Catherine Austin & Farida Fozdar. National Identities. Volume 20, Issue 3, 2018.
Introduction
It has been argued that Australians are both overly concerned about national identity and somewhat confused about what that identity might be (Castles, Foster, Iredale, & Withers, 1998; Hage, 1998). Generated through a combination of popular culture, cultural ties and government policies such as Australia’s immigration policy history (the ‘White Australia Policy’, and ‘Populate or Perish’ which sought to populate the country with British people), Australianness has morphed from being the embodiment of ‘hell on earth’ for convicts, to become the ‘lucky country’ offering opportunity and egalitarian individualism for some—the land of the ‘fair go’ and ‘mateship’, founded on mythic male archetypes such as Ned Kelly, the larrikin, pioneer farmers and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZACs) (Elder, 2007; White, 1981). Consumerism, the growing fixation with sport, and the country’s diversity and multiculturalism also became part of the national consciousness over the post-war decades. And yet throughout this history, Indigenous Australians remained excluded from the national ‘us’ (Beckett, 2014a; Hollinsworth, 2006; Moreton-Robinson, 2004; Reynolds, 1996). As a result of this range of influences, Smith and Phillips (2006, p. 825) suggest that there is not one single national identity that binds Australians, but ‘a set of overlapping, evolving and contested themes’ that are complexly engaged with by the population in its self-construction. Who, why and how somebody is seen as ‘Australian’ is a matter of debate therefore, from requiring native (but ironically not Indigenous) birth and a Christian heritage to simply possessing an affective attachment to the nation state and sense of civic responsibility (Phillips, 1998).
The years since Phillips (1998) seminal review of popular views about national identity have seen an explosion of public discourse on the subject. The Australian government has taken steps to implement a range of policies around encouraging ‘Australian values’ and promoting ‘a shared identity, a common bond which unites all Australians’ (DIAC, 2013). The conservative government of former Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007) particularly sought to reconstruct Australian identity in its historical connection with the UK and a celebratory version of colonial and ANZAC history, and set about systematically embedding this version of Australianness in public discourse, including in the national educational curriculum (Bonnell & Crotty, 2008; Brett, 2013; Clark, 2008; Curran, 2004). Ironically, Howard simultaneously asserted that ‘we no longer navel gaze about what an Australian is … all of us … know what an Australian has always been and always will be’ (Curran, 2004, p. 356). This conservatism continued through the subsequent Labor, and then Abbott Coalition, governments. These moves sit in contrast to a range of global trends over the past two decades.
Geo-politically defined identities are becoming less significant due to increased mobility and global communication, and it has been argued that global citizenship is superseding national identification (Beck, 2000; Lamont & Aksartova, 2002; Nussbaum, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Szerszynski & Urry, 2002). Web technologies and social media expand social networks beyond the nation; the G-Summits, European Union, International Criminal Court, United Nations and growth of non-state actors challenge national sovereignty and governance; and international ‘threats’ and challenges—global warming, humanitarian issues, terrorism and the Global Financial Crisis—have to some extent united people globally against a common enemy, or for a common cause.
Despite these global changes, Australian nationalism has become more visible in the public sphere. Flag flying and ANZAC Day ceremony attendance have increased, and there is renewed interest, particularly among some younger Australians, in visiting the military sites of Gallipoli and the Kokoda trail (Bongiorno, 2014; Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Donoghue & Tranter, 2014; Fozdar, Spittles, & Hartley, 2014). Events like the Cronulla Riots, the first anti-immigrant riots in Australia since 1934 (Cleveland, Erdoğan, Arıkan, & Poyraz, 2011) and more recently the ‘Reclaim Australia’ movement that has begun staging anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rallies highlight how contested the question of ‘who we are’ actually is.
While these socio-political shifts suggest Australian identity may have changed, it is only through empirical research that such shifts can be mapped. It is thus apposite to review research on the topic since Phillips’ ground-breaking 1998 meta-analysis. We commence with a summary of his review, before discussing empirical research since.
Phillips’ review
In 1998 Phillips sought to build a comprehensive picture of contemporary Australians’ understandings and experiences of identity by reviewing empirical social sciences literature on Australian identity, and integrating and analysing findings for the first time. Phillips was interested in popular understandings of Australian identity, including shared attitudes, practices and symbols. His selection of 17 studies was limited to those that focused on national identity and that used large representative samples.
Phillips concluded that Australia is a significant source of self-identity for a majority of Australians. Popular perceptions of Australianness cohered around two different models of allegiance to the nation state, consistent across many countries (Connor, 2003; Kymlicka, 2006). These were inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethno-nationalist: the former driven by attachment to an ill-defined Australia and/or achieved identity and civic values, such as citizenship; the latter focussed on innate and historically determined characteristics, as well as how threatened people felt by the Other. All researchers used this binary construction, with subtle variations, to analyse sources and correlates of identity.
Ageing, religious and political affiliation, lower levels of education, native birth, mainstream media usage and rural dwelling were all associated with more ‘traditional’ and exclusionary conceptualisations of Australian identity. Greater political knowledge was associated with civic values, while people with longer Australian ancestry (i.e. ‘first fleet’ and convict heritage) were more likely to be xenophobic. Class had limited importance, although lower levels of education correlated with stronger attachment, and the effect of gender was unclear. There was little assessment of associated practices but ‘nativists’ were apparently more likely to act in ‘traditional’ and xenophobic ways, and to vote for the conservative party. Traditional views about Australianness were linked with ‘pro-militarism, anti-Aboriginality, anti-republicanism, anti-multiculturalism, anti-homosexuality and anti-feminism’ (Phillips, 1998, p. 296), and national pride was linked with militarism, monarchism and opposition to activities deemed ‘unAustralian’.
Phillips argued that more research, particularly qualitative research, is needed into how everyday life interacts with and promotes national identity. He identified a lack of research representing elite, immigrant and Aboriginal perspectives, and also saw a need to explore how and why traditional forms of Australian identity remain strong and why the dichotomous construction of inclusive/civic verses exclusive/ethno-nationalist national identity persists.
Methodology
Initially it was intended to replicate Phillips’ methodological restrictions, however a preliminary literature search, and Phillips’ recommendations for future research, led to some alterations. Firstly, this review is not restricted to large-scale quantitative studies using representative national sampling. Phillips (1998) set this limitation partly for pragmatic reasons, as few qualitative studies existed. Since then, numerous qualitative studies have been undertaken. While we could not cover all of these, a selection is included, based on the criteria that the specific focus must be national identity and that the paper must report empirical data. Secondly, as noted, since Phillips’ original review national identity has become complexly imbricated with issues related to globalisation. To recognise this shift, we have included in our review literature that explores cosmopolitan identity in Australia. Finally, only studies within the social sciences (as opposed to literary and cultural studies) are reviewed, as per Phillips.
Applying these parameters, 22 studies reporting Australian perceptions of national identity are analysed. These were retrieved from a systematic search of journal databases between September 2012 and March 2013, and include studies using a range of theoretical and methodological approaches. For ease of presentation, the methods, primary research questions and principal findings of each study are included in Appendix.
It should be noted at the outset that many of these rely on data sources that are now 15-20 years old, such as the 1995-1996 Australian National Social Science Survey (NSSS), the 1995 International Social Services Programme (ISSP95) and 1996 Australian Electoral Survey (AES96), the World Values Survey (1995), the 2000/2001 Australian National Identity Survey (ANIS), the 2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) and the 2004 Australian Election Study.
We first discuss the results of the research, and arising themes, and then limitations are highlighted and future directions for research suggested. We conclude by considering what can be inferred from these studies about Australian identity currently. Critical appraisal of the methods used by each study is not the purpose of this paper; rather we aim to collate what almost two decades of research has discovered about Australianness.
Integrated findings
Thematic analysis of the 22 studies, using both deductive and inductive approaches, revealed the following key issues recurring in the studies: the civic/ethno-nationalist divide, but developing complexity around this, particularly the relationship between traditional and ‘progressive’ values; the significance of socio-cultural factors; the relevance of the economy in relation to socio-political issues; and the increasing influence of globalisation in national identity construction, particularly a move towards cosmopolitanism. We also note the ongoing lack of engagement with Aboriginality as an aspect of Australianness. We deal with each of these in the following summary of results which points out analytical connections across the studies.
Civic and ethno national identities
Firstly, national identity continues, for many, to be constructed according to ethno- and civic-nationalist categories. As well as among mainstream samples, both were evident in migrants’ perspectives, including Asian-Australians and refugees and asylum seekers; and arose across a range of issues including identification, belonging and attachment (Clark, 2009; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Hugo, 2006; Phillips, 2002; Phillips & Smith, 2000).
Civic identity was found to be more prevalent than ethno-nationalist, although there is significant variance in the figures: 75% according to Jones (2000) and 38% according to Pakulski and Tranter (2000). Jones’ figure (75%) includes what he terms ‘moderate pluralists’ (40%) and ‘civic nationalists’ (35%). Moderate pluralists feel less attachment to the nation. Pakulski and Tranter’s (2000) findings (38%) relied on a strong sense of attachment to a civic society, and therefore Jones’ moderate pluralists would not be recognised in this assessment.
Comparatively, Australia has the second highest level of civic identity of the 24 nations involved in ISSP95 (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). This orientation includes attitudes of inclusivity, low national pride, boundary permeability and a ‘felt’ sense of Australianness (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2006). Civic nationalists are more likely to espouse republican and pro-immigration views, be younger, less religious, more highly educated and use ‘high-brow’ media (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2006). Ethno-nationalists (variously termed nativist, dogmatic or literal nativist), on the other hand, constitute about 25% (Jones, 2000) or 30% (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000) of the population and tend to have ‘traditional’, and, for some, exclusionary views, valuing: native birth, national pride, the ANZACs, Christian heritage, patriarchy and boundary maintenance; and they tend to be anti-immigration (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2006; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). While neither group supports ‘hard multiculturalism’ (government support for ethnic minorities to preserve their cultures), ethno-nationalists are also much less likely to support ‘soft multiculturalism’. Both groups are pro-migrant but less positive about multiculturalism, to different degrees (Goot & Watson, 2005). Pakulski and Tranter (2000) found very low levels of support, across the board, for the notion that ‘different ethnic and racial groups should maintain their distinct customs and traditions’ (25%). Rather, they found most Australians believe in assimilation, that is, that such groups should ‘blend in to the larger society’ (75%).
Moving beyond the civic/ethno divide
There were some studies that moved beyond the civic/ethno-nationalist binary. Pakulski and Tranter (2000), for example, operationalised three identities: ethno-nationals, who inhabit a ‘community of fate’ with strong attachment to the nation, and shared culture, traditions and customs; civics, similarly attached to the nation, but valuing a community of choice; and denizens, who showed a weak attachment to the nation state (totalling only 6% of respondents, mostly new migrants). They found that in terms of attachment, both ethno-nationals and civics felt strongly connected to Australia. Tranter and Donoghue’s more recent findings on views about Ned Kelly challenge this dichotomy; they found that left-leaning progressive, young Australians—demographics that align with civic nationalists—valued this traditional, historical embodiment of Australian larrikinism (Tranter & Donoghue, 2010). This suggests a growing complexity within the civic/ethno-national binary, and that traditional orientations and progressive values may coalesce.
Indeed, there is a growing body of research showing Australian national identity is characterised by both traditional and progressive values. Traditional characteristics of mateship, a ‘fair go’, ‘giving it a go’ and a down to earth character (Phillips & Smith, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2001) are joined by a growing regard for egalitarianism, achievement, democracy, agreeableness, diversity and multiculturalism (Brett & Moran, 2011; Phillips & Smith, 2000). These findings were consistent across methodologies (Smith & Phillips, 2006).
Traditionalism
Whilst progressive aspects exist within conceptualisations of Australian identity, traditionalism dominates. For instance 90% of Australians thought the ANZACs had an influence on national identity (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013), while sporting heroes (52%), post-WWII migrants (50%) and Aboriginal peoples (14%) were seen as much less important (Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). Around two-thirds of Australians favour retaining the ANZAC legend, and one-third support an increase in its place in the national imaginary (Phillips & Holton, 2004). Qualitative research corroborates this (Phillips & Smith, 2000). The ANZAC legend and associated mythology has become an important part of everyday nationalism, with the annual ANZAC commemoration drawing large crowds in Australia and Gallipoli, and people keen to trace their connection to the battle through family heritage. This emphasis on a military event that occurred 100 years ago necessarily gives weight to ethno-nationalist renderings of Australianness (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007).
The sporting tradition also remains significant (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013), seen in the value ascribed to individuals (e.g. Don Bradman), organisations (Surf Life Savers) and public sites (sporting arenas) associated with sport (Phillips & Smith, 2000). Bushrangers, and Ned Kelly specifically, were also important and viewed positively, rather than as criminals (Tranter & Donoghue, 2008, 2010). Younger, working-class and left-leaning people see him as a product of unfortunate circumstances and a champion of the poor. Qualitative research shows that these traditional understandings of Australianness remain prevalent, even amongst migrants and children (Phillips & Smith, 2000; Purdie & Wilss, 2007).
Iconic Australian activities, occupations and characteristics remain important aspects of what is seen as the Australian identity. These include leisure activities (sport, BBQs, beer-drinking); occupations (stockmen, farmers), colloquial language (G’day), clothing (Akubra hats), the nuclear family, work mates, home ownership, places (Bondi Beach, Uluru, the Sydney Opera house, sporting arenas), animals (koalas, kangaroos) and the national flag (Hogan, 1999; Howard & Gill, 2001; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). Australian identity is still seen in terms of middle-class white males, even among women of non-English-speaking background (Phillips & Smith, 2000). The ‘unAustralian’ person is seen as selfish or arrogant (the obvious contrast with matey) (Smith & Phillips, 2001), although more recent work suggests that particular categories of Other, such as Muslims, are now more likely to be seen as ‘unAustralian’ (Kabir, 2007; Noble, 2009; Yasmeen, 2008).
Nationalism, immigration, and diversity
The nation remains central to Australians’ identities. National identity is more important than local, state or global identities, both domestically (Phillips, 2002) and for Australians living abroad (Hugo, 2006). High levels of national pride were found among the population generally (Goot & Watson, 2005); and 94% expressed a strong or very strong attachment to Australia (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). However Clark (2007) found that for Asian-Australians national identity is less significant when compared with other identities (societal, familial, occupational). This may indicate a lower level of attachment for migrants/the visibly different when compared with native-born/mainstream Australians.
A strong sense of national identity is associated with protectionist attitudes and the primacy of economic concerns, for example, the favouring of limits to foreign imports and immigration (Smith & Phillips, 2006; Woodward, Skrbis, & Bean, 2008). Negativity towards immigrants, particularly regarding employment and ‘illegal’ immigration, was found across many studies (Clark, 2009; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). Support for assimilation remained strong, with only 16% agreeing that migrants should ‘maintain distinct traditions and customs’ (Goot & Watson, 2005). The sense of exclusion felt by refugees (Fozdar et al., 2014); disillusionment, betrayal and injustice reported by asylum seekers (Haggis & Schech, 2010); as well as social and economic exclusion experienced by Muslims (Kabir, 2008; Noble, 2009; Yasmeen, 2008) are most likely related to this widespread negativity towards migrants/difference.
Positive attitudes toward immigration appear to be related to a cost/benefit analysis. Goot and Watson (2005) found a growing openness to immigration during Howard’s early years, due to their economic contribution. This was perhaps surprising, given the negative political rhetoric of the time. Relatedly, Australian emigrants were evaluated by the potential economic drain caused by their departure (Hugo, 2006). However, migrants were also seen as a boon to the country in other respects, bringing openness to new ideas (Hugo, 2006) and cultural benefits, such as variety in food choices (Brett & Moran, 2011). Those with a more civic national identification valued multiculturalism. Indeed, when compared to other out-groups, migrants and people of different races were seen less negatively (e.g. compared to drug users, emotionally unstable people, criminals, political extremists, homosexuals and members of new religions) (Phillips, 2002).
This cost/benefit assessment of migrants perpetuates the idea that Anglo-Australians stand above particular migrant ‘Others’. As Hage (1998) suggests white Australians live a fantasy of mastery over the national space and identity..and its concomitant identity.
Migrants tended to be positive about Australianness, emphasising the fiscal, educational and employment opportunities ‘being Australian’ offered, while viewing national identity in familial, multicultural, political and globally inclusive terms (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Kabir, 2007). British dual citizens reported high levels of national pride in Australia (Phillips & Holton, 2004). Even refugees, while articulating the tension of living between two worlds, positively linked citizenship, family and globality. For them, civic identity was valued, as citizenship was seen to provide legitimate access to Australian identity and political, legal, economic and social benefits, as well as to international belonging (Fozdar & Hartley, 2014; Haggis & Schech, 2010).
Cosmopolitanism
Finally, there was some indication that Australian identity is moving towards the cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism is a slippery term, and identifying who is cosmopolitan is a matter of much debate. Common elements include an ethic of openness to the ‘Other’ and identification as a ‘citizen of the world’. It is a characteristic of those who engage a global consciousness and identity, generally in place of a nationalist one (Beck, 2006; Lamont & Aksartova, 2002). The relationship between national and global identification is a feature of a number of the studies, and it is unclear the extent to which this is a product of the researchers’ own interests, and therefore the focus of their research questions, or whether it is a growing aspect of Australian identification. Particularly in the more recent literature, global citizenship and cosmopolitanism are a focus (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). The more recent studies found that the incorporation of traditional, somewhat stereotypical characteristics, together with commitment to democratic ideals and individualism, shaped a contemporary civic, universalist national identity situated in the global community (Brett & Moran, 2011; Purdie & Wilss, 2007). This contrasts somewhat with the conclusion of the older studies that ‘Australian values and ideals seem to be grounded in … everyday life … rather than by the abstract [cosmopolitan] ideals of political discourse’ (Phillips & Smith, 2000, p. 220).
Cosmopolitanism is seen positively when positioned as a complement to, or expansion of, national identity. For example, only 11% of respondents disagree with the statement ‘I regard myself as a citizen of the world as well as an Australian citizen’ (Woodward et al., 2008). The two-thirds who agreed with the statement perceive the benefits from cosmopolitanism (seen in terms of global citizenship and globalisation), as including cultural enrichment, the opportunity to experience difference, and economic and cultural global inclusion. However, these values appeared to be consumer-oriented, based in acts of ‘sampling’, ‘learning’, ‘choice’ and ‘access’ (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). The Australian diaspora abroad was similarly positive about the opportunities globalisation affords, while they continued to ‘call Australia home’ (Hugo, 2006).
Negative views about cosmopolitanism arise when it is posited against or as an alternative to national identity (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008), with national identity (45%) significantly prioritised over global identity (10%) (Phillips, 2002). While 83% of Woodward et al.’s (2008) sample saw globalisation as good for democracy and human rights, national economic concerns trumped these. Fears of international interference (multinational domination, cultural homogenisation or Americanisation) were also voiced (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Smith & Phillips, 2001). These responses were complex however, suggesting ‘Australians have contradictory, even schizophrenic, responses to globalization and American influence’ (Beasley, Bulbeck, & McCarthy, 2010, p. 17). Indeed, Skrbis and Woodward (2007) found binary responses signaling ‘ambivalent cosmopolitanism’. Thus while Australians enjoy economic globalisation for the personal freedom, opportunities and consumerism it offered, they are negative about its potential for exploitation, commercialisation and alienation. The authors note a tension between the desire to remove borders and unreservedly embrace others, and fears for the local/home culture and a perception of growing cultural homogenisation. Finally they identify an openness to the world resulting from technology and mobility, but fears of vulnerabilities to terrorism, pollution and moral decadence.
Progress, problems, and prospects
These studies provide a wealth of knowledge about the development, and stability, of Australian identity over the years since Phillips (1998) review, and respond to some of Phillips’ noted gaps in research, such as the lack of qualitative studies, offering a richer understanding of how Australians perceive themselves. They show that Australian identity continues to be constructed and analysed as either civic or ethno-nationalist, but connections between the two are being recognised. While traditional notions of Australianness prevail, more progressive values are increasingly being seen as fundamental. Protectionism and economic concerns continue to be prioritised in Australians’ conceptions of socio-political and cultural issues related to internal diversity and orientations to globalisation. Indigenous Australians continue to be marginalised in most Australians’ conceptions of Australianness. Finally, the studies show national identities are being redefined, for some.
More diverse methodological approaches, most notably qualitative, are being used (8 out of the 22 studies were qualitative, detailed in Appendix), and there is now more research involving minority/sub-populations (youth, migrants, Muslims) and the views of ‘everyday’ Australians (Haggis & Schech, 2010; Kabir, 2007; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Purdie & Wilss, 2007; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Smith & Phillips, 2001).
However it is difficult to conclude much about contemporary understandings of Australian identity because of an overreliance on the same, now dated, sources, as noted. ISSP95 (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000), 1997 Queensland focus groups (Phillips & Smith, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2001), 2000/1 ANI survey (Phillips & Holton, 2004; Phillips & Smith, 2008; Smith & Phillips, 2006) and 2003 AuSSA (Clark, 2007, 2009; Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007) were all used multiple times. Pre-1998 data were also used extensively (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Phillips, 2002; Phillips & Smith, 2000). This limits the relevance of findings to understanding contemporary Australianness. Future research would benefit from investment in large-scale studies specific to Australian identity and the use of contemporary data sources in timely publications.
Some of the gaps Phillips noted persist in the current literature. For example there are still no studies incorporating Indigenous Australians’ perspectives on Australian identity. Indigenous Australians tend to be ascribed a separate identity, reflected in Australian popular culture (Jackson, 2013) and institutionalised in government (indigenous.gov.au) and academic (‘Indigenous Studies’) administrative structures. This was vividly demonstrated in the national apology speech to the Stolen Generations which differentiated Indigenous and non-Indigenous members of the nation state, with the non-Indigenous speaking for/as the nation (Augoustinos, Hastie, & Wright, 2011). The history of coloniser/Indigenous relations is a national embarrassment, which may explain the lack of engagement with Indigenous perspectives (Hollinsworth, 2006). Additionally, Indigenous Australians have been constructed, since white settlement, as belonging to an homogenous culture, perpetuating a reductionist understanding of identity that defines ‘them’ as different from ‘average Australians’ (Beckett, 2014b). The reason for the persistence of this analytical segregation, and the interplay between cultural exclusion and cultural preservation for Indigenous Australians, is an important area for exploration in future studies of national identity.
Socio-political events such as the terrorist attacks in New York, London and Bali, and contentious asylum seeker policies, may have turned attention towards minority migrant groups rather than Indigenous Australians (Clark, 2007, 2009; Kabir, 2008). Future research with minority migrant groups may benefit from exploring how and why migrants, including refugees, are positive about Australianness, while not necessarily feeling totally included (see e.g. Fozdar & Hartley, 2014). Qualitative results from the studies to some extent challenge Phillips’ suggestion that ‘immigrants … regard Australian identity as a symbol of exclusion’ (Phillips, 1998, p. 298). Migrants felt included through the economic, legal, political and familial opportunities afforded by life in Australia. Future research could explore how this relates to social inclusion and attachment, particularly in light of the growing negative rhetoric around immigration and diversity (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Yasmeen, 2008).
The literature post-Phillips continues to distinguish civic from ethno-nationalist orientations to national identity, albeit using a more complex understanding. Correlations with social, political, economic, educational and dispositional characteristics offered a clearer picture of which types of people tend to hold more civic or more ethno-nationalist orientations (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2006; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). However, the continued use of this dichotomy may reflect its analytical functionality, rather than the reality of complex identifications. Some studies began to demonstrate this complexity (Phillips, 2002; Tranter & Donoghue, 2008, 2010), as international studies have (Brubaker, 1999; Shulman, 2002; Spencer & Wollman, 1998), and future research may benefit from re-theorising the constituent elements of the contemporary civic/ethno-nationalist dichotomy.
In his original review Phillips suggested that ‘future research needs to pay more attention to how everyday interactions and experiences foster, valorise and renew the attachment of many Australians to traditional national identity … ’ (Phillips, 1998, p. 298). ‘Everyday life’ has been the focus of some of the smaller scale qualitative studies, but many others have focused on socio-political and economic correlates. More research at the banal, everyday level would be useful, particularly work focused on the centrality (or otherwise) of Australian identity to peoples’ lives.
Self-identification as Australian does not necessitate a strong allegiance or attachment to national identity (Beck, 2010; Clark, 2009), yet current research often seems to presume this. The growing impact of trans- or post-national affiliations, through sport, music, fashion, online communities and other ‘everyday’ allegiances may be reducing national bonds. Extending Skrbis and Woodward’s work (2007), further research could compare the relative importance of Australian identity with other identities, and whether this varies across different social categories, such as education and religious affiliation, or regional and global connections.
Gender was mentioned as having an unclear effect on ethno-nationalist views (Phillips, 1998), but has not been considered in detail in any recent studies. Given the importance of this dimension, particularly with the first female Prime Minister holding office during the period of this review and calls for greater representation of women more generally, future studies would benefit from exploring this dimension. Additionally, Phillips noted a lack of research amongst the ‘elite’, and this gap remains.
Globalisation was identified as a growing influence on Australians’ sense of identity and was related to a range of issues (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). Just one example is the role of the media and technology. Earlier research identified a relationship between an ethno-nationalist identity and type of media consumed (Anderson, 1991), which other studies have corroborated. New media such as the Internet, however, may support a more universalist outlook (Smith & Phillips, 2006). New work has begun to explore the role of the Internet in identity construction and presentation (Prensky, 2009; Young, 2009), but Australia-specific studies could usefully explore the relationship between national/cosmopolitan identity and online media use. Work on this has begun, but it is an area ripe for further examination.
There was evidence that, for some, processes of globalisation have entrenched national consciousness, since, as Calhoun (2007, p. 1) has argued, ‘nationalism helps locate an experience of belonging in a world of global flows and fears’. This was seen in economic parochialism (Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008), with the economy conceived nationally, despite its increasingly global reach. Public discourse promotes an attitude of fear around economic concerns, mutually reinforcing socio-political fears, such that a unified sense of national identity is created against the threat of the Other (Robin, 2004). For those who have benefited from the international work opportunities that globalisation presents, globalisation processes are seen as opening up doors and creating avenues for cooperation and communication beyond national borders, albeit in a consumerist way (Hugo, 2006).
Thus globalisation has the potential both to challenge this fear of the Other and to encourage a response of national protectionism. Further research into Australians’ responses to globalisation may better contextualise constructions of Australian identity, and assist with the conceptualisation of policies to promote inclusion, diversity and global aims (for instance Carbon Emissions Trading or the Sustainable Development Goals).
Finally, globalisation appears to be linked with more cosmopolitan identities (Woodward et al., 2008). Thus far research into the relationship has been predominantly quantitative and exploratory, employing necessarily blunt measures to try to capture a complex phenomenon. This may produce limited findings. For example, the desire to live in Australia rather than another country has been interpreted as un-cosmopolitan (Woodward et al., 2008), but this may not account for the complexities of individuals’ circumstances, such as familial or career ties, or preference for Australia based on its promotion of inclusive and universalist (cosmopolitan) values (Brett & Moran, 2011). A mixed methods approach might be better suited to understanding these complexities.
At the theoretical level, national and cosmopolitan identities are complex and ill-defined. Numerous constructions of the cosmopolitan exist, such as banal (Lamont & Aksartova, 2002), ideological (Nussbaum, 2008), political (Beck, 2009) and elitist (Peterson & Kern, 1996). This is mirrored in the growing Australian literature (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). Cosmopolitanism has been found at times to co-exist with Australian national identity, and at others to be an alternate discourse (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007). Brett and Moran’s study began to explore this relationship between cosmopolitan and national identity (2011), but further research would be beneficial to clarify whether they can and do co-exist, converge or mutually exclude one another.
Conclusion
To conclude we ask: what do these empirical studies on Australian identity published in the last two decades indicate about Australian identity now? Simply put, it appears Australianness has become (or become conceptualised as) more diverse and more complex. Rather than fundamentally dichotomous—ethno-nationalist or civic, as Phillips (1998) found—there exists a range of overlapping characteristics associated with Australian identity. However, we do see the perseverance of these two framings. The socio-political characteristics of these identities remained fairly consistent across the studies, and indeed consistent with Phillip’s own findings—ethno-nationalists continue to be older, more religious and less educated, civic nationalists more likely to be baby-boomers and younger, non-religious and better educated. Yet various complexities were revealed. Perhaps most obvious is the different proportions of Australians categorised as holding a civic sense of identity when evaluated against socio-economic/political correlates (75%) (Jones, 2000) as opposed to a personal emotional sense of attachment (38%) (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). This finding suggests that there may be some contradictions in the concept itself. Perhaps, as other scholarship has suggested (Brett & Moran, 2011; Calhoun, 2007), a strong attachment to the nation does not negate civic values, but at the same time, civic values can be held without feeling attached to the nation, which opens the door for other, more global or local, attachments. It also suggests a growing orientation to civic values and identity, although ethno-nationalists remain at a relatively constant third of the population. A further complexity is added through the finding that traditional Australian symbols, such as Ned Kelly and the ANZACs, remain significant to a large majority, suggesting the complex interplay between the two.
There is also room for cosmopolitan identities in Australia. Although the research does not provide a clear indication of whether Australians are becoming more cosmopolitan in their outlooks, this is certainly an area of growing interest among researchers. The correlates of cosmopolitan orientations (baby boomer and generation X, tertiary education, non-Christian) coincide with those associated with civic identities. There is a gap, however, between cosmopolitan attitudes/orientations and actual practices, but these are somewhat contradictory with one study indicating high levels of cosmopolitan attitudes but little engagement in cosmopolitan practices, and another suggesting high levels of practices (using quite different measures) disconnected from inclusive attitudes (Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). Additionally, when posited as oppositional, people were more attached to a national than a global identity. It may be concluded that a ‘lite’ version of cosmopolitanism is developing as part of, or in addition to, Australian identity, but which form this takes (ideological, ethical, banal, or political), and its particular characteristics, is as yet unclear.
While governments over this time period have tried to articulate Australian values (Curran, 2004; Walsh & Karolis, 2008), these do not tightly overlap with conceptualisations of what it means to be Australian to the ‘average Australians’ who were involved in these studies. Values associated with Australian identity include both traditional, stereotypical aspects associated with masculinity and sport, what might be seen as working-class activities (saying ‘g’day’, barbecues, beer-drinking, sports); and progressive values including openness, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Yet these progressive values stand in contradiction to more exclusionary aspects of Australianness—support for economic protectionism and immigrant assimilation. These cannot be explained away as ‘regressive’ attitudes of an ethno-national minority, as they were found to be consistent across the population (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). As such, Australianness continues to be expressed in fairly exclusionary terms by many.
Phillips (1998, p. 299) concludes his paper with the observation that ‘Australian identity looks likely to continue to have an enduring and possibly increasing presence in Australian political and cultural life in the years to come’. The decade and a half since his publication suggests this remains the case, but that there has been significant diversification of what Australianness means.