Paul K Macdonald. Political Science Quarterly. Volume 133, Issue 3. Fall 2018.
On 16 June 2015, real estate mogul and reality television star Donald Trump announced that he would seek the Republican nomination for president. In a lengthy speech introducing his candidacy, Trump touched on a number of foreign policy topics, many of which would become centerpieces of his campaign. “Our country is in serious trouble,” he observed, “we don’t have victories anymore.” Pointing to economic competition from China and Japan, Trump promised to “bring back our jobs, and I’ll bring back our money.” Citing the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and Iran in the Middle East, he declared, “I want to have the strongest military that we’ve ever had … nobody would be tougher on ISIS than Donald Trump.” Perhaps most famously, Trump pledged to tighten restrictions on illegal immigration. “When do we beat Mexico at the border?,” he asked, adding, “I will build a great, great wall on our southern border.
During the 16‐month run‐up to the general election, Trump expanded on his foreign policy vision in a series of speeches, debates, interviews, and tweets, but the general themes remained the same. The United States is no longer winning in international affairs. Other countries are taking advantage of American weakness. The United States needs to get better deals from other countries. On many of the particulars, Trump laid out a foreign policy vision profoundly at odds with American traditions. He expressed a deep skepticism of free trade. He raised questions about the value of America’s alliance commitments. He articulated doubts about the wisdom of foreign interventions, in particular the Iraq War. At the same time, many of his foreign policy positions were familiar. He called for increases in defense spending and a larger, more advanced military force. He pointed to the dangers posed by terrorist groups and rogue states armed with nuclear weapons. He proposed that the United States act as an impartial peacemaker, especially in the Arab‐Israeli conflict.
To what extent has Donald Trump fulfilled these campaign promises? Has he upended American foreign policy in the ways that he promised? Prior to his inauguration, many foreign policy experts warned about a potential Trump presidency. “Trump seeks nothing less than ending the U.S.‐led liberal order,” Thomas Wright argued, “freeing America from its international commitments.” James Goldgeier agreed: “there’s no indication that Donald Trump wants to continue the kind of foreign policy that the U.S. has followed since World War II.” The consequences of pursuing this radical vision of America’s role in the world would be profound. “A Trump foreign policy,” Colin Dueck concluded, “would be a disaster for the United States, for American allies overseas, and for the GOP by association.”
Others scholars predicted that Trump would find it difficult to upend American foreign policy. Joshua Shifrinson dismissed claims that Trump’s views were outside the mainstream, arguing that “Trump’s ideas do go beyond what Truman, Eisenhower and others had in mind, but the basic approach is rooted in prior practice.” Elizabeth Saunders highlighted potential bureaucratic and institutional barriers that might constrain the new president, noting that “most foreign policy elites, in both parties, are internationalist … They will be the ones to … sound the alarm if [Trump] trends in dangerous directions.” Mira Rapp‐Hooper emphasized the practical difficulties Trump might face when trying to revamp American policy, noting that “security guarantees cannot actually be dismantled on a whim … [and] Trump will not find it easy to raze these longstanding pacts.”
To assess these arguments, I examine the evolution of Donald Trump’s foreign policy during his first year in office across a sample of 19 issues. I present two main findings. First, there was a fair amount of continuity in American foreign policy during the first year of the Trump administration. As a candidate, Trump promised to upend the very foundations of American foreign policy. As president, he has adopted policies similar to his predecessor in at least nine cases. There are many forces pushing U.S. policy toward continuity. In some cases, the issues involved are complex and high stakes, limiting the attractiveness of a radical departure from the status quo. The relative continuity of U.S. relations with key states in East Asia, such as China and Japan, highlights this dynamic. In other cases, opposition from Congress and motivated interest groups has blocked potential changes. Bipartisan support for continued sanctions on Russia provides an example of this dynamic. Although the president’s rhetoric surrounding these issues can be extreme, the combination of structural and domestic constraints has proven to be a surprisingly effective check on dramatic shifts in policy.
Second, in the cases in which Trump has pushed American foreign policy in new directions, he has done so in varied and unpredictable ways. In at least six cases, he has changed American foreign policy in ways that are consistent with his campaign pledges. These cases tend to involve shifts that resonate strongly with his domestic base: the president’s travel ban targeting Muslim‐majority countries and his declaration withdrawing from the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) are two good examples. Yet in at least four cases, Trump has embraced policies that run counter to his own campaign promises: the decisions to launch airstrikes against the Syrian government and to escalate the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan are two dramatic examples. These cases suggest that on certain issues, notably American foreign policy in the Middle East, the president has proven willing to defer to his more hawkish, and more experienced, foreign policy advisers. President Trump has been disruptive, but not necessarily in the ways he promised.
The upshot is that Trump’s foreign policy has been less of a revolution than many feared. His most dramatic departures have been on issues of high salience either to his domestic base or to his experienced foreign policy advisers. When the issues are complex or there are domestic interests opposed to radical change, the president has accepted policies similar to his predecessor, even when they are at odds with his own campaign pledges. These findings do not necessarily mean that Trump’s incendiary rhetoric may not have unintended long‐term consequences. Even if he does not formally repudiate the United States’ Article 5 commitment, frosty relations with crucial NATO allies may damage the future credibility of the alliance. Moreover, there is no guarantee that trends from the first year of Trump’s presidency will endure into its second. Trump appeared to embrace the status quo on certain issues early in his presidency, such as the Iran deal and the Israeli embassy, before shifting course. Turnover in key national security posts, combined with unexpected developments such as the summit between the president and North Korean leader Kim Jong‐un, suggest that the chaos and uncertainty that surrounded Trump’s foreign policy during his first year in office is likely to continue.
Continuity and Change in American Foreign Policy
Anytime there is a change in presidential administration, observers search for signs of continuity and change. President George W. Bush’s approach to foreign policy was widely debated: scholars such as Ivo Daalder, James Lindsay, and Robert Jervis viewed it as a significant departure, while those such as Timothy Lynch, Robert Singh, and Melvyn Leffler stressed its similarity to the past. Part of the reason these debates can be so contentious is that there is no commonly accepted set of metrics by which to compare foreign policy across administrations. One approach, following Ronald Krebs, is to evaluate the rhetoric that different presidents use to describe America’s role in the world. Both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama emphasized the promotion of America’s values abroad, but they differed considerably in how they framed this goal. Another approach, exemplified by William Newmann, is to examine the institutions and processes that presidents use to formulate their policies. Some presidents centralize the foreign policymaking process inside the White House, while others delegate to members of their cabinet in the relevant national security–related bureaucracies.
The most common way to assess continuity versus change in American foreign policy is to focus on the specific policy choices presidents make. Presidents may change policies to pursue different goals. They may change policies to employ different means. They may allocate time and attention to different issues or regions. An advantage of focusing on policy changes is that they tend to reveal a president’s preferences and priorities more directly than more ephemeral shifts in rhetoric or process. At the same time, it can sometimes be difficult to identify policy shifts. Policies may evolve over time, not because of presidential intervention but because of bureaucratic drift or changing circumstances. Presidents can also alter policies in subtle ways that are hard to detect. They might pursue the same goals but may be willing to incur greater costs or run greater risks to achieve them. They might use familiar instruments but shift underlying “policy investments” in ways that increase or decrease their efficacy.
There are a number of reasons why one might expect discontinuity in American foreign policy from one administration to another. First, presidents come from different backgrounds and possess distinct ideological visions of the world, which can lead them to pursue different policies. A vast and growing literature on leaders in international politics emphasizes how an individual’s age, gender, career background, and experiences can shape his or her approach to foreign affairs. As Elizabeth Saunders emphasizes, presidents’ attitudes about international affairs tend to be formed before they assume office and tend not to change once they are in office. The American constitutional system, in which the president has traditionally had considerable autonomy in the realm of foreign affairs, reinforces the importance of these individual‐level factors. The more divergent the personal background and beliefs from one president from another, the greater the degree of policy change we would expect.
Second, staffing changes and bureaucratic turnover can induce shifts in policy. As members of the cabinet and other top officials assume their positions, they bring with them new priorities and ideas, which they seek to turn into practical policy changes. Even when there is continuity in basic goals, incoming leaders can bring with them new ways of doing business. The American bureaucratic structure, with its emphasis on political appointees and relatively weak civil service, elevates the importance of leadership turnover from one administration to another. “In the United States large numbers of political appointees come and go,” Jeffrey Legro emphasizes, “especially when there is a change of political party.” The more adept presidents are at staffing the executive branch with appointees that share their foreign policy vision, the more change we would expect. “Presidents control what they initiate,” Jeff Fishel emphasizes, while “other institutions control what presidents achieve.”
Third, there may be domestic political incentives for presidents to embrace new policies. When the White House changes hands from one party to another, an incoming president can use policy changes to differentiate themselves from their predecessor and to fulfill campaign pledges. “For most incoming presidents,” David Clinton and Daniel Lang argue, “the goal that assumes priority … is to ‘hit the ground running.’” When President George W. Bush came into office, his administration adopted an “anything but Clinton” approach to foreign affairs, “rejecting foreign policy positions just because the previous administration had taken them.” Policy shifts can also be used to reward specific interests groups or domestic constituencies. The access that concentrated interest groups have to political parties and candidates through campaign donations helps accentuate these dynamics. In a study of presidential campaigns from 1912 to 1972, Michael Krukones finds that winning candidates fulfilled campaign pledges related to foreign affairs 71 percent of the time. The more salient foreign policy issues are to a president’s base, and the wider the president’s electoral victory, the more likely a new president is to pursue changes after taking office.
At the same time, there are many factors that push American foreign policy toward greater continuity. First, policies may receive consistent support across administrations because they promote some obvious and enduring national interest. “Similarities … in setting,” Richard Neustadt observes, can create a “high degree of continuity” from one president to another. The idea that the United States should ensure the free flow of oil from the Middle East, for example, has received bipartisan support since World War II. Presidential candidates may criticize American foreign policy in general terms while they are on the campaign trail. But once in office, they tend to accept the America’s enduring interests in certain areas and to defer to their more experienced officials. In cases in which a widespread consensus exists among foreign policy elites, we expect considerable policy stability from one administration to another.
Second, because international politics is a complicated and unpredictable realm, presidents may be hesitant to depart dramatically from their predecessors. Presidents may be dissatisfied with the status quo, but they may be unwilling to shift policies too quickly or decisively. They may lack a clear sense of what U.S. interests are stake. They may be unclear what policy alternatives are available. Adopting a new policy might require coordination with long‐standing allies or the consent of international institutions. As John Lindsay observes, “changing strategies, revising priorities, and revamping missions is politically painful and potentially dangerous.” In complex situations in which change requires the consent of others, we would expect presidents to be more hesitant to spend political capital pursuing dramatic policy changes.
Third, bureaucratic organizations can resist a president’s attempt to chart a new course. Foreign policy‐related bureaucracies possess standard operating procedures and entrenched organizational cultures that endure across administrations. Organizations can resist instructions to pursue new goals. Prior investments in human and physical capital can also limit the range of new instruments available to a president. “Presidents come and go,” Eugene Wittkopf, Christopher Jones, and Charles Kegley observe, “but … millions of bureaucrats remain, providing continuity from one administration to the next.” Presidents can try to reform entrenched bureaucracies, of course, but this requires time, attention, and access to reliable appointees. “The president’s ability to successfully manage the bureaucracy,” Jerel Rosati and Stephen Twing contend, “remains a very difficult—if not impossible—task.” The more committed presidents are to forcing change on recalcitrant bureaucracies, the more success we expect them to have in forcing through policy changes.
Fourth, presidents may encounter domestic constraints that inhibit change. Some foreign policy changes require the support of Congress, whose members may not share the president’s vision. Interest groups can mobilize to defend the status quo, often lobbying Congress on their behalf, and the conventional wisdom holds that interest groups are “more effective in stopping action than in changing directions.” The public tends to be both apathetic and uninformed about foreign affairs, which provides new presidents with strong incentives to prioritize their domestic agendas. The media tends to cover dramatic foreign policy blunders more than incremental progress, which provides an additional reason for presidents to proceed cautiously. “The necessity for ad hoc day‐to‐day building of [domestic] consensus,” Alexander George warns, “makes it virtually impossible for the president to conduct long‐range foreign policy in a coherent, effective manner.” The greater the hostility of entrenched interests toward dramatic shifts in foreign policy, the more continuity we expect to observe.
While these factors do not push in any single direction in the case of Trump, they do seem oriented more toward change than continuity. Trump entered office with a dramatically different vision of foreign affairs than the mainstream, with strong political incentives to differentiate himself from his predecessor, and with a relatively permissive domestic political context, given Republican control of both chambers of Congress. At the same time, the incoming president had no experience managing executive branch bureaucracies, a rudimentary understanding of the complexities of foreign policy, and a narrow election victory rather than a sweeping mandate. Whether Trump would expend the time and attention necessary to realize his foreign policy vision was an open question. To understand what kinds of change to expect, we first need to describe the type of foreign policy that Trump promised to bring to the Oval Office.
The Manichean Candidate: Trump’s Foreign Policy Vision
During the campaign, candidate Trump was famous for his reluctance to use a teleprompter and his preference for speaking extemporaneously. Because of his lack of policymaking experience and the sense that he was making it all up as he went along, critics often described his foreign policy vision as opaque or contradictory. The fact that Trump revealed many of his ideas about foreign policy in rambling interviews with newspaper editorial boards or in 140‐character tweets only added to this sense of incoherence. Yet when viewed as a whole, Trump’s views about American foreign policy have proven remarkably clear and consistent. Trump articulated a dark vision of international politics as a highly competitive, fundamentally transactional, and personality‐driven realm. As Colin Kahl and Hal Brands argue, “beneath all the rants, tweets, and noise there is actually a discernible pattern … a Trumpian view of the world that goes back decades.”
The foundational assumption of Trump’s foreign policy vision is that the United States resides in a zero‐sum world. When other states gain in international politics, America loses. “We’re living in a very vicious world,” Trump told a CNN town hall in March 2016. “Other countries are outsmarting us,” he explained to the Washington Post, “we’re spending to protect other countries. We’re not spending it on ourselves.” He made a similar assertion to the New York Times, “we have been disrespected, mocked, and ripped off for many, many years by people that were smarter, shrewder, tougher,” citing China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea as prime examples. Part and parcel of this worldview is the idea that America’s interests are disconnected and distinct from those of other countries. “Many Americans must wonder why we our politicians seem more interested in defending the borders of foreign countries than in defending their own,” Trump argued in a prominent April 2016 foreign policy speech. “We will no longer surrender this country or its people to the false song of globalism.” Given this vision of international politics as a cutthroat world of independent interests, Trump proposed a simple solution: “America First … meaning we are going to take care of this country first before we worry about everybody else in the world.”
In practice, Trump’s “America First” approach involved the rejection of three key pillars of postwar American foreign policy. First, Trump expressed deep skepticism of the benefits of an open, interdependent global economy. He criticized multilateral trade agreements, describing the TPP as “a terrible deal,” the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as “a disaster for our country,” and the U.S.‐South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) as “horrible.” He decried large trade deficits with other countries such as China, Japan, and Mexico as “a very unfair situation” and complained that “our jobs [are] being stolen from us.” In his speech to the Republican National Convention, Trump pledged “to enforce all trade violations, including through the use of taxes and tariffs, against any country that cheats.” At various points, he floated proposals for a 45 percent tariff on Chinese imports and a 20 percent “tax” on Mexican imports.
Second, Trump repudiated the institutional foundations of American leadership. He heaped scorn on America’s standing alliances, complaining that “our allies are not paying their fair share.” He described NATO as “obsolete” while arguing that “we cannot afford to be losing vast amounts of billions of dollars” defending Japan and South Korea. Trump expressed a similar contempt toward multilateral institutions. He told that New York Times that “we get nothing out of the United Nations,” and he later described the organization as “just a club for people to get together, talk and have a good time.” Trump was also a persistent critic of multilateral diplomatic agreements. He promised to cancel the Paris climate agreement, falsely claiming that it “gives foreign bureaucrats control over how much energy we use on our land.” He decried the “disastrous deal with Iran,” claiming that the international community “watched them [the Iranians] ignore its terms even before the ink was dry.”
Third, Trump articulated doubts about the benefits of democracy promotion and repeatedly flattered non‐democratic leaders. He rejected the idea of “trying to spread universal values that not everybody shares or wants.” When asked about Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s crackdown following a failed coup, Trump argued, “when it comes to civil liberties, our country has a lot of problems, and I think it’s very hard for us to get involved in other countries.” During the transition, Trump reportedly endorsed Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte’s controversial antidrug crackdown, saying he was conducting it “the right way.” The president‐elect also praised Russian president Vladimir Putin, describing him as “very smart.” In terms of practical policy, Trump pledged to “abandon the failed policy of nation building and regime change.” He criticized U.S. intervention in Iraq, saying, “all we got … was death, destruction and tremendous financial loss.” He made similar comments regarding Afghanistan, arguing that “we made a terrible mistake getting involved … it’s a mess.” He likewise declared that the United States should “never have attempted to build a democracy in Libya … or to support the overthrow of [President Hosni] Mubarak in Egypt.”
While observers emphasized the ways in which Trump’s views put him at odds with mainstream views of American foreign policy, there were many areas in which he was decidedly conventional. Similar to past Republican presidential candidates, Trump promised to increase defense spending, arguing that “we want to deter, avoid and prevent conflict through our unquestioned military strength.” He likewise pledged to improve care for veterans, claiming that “our veterans have not been treated fairly or justly.” He also expressed concern about nuclear proliferation, stating in an interview with the Washington Post that “the biggest risk to the world … to me the biggest risk is nuclear weapons.” On the whole, there is a close resemblance between Trump’s worldview and what Walter Russell Mead calls the “Jacksonian tradition” in American foreign policy. It combines a deep skepticism of America’s foreign entanglements with a profound faith in the virtue of America’s power. It is a Manichean view of the world in which there are winning and losing countries, good and bad actors, strong and weak leaders. It was precisely the clarity of this worldview, during a time of inconclusive military campaigns and uneven economic performance, that made it attractive to so many voters. How Trump would translate this worldview into practical policy once in office, however, remained unclear.
The Capricious President: Trump’s Foreign Policy in Practice
The new president’s efforts to remake American foreign policy got off to a slow start. Because of his lack of political experience, Trump did not possess a natural sense of how to pursue policy change. His unconventional campaign and fringe views also meant that the incoming president could not take full advantage of the deep bench of mainstream foreign policy experts in the Republican Party and often put him at odds with the national security bureaucracy, which members of his administration disparagingly referred to as the “deep state.” The early departure of key officials inside the White House, notably National Security Adviser Michael Flynn, Deputy National Security Adviser K.T. McFarland, and Chief of Staff Reince Priebus, only added to the lack of policy coordination at the top. Despite this turmoil, by the end of his first year in office, Trump had made a number of key decisions related to foreign policy, and some clear patterns had begun to emerge.
In what follows, I assess some of the most important policy choices President Trump took during his first year in office along two dimensions. First, I examine the degree to which they depart from President Obama’s policies. In some areas, Trump has pursued policies that are dramatically different in style and substance from his predecessor, while in others, he has embraced policies that are surprisingly similar. Second, I assess the extent to which Trump’s policies are consistent with his campaign pledges. In some cases, Trump has remained true to his America First worldview, while in others, he has departed from this vision in unexpected and revealing ways. Taken together, variation along these two dimensions creates four potential categories of policy change.
To be clear, the list of cases that I consider is not exhaustive. Trump has also overseen shifts in U.S. policy toward sub‐Saharan Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. Members of his cabinet have also imposed important—and in some cases, widely criticized—reforms on their specific agencies, most notably former secretary of state Rex Tillerson. I have chosen these 19 cases not because they are a representative sample but because they are among the more prominent policy choices Trump made during his first year in office. The specific percentage of cases in each category is less important, therefore, than the reasons why issues are grouped in specific categories and why policies evolved in these distinct ways. Examining which of President Trump’s decisions fall into each of these categories tells us a great deal about how he approaches foreign affairs and what factors appear to influence his decision‐making.
Inconsistent with Campaign Pledges/Continuity with Predecessor
On a number of issues, President Trump has adopted policies that are similar to those of his predecessor and at odds with his own campaign pledges. Given his repeated and vociferous criticisms of President Obama, the sheer number of policy choices that fall into this category is surprising. Given his idiosyncratic worldview and thorough rejection of the views of his predecessor, we might have expected the incoming president to upend American foreign policy consistently across the board. The fact that he was either unwilling or unable to do so in many cases is validation for those who predict a degree of continuity in American foreign policy.
Trump’s policy toward China is one prominent case that falls into this category. Prior to his inauguration, Trump repeatedly criticized China, accusing it of “taking out massive amounts of money [and] wealth from the U.S.” and declaring that “we can’t continue to allow China to rape our country.” He promised to brand China as a “currency manipulator” and impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports. Trump’s decision to speak with Taiwanese president Tsai Ing‐wen during the transition raised further questions about his commitment to the “One China” policy. As Jessica Chen Weiss warned in late 2016, “the situation could become quite combustible.”
Once in office, however, Trump’s position changed significantly. After a successful summit at Mar‐a‐Lago in April, Trump described Chinese president Xi Jinping as “a very good man.” He declined to brand China as a currency manipulator, refused a follow‐up call with the Taiwanese president, publicly endorsed the One China policy, and signed a set of new trade deals related to financial services and agriculture. In the South China Sea, the administration resumed freedom‐of‐navigation patrols, but the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet assured the Los Angeles Times that “the policy is consistent between the two administrations.” Far from ushering in a dramatic shift in policy, Trump continued his predecessor’s policy of engaging with China on areas of common interest, especially North Korea.
Trump’s approach to counterterrorism policy, in particular the treatment of detainees and the use enhanced interrogation techniques, provides another example. During the campaign, Trump promised to “load up” the Guantánamo Bay detention facility “with some bad dudes, believe me, we’re gonna load it up.” He declared his intention to “bring back waterboarding” and bluntly stated that “torture works.” A draft executive order obtained by the New York Times in late January 2017 suggested the White House was considering proposals to revise counterterrorism practices along these lines. Yet ultimately, the administration chose not to move quickly in these controversial directions. During their confirmation hearings, both Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Central Intelligence Agency director Mike Pompeo disavowed the use of torture. Trump deferred to his cabinet officials, telling ABC News “if they don’t wanna do [it], that’s fine.” The administration also declined to send additional detainees to Guantánamo. It transferred one suspected al Qaeda member, Ali Charaf Damache, to Philadelphia to face charges in federal court. It allowed another, Abu Khaybar, to remain in custody with a partner nation pending a decision about whether to try him in New York. A revised executive order on moving detainees to Guantánamo languished in the bureaucracy. After an October truck attack in Manhattan, Trump tweeted that he “would love to send the NYC terrorist to Guantanamo [sic] but statistically that process takes much longer than going through the Federal system.” Despite Trump’s bombastic campaign rhetoric, there was considerable continuity in U.S. counterterrorism policy during his first year in office.
In the case of North Korea, the president’s unusual rhetoric suggested a dramatic new approach. Trump rejected diplomacy, tweeting that Secretary of State Tillerson was “wasting his time trying to negotiate” and that “talking is not the answer.” He appeared to embrace coercion, noting that “military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded” and famously declaring, “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” In practice, however, the substance of his policy differed little from that of his predecessor. The new administration pushed for tighter United Nations sanctions, sought to enlist Chinese support to pressure Pyongyang, continued bilateral military exercises with—and missile defense deployments to—South Korea, and specified various preconditions for engagement with North Korea. Because the available policy options were so circumscribed, the difference between “maximum pressure and engagement” and “strategic patience” proved to be mostly rhetorical. (Of course, the president’s decision at the beginning of the second year of his term to accept an invitation to meet directly with Kim Jong‐un represented a dramatic shift in approach with potentially far‐reaching consequences. Yet it is important to note that the United States has reached diplomatic agreements on North Korea’s nuclear program in the past, whether the 2007 Six‐Party agreement or the 2012 “Leap Day” agreement. Whether the summit represents a dramatic shift in U.S. policy, therefore, depends on if and how any agreement signed in Singapore is actually implemented.)
There are a number of potential explanations why Trump would depart from his campaign pledges and embrace policies similar to his predecessor. In some cases, the issues involved were so complex, high stakes, and difficult to change that there was a natural push toward continuity in policy. This was particular true for long‐standing bilateral relationships with other countries. On the campaign trail, Trump benefited from treating China as a punching bag. Once in office, however, he realized that he needed China’s help on a variety of issues, most notably North Korea. Trump’s views underwent a similar transformation in a number of other cases. During the campaign, he claimed that Saudi Arabia wants “women as slaves and to kill gays” and declared that “Saudi Arabia should be paying the United States many billions of dollars for our defense of them.” Once in office, he made Saudi Arabia his first stop abroad as president, signed an arms deal with the kingdom worth up to $110 billion, and expressed his “great confidence” in Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman. Trump’s attitudes toward Japan likewise evolved from bemoaning “Japan’s currency manipulation” and the “pretty one‐sided [U.S.‐Japan mutual defense] agreement” to praising Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and claiming that their “friendship … will yield many benefits.” As Jennifer Lind observed, Trump’s approach to Japan “has significantly backtracked from the revolution he promised at those red‐hatted rallies.” Personal relationships may have played some role in leading Trump to reconsider his campaign pledges, but underlying interests in preserving these bilateral relationships also acted as a constraint on dramatic shifts in policy.
In other cases, domestic barriers conspired to limit the extent to which the president could fulfill his pledges to upend American foreign policy. This was particularly true for issues on which members of Congress were invested in preserving the status quo. On counterterrorism policy, prominent congressional Republicans such as Arizona senator John McCain spoke out against the potential return of enhanced interrogation techniques, stating that “the president can sign whatever executive orders he likes. But the law is the law. We are not bringing back torture in the United States of America.” Opposition from career Justice Department prosecutors and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents reportedly derailed proposals to transfer detainees to Guantánamo Bay. Similar barriers conspired to restrain Trump in other areas. As a candidate, Trump praised Russian president Vladimir Putin as “a leader, far more than our president has been” and declared, “wouldn’t it be nice if we could get along.” But any momentum toward improving relations stalled in July when Congress passed sweeping new economic sanctions on Russia with veto‐proof majorities in both houses. While the administration attempted to delay the implementation of these sanctions, claiming the legislation was already “serving as a deterrent,” the Treasury Department eventually designated a selection of individuals and entities following the attempted assassination of a former Russian spy in England. As a candidate, Trump had likewise pledged to renegotiate NAFTA, threatening “if I can’t make a great deal, we’re going to tear it up.” But after more than a year and five rounds of negotiations, the president has not yet fulfilled this threat, in part because of intense lobbying by interest groups and members of Congress. Similar pressure reportedly convinced the president to back away from a promise to eliminate the Import‐Export Bank. Trump’s inexperience may have played a role in some of these cases, his views evolving when provided with more facts, but the cases also suggest that members of Congress can help guide the president on particular policy issues when motivated to do so.
Consistent with Campaign Pledges/Continuity with Predecessor
On a relatively small set of issues, Trump has embraced policies that display continuity with the previous administration yet are also consistent with his campaign promises. Given his repeated efforts to differentiate himself from President Obama, the idea that Trump would endorse any of his predecessor’s policies seems far‐fetched. But in each of the cases that fall into this category, candidate Trump misunderstood or misrepresented the character of U.S. policy. As a result, he pledged to do things that were already being done.
Trump’s approach to dealing with ISIS is a case that falls into this category. During the campaign, Trump repeatedly criticized his predecessor’s approach to dealing with the Middle East. He claimed that “ISIS is honoring President Obama … he is the founder of ISIS.” He bragged to a crowd in Iowa that “I know more about ISIS than the generals do.” When pressed on details, Trump pledged to “bomb the hell out of ISIS.” What these various statements ignored, of course, was the fact that the United States was already conducting offensive military operations against ISIS, which continued once Trump became president. The U.S. military continued to use airpower to strike ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. According to the website Airwars, coalition forces conducted 10,722 airstrikes during Trump’s first year in office, compared with 7,780 during the last year of Obama’s presidency. American forces continued to advise local partners, notably the Iraqi military and the Syrian Democratic Forces, providing them support in offensives against ISIS‐held cities such as Mosul and Raqqa. ISIS lost an estimated 19,000 square miles and 8,000 square miles during the Obama and Trump administrations, respectively, as a result of these efforts. Trump did make some minor changes: he delegated greater authority to the military to conduct airstrikes and authorized arms transfers to Kurdish fighters in northern Syria. “Trump deserves credit for fully implementing the plan and some limited improvements,” Anthony Cordesman concludes, “but it is nonsense for him to take credit for a program his predecessor had largely put in place.”
Trump’s approach to dealing with NATO is another case that falls into this category. During the campaign, Trump’s rhetoric suggested that he would embrace a radically different approach to the alliance. “I think NATO is obsolete,” he told the New York Times, “we don’t have somebody looking at terror, and we should be looking at terror.” He likewise declared that “NATO has to be changed … we shouldn’t be paying most of the course of NATO because it’s unfair.” What these statements missed, however, was long‐standing efforts by the Obama administration to encourage NATO allies to spend more on defense. In June 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that the alliance would face “a dim if not dismal future” if member states did not contribute more. At a March 2014 press conference, President Obama likewise stated that “we’ll have to examine is whether everybody is chipping in … this can’t just be a U.S. exercise.” The Trump administration continued this policy: U.S. officials pressed NATO allies to contribute more while also working to strengthen the alliance. The vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense all made trips to Europe to reassure NATO allies. The United States increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative, a program begun in 2014, by $1.4 billion. It participated in large‐scale military exercises in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. “By most measures,” Thomas Valasek observes, “the U.S. is more committed to NATO than ever.” Even the president appeared to change his tone on the alliance. At a press conference with NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg, Trump said of NATO, “it’s no longer obsolete.” At another press conference with Romanian president Klaus Iohannis, Trump declared, “absolutely, I’d be committed to Article 5.”
The cases of the ISIS campaign and NATO relations highlight the difficulties of translating campaign pledges into actual policy changes, especially when the candidate lacks a deep understanding of the issues. Claims that Obama is a “founder of ISIS” or that NATO members “owe massive amounts of money” may be compelling campaign rhetoric, but they are not grounded in policy reality. The forces of continuity in these cases are similar to those described in the previous section: the issues involved are complex, the range of policy options is narrow, and the bureaucratic consensus in favor of the status quo is strong. In these circumstances, it makes sense that the president would quietly embrace policies similar to his predecessor while loudly trying to take credit for fulfilling his more dramatic campaign promises.
This does not mean that the rhetoric that Trump has employed in these cases is without consequence. European allies remain understandably worried about the president’s true commitment to NATO. Pledges to “bomb the hell out of ISIS” provide little clarity on how U.S. policy might evolve as ISIS surrenders territory in Iraq and Syria, especially given Trump’s oft‐repeated aversion toward nation building in the Middle East. Administration officials can promise continuity behind the scenes, but observers may discount these pledges if they clash with the president’s more boisterous public pledges.
Consistent with Campaign Pledges/Discontinuity with Predecessor
Another category that is well populated with cases is one in which Trump has adopted policies that are consistent with his campaign pledges and involve a clear change from his predecessor. The prevalence of policies in this quadrant is unsurprising: incoming presidents have a natural desire to move policies in their preferred direction. At the same time, one striking feature of many cases in this category is that they are what Bayless Manning calls “intermestic,” touching on both foreign and domestic political interests. Shifting policies in these areas not only matches the president’s vision of foreign affairs but also appeals to constituencies that are essential to his domestic political base.
One prominent policy in this category is U.S. participation in the Paris climate accord. On the campaign trail, Trump repeatedly expressed skepticism about anthropogenic climate change. During an interview on CNN, he stated, “I don’t believe in climate change.” At a speech in South Carolina, he likewise declared, “Obama’s talking about all of this with the global warming … a lot of it’s a hoax.” In May 2016, Trump told an oil conference in North Dakota that he intended to “cancel the Paris Climate Agreement.” Once in office, many observers hoped the president would back off this promise. Some in the administration, including the president’s main climate adviser, George David Banks, reportedly recommended that the United States stay in the agreement but reduce its specific pledges on emissions. In March, however, Trump signed an executive order directing the Environmental Protection Agency to end the Obama‐era Clean Power Plan, designed to curb emissions from coal‐fired power plants, a move that has been challenged in federal court. In June, the president delivered a speech in the Rose Garden announcing his intention to withdraw from the agreement, stating, “I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.” This decision was not popular with the public, with only 29 percent of Americans saying they “strongly or somewhat support[ed] withdrawing from the agreement,” yet it resonated with the president’s base, with 51 percent of Republicans saying they supported the decision.
The president’s abandonment of the TPP trade deal is another case that fits into this category. As a candidate, Trump strongly criticized the deal, describing it repeatedly as “a rape of our country.” He made no fewer than 19 mentions of the TPP on Twitter during his campaign, using the issue to criticize Ohio governor John Kasich during the Republican primaries and Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton during the general election. Shortly after his inauguration in January, Trump followed through with his pledge, signing a pledge to pull the United States out of the TPP and declaring, “great thing for the American worker, what we just did.” Again, the public was divided in its reaction to this move: while only 27 percent of the public favored ending U.S. participation in the agreement, a plurality of Republicans—43 percent—endorsed the decision.
The other cases that fall into this category also show a prominent place for domestic politics. During the campaign, Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” He later clarified that he was talking about a temporary ban on admitting people “from nations tied to Islamic terror.” Once in office, Trump issued a series of executive orders, each of which was promptly challenged in court, that attempted to restrict travel from assorted Muslim‐majority countries. These moves were popular with Trump’s base; February 2017 polls indicate that 88 percent of Republicans approved of the policy, compared with just 46 percent of the public as a whole.
Similarly, as a candidate, Trump promised to “move the American embassy to the eternal capital of the Jewish people, Jerusalem.” When announcing the decision to formally start this process in December, he emphasized fulfilling his pledge: “previous presidents … failed to deliver. Today, I am delivering.” Not only did this move conform with the president’s self‐image as a decisive leader, it also resonated with his base: 66 percent of Republicans approved of moving the U.S. embassy, compared with only 36 percent of the public at large. There were similar breakdowns in public attitudes toward other issues, such as Trump’s proposal to increase the base military budget to $603 billion in fiscal year 2018. While only 46 percent of the American public favored increases to defense spending, this figure stood at 71 percent among Republicans.
A question that these cases raise is why the president would focus on fulfilling campaign pledges that are popular with his base but not necessarily with the American public as a whole. One possibility is that the president is seeking to energize his supporters because of the potential electoral benefits. Trump’s decision to reverse Obama‐era policies designed to normalize relations with Cuba, for example, played well among his supporters in Florida, a critical swing state. A Florida International University poll found that while only 34 percent of Floridians favored Trump’s approach to Cuba, this figure increased to 77 percent among Republicans. Another possibility is that the president is seeking to preserve relationships with prominent Republican donors. In the case of moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, businessman Sheldon Adelson, who donated more than $20 million to Trump‐affiliated groups during the 2016 campaign cycle, met with Trump personally to encourage him to make the move. The president may also be selecting policies that enjoy congressional Republican support. Senator McCain and Texas representative Mac Thornberry, chairs of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, respectively, are both strong proponents of increased defense spending and pushed Congress to approve budget toplines that exceeded the president’s own request. Whatever the explanation, the record suggests that Trump is most willing to make dramatic policy changes on issues for which there is at least some domestic benefit to doing so.
Inconsistent with Campaign Pledges/Discontinuity with Predecessor
The final category includes cases in which Trump has chosen policies that depart from Obama but are also inconsistent with his own campaign pledges. These cases are perhaps the most surprising of all: they involve a president contradicting not only his predecessor but also himself. In some cases, this is because the president has been convinced to delay or moderate a controversial policy decision. In other cases, especially those involving complex and ongoing military operations in the Middle East, the president appears to have deferred to his more experienced advisers. This suggests that there are issues on which even a strong‐willed and doctrinaire president such as Trump can be managed.
One case that falls into this category is the decision to escalate troop levels in Afghanistan. During the campaign, Trump sent inconsistent messages about whether he would maintain troops in this long‐running war. During the Republican primary, Trump observed, “we made a terrible mistake getting involved there in the first place … It’s a mess.” In the aftermath of a suicide bombing that killed six American soldiers, he tweeted, “When will our leaders get tough and smart. We are being led to slaughter!” Pressed to define his policy in a television interview, Trump admitted, “I would stay in Afghanistan. I hate doing it so much.” Once in office, however, Trump struggled to define his policy. Many of his advisers, notably National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, pressed the president to increase troops to check the Taliban’s advance. Eventually, after rounds of contentious internal debates, Trump announced that the United States would surge forces in Afghanistan by approximately 5,000 troops, expand its advise and assist mission, and loosen rules of engagement for airstrikes. In his speech announcing this reversal, Trump confessed, “My original instinct was to pull out … [but] decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office.” Rather than avoid a costly foreign entanglement, the president embraced what some in the West Wing had been calling “McMaster’s War.”
The decision to decertify—but not immediately withdraw—from the Iranian nuclear deal is another case that falls into this category. During the campaign, the president was a vocal critic of the deal. In a series of tweets, he described the Iran deal as “terrible,” “insane,” “truly stupid,” and “a catastrophe that must be stopped.” In a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, he declared, “my number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.” Once in office, however, Trump proceeded with caution. While the administration declared Iran was “violating the spirit” of the agreement, it nevertheless agreed to certify that Iran was abiding by the deal in both April and July. In October, however, the president announced his decision not to certify that Iran was in compliance with the agreement, placing the onus on Congress to decide whether sanctions should be reinstated. In January, the president agreed to continue to waive economic sanctions on Iran but called on the other signatories to “fix the deal’s disastrous flaws, or the United States will withdraw.” Rather than tear up the agreement, the president appeared to be using the threat of withdrawal to try to get a different deal (Eventually, these intermediate steps and half‐measures proved unable satisfy Trump, who formally withdrew from the agreement just two months into the second year of his presidency).
In each of the cases in this category, members of the cabinet and White House staff appear to have played an important role in convincing Trump to depart from his own campaign pledges. In the case of Afghanistan, McMaster helped formulate the initial surge proposal and then sell it to a reluctant president. At one point, McMaster showed the president a photograph of Afghan women in miniskirts walking through Kabul in the 1970s to convince him that Afghanistan “was not this hopeless place.” As one former official familiar with the internal debates explained to Politico, “what [Trump] wants to do is get out, but McMaster and Mattis are giving him the military view.” Eric Prince, the Blackwater chief executive who was involved in the deliberations, likewise explained, “the presidency by its nature lives in a bubble … when you fill it with former general officers, you’re going to get that stream of advice.” In the case of the Iran nuclear deal, both Mattis and Tillerson urged the president not to withdraw from the agreement. In response to the president’s frustration, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, reportedly acted to “lay a foundation” for the middle path of decertification. In the face of pushback from his advisers, we see a president backing away from his more extreme campaign pledges, at least initially, and searching for alternatives.
There are a number of reasons why the president might have deferred to his advisers on these issues. First, all of the cases in this category involve U.S. policy toward the Middle East, a complex region that Trump did not discuss in detail during the campaign. Once in office, the president had to make rapid decisions, in response to ongoing crises, without having an abundance of personal experience to draw on. He made the decision to launch a salvo of Tomahawk cruise missiles against a Syrian government airbase in retaliation for its chemical weapons attack in Khan Sheikhoun, for example, just 77 days into his presidency, reportedly at the urging of both Tillerson and McMaster. Second, many of the cases in this category involve the escalation of ongoing military operations. Early in his administration, Trump loosened constraints on drone strikes and command raids in places such as Yemen and Somalia. He also delegated greater authority to military commanders to authorize such operations on their own without seeking White House approval. As a consequence, the pace and scale of U.S. kinetic military operations in these conflicts has increased. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the Trump administration authorized an estimated 161 drone strikes in Yemen and Somalia during its first year in office, “more than triple the number carried out the year before.” Micah Zenko likewise finds that the number of lethal counterterrorism operations increased fivefold during Trump’s first six months in office. Trump’s desire to keep the United States out of costly foreign wars appears at odds with his competing preference to delegate responsibility for the conduct of America’s wars to “my generals.”
Conclusion
As a candidate, Donald Trump promised to upend American foreign policy in dramatic and far‐reaching ways. As president, he has dramatically shifted policies in some areas while maintaining continuity with his predecessor in others. He has fulfilled some of his campaign pledges while ignoring, delaying, or disavowing others. The empirical record of Trump’s first year presents a much more confusing and mixed picture than the clear‐cut predictions many observers offered prior to Trump’s inauguration. Trump has not worked to dismantle the liberal international order as rapidly or completely as many had feared. Yet he has also embraced a much more defiant and dramatic rhetoric regarding the rest of the world, and he has pushed U.S. policy into new and unfamiliar directions, especially on climate change, immigration, and Middle East policy.
There are a number of lessons to be drawn from this exercise in charting continuity and change over the course of the first year of a new administration. First, American foreign policy is almost always multifaceted and complex. Rarely does it move in one uniform direction, and identifying broad patterns of continuity or change can be difficult. Instead, what we often observe is subtle shifts within and across different bundles of issues. In the case of the first year of the Trump administration, we see a surprising degree of consistency in U.S. policy toward Europe and East Asia. Despite Trump’s boorish behavior at the NATO summit in May 2017, the United States has not repudiated its treaty commitments, continues to work closely with European allies on joint exercises and collective defense, and has maintained economic and diplomatic pressure on Russia. Despite the president’s inflammatory rhetoric regarding “Little Rocket Man,” the United States has retained its military deterrent in the Asia‐Pacific, cultivated close relations with Japan and South Korea, and worked with China to focus pressure on North Korea. At the same time, there are important issue areas where Trump has brought a dramatically new approach. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement threatens to cripple collective efforts to address climate change. His decision not to ratify the TPP raises significant questions about the viability of multilateral trade agreements and the future of free trade. In the Middle East, the administration has embarked on a contradictory set of policies that include standing by regional allies such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, disrupting Arab‐Israeli relations by moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, heightening tensions with Iran by threatening to scrap the nuclear deal, all while escalating the pace of military operations in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria.
Second, American foreign policy is shaped by a complicated array of factors, but domestic and bureaucratic politics can play important roles in generating policy change. When the issues involved are complex, present few obvious solutions, and involve long‐standing American interests, we tend to observe greater continuity. When there are domestic political constituencies or bureaucratic actors that have strong preferences on a particular issue, and they can gain access to and leverage over the president, we tend to see change. In the case of the first year of the Trump administration, long‐standing alliance relationships and established trade deals proved resistant to disruption. Despite repeated claims of being “ripped off” by China, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia, Trump has basically maintained or improved relationships with all of these countries. The opposition of domestic interest groups has likewise slowed efforts to withdraw from “terrible trade deals” such as NAFTA or KORUS. In contrast, the administration embraced policy changes that could be made quickly and would appeal to domestic constituencies. The decisions to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, to reverse engagement with Cuba, and to impose a travel ban on Muslim‐majority countries all represent moves designed to please Trump’s base. Similarly, the embrace of a surge in Afghanistan, airstrikes in Syria, and the escalation of the drone campaign in Yemen reflect the influence of the military and his close advisers. While political scientists tend to view domestic and bureaucratic politics as factors that block presidential initiatives and thus inhibit foreign policy change, at least in the case of Trump’s first year, they appear to be prominent drivers of discontinuity.
While I have argued that Trump has not transformed American foreign policy as dramatically as he promised, and that his policy choices are driven more by his domestic base and bureaucratic politics than some overarching vision, some cautionary notes are in order. First, I have focused my analysis on Trump’s most salient policy changes. It is entirely plausible that Trump is having a transformative effect on American foreign policy in more subtle and indirect ways. The State Department under Tillerson’s tenure provides a dispiriting case study. The administration proposed slashing the State Department budget by one‐third, Tillerson isolated himself among a small coterie of advisers amid talks of a bureaucratic reorganization, and critical ambassadorial posts went unfilled. As a result of flagging morale, the American Foreign Service Association reports that 60 percent of the State Department’s top‐ranking career diplomats have departed, while new applications to join the Foreign Service “have fallen by half.” If James Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders are right that “good foreign policy is invisible,” then the administration may be transforming American role in the world less by sins of commission than of omission.
Second, I have focused on cases in which Trump has made tangible shifts in policy, rather than changes in rhetoric or style. Yet there have been moments where the president’s public persona has raised serious questions about his beliefs and preferences. In his June speech at the NATO summit, for example, Trump surprised his own advisers by omitting language reaffirming the United States’ Article 5 commitment. Trump’s famous “fire and fury” threat directed at North Korea was reportedly improvised and caught U.S. allies in Asia completely off guard. When four Gulf States imposed a blockade on Qatar, Trump undercut efforts by his own secretary of state to mediate an end to the crisis when he described Qatar as “a funder of terrorism at a very high level” in a Rose Garden press conference. In each of these cases, the president’s rhetoric has raised questions about the extent to which he is on the same page with key members of his administration. Other countries, including key U.S. allies, may wonder whether official statements and policy decisions coming from the State or Defense Department actually reflect the preferences of the president. The White House’s release in December of the new National Security Strategy, which emphasizes the need for the United States to “respond to the growing political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world,” highlighted the divergence between the president’s public statements and his administration’s official position. Lingering uncertainty on this question may hamper future efforts by U.S. officials to reassure allies and partners that the president really intends to preserve, rather than dismantle, the liberal international order.
Third, and most importantly, I have only examined cases drawn from the first year of the Trump presidency. The first year of every presidency tends to be chaotic, because of the practical difficulties of staffing and organizing a new administration. The current administration may be uniquely hamstrung in this respect, however, given the president’s lack of political experience, high rate of turnover among senior White House officials because of scandals, and the relatively slow pace of political appointments to key positions across executive branch bureaucracies. After six months in office, only 49 of the Trump administration’s key nominees had been confirmed, a rate at least three times slower than each of Trump’s four predecessors. It is possible that Trump has been unable to fulfill his vision because of practical constraints. As he gains more confidence and comfort in the office, he may well push for more dramatic policy changes. Trump’s decisions in early March 2018 to fire Secretary of State Tillerson and National Security Adviser McMaster and replace them with Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, respectively, may be evidence of a more assertive president seeking to regain control of his foreign policy.
While it is possible that Trump’s foreign policy will become more doctrinaire during the second year of his presidency, many of his recent moves suggest the continued primacy of domestic prestige over policy consistency. The president’s dramatic announcement of a 25 percent tariff on imported steel and aluminum seems to suggest a hardening in U.S. trade policy, but the administration has since delayed implementation of the tariffs and has promised exemptions to various U.S. allies. Trump’s willingness to meet directly with Kim Jong‐un reflects his self‐image as the iconoclastic dealmaker, but the announced goal of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament” is one borrowed directly from past administrations. The president’s decision to join France and Britain in conducting strikes on Syrian military sites following a suspected chemical weapons attack in Douma in April 2018 reflects the need for a “big show,” rather than any fundamental policy shift regarding U.S. involvement in the Syrian civil war. Even the president’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, perhaps the most consequential foreign policy decision of his administration so far, seems driven more by the need to fulfill a campaign pledge after more than a year of equivocation, than by any clear policy alternative. The inconsistent and erratic character of Trump’s foreign policy seems poised to endure well into his presidency.