political test for the discourse occurred when the Supreme Court ruled in Romer v. Evans on Colorado’s Amendment 2, an anti-gay rights initiative. In fact, Hamer was a witness for the plaintiffs in the challenge to Colorado’s Amendment 2, but his testimony proved to have little bearing on the final decision rendered by the Supreme Court. The court determined that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, but they did not base their decision on the argument for the biology of homosexuality; in fact, their ruling illustrates that the biological argument may be counterproductive for the gay rights movement. Kennedy (1996) determined that Amendment 2 “is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence” (p. 866). He concluded that “Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do” (1996, p. 868).
Clearly, the court is resisting the attempt to define homosexuals as a discrete population, which is the purpose of the gay gene discourse. The court rejected Amendment 2 because it denied homosexuals the same legal recourse and access to political participation that is available to all citizens. Furthermore, the court rejected Colorado’s efforts to exclude certain citizens from the political process solely on the basis of their sexuality. In other words, the Supreme Court’s argument suggests that homosexuals deserve the same protection afforded other citizens, not because they are homosexual, but because they are citizens. In addition, Kennedy’s opinion should serve as a warning to those who would identify homosexuals as a discrete population: the biological argument that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic can be used to single out homosexuals in discriminatory legislation. Colorado’s Amendment 2 is a case in point.
Considering that the court’s ruling on Amendment 2 will be the basis for future legal tests of gay rights, the political potential of the gay gene discourse is limited. In fact, Murphy (1998) has observed that the Supreme Court’s ruling on Romer v. Evans may have brought an end to “(t)he utility of pursing suspect classification for gay people” because “there are no references to scientific research in this opinion” (p. 187-188). In an analysis of the decision that appeared in Constitutional Commentary, Farber and Sherry (1996) note that not only did the Supreme Court reject the legal arguments that attempted to define homosexuality as a discrete minority, but all the other courts that heard Romer v. Evans also rejected the argument. Instead, the Supreme Court based its decision on moral questions of rights and equality.
As I mentioned in the beginning of this essay, the gay gene research has been hailed as a boon to gay rights. Unfortunately, the gay gene discourse, as a bio-rhetoric, has not gained much legal traction. In fact, I would maintain that the gay gene discourse would enjoy more rhetorical power as an anti-gay rights bio-rhetoric.
The gay gene discourse seems credible because it provides a biological basis for society’s belief that male homosexuals are effeminate. Furthermore, the gay gene discourse takes this belief a step further when it attempts to prove that male homosexuals are not only effeminate in their behaviors, but are physically feminized as well. In addition, in its search for the cause of male homosexuality, the gay gene discourse identifies the usual suspects: mothers. It would be unlikely that the research on male homosexuality would enjoy any rhetorical traction if it contradicted social beliefs about male homosexuality. By way of contrast, it would not be difficult to imagine how this research would be received if it concluded that male homosexuality was a state of physiological hypermasculinity. Imagine for a moment the public reaction had Hamer isolated the gay gene on the “Y” chromosome, thereby proving that men cause their sons to be homosexual. Unfortunately, the background beliefs about effeminacy infer biological pathology.
Underlying the background belief in male homosexual effeminacy are general beliefs about sex, gender and biology. As other feminist scholars have noted, the biological research on gender and sex differences presents a dualistic view: there are only two sexes (Condit, 1996; Longino, 1990; van den Wijngaard, 1997). Therefore, the deviation from proscribed gender roles signifies a deviation from biological sex: the male homosexual signifies a behavioral and biological departure from his own sex, and this departure seems to be a flight to the feminine. In bio-medical science, women have often been defined as abnormal against a male standard of normality (Hubbard, 1990). This sense of feminine abnormality is reinforced in the gay gene discourse when male homosexuality is imagined to be the abnormal feminization of the male body.
By associating male homosexuality with the feminine, the gay gene discourse enjoys its rhetorical power by reinstantiating the supposed biological inferiority of women and gay men. In this process, the normality of heterosexual men operates as an uncontested, and incontestable, given. For example, in the endocrinology experiments the behaviors of the untreated male animals were never coded as feminine, or abnormal, even though they participated in homosexual sex. Because these animals were displaying masculine behavior, their normality and their heterosexuality were never questioned. Furthermore, femininity is represented as a threat to normal masculinity; as some interpretations suggest, homosexuality is inflicted on men by women.
The fact that the biological research on male homosexuality assumes the belief about effeminacy illustrates how this research can be used to argue for the pathology of homosexuality. After all, the research signifies that male homosexuality is a genetic, physical, and behavioral departure from masculine normality. The biological distinction between the male heterosexual and the male homosexual is one of deviance. The male homosexual deviates from the male heterosexual norm on a genetic, physical and behavioral level. In fact, to the degree that the gay gene discourse produces effeminacy as a top-down condition of biological male homosexuality, the male homosexual is deviant from the top, down. The political implications should be clear. After all, the idea that homosexuality is a disease has been, and continues to be, one of the most powerful arguments of gay rights opponents (Leland & Miller, 1998). In fact, Lyne (1993) has expressed concern that the biological determinism of homosexuality may have some negative consequences. Given the way male homosexuals are represented in the gay gene discourse, Lyne’s concerns are justified.
In this essay, I have attempted to isolate the social influences that are present in the gay gene discourse, as they are manifest in the background belief about effeminacy. This background belief may constrain the way the gay gene discourse functions as a bio-rhetoric. For example, the gay gene discourse has yet to deliver on the promise of equal rights for gays and lesbians, and is unlikely to do so in the future. Yet, the presence of the background belief about effeminacy in the gay gene discourse could be easily exploited by gay rights opponents. Therefore, understanding the gay gene discourse as a bio-rhetoric illustrates that the research reflected in the discourse follows an agenda that is not necessarily committed to making the world a safe place for lesbians and gays. Consequently, gay rights advocates should be hesitant to embrace scientific panaceas.
Gay rights advocates should, instead, carefully scrutinize the biological research on homosexuality to determine how their own sexuality is being represented, or misrepresented. This scrutiny is particularly necessary when the research attempts to structure homosexual identity in ways that are both stereotypical and degrading. Furthermore, the gay rights movement should not stake its political viability on biological theories, because theories can change and so can political climates. In fact, the history of several civil rights struggles reveals that biological arguments were often evoked to justify oppression and deny racial minorities and women the right to social and political participation (Campbell, 1989). Therefore, the use of a biological argument to justify gay rights is a significant departure from other civil rights movements. As I have tried to demonstrate, this departure carries significant risks.
I do not believe that gays and lesbians should absolutely reject the possibility that sexual desire may have some biological etiology. It should be understood, however, that this knowledge provides little understanding of how sexual orientation is socialized and politicized. Sexual minorities who experience the social and political impact of their respective orientations on a daily basis, are in a much better position to critique these experiences and determine the appropriate liberatory actions. When scientific claims are made about sexual orientation, the members of the various sexual minorities need to make sure that those claims reflect their own sexual experience. If the members of sexual minorities relinquish authority over their own sexuality to the people in lab coats, they may discover that promises of liberation belie a more insidious form of oppression. The “is” of biological research may lead to an “ought” of policy that the advocates of sexual rights never imagined.