Anton Tsvetov. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs. Volume 38, Issue 1, April 2016.
Sour relations with the West largely determine contemporary Russian foreign policy. The Ukrainian crisis was a tipping point for relations between Russia and the West which had been steadily deteriorating for over a decade. On the one hand, Moscow did not believe that the West was taking its interests seriously, and the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), together with a planned missile defence system in Europe, were all perceived as unfriendly moves towards Russia in its immediate neighbourhood. On the other hand, the West expected Russia to demonstrate a faster pace of democratization and market reforms, as well as a willingness to “let go” of the former republics of the Soviet Union. These mutual perceptions provided the proximate cause of the full-scale rift which occurred after the two parties engaged in open confrontation over the future of Ukraine in 2014. The breakdown in relations between Russia and the West led Russian policymakers to turn their attention eastwards, leading some observers to speak of Russia’s “Asian pivot”, similar to that undertaken by the Obama administration since 2011. Though Russian officials reiterate, and scholars confirm, that this shift has been a part of the country’s foreign policy for several decades — arguably starting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok speech — there is little doubt that it is precisely the Russia-West conflict over the Ukraine that gives the pivot new meaning. Yet it seems that Russia’s pivot is portrayed as having been forced upon the country, as well as being tactical, lacking in substance and skewed towards China.
Southeast Asia is presumably among the targets and beneficiaries of Russia’s Asian pivot, hut substantial cooperation has yet to occur. The aim of this article is to assess Russia’s current engagement with Southeast Asia within the broader context of the country’s foreign policy. As such, the approach taken in this article is deliberately Russia-centric. This article proposes a motivational framework for interpreting Russian policies towards Southeast Asian countries as well as regional organizations, including ASEAN and ASEAN-centred forums. It outlines the functions of Russia’s activities in Southeast Asia, connects them to the overall objectives of Russia’s external relations, and thus assesses how substantive Russia’s interests are in the region. These proceedings will allow us to forecast the development of Russia-Southeast Asia relations in the near future.
The first section of this article explains Russia’s current foreign policy priorities and the driving forces behind them. We will see how the Ukraine crisis affected Russian strategic thinking. This section will serve as a reference point for understanding the intended functions of the Russian pivot towards the Asia Pacific. In the second section, we will briefly assess the current level of bilateral and multilateral ties between Russia and the ASEAN states in key areas. Finally, the third section will compare the substance of Russia’s engagement in Southeast Asia with the mission of the country’s foreign policy, bringing together the proceedings of the first two sections.
The arguments presented in this article suggest that Russia’s Asian pivot is at least secondary to other directions in the country’s foreign policy. Interactions with the West, even in their confrontational mode, continue to absorb most of Russia’s foreign policy bandwidth. Moreover, in 2015 Russia began military operations in Syria, and this will remain a major distraction for the Kremlin’s foreign policy. In addition, the administration of President Vladimir Putin will be prioritizing the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a major economic project aimed at cementing Russia’s leadership of post-Soviet republics. Against this backdrop, growing cooperation with countries in the Asia Pacific aims to bring significant public relations benefits and add to the mainstream narrative of Russian policy, which is primarily aimed at portraying Russia as a Great Power with a diverse and multifaceted foreign policy. Even within the Asian pivot, Southeast Asia is secondary to China, which generates more value and visibility to Russia’s attempts at reducing its dependence on the West. In other words, Southeast Asia is far from being a top priority in contemporary Russian foreign policy, but does have a special function within Russia’s global strategy.
However, Russia’s difficult geopolitical situation along with internal issues may prove to be beneficial to Southeast Asian states and their relations with Russia. This article argues that current conditions provide for a more open-minded Russia, one that will be more cooperative and welcoming towards projects initiated by Southeast Asian countries, as long as such projects create immediate economic value and political visibility.
Russia’s Foreign Policy after Ukraine: Drivers and Aims
The foreign policy of post-Soviet Russia has seen different iterations over the course of the last twenty-five years, but it has always been, and still is, shaped predominantly by the country’s relations with Europe and the United States. Thus, in order to understand Russia’s current foreign policy, it is vital to understand Moscow’s relations with the West. Though most of the factors influencing the current Russia-West rift have been in place since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the events in Ukraine have certainly exposed the underlying differences, encouraged the parties to act upon these differences and entrenched their rigid understandings of reality.
Russia and the West before Ukraine
When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) ceased to exist in 1991, the young democratic government in Russia expected fast and deep integration with the European Union (EU). As cooperation expanded rapidly, so did Western influence in former Soviet republics. When Russia finally managed to cope with most of its severe internal development issues in the early 2000s, the new leadership under President Vladimir Putin centralized political power, which was necessary to deal with internal terrorism threats and provide a new level of growth-fostering stability. This domestic campaign required a stronger international posture, one that was initially not intended to be hostile to the West.
Despite successful cooperation with the West following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, a whole series of events gave the Russian leadership the impression that Washington and its European allies were not treating Russia as their equal. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, NATO’s fourth round of expansion in 2004 (to include seven Eastern European states, including some directly bordering Russia) as well as perceived Western support for the “colour revolutions” of 2003 and 2004 in Georgia and the Ukraine respectively, all contributed to Moscow’s growing distrust of the West.
The Georgian conflict in 2008 provided another low for Russia-West relations, and encouraged the parties to seek a new understanding. At that time, Russia witnessed a change in leadership and the new president, Dmitry Medvedev, appeared to be a more comfortable partner for the West. This new attempt at improving relations resulted in an attempt to “reset” US-Russia relations, including the signing of a new arms reduction treaty in 2010 (the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or New START).
The 2011 Arab Spring, however, dealt a severe blow to Russia-West relations. The Russian leadership (though it was not unanimous on this matter) decided to abstain from voting on the Western-sponsored resolution on Libya at the United Nations, essentially allowing it to be passed. But the no-fly zone provided by the resolution was later interpreted by the international coalition as allowing it to intervene directly. This ultimately led to the downfall of the Gaddafi regime and the subsequent erosion of statehood in Libya. This was seen in Moscow as yet another reason for mistrusting the motives of American and European democratic endeavours in the Middle East and elsewhere. Regime changes supported by social media activism, often ending in great internal turmoil, provided the Russian political elite with arguments to caution the country’s population of the dangers arising from such dissent. Thus in 2012, when Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency, he promised even greater internal stability and a more proactive stance internationally — essentially meaning a foreign policy that would be more assertive towards the West.
The Ukrainian Crisis and the Sanctions War
When the crisis in the Ukraine broke out in the spring of 2014, it became evident that it was caused by clashing perceptions. Russia saw Western support for the Maidan protesters as intervention in Russia’s nearest neighbourhood, an area of great historical and cultural importance. Russia’s response, domestically seen as defensive — the accession of Crimea and support for rebel groups in southeastern Ukraine — was, in turn, perceived by Europe and the United States as a shift towards a hostile, even aggressive foreign policy. Since then, Russia and the West have engaged in a renewed type of “cold warfare” that is being waged in three distinct dimensions.
First, in the political dimension of the current crisis the parties have reduced the level of contact and narrowed the scope of cooperation. Russia was suspended from the Group of Eight (G8), widely condemned for its actions in Crimea, and individual sanctions were applied to selected Russian state officials who played a part in the country’s involvement in the Crimean affair and the rebellion in southeastern Ukraine.
Second, economic instruments are also widely employed by both sides in order to influence domestic attitudes and gain leverage at the Minsk negotiations, where Ukraine, Russia, Europe and rebel groups from southeastern Ukraine are seeking a compromise solution to the future of the Ukraine. When the United States, Europe, and other allied countries such as Japan, introduced sectorial sanctions on Russian businesses, Russia retaliated with sanctions of its own, e.g. by banning imports of agricultural produce from those countries. Given the structural deficiencies in the Russian economy that were present well before the Ukrainian crisis, this dimension of the Russia-West rift produced the most significant effect on the actual and perceived quality of life in Russia. Against the backdrop of falling oil prices and the consequent depreciation of the rouble, Russia’s economy has entered a period of stagnation. Growth has been contracting, while consumer prices are growing and real household revenue have decreased. Transaction bans introduced by the EU and the United States against Russian banks and companies, as well as restricted access to Western credit, are holding back the recovery process.
Third, both sides have engaged in extensive information warfare using contemporary means of propaganda and mass communication. Central to this issue are narratives employed by the West and Russia in order to support and defend their respective policy choices. After Crimea became a part of Russia, Western leaders and mainstream media outlets began promoting a view of the events that describes Russia as the aggressor. Western sanctions are thus designed to impose costs on Russia, isolate it from the “free world” and force it to comply with international rules and norms, as significant economic interdependence will not allow the Russian government to provide high living standards in the crisis-stricken country.
The counter-narrative with which Russia has armed itself paints the West as an entity that meddles in the affairs of other countries and employs double standards. The United States in particular continuously imposes its will on peoples all over the world and topples leaders who disagree with it. Russia has plenty of partners apart from the United States and Europe, so the narrative continues, including in Asia. China is presented as a country that is also challenging the Western-led world order and, along with the other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) members, is striving for a truly multipolar world.
Perhaps the most important feature of this battle of the narratives is that the primary audiences are the relevant voters and pressure groups in the countries themselves. Instruments of cross-border propaganda have proved to be surprisingly inefficient, with attitudes of allied audiences strengthening, but those of the adversaries remaining unchanged. This has special importance in Russia, where such mobilizing rhetoric has proved useful in maintaining high ratings for the leadership in times of economic crisis.
A New Foreign Policy in the Making?
We now arrive at a vision of Russian foreign policy post-Ukraine, its key features and manifestations in practical politics. This will later allow us to place the current version of Russia’s “pivot to the East” within a comprehensive framework in order to ascertain what functions it performs. There are arguably four key drivers of Russia’s post-Ukraine foreign policy, four things that Russia seeks: first, bargaining power; second, growth opportunities; third, internal cohesion; and fourth, global status.
Bargaining power. As relations with the West continue to deteriorate — and there is limited room for the Kremlin to compromise on southeastern Ukraine and especially Crimea — Russia will seek advantages elsewhere, outwardly or implicitly offering cooperative behaviour in exchange for more favourable conditions in negotiations over the future of the Ukraine. Russia’s aim is to gain bargaining power in its relations with Europe and the United States by becoming a valuable partner in common causes or, conversely, demonstrating that it has opportunities to allocate its loyalties elsewhere i.e. in the Asia Pacific.
Growth opportunities. Significant economic issues have become long-term motivators of Russia’s policies, and Western sanctions have aggravated the country’s economic problems. However, the leadership does not consider open concessions to be a viable move, as it would likely prove detrimental to public support for the government. To the contrary, the much publicized resilience of the country to Western sanctions and other forms of pressure have improved the ratings of the ruling elite. These conditions facilitate Russia’s quest for new growth opportunities. This means diversifying external trade contacts and sources of investment, as well as joining and sponsoring alternative international cooperation frameworks, forums and multilateral agreements.
Internal cohesion. Russia is to adopt policies to encourage greater domestic mobilization. This would serve as a substitute for the current lack of economic dynamism and furnish the population with a positive agenda. At the same time, past experiences in Afghanistan in the 1980s and Chechnya in the 1990s will likely dissuade the government from excessive engagement in full-scale military operations abroad. In other words, Russia is likely to participate in focused efforts to the point where the political and propaganda benefits outweigh the economic and human costs.
Global status. Russian foreign policy post-Ukraine demonstrates a strong focus on status and international recognition. Suspended from the G8, Moscow is now in search of policies and actions that would bring direct reputational benefits and show widespread recognition of Russia’s global importance.
Russia’s operation in Syria, launched in 2015, is a vivid example of how the aforementioned principles manifest themselves. By engaging in global efforts to fight the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria, Russia hopes to demonstrate that it is part of — however informal — an international coalition. This gives it the image of a state capable of projecting power beyond its borders, thus belonging to a class of Great Powers as it is widely understood in Russia. The Syrian operation enjoys widespread domestic support as part of the state’s fight against Islamic radicalism. At the same time, Russia believes that by assuming part of the burden in Syria, it gains leverage over the West vis-a-vis the situation in the Ukraine.
Another example is the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which was formally launched in 2015. This economic grouping — consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan — provides for greater connectivity with former republics of the Soviet Union and is designed to bring Russia economic benefits. Moscow has also promoted it as an example of an “independent” integration mechanism, ready and able to interact with the EU, converge with China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative and pursue free trade agreements with countries across the globe. The geographical scope of the EEU and related initiatives counters the narrative of Russia’s isolation, and presents both domestic and international audiences with a lengthy list of countries eager to engage with Russia economically.
The key drivers of this new configuration of Russia’s foreign policy and the examples cited above also suggest that the Ukraine, Syria and Eurasian economic integration will most likely absorb most of Russia’s political attention and resources for the foreseeable future. The Syrian operation and the intensification of Eurasian integration comprise distinct Western-directed motives by Russia. This leads us to conclude that when assessing Russia’s foreign policy initiatives, we must keep in mind a certain historical and psychological fixation with the West, and treat it as one of the key audiences of Russian policymaking.
Russia’s Latest Asian Pivot
Having described the motivational framework for Russian foreign policy, we can now attempt to fit within it Russia’s renewed attention to the Asia Pacific. Russia has reiterated its Asian and Pacific status several times throughout the last three decades, from Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok speech11 to the most recent “turn to the East” in 2012, when Russia hosted the APEC Summit in the very same city. However, government officials posit that the pivot is not a new phenomenon, but merely a continuation of a long-term and far-reaching policy sourced in Russia’s ontological connection to the Asia-Pacific region.
Although the central pillars of the 2012 policy initiative remained unchanged, we can argue that after Ukraine, Russia’s Asian pivot faced a new strategic context and thus acquired new meaning and interpretation. We will now apply the four drivers of Russian foreign policy presented above to the pivot to see which of the policy needs it satisfies and how.
Two-thirds of Russia is located in Asia. But those two-thirds of the country are the least developed. The Russian Far East, along with Eastern Siberia, is a vast but sparsely populated region in dire need of investment and infrastructure — only 37 out of 142 million Russians live east of the Urals. The current rift in its relations with Europe, the general trend in developed countries to diversify import sources both geographically and by type, as well as growing energy consumption in the Asia Pacific, gives Russia an opportunity to redirect some of its energy exports, while at the same time attracting foreign investment to the Far East and Siberia. The development of this part of the country is considered not as a mere effort of evening out inter-regional development levels, but as the conquest of a new frontier. An oft-cited statement by Vladimir Putin illustrates the importance given to developing Siberia and the Russian Far East, which he called Russia’s “national priority for the entire 21st century”.
However, the pivot goes beyond increasing the contribution of the Russian Far East to the national economy and attracting East Asian partners to this endeavour. Russia is also seeking recognition as a power that wishes to keep up with the latest trends in global politics, the growing significance of the Asia Pacific being one of the most acknowledged (this is what Vladimir Putin meant when he called the region a “linchpin of global economy and politics”). As Bobo Lo notes:
The current turn to the East reflects the lasting influence of this globalist mindset. Although the Russian elite has begun to appreciate Asia as important in and of itself, the emphasis is still very much on the larger geopolitical picture — the “polycentric system of international relations”, strategic balancing, and constraining US global leadership. In this connection, a “turn to the East” does not signify a rejection of the West, but rather a “rebalancing” relative to the West. It is consistent with the larger objective of reasserting Russia as an “independent” center of global power, one of the “poles” in the “multipolar world order”.
Domestically, the pivot is not only a demonstration that Moscow has other options in its foreign policy, but also as an element of the nation-scale effort of elevating the Russian Far East to the same developmental level as the rest of the country. For example, the Russian government plans to grant every citizen a one-hectare plot of land in the region. The purpose of this policy is to foster agricultural development and farming in the Russian Far East, and perhaps create a closer connection between people in the Western and Eastern parts of Russia.
Having identified the purpose of Russia’s new interest in Asia, we may proceed to assess the place of Southeast Asia within this teleology. However, in order to do so, an overview of Russia’s engagement with Southeast Asia is required. We will then be able to evaluate whether this sub-region falls well within the overall Eastern strategy of Russia, and thus assume a possible course of action for the parties involved.
Russia and Southeast Asia: A Fragmented Partnership
Policymaking and Diplomacy
Southeast Asia occupies a relatively favourable position in the hierarchy of Russia’s foreign relations. When President Putin was re-elected to his third term in 2012, he immediately issued a series of orders known as the “May Decrees”, among them Decree No.605 which listed the country’s foreign policy priorities. The Asia Pacific was ranked third among the geographic sections after the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the European Union (EU). This third section describes Russia’s tasks in the Asia Pacific as increasing participation in regional integration mechanisms, furthering the initiative of creating a new non-bloc and rules-based security architecture, contributing to the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue and the East Asia Summit (EAS) agenda, and developing partnerships with China, India and Vietnam. The next group of countries included Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. ASEAN’s prominent position, and especially the privileged listing of Vietnam, is an indication that at least in 2012, the Russian leadership attributed diplomatic significance to Southeast Asia.
In a later document, the 2013 edition of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, also approved by President Putin and widely perceived as the day-to-day guide for Russia’s diplomatic activities, Southeast Asian states and institutions found their position downgraded. The Asia Pacific as a whole found itself relegated to fourth place, yielding to the United States in the list of Regional Priorities (Section IV). Within the Asia Pacific part of the Concept, multilateral institutions found themselves at the forefront once again, but this time the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) appeared before APEC, the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) forum. Particular countries are listed as follows: China, India, North Korea, Japan, Mongolia and only then Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand.
Perhaps the most recent mention of Southeast Asia among major policy sources appeared in Putin’s 2015 annual address to the Federal Assembly (the parliament). In his address, Putin mentioned the 2015 EEU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement and the proposed 2016 ASEAN-Russia Summit in Sochi. He also put forward an initiative (as yet unnamed) designed to be on par with the US-led Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Russia’s plan is to link the EEU, ASEAN and SCO in a partnership that would focus on investment protection, cross-border flow of goods and opening up service and capital markets.
Russia lacks a positive history of bilateral ties with most countries in Southeast Asia, and arguably, Moscow currently enjoys only one politically significant partnership in the region, that is, with Vietnam. The relationship carries an official status of a “comprehensive strategic partnership”, a level of Vietnam’s external ties reached only by China. The two states hold bilateral summits and high-level meetings annually, and reference is always made to the “traditional” and “historic” friendship between Russia and Vietnam.
This high status, together with significant transfers of weapons systems to Vietnam, is what gives Russia preferential treatment in the use of military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, thus adding to the strategic value of the relationship. In 2014, Vietnam simplified procedures for Russian naval ships to make port calls at Cam Ranh Bay. Moreover, due to a media leak it was revealed that Russia is (or at least had been] using the Cam Ranh airfield for stationing aircraft used to refuel Tu-95 MS Bear nuclear-capable strategic bombers. The fact that Vietnam is willing to provide such facilities to Russia despite its “three no’s” policy, and a burgeoning relationship with the United States, demonstrates the high value attributed to Russia in the Vietnamese political mindset. Russia’s high status is mostly due to the fact that it is the largest arms seller to Vietnam, but also due to long-standing historical ties. These ties manifest themselves in strong positive attitudes towards Russia in the Vietnamese armed forces and among the country’s elite.
Though Russia cannot boast a wide network of bilateral partnerships in Southeast Asia, it is quite visible in multilateral institutions. Apart from the Russia-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership, which celebrates its 20th anniversary in 2016, Russia is a member of all the main ASEAN-led regional architecture mechanisms, namely the ARF, ADMM-Plus and the EAS. As previously mentioned, foreign policy documents prioritize these forums, which may be viewed as a sign of their relative importance in Russia’s vision of regional security.
However, there is significant scepticism among scholars and observers over the attitude of the Russian political elites towards Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions. Though Russia expressed great interest in joining the EAS, and spent significant diplomatic effort to join the organization in 2011, no Russian head of state has ever participated in the EAS, though the prime minister has attended it twice. Alexander Gabuev, a prominent critic of Russia’s approach to the EAS, attributes this absenteeism to a certain distrust of Asian multilateral institutions, as well as a disinterest in regional security issues in general. This lack of interest may be attributed to a perception of multilateral security mechanisms as weak, while the main actors responsible for maintaining stability in the Asia Pacific, according to Russian political thinking, are the Great Powers. Moreover, Russia does not have a central role to play, and will not settle for a peripheral role, in these institutions.
Economy, Trade, and Investment
Russia’s economic relations with Southeast Asia have demonstrated a positive dynamic, at least in relative terms. Between 2005 and 2014, trade between Russia and ASEAN grew more than five times; in 2014, trade growth was 13 per cent and Russian exports grew as much as 49 per cent. Impressive though this growth may appear, the ASEAN-Russia trade nexus is only marginally important to both sides. In 2014, the value of total trade amounted to just US$21.4 billion, making Russia ASEAN’s 14th largest trade partner and accounting for less than 1 per cent of the Association’s external trade. Within Russia’s foreign trade structure, trade with ASEAN amounts to only 2.7 per cent. In terms of its trade with the ASEAN members, Russia is mostly playing to its comparative advantages in the global production chain. During January-June 2015, 60 per cent of all Russian exports to the region consisted of mineral resources (mostly oil and gas), machinery and equipment accounted for 14.5 per cent while chemicals took up 13.8 per cent.
Neither is Russia a significant investor in the region. From 2012 to 2014, Russia invested only US$698 million in the ASEAN economies, or about 0.2 per cent of total FDI inflows. In fact, in 2014 total Russian investment growth was negative. Of the US$698 million, US$420 million was invested in one country and in one year — Vietnam in 2013. This demonstrates that Russia’s ASEAN investment strategy currently lacks both depth and breadth.
At least rhetorically, Russia has expressed its desire to increase its trade footprint in Southeast Asia. Officials have plans to double trade with Vietnam by 2020, and with Thailand and Indonesia by 2016. These goals are to be achieved with the help of trade in national currencies. One of the most recent initiatives designed to boost trade ties between Russia and Southeast Asia is the EEU-Vietnam FTA. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, this initiative goes beyond improving trade relations with Vietnam and is supposed to become “a pilot project for a general liberalization between the EEU and ASEAN”.
Structurally, there are three main areas of economic cooperation with ASEAN states where Russia has a comparative advantage: first, oil and gas exploration, extraction and trade; second, nuclear energy; and third, arms sales.
In terms of oil and gas exports, Southeast Asia’s intended place within Russia’s export composition remains unclear. According to the country’s Energy Strategy, the Asia Pacific is supposed to account for around 30 per cent of all hydrocarbon exports by 2035. However, countries in Northeast Asia, i.e. China, Japan and South Korea, are more likely to account for the bulk of Russia’s energy exports — the massive 2014 gas contract with China being the most vivid example. Yet there is some positive experience with ASEAN states as well. In particular, Russia-Vietnam joint oil and gas exploration projects date back to the 1980s and are still generating revenue and being expanded, both in Vietnam and Russia. In addition to Vietnam, Russia also supplies oil and gas to Singapore and Malaysia,41 and plans to cooperate with Indonesia in a wide spectrum of oil-related projects.
In nuclear energy, Vietnam also seems to be at the forefront of Russia-ASEAN cooperation. Russia is building Vietnam’s first nuclear power plant, Ninh Thuan-1, which will generate over 2,000 MW of electricity, and is providing training to Vietnamese personnel to run the facility. The Russian government is also exploring opportunities for initiating nuclear cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries. As early as 2007, Russia proposed building a nuclear reactor in Myanmar, but it was only in 2015 that the parties agreed to cooperate on nuclear issues after a visit by the deputy head of the Russian Rosatom nuclear corporation. In 2014 Russia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Thailand on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and in the following year agreed to help Indonesia in the research and design of nuclear reactors.
Arms sales is the area of commerce where Russia has excelled the most in terms of goods transfers to Southeast Asia. Historically, Vietnam has been a major buyer of Russian military equipment. It remains in this position, accounting for about 6 per cent of total Russian arms exports in 2013. Vietnamese acquisitions include Su-27 and Su-30MKK fighter aircraft, frigates, anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and most notably six diesel-electric Varshavyanka(Kilo)-class submarines. Russian-designed Tarantul-class corvettes are also being assembled in Vietnam under licensed production.
Indonesia has also bought Russian arms in the past, including infantry vehicles, helicopter gunships, missiles and Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets. Jakarta has expressed an interest in purchasing more fighter jets from Russia. There are also pending orders for Russian Su-30MKM fighters for the Malaysian air force, and Russian arms production consortium Rostec has reportedly offered to sell multi-role helicopters and fighter jets to Thailand. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, Myanmar bought a number of Russian MiG fighter jets, and Russia hopes to make further military sales in the future.
This overview of political and economic engagement between Russia and Southeast Asia demonstrates that Moscow’s cooperation with the ASEAN countries occurs in only a limited number of areas. Moreover, this cooperation accounts for only a minor percentage of external bilateral trade and investments. However, further analysis will demonstrate that while ASEAN countries are not central to Russia’s global strategy, they serve a purpose within the rubric of Russian foreign policy, and it can be expected that cooperation is likely to expand.
ASEAN in Russian Foreign Policy: Beyond Public Relations?
Having established the drivers of Russian foreign policy and outlined the key elements of Russia’s engagement with Southeast Asian states, we can now assess how it contributes to the overall functionality of Russia’s external actions, as well as its international image.
Burnishing the Pivot’s Exterior
The “pivot to the East” has become an element of Russian policy despite the debate over how real, how permanent and how situational it is. One of the most significant concerns expressed both by local and international observers over this strategy has to do with the predominant role China plays in Russia’s Asian rebalance.
China seems to be the obvious choice as Russia’s key partner in the Asia Pacific, as it helps satisfy all of the needs [drivers) of Russian foreign policy outlined earlier in this article. But Russian policymakers seemingly share concerns about possible overdependence on China. That helps explain why Russia is interested in increasing economic cooperation with Southeast Asian states, particularly in areas where Russian businesses have a comparative advantage. Growing energy consumption and military spending in ASEAN opens up new opportunities for Russia beyond China, especially given the latter’s growing capabilities in domestic military production.
It appears that the propaganda value of Southeast Asia within the pivot is as important as economic considerations. Opinion leaders and mainstream Western media tend to portray Russia’s pivot as poorly planned, imbalanced, sluggish and skewed towards China. Thus, increasing cooperation with ASEAN states is meant to refute those allegations, and present the geographic rebalance as a well-structured and thought-out process. In Russian public opinion, Southeast Asia does not pose any threats to the country, while strong fears of Chinese expansion into Russia’s Far Eastern territories still linger.
Another important purpose that Southeast Asia serves is helping to holster Russia’s image as a Great Power. In the mindset of Russia’s ruling elite, political greatness is closely connected to global presence and the ability to influence outcomes in every part of the world. Russia’s participation in the fight against IS, and support for the Assad regime in Syria, is presented as one of the manifestations of Russia’s restored greatness, previously lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russia’s ties with ASEAN are thus meant to show that as a global power, Russia cannot withdraw from (or avoid getting involved in) Southeast Asia. According to Russian political thinking, the country’s membership in regional forums is a natural manifestation of its Asian and global status. Perhaps even more important in this context is Russia’s relationship with Vietnam. Russia’s withdrawal of military personnel and assets from Cam Ranh Bay in 2002 was widely interpreted as a symbol of Russia’s waning global influence in the 1990s. Consequently, any arrangements concerning the use of Cam Ranh today by the Russian military is framed as a restoration of the country’s presence in Southeast Asia. The overall strategic status of Russia-Vietnam relations gives the Russian leadership reason to believe that Russia is still an important player in the region, with Vietnam often being characterized as the country’s “bridge” to ASEAN. Associations with Cold War times are invoked, when the USSR supported North Vietnam against the United States, thus supporting the narrative that Russia has unconditional allies in all corners of the world.
One other important contribution that Southeast Asia makes to the Russian foreign policy narrative is that the subregion is a substantial part of the non-Western world, the one that contemporary Russia belongs to (at least in the view of Russian policymakers). What is perhaps more important is that many Southeast Asian states have demonstrated economic dynamism while not implementing the full slate of democratic reforms advocated by Washington. This is very important for Russia’s global ideology, as the country promotes national — as an alternative to liberal democratic — state-building strategies. Singapore — and to a lesser extent Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand — is often cited in Russian scholarly and political discourse as a state that has demonstrated miraculous economic growth despite its political rigidity.
As noted in the previous section, Russia’s economic presence in Southeast Asia is most visible in traditional areas such as energy and the arms trade. But there are also prospects for joint projects in infrastructure58 and space technology. All of these Russian industries are monopolized by large state-owned corporations, with exports often financed by banks which are also owned by the government. This means that they bring substantial revenue in taxes and foreign currency, the latter being particularly important given the rouble’s recent depreciation. Moreover, as Richard Bitzinger notes, Russia’s arms industry employs about 2.5 million workers, while the oil and gas industry generates the bulk of Russia’s GDP and budget revenue. Maintaining and deepening ties within such domestically important sectors is crucial for the leadership to preserve the support of voters and interest groups within the country.
Obstacles for Practical Cooperation
Despite Southeast Asia’s value as an element of Russia’s global image, there are significant obstacles for achieving qualitatively new levels of cooperation. The resource strain affecting Russia’s pivot to the East, as mentioned earlier, is even more severe for Southeast Asia, as current policies mainly focus on China. There seems to be an intention to allocate more of those resources towards ASEAN states, but it is highly unlikely that this will be done at the expense of Russia’s cooperation with China, since the reputational costs of scaling down engagement with China are higher than the risks of underperforming initiatives with the ASEAN states.
Another barrier for increasing Russian involvement in regional affairs stems from the country’s current lack of influence. While Russia was largely absent from Southeast Asia following the end of the Cold War, the United States has maintained, and China has greatly strengthened, their military, economic and soft power footholds. Both enjoy large trade surpluses, institutionalized integration mechanisms and vast commercial presence. Russia thus finds itself in catch-up mode with the world’s two strongest powers. At the same time, regional states are navigating their policies between Washington and Beijing, and it is unclear whether they view Russia’s presence as desirable or a complicating factor.
Moreover, Russia seems reluctant to get deeply involved in the South China Sea dispute, which is the defining security issue for Southeast Asia. It seems that if other major powers are willing to demonstrate their interest in stability and peace in Southeast Asia, they might be able to contribute to resolving the South China Sea dispute. This explains the concerns over the conflict expressed by India, Japan and the EU. Against this background, Russia has not been vocal about its position on the issue. Russian officials have limited themselves to baseline statements, urging peaceful and diplomatic resolutions, adherence to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), observance of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and an early conclusion to the proposed Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. One element of these statements suggests that Russia primarily seeks to maintain good relations with China over this sensitive matter more than anything else: on several occasions Russian foreign ministry officials have emphasized that they do not see the internationalization of the South China Sea issue as constructive or helpful.62 However, offending Vietnam would also be highly undesirable, as it would damage the whole influence base of Russia in Southeast Asia and significantly hurt Moscow’s image. So it is precisely because of this reluctance to affect relations with both China and Vietnam that Russia abstains from taking a firm position over the disputes in the South China Sea.
Implications for Short- and Medium-term Policy
As we have demonstrated previously, Russia’s relations with Southeast Asia are insufficient in substance and effort, and the current trends in Russia’s external environment suggest that there will be no significant changes in the near term. Nevertheless, engagement with ASEAN holds important public relations value and, if Southeast Asian growth is only slightly affected by the economic slowdown in China, may also produce some practical results.
We can thus draw several features of Russia’s cooperation with Southeast Asia in the near future. First, Russia-Southeast Asia cooperation is likely to be focused and piecemeal. Joint projects will involve specific areas in traditional sectors such as energy and the arms trade. Second, Russia will be mostly interested in projects that generate significant propaganda value, i.e. supporting the narrative of Russia as a global, economically successful power that is conducting a comprehensive rebalance towards Asia. Third, given the lack of attention and resources in Russia, the country is more likely to become an object of Southeast Asian policy, rather than a subject thereof. Though it is doubtful that Russia will produce regular initiatives for cooperation with ASEAN states, it may become more receptive to future cooperation proposals. Fourth, Russia’s Southeast Asian partners may see the greatest value in cooperative initiatives that deal with immediate issues in the Russian economy, such as compensating for shrinking import markets in the EU and, more recently, Turkey. Additionally, the strategic goal of attracting investment to the Russian Far East and Siberia will also remain high on the agenda.
One of the first examples of such cooperation is a planned US$2.5 billion investment project by a Vietnamese dairy company, TH True Milk, near Moscow. This project carries many of the features described above. Firstly, the produce is meant to fill in the gaps created in Russia’s dairy market after Moscow banned agricultural imports from the EU due to the Ukraine crisis. Secondly, it shows that Russia is an attractive destination for foreign investors. More importantly, it demonstrates interest in Russia from Southeast Asian investors, i.e. non-Chinese investors. Thirdly, the project comes from a country that is a “traditional ally” of Russia, and this demonstrates its wide network of partners around the world as well as its independence from Western countries.
Conclusion
Russia’s worsened relations with the West currently define its policies in the Asia Pacific. While the “turn to the East” is not substantive, its public relations value is something quite real and important to the Russian leadership. Southeast Asia plays a vital role in this narrative: it is there to demonstrate the comprehensive and strategic quality of Russia’s renewed interest in the Asia Pacific. Relations with ASEAN countries are supposed to show that Russia has options beyond the United States and Europe, and that within the Asia Pacific it has options beyond China.
At the same time, strategic and material constraints impede Russia’s ability to engage with Southeast Asia in a comprehensive manner. As such, the practical side of cooperation will lag behind its advertised value for the foreseeable future. This gap will draw the attention of Russian policymakers. And while we are unlikely to see substantial dynamism from the Russian side, we can expect increased openness and attention towards future cooperation in the form of focused initiatives. Future research has to address the reasons behind Russia’s inability or lack of interest in Southeast Asia, as well as answer the question of how deep (if any) is the interest of the ASEAN members in Russia’s increased presence in the region and to what extent this interest is real and not merely friendly rhetoric.